

PRAXIS

A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL

πραξις

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**LIBERALISM
AND SOCIALISM**

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PRAXIS

A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL EDITION

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I. OPENING OF THE MEETING

Mihailo Marković

In the name of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade, Philosophical Society of Serbia and the journal »Filosofija«, I have pleasure in opening our meeting on LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM and in welcoming all the participants, especially our colleagues from Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje and Titograd, and also our colleagues from the allied disciplines: sociologists, economists, jurists, psychologists and writers. It is our wish that this should become a traditional gathering held every year in February, and devoted to some of the vital theoretical and practical questions of the modern world, a gathering which would offer philosophers the opportunity to debate with sociologists, economists, jurists, psychologist and others interested in discussing the key problems of modern life and modern thought. We chose LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM as the problem for this, our first, meeting for the following reasons: liberalism was the revolutionary ideology of the bourgeoisie during its ascendancy an ideology which served the bourgeois in the fight against feudalism. Like all revolutionary ideologies, liberalism contained certain elements of lasting importance to all mankind such as, for example, the ideas of political freedom, of freedom of thought, of equality, of the sovereignty of the people, and of the people's right to resist tyrannical government, by force if necessary. It was, however, evident that such freedoms and human rights could be completely realised only under certain social and economic conditions which are absent in capitalism. These are conditions of far greater economic equality

* This discussion on »Liberalism and Socialism« was held at the »Philosophical Winter Meeting« in Tara (Serbia), from February 8 to February 10, 1971, and it has been published in Serbo-Croatian in the journal »Filosofija«, No. 1/1971. The decision to publish it in the international edition of »Praxis« was taken at the meeting of the editorial board of »Praxis« in Korčula, August 1971. Thus neither the discussion itself, nor the decision to publish it in the international edition of »Praxis« was influenced in any way by the political discussion on liberalism which started in Yugoslavia later on, in autumn 1972. (Editorial note)

and democracy than capitalism has ever been able to secure. This is why in the Nineteenth century liberalism was already beginning to split, thus giving rise to several possible variants, some of which were distinctly reactionary while others tended towards socialism by continuing to develop their humanist side.

However, socialism as a system was in practise brought to life in relatively backward societies which have not yet solved certain basic problems of industrialization and urbanization, and which were at a lower social, economic, political and cultural level than bourgeois society was at the time when liberalism had already reached its limits. So, the problem posed here is: has socialism thus far, in theory and in practise, succeeded in surmounting and dialectically outstripping liberalism such as it is known to us through history, or has liberalism simply been rejected while many of the problems and many of the features of lasting importance which it introduced (such as the human rights and freedoms I have already mentioned) have still not been implemented by socialism?

The task which has not yet been properly tackled by Marxists, both in Yugoslavia and in the rest of the world, is that of opening up the way towards a true criticism of liberalism, free of any ideological exclusiveness and fully imbued with the sense of history, a criticism which would take into account all the variety of the forms of liberalism, the progressive as well as the reformist and reactionary types. The aim of such an inquiry would be: to discover what is negative in this doctrine, in the practice of political and social organization, inspired by it, and on the other hand to find out what are the achievements of liberalism that have not yet been accomplished by socialism. This relates, above all, to certain basic human rights, the rights of man as a person, as an individual, and also to the problem of certain basic human freedoms.

This is our problem, and we can only hope that during the next three days we will tackle it seriously and constructively. The discussion will, on the whole, be spontaneous since we preferred to have as much free exchange of thought as possible. We tried to avoid spending too much time on reading previously prepared papers.

There will be only introductory paper and it will be presented by professor Tadić.

II INTRODUCTION

THE LIMITS SET TO HUMAN FREEDOM BY PRIVATE PROPERTY

Ljubomir Tadić

I ought to feel bound by certain of the ideas about liberalism expressed by prof. Marković in his opening speech. Unfortunately, I shall most likely disappoint you as I do not have a very high opinion of liberalism as a form of freedom-orientation. In fact, in this speech I should like to show that the liberal concept of freedom, although the name »liberalism« might itself suggest otherwise, is fairly problematic. Moreover, an acquaintance with liberalism as a way of thinking, an ideology and an attitude to life, leads one inevitably to reflection and hence to the conclusion: is not liberalism characteristically more conservative than freedom-oriented? A certain writer, discussing liberalism as an ideology, placed it between revolution and reaction. I think this ideological location is quite accurate for liberalism indeed vacillates between two poles. What is more, when liberalism was forced to come to a definite decision it more willingly opted for the reactionary than the freedom-oriented standpoint, but most willingly stuck to a conservative position. It is certain that the POLITICAL liberalism of a John Stewart Mill or even a Benjamin Constant, who wrote and worked during the first years of the Restoration, stand for something different than liberalism in its ECONOMIC preception. However, in the cases just mentioned, one may with good reason ask whether what is called political liberalism is really a consistent form of liberalism.

THE CONCEPTS: »LIBERALISM« AND »SOCIALISM«

However, before moving on to the matter in hand we should, I think, consider a preliminary question. If we have chosen this theme for discussion, how can our choice be justified? On the face of it, this debate on the subject of liberalism and socialism smacks more of mere idle, one might say academic, curiosity than serious

interest. And to this some might add that the title itself is stick-in-the-muddish and arouses no more interest than an archaeological urge to burrow into the archives of the irrevocable past.

I do not deny the importance of the search for the original meanings of these ideas and of the need to clarify them. As you will see, a considerable part of this introduction will be devoted to just such an attempt to clarify meaning. However, if our theme was not of crucial importance today it would not be worth this kind of attention and discussion. Its immediacy overleaps the boundaries of traditional professional discussion or, to be more precise: this discussion is justifiable only in a practical and historical frame. Hence, my task — at least as I understand it — is far from easy: it requires that all theoretically relevant questions be recorded and that their CONTEMPORARY importance be pointed out.

Before passing on to the main topic I would like to take the liberty of offering you two simplified definitions of liberalism and socialism so that later, perhaps, I may attempt to pass on to a consideration of their more complex significance and their mutual relations.

First, liberalism may be defined as the IDEOLOGY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP. Private property is here not only the corner-stone of liberal society and politics, it is also the key category and still more the supreme principle behind all other relations and concepts, above all the principles of freedom, equality and security in society. Hence, it is NOT THE FREEDOM OF MAN as a being, or of the individual as an individual — as the word liberalism might at first appearance suggest — that is the quintessence of liberal ideology, but primarily, in my opinion THE FREEDOM OF ENTERPRISE, the freedom of acquisition and ownership, that is, of the possession of things.

Liberalism is known in the history of modern thinking as the »Rule of Law« (or »Rechtsstaat«), and indeed this is just what it is. But liberalism is the Rule of Law insofar as THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS THE PRINCIPLE DETERMINING ALL OTHER RIGHTS AND ALL OTHER OBLIGATIONS WHICH IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AS THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE, ARE MERE EPIPHENOMENA OR DERIVATIVES.

Sesond, socialism, as the counterpart to liberalism, IS SOMETIMES AN IDEOLOGY AND SOMETIMES A MOVEMENT based on SOCIALLY-OWNED PROPERTY. This is already a banal truth. All other social relations and concepts on which socialism rests, or to which it has recourse, derive from the character or nature of social ownership. To be precise: socialism may be the antithesis of liberalism as long as it pursues the idea of the need for uprooting the social system and ideology of private property, in the form of socialization or even nationalization, and as long as it relies on ASSOCIATIONS and not on INSTITUTIONS. In other words, socialism can be dually determined: 1) as AUTHORITARIAN (or

despotic) socialism and 2) as LIBERTARIAN socialism, to use another name for the thought or idea of ANARCHY. This difference means that in the first instance the removal of private property is based on state intervention (the statist method), while in the second instance property is abolished by setting up free communities (the anti-statist method). It should be understood that all the social consequences arising from this are determined by the way in which private property is removed or surmounted.

As you can see, here we have a direct conflict between liberalism and socialism. They are ideologies competing against each other, rival ways of thinking or of organizing life in modern society.

NATURAL RIGHT AND LIBERALISM

Now I should like to pass on to a review of the more complex meanings of liberalism and socialism and to a determination of the relations existing between them. Liberalism as an ideology is established according to the assumptions of NATURAL RIGHT and I feel sure that it is only by making ourselves familiar with these assumptions that we will be able to understand the economic, political and other consequences of liberalism. No matter how different the solutions may be, it is well-known that all the theories of natural right ask which form of social life is best suited to human nature.

These theories question the so-called NATURAL ORDER of Society (I am deliberately using the expression often used by the physiocrats since it is most appropriate to our problem). The very concept of Nature, as interpreted by natural right, is »metaphysically burdened«, as the German sociologist Hans Freyer would say. It designates the essence of things, their SEIN UND SOLLEN. Nature is the primal essence of man as man, that which makes him equal to other men. Once all individual traits and differences have been eliminated, man as man is left with reason, RATIO, as the universal sign of human understanding. Despite all differences, this is the basic idea of natural right at its most developed, an idea which is rooted in the basic tenets of enlightenment. The idea of PEACE is immanent in this ideal of natural right, peace which may be created either through man's inborn sociability (»appetitus socialis« as Hugo Grotius understood it) or with the aid of another inborn urge, that of self-preservation. Two great English thinkers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, trained their full attention on this urge towards self-preservation. In close conjunction with this we have the efforts of the school of Natural Right to point to the historical line of progress leading from barbarism to civilization. This progress from barbarism to civilization is basic preoccupation of natural right. To a certain extent the thinking of liberalism also moves along this line.

I must, unfortunately, limit this exposition of the natural right nucleus of typically liberal ideology to just two striking examples, which seem to me most appropriate in attempting to understand this nucleus — these are: the teaching of Locke and the teaching of the physiocrats in France. Here I would add an important reminder that Calvinist teaching about »libertas«, freedom, was a powerful Protestant fulcrum for liberal ideology as a whole because, as is well known, the Calvinist concept of freedom held that the acquisition of property was not only the right but also the greatest duty of every individual and the highest form of praise that could be given to God. So, the worldly basis of natural right in liberal ideology is supported firmly by the Calvinist ideas concerning the acquisition of property.

Locke's liberal theory — and to a great extent this also goes for the physiocrats — is distinguished by a particular form of super-liberalism which was, and remained, the metaphysical fibre of political economy and civil law. According to Locke, the concern for self-preservation (here he continues Hobbes' theory, which I do not have time now to examine) leaves no room for concern for one's neighbours. So liberalism must dismiss the Christian idea of solidarity or the Christian form of love. Self-preservation becomes the trip-switch both for the defence mechanism and also for the working potential of each man. Life is born out of the fear of death, and above all the fear of death by starvation. The economic and legal condition for self-preservation lies in private property while the political condition lies in limited state power. (Here we meet the problem of political liberalism mentioned earlier, but for the moment we shall leave it aside.)

Property, according to Locke, is an institution of Natural Law and a condition for man's personal happiness. Since the individual, and not society, is the maker of property (later we shall see how), the state and society exist in order to protect property. This is also what the physiocrats think. The right to property is given unconditional priority owing to the essential desire of happiness which regulates all human systems. So the famous Mercier de la Rivière, the first writer to use the phrase »public opinion« (and the problem of public opinion is closely linked to the liberal doctrine) points out in his book »Ordre Naturel« that the right to property is a natural and essential right. It is the prime principle of all rights and all duties pertaining to these rights. These rights and duties are simply the necessary outcome of property. Property goes with right, it is the origin and root of all rights. Like Locke, the physiocrats consider that the state and all other institutions derive from the ownership of property. One must begin, they say, from the right to property in order to discover the real need for these institutions. The need for them is rooted in the right to property itself. And, for the physiocrats, there exists no right whatsoever without property to which freedom, equality and the security of man are subordinated. To put it precisely: a man is free in proportion to the amount he owns. Turgot and Quesney further conclude that right depends

on the amount of power; since powers are unequal in strength, the rights of individuals are naturally unequal in effect. The physiocrats do not hold with the rights of the individual as an individual unless they spring from the proprietorial circumstances surrounding that individual.

OWNERSHIP AND THE STRENGTH OF SOCIETY

Locke, too, considered that our greatest fortune lies in our greatest strength, and our greatest strength comes from ownership. What we CAN DO is determined by what we HAVE. One can already spot the link between hedonism (insofar as one is speaking of the idea of human happiness) and Natural Law with its economic consequences. Just as Locke considers that happiness is achieved by taking from nature, so the physiocrats believe that the road to happiness entails using, or rather, making use of the world for one's private ends. The individual is motivated by a powerful acquisitive urge («amor habendi» or «amor sceleratus habendi») which is the source of the wicked love or longing for possession, for ownership. Locke admits that bourgeois society is founded on selfishness which, though it may be a mean motive is still a solid basis for that society. The road to civilization (the liberal concept of progress) is routed through covetousness. In order to progress one must elevate one's condition from a state of want and misery to a state of richness. The natural state is the barbarian state of want. On the other hand, the bourgeois state creates plenty and leads us to civilization. Locke favours the stimulus towards acquisition in which he sees the pledge for the general good, no matter if this good is reserved only for the minority, for those whom Locke calls industrious, by way of contrast with the stupid and troublesome. One must protect the industrious by preventing the stupid and «quarrelsome» from making their presence felt. From the very outset liberalism took the «quarrelsome» as a target for criticism.

THE IDEOLOGY OF WORK

In Locke's natural law we strike the roots of the IDEOLOGY OF WORK. I deliberately stress the ideology of work because it was later to become extremely characteristic of the modern world. Personal happiness is only to be achieved through the possession of property and one may come by property only through hard work. Work is a pain which drives away another pain: we must work to free ourselves from pain, and above all from the pain of penury. However, in a bourgeois society, according to Locke, it is not simply a question of self-preservation but also of a comfortable life. Hence, it is not sufficient to stimulate the ordinary acquisition of property, this acquisition must be enduring and ever increasing.

One must, therefore, accumulate! This is the common postulate of all liberal ideologies. Locke even goes so far as to advise us not to lay up stores of things which easily perish but to collect only those things which do not wear away with use — gold and silver. Here the idea of money, for political economy, has been directly prepared through the idea of natural right. Thrift, or the accumulation of treasure, becomes the principle of liberal economy and accumulation is the dynamic form of pure private property. So we may advance one step further by saying that liberalism is the ideology of PURE, MOVABLE, PRIVATE PROPERTY. The basic aim of liberalism is the striving towards gain or profit. It is only work, which drives us towards gain, towards increasing gain, with the possibility of reproduction or investment, that counts as an activity which liberalism most highly esteems and justifies.

And what about Reason in liberal ideology? It too places itself at the service of private interests. Mercier de la Rivière, whom I mentioned earlier, claimed that reason serves as the eyes of the soul (*»les yeus de l'âme«*), as a light by which we may distinguish and recognise objects (*»de distinguer et de connaître les objets«*). Here the evidence is determined by the individual sensitivity which is ruled by private interests. RATIO has the same relation to nature as form has to material, i. e. it is an active form related to the purely phenomenal given. It is through work that the object is removed from its natural condition, in which it was a common thing, and becomes my private thing. Work is the intermediary in the creation of private property with the aid of nature. This is what led Locke to say that the natural limit of property is clearly determined by the human capacity for work. This is, in fact, the Protestant glorification of work as a way of saving the soul. The idolatry of work, so peculiar to liberal ideology and, as we know, not only to liberal ideology, served as the justification for private acquisition.

In the beginning, says Locke at one point, the whole world was one America. This means that the whole world was right here at hand. There were as many things in nature as could be made, and the making of things is a condition for the appearance of private property, or a true occupation in the Civil-law sense. It is only later that poverty emerges in the wealth of the natural world which is right at hand and which is based on the poverty and restrictions imposed by private property. In relation to property, as we have said, freedom, equality and security are accessories. What is more, property refashions not only the political but also the rational, moral life of the individual. The individual's value as a man is reduced to his economic value or economic dimension. In all liberal constitutions freedom is defined as the right to do what is permitted by law (all that is not forbidden by law is permitted by law). This is the maxim of liberal law. But, as we have seen, the laws are determined by private property, again in a decisive way. Our freedom comes to a halt on the borders of private property. It is only the owners who are true members of society and admini-

strators of the state. Non-owners in a working society are simply the majority of the people who are incapable of rational action and later we shall see how in the apogee of liberal states restrictions are imposed on the right to vote (election census).

THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION

The strength of liberalism, as I understand it, rests on the instrumental release of the force of labour and on its expansion subject to the aims of private acquisition. Liberal ideology established the principle of competition as its life CREED. From Locke to J. S. Mill and hence to Hegel there runs a straight line guided by the belief that evil motives may still be a condition for the achievement of positive results. Thus, evil must be mobilised to produce positive, productive results. The harmony of what the physiocrats called the »ordre naturel et politique« lies in the system of competition. The liberals believed that competition, as a battle between private interests, created of its own accord the conditions for general harmony i. e. the liberal concept of peace through conflict. The market is the model of liberal competitiveness. The fight for the market — and, according to Adam Smith, in bourgeois society as well — sets the basic tone for competition. According to Smith every man in bourgeois society (»societas civilis«) exists on exchange and becomes a kind of tradesman, indeed, society itself is, in fact, a TRADING SOCIETY. In this society, then, a man cannot exist if he is not a trader. If the basic aim is acquisition and the increase of possessions, i. e. gain or profit, then competition is a relentless battle gravitating towards power, and the means by which this basic aim is achieved is destruction, above all the destruction of one's economic rival. Competition inevitably gives rise to the idea of monopoly. The competitors are alike in the strength of their desires, but only one may reach the goal. The rest must be excluded. Since »the furies of private interests« clash, the field becomes too cramped for two contestants.

Liberalism resorted to the ideas of so-called peaceful and loyal competition, fair play within the framework of the law. But — if I may remind you again — this is the law of the stronger. The satisfaction of one competitor will automatically exclude the other. The liberal »market republic« — I am here using the metaphor of Pashukanis, which seems to me most apt — inevitably rests on the »despotism of the factory«. Competition and the accumulation of capital can survive only on social inequality and ownership rights. The workers' wages should be only sufficient to satisfy the elementary needs of day to day life; there is no need whatsoever to be concerned about his spiritual improvement. This, then, is life on the breadline. Adam Smith considered inequality useful to all classes of society. He was opposed to »levelling« since private property performs an integrational role in society. If there is no property,

said the honest Smitsch, there can be no government either, and the real aim of the government is to protect wealts and defend the rich from the poor.

I think it should be stressed that the problem of competition is an exceptionally important and vital element of liberal ideology and also of that phenomenon which Max Weber, himself a liberal, called the »spirit of capitalism«. Competition has an elemental, wild and ungovernable effect on relations between men; it necessarily stirs painful conflicts because it encourages disputes over the same objects and goals. It rarely happens that this conflict between the convoluted and antagonistic interests of the competing parties is resolved through an agreement of any permanence. Agreement can only be of a temporary nature because a more permanent solution would harm these interests and cause damage to one of the competing parties. One must, in fact, expect the opposite: the natural outcome of this battle will be the elimination or even destruction of the rival. (Here I should like to mention the well-known witticism about the kind of competition we have in a Serbian village: »I hope my neighbour's cows will die!«. In the same way a young sociologist not long ago in his final essay most effectively described the vicious outbursts of hatred and squabbling between village neighbours near Smederevska Palanka. Spitefulness was taken to such lengths that one man even cast a hook to catch his neighbour's chicken. The case was taken to court, and when the judge asked the accused why he had done this, he replied: »Oh, I just wanted to do him harm«. But these are just innocent examples of competition.). Real competition is, in fact, the urge for power and the desire for monopoly.

THE NARCISSISM OF PETTY DIFFERENCES

It is not, however, only possessions, or economy in the narrower sense, that mark out the battleground for the fight of all against all; culture is also a field for fierce and bitter conflict. We today are witnesses of the tooth-and-nail struggle both for the distribution of goods and the attainment of so-called cultural prestige. I place particular stress on this cultural prestige. Savage hatred is stirred up at every stage in such conflicts. The so-called field of culture is the place where human aggressiveness and the darkest urges are most easily aroused, and so we may with good reason ask whether competition — as the liberals believed — promotes the advancement of culture and civilization, or whether perhaps it corrodes, destroys and endangers them. I should like to diverge for a moment to mention a psycho-analytical point brought up by Freud concerning so-called neighbouring communities and the conflicts between them. He points to the Spanish and the Portuguese, the English and the Scots, who, although belonging to neighbouring communities, clash furiously. In his work »Civilization and its Discontents«, Freud described these clashes as »The

Narcissism of Petty Differences«. Freud was our Viennese »neighbour«, yet strangely enough he did not seem to think of the closest, finest and possibly most interesting example for his theory. Like Freud, I am convinced that one person may be another's rival without necessarily having to be his enemy as well. The criticism of competition as the motive force behind liberal ideology, that is, the mechanism for determining relations in a society founded on liberalism, is not in any way a plea for the exclusion of social conflict altogether or for introduction of some quietist ideology. On the contrary, it is my belief that progress can result from social conflict because OPPOSITION by itself need not necessarily stir up destructive enmity. Far from it: a certain rivalry often has fruitful results. Here we must ask only whether in competition, as the battle for power and ownership, it is not possible that opposition — as Freud also realised — may be misused by being turned into an occasion for »enmity which annihilates«. And this indeed often happens. This is something which, is, in fact, most fervently undertaken by cultures tainted with nationalism or chauvinism, i. e. that form of refined human aggression which aims, as Freud says, to cause suffering and endanger human life in the battle for power and control.

THE RANGE OF CHANGES IN THE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP

We must go on to ask the question, and this may be the cardinal question concerning the relation between liberalism and socialism: is a change in the form of ownership, since socially-owned property is the antithesis of private property, a sufficient and essential condition for fundamentally changing the form of our lives, fundamentally insofar as this would ensure that our civilization made a true advance towards humane peace and understanding between men? In answering this question Freud, as you know, was a great pessimist. For those who may not have got round to reading »Civilization and its Discontents« should now like to quote a longish passage. »The Communists,« he says, »consider that they have discovered the way to remove evil. Man is indubitably good and kindly-disposed towards others. The institution of private property has spoilt his nature. The possession of private property gives power to some and thereby leads them into the temptation of misusing others. Those who have been deprived of possession must rise up as the enemy of the subjugators. With the abolition of private property, with the proclamation of the common ownership of all goods to be enjoyed by all men, malice and enmity will disappear. Nobody will have any reason for looking on another as his enemy because all needs will be satisfied and all people will willingly undertake the work that needs to be done.«

»I am not connected«, Freud continues, »with the economic criticism of the communist system and I cannot test whether the abolition of private property is useful or advantageous. I realise,

however, that the psychological tenets of this system are an inadmissible illusion. By taking away private property one takes away from the human desire for aggression a weapon which is undoubtedly important, though it is not the most important. This in no way alters the difference in the power and influence which aggression wrongly uses for its own ends, nor does it change the essence of aggression. Private property did not give rise to aggression, for this impulse governed even in those far-distant times when there were still very few possessions; aggression can also be seen in the child's room just as soon as ownership relinquishes its ancient anal form, it forms the dregs of all tender relations in love and all contacts between people with perhaps one exception — the relation between a mother and her male child. If we take away the individual right to material goods we are still left with a privilege which derives from sexual relations and which must become the source of the strongest hate and fiercest enmity between people who are otherwise equal in most respects. If we were to remove this privilege as well by making sexual life completely free, if we were, then, to reject the family, the germ of culture, it certainly would not be possible to foresee what new paths culture would take in its development but, wherever it led, we could certainly expect this indestructible quality of human nature to follow.« Somewhat later Freud added the following: »It is with great concern that we ask ourselves: what will the Soviets do after they have driven out the bourgeois?«

We do not have enough time to dwell on a closer, more critical analysis of Freud's statements. What is immediately clear is his objection that the psychological basis of the communist criticism of private property is an inadmissible illusion. Human aggressiveness, as a threatening and destructive danger, was not — says Freud — created by private property. It is, so to speak, an ineradicable part of our human nature. This is a pessimistic idea according to which human nature unceasingly and unchangingly radiates aggressiveness, which is a permanent feature of our existence. From the psychological point of view, considering the results of the socio-political practice of socialist states during the past fifty years, it is difficult to counter Freud's objections. Liberalism, as he correctly observed, has made good use of the aggressive potential of human nature, turning it to productive ends. Certain modern liberal theoreticians, for example Einaudi the former president of the Italian Republic, have seen in the permanence and endurance of liberalism, both as an ideology and as a system, the natural strength and resistance it has to every form of theoretical and practical revolutionary criticism. This, then, is the problem: does the endurance and permanence of liberalism stem from the fact that through competition and private ownership it has succeeded in recognizing and organizing in the form of social relations those features which are latent in the psycho-physical make-up of human nature? But the matter is by no means simple and one should not, in my opinion, hasten to accept a realistic answer which may at

first sight seem acceptable. Where is the strength of this realism? I should here like to quote Adam Smith, the founder of classical political economy, who dismisses the Christian concept of solidarity. In opposition to the idea of competition we might set aside Christian solidarity on the one hand and Socialist solidarity on the other as both being opposed to liberal ideology and practise. In opposition to the Christian concept of solidarity, which — even though in an idealistic way — requires us to love our neighbour as ourself, Smith states that man has an almost incessant need for the help of his neighbours. But it would be futile to expect this help to come from their good disposition towards him. The underlying meaning of his proposal is: give me what I need and you will get from me what you need. The dinner we are looking forward to does not depend on the friendly disposition of the butcher, the fishmonger or the baker but far more on their concern for their interests. We do not appeal to their humanity but to their egoism. We never speak to them of our needs but always of their advantage. This is Smith's attitude. Thus economy as understood by the liberals rejects the idea of solidarity and concentrates on the idea of cold calculation and private interest and advantage. Here **RATIO** appears as an interest in the literal sense of the world: rationality as wisdom is opposed to what is described as the problem of soul and heart in the Christian idea of brotherly love. There is no place for soul and heart in the world of economy. »Societas civilis«, bourgeois society, whose spiritual guise is liberal economy, rests on the assumption of **LOVING ONE'S OWN ADVANTAGE AND NOT ONE'S NEIGHBOUR**. In this society people are permanently dissevered, despite all bonds, as Ferdinand Tönnies says in his analysis. This separation among men is aptly shown by their competitiveness. Indeed, competitiveness may even bind them, but these are bonds of mutual need and are not permanent: they may be linked in a calculating way in the community, through trade, or business, but only as a mechanical aggregate and in no other way.

NATIONALISM AND THE EXPANSIVENESS OF CAPITAL

The competitive struggle as a universal principle for the movement of isolated individuals within state and national borders has expanded together with the expansion of the world market until it reached international proportions. The expansion of trade leads to national expansion, or, to put it differently, to the imperialist policy of capital wherever it can and as much as it can. The result of the competitive struggle in world dimensions is, as we know, **WORLD WAR**. It is no mere chance that in his time Gladstone, the great leader of the English liberals gave prime importance to the policy of the **POWER OF THE NATION** as the basic factor in the battle for world power. Gladstone was the political model for the heroic liberalism of Max Weber, who also stressed

that it was the duty of the Germans to become a great power and counter the English and Russians in Europe in order to maintain the balance of the world. But Weber justified the German battle for power more on altruistic and cultural grounds than through changes on the map and economic profit as might, at first sight, have been expected.

»The small nations around us«, he said, »live in the shadow of our might. The balance of the great powers is a condition for the independence of the smaller powers. The battle for one's own power, and the responsibility for one's own affairs that emerges from this power, is a vital element for both politicians and entrepreneurs.« One should not, of course, directly link Weber's idea with the later political attitude of the Nazis. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that liberalism and Nazism, despite all their rooted antipathies and mutually exclusive features, have grown up, as Marcuse once pointed out, on the SAME SOCIAL SOIL. Both are ideologies of might, and all that remains is to determine the intensity and strength of this might. It is none other than national, Nazi aggressiveness which emerges as the end result of the liberal principle of competition released on national soil. In 1933 Herbert Marcuse pointed out quite rightly that the charismatic and authoritarian idea of the leader is already prepared by the liberal glorification of the natural leader and the born head. And it is just here that one should discover the meaning of the vital elements of Weber's politicians and also his entrepreneurs. If human RATIO and freedom are placed in the service of power i. e. of property or power through property, then the authoritarian charisma of the Nazi or national-socialist type is inevitable and guaranteed. Rationalism, in this case, must be turned into irrationalism and liberal parliamentarianism very easily grows into a totalitarian state, no matter how paradoxical this may seem.

PERSONAL FREEDOM AND PROPERTY

Thus far I have been attempting to prove or show that liberalism subordinates personal freedom to private property. This was stated with remarkable frankness by the nineteenth century German jurist Rudolf Ihering in his book »The Aim in Law« — »My purse is my freedom and support on the road«. We may conclude that political economy and civil law are the scientific nucleus of liberal ideology.

But the dependence of personal freedom on private property appears to contradict the firmly established image of liberalism as a freedom-oriented ideology. All efforts to uphold the freedom of the individual, personal dignity and personal integrity, and all attempts to remove the individual from the confines of private property relations are usually denounced as liberalism or anorcho-liberalism in typically authoritarian societies. And in the most recent literature the concept of LIBERAL is generally opposed to

that of AUTHORITARIAN. I should like to remind you that I have tried to show that liberalism, under certain circumstances, can also be turned into an authoritarian ideology. This alone deserves some reflection. However, the confusion usually arises from the ambiguity of the concept of liberalism, or more precisely, from the traditional distrust which liberalism feels towards states, a distrust which arises — as Mihailo Marković pointed out in his opening speech — from the battle between the philosophy of natural right and the arbitrariness of absolutism, and also arises from economic interests and for economic reasons. I shall refer to Tom Paine, who, at one point, best expresses the liberal sense of distrust towards the state with all its still innocent forms of the pathos of natural right. Certain writers, he says, have so confused society and government that little or no difference is left between these two terms although they are not only different but of different origin as well. Society arises from our needs, government from our evil-mindedness. Society positively encourages our good fortune by uniting our inclinations. Government negatively represses all our defects. The one encourages relations, the other creates differences. The former protects, the latter punishes. In all states society is the benefactor, and government, even the best, merely a necessary evil, and still worse, an intolerant evil. The government represents lost innocence. Royal palaces are built on the ruins of heavenly towers.

From our review of Locke's concept, one idea clearly emerges — and this goes for the physiocrats as well — that the state must defend the natural order contained in the economic and legal system of private property. The state has a conservative and static role, it is never an active transformer. The state must renounce all idea of transforming social relations. It must preserve them.

LIBERALISM TENDS TOWARDS OLIGARCHY

Liberalism counts on the corruptibility and on the egoistic nature of man, and particularly on the corruptibility of power and government. But liberalism also accepts such power so as not to be exposed to greater risk and insecurity; in so doing it relies on the possibility of ensuring egoistic freedom through the support of a political order which is against those who are dissatisfied with the wealth of the minority. LIBERALISM WANTS, AND AT THE SAME TIME DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE DEMOCRACY. It is in this vacillation that one should seek for the difference between liberalism and democracy and hence for the criteria in differentiating between socialism and liberalism. Liberalism would like to have limited government but, in the threat of revolution, it would more willingly accept a reactionary form of government than democracy. This attitude is determined by the immanent tendency in liberalism towards government by the rich i. e. OLIGARCHY. This aspect of liberal ideology is well portrayed in the history of French political life by the conflict between the liberals and demo-

crats in 1848. Two typical slogans of the class war of that period — the one a revolutionary-democratic slogan, the other liberal in content — best illustrate the difference between the democrats and the liberals. The slogan of the revolutionary democrats was »LIBERTY, FRATERNITY, EQUALITY«. Fraternity is possible only when equality exists; if there is no equality then fraternity is an illusion. As a counter to this democratic slogan with its socialist implications the French liberals, conscious, of the moral and political prestige of democracy, attempted to turn this democracy to their own ends through the slogan »PROPERTY, FAMILY AND FATHERLAND«, but the streak of conservative ideology is easily recognizable here.

THE ANARCHIST CRITICISM OF LIBERALISM

This inconsistency in liberalism as a bourgeois ideology is sharply underlined by the LIBERTARIAN movement or the idea of anarchy, which concludes that **RATIO** and force cannot co-exist in this world.

The system of force or compulsion is not part of the natural order. Human vices cannot be held in check by oppression, even if we look upon this oppression as a necessary evil. Resorting to the means of oppression is also a serious human vice. Authority and freedom are contradictory concepts. If one is accepted the other must be rejected. In rejecting every authoritarian principle, the consequential anarchists — and among anarchists we have certain inconsistent anarchists such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon — accept the principle of freedom and, most often, the principle of **FREEDOM-ORIENTED SOCIALISM** as their CREED. Thus from the very outset they find themselves inevitably conflicting not only with the liberals but also with Marx and the Marxist concept of socialism. It is not enough, the libertarians feel, to free mankind from the oppressive might of capital itself, one must also swiftly and radically expunge all **HOLY** principles from this world. God and the State are also concepts which complement one another and condition one another. So, one must destroy **THE METAPHYSICAL NUCLEUS OF STATE POWER**, because the state is the symbol of authoritarian government. Freedom-orientation also cannot and should not be equated with privateering; human pride and dignity cannot grow out of private property, or freedom cannot be dependent on private property.

It is well known that Proudhon was the first to embrace the idea of an anti-statist concept of management in economy through the creation of workers' associations which, as he said, are a revolutionary fact. All the same, his relation to property remained ambivalent. He, like Locke, considered property to be a category which supported both injustice and personal freedom at once. He was also ambivalent in his attitude towards competition, for he considered that the principle of competition and the principle of

association were inter-related and that one could not survive without the other. (And this is also how I think we should take the ideas at present appearing in our own economy). »Whoever speaks of competition,« says Proudhon, »already assumes a common goal.« The idea of balancing social relations is Proudhon's characteristic idea. One must build up a society such as will achieve the best balance, allowing oneself to be guided by the »mutualist« idea of justice. For competition left to itself, he says, results in mere aimless oscillation which may lead to the worst extremes and have undesirable consequences that must at all costs be avoided. Proudhon built up the idea of association in contradiction to the organization of companies which Louis Blanc, the French socialist and minister in the post-revolutionary government of 1848, conceived as an organization involving the participation of stockholders and the patronage of the state authorities. From the legal point of view Proudhon, after long hesitation as to whether or not the workers' associations were the proprietors of the companies, took the attitude that a distinction should be made between PRIVATE PROPERTY, which is an absolutist and despotic institution, and POSSESSION, which is a democratic, republican and egalitarian principle.

There entire organization of the economy, according to Proudhon, should be founded on a federation of industrial and agricultural associations. The federation would be »antigovernmental« and anti-statist. However, Proudhon considered that management by the workers' associations could only be unitary. Political anticentralism, he said, does not exclude the need for centralization and unity within the economy i. e. economic centralization. This need follows from the fact that the idea of workers' self-management, as he saw it, could not be implemented without democratic and freedom-oriented planning. In fact, the entire organization of society must be built up in an anarchistic way FROM THE BOTTOM UP and not, as the authoritarian socialists and Marxists consider, FROM THE TOP DOWN. Self-management and the authoritarian-hierarchical organization of society are mutually exclusive on principle.

THE YUGOSLAV SOCIAL SYSTEM: A MIXTURE OF AUTHORITARIAN AND LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLES

Here I should like to conclude. There is more I might have said but I should like to break off here because I feel that already a great deal has been offered for discussion. I just want to add a few remarks necessary for the consideration of our own problems and dilemmas in Yugoslavia. What I feel is that contemporary Yugoslav society is in fact a mixture of two principles which have been opposed from the very beginning of modern socialist thinking; these are the authoritarian and the libertarian principles, with this difference that at the beginning the authoritarian principle was

dominant. The libertarian principle was later introduced as a correction to the authoritarian principle, but never in my opinion consistently enforced. The authoritarian principle is still retained as a kind of control of the libertarian principle, but the libertarian principle itself, in its ESSENTIAL implications, has never been seriously and thoroughly brought to bear on the criticism of authoritarian power. The question now arises to what extent — and this might be a topic for further discussion — these two principles can co-exist in a socialist society. Personally, I feel that this co-existence is unnatural and that the longer it lasts the harder it becomes to believe that the libertarian principle may win over the authoritarian.

I deliberately avoided giving a more detailed explanation of my own opinions and have left certain questions quite open because I feel sure that, if we are to have a basis for fruitful discussion, it should not be doctrinal. The analysis of the problem of liberalism and socialism (both authoritarian and libertarian) is also an analysis of our time and our society. And in this analysis we can see the immediate importance of the topic we have chosen.

III DISCUSSION OF THE INTRODUCTORY PAPER

Danko Grlić:

FOR A MORE COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF LIBERALISM

Although he was as brilliant as ever, Tadić disappointed me to some extent in his introductory speech. What, in fact, I mean is that I feel he was too closely bound to certain traditional concepts and that he explained liberalism by a way of thinking which, in a certain sense, remained within the fixed categories of traditional economy, i. e. a way of thinking which linked liberalism to private property, to competition, though he did indeed give an exceptional and exhaustive explanation of what liberalism means in the economic sphere. However, by analogy, we might just as well link socialism to this sphere and say: socialism is socially-owned property, socialism is the negation of competition, socialism is the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production etc., and yet by this we would have said practically nothing about the real problem of socialism *here and now*. It seems to me that neither liberalism nor socialism can be entirely explained in the modern sense if we reduce them to their economic correlates. If, for example, we were to criticise liberalism exclusively because it prefers the system of private property we might just as well praise socialism because it has, for instance, set the system of socially-owned property at the heart of its programme. Similarly we could not, on the basis of certain economic and political determinants, criticise liberalism (or: only liberalism) exclusively because — and here I am in complete agreement with Ljubo Tadić — in its political sphere it has turned itself into authoritarian and even dictatorial systems.

We should not concentrate exclusively on this kind of criticism because by the same process of thinking we could also show that socialism has turned itself into even more authoritarian systems, such as Stalinism. For this would not at the same time be a criticism of *the concept, the idea* of the doctrine of socialism, just as the criticism we have heard is not, in my opinion, an adequate

criticism of the *concept* of liberalism, i. e. of liberalism as we regard it here and now, seeing in principle, as Marković said at the beginning, both its positive strength and value and also its deficiencies and even its utterly absurd and unacceptable tenets. I shall not discuss this now; later, perhaps, we shall say something about this in the discussion. It seems to me that nowadays, especially, liberalism has certain basic deficiencies precisely because as an attempt to set up a certain limited freedom it in some way allows itself to continue acting within the limits of certain older fixed structures. Thus, not only does it not negate these structures, it even confirms and stabilizes them by slipping in certain safety valves. So, the Head of Police may in principle be a somewhat better man; but if, now, he is somewhat gentler he cannot take to beating up people in the prisons, or perhaps he will not imprison people at all. But liberalism does not rule out the possibility that this Head of Police may, if he feels in necessary, lock up all these people the very next day. In fact, he leaves both the system and structure of society untouched, only allowing the system to relax from time to time so that it really lives from its apparent opposite, from despotism. If there were no despotism, if terror did not exist, there would be nothing left to liberalise and so the very concept of liberalism in the modern sense would be meaningless.

Liberalism today, as a political doctrine, that is, as something with its own political programme and organization, does not in fact exist, or else it exists only to a completely insignificant degree within the framework of certain smaller political parties which now already mean very little in political life. These parties are of practically no importance in relation to socialism. So, if we are to speak of the current concept of liberalism, it seems to me that it would be worthwhile attempting to see not what liberalism means in the sense of a political party or political doctrine but what precisely it means as a distinct ideology, or even as a philosophy, as — one might say — a definite movement which is still fairly strong today. One should not forget that to a great extent the concept of liberalism is linked to many anti-authoritarian movements and that for this very reason many in the West often call us philosophers and sociologists (whom they somehow consider to be more free) the liberals within socialism. We are for them the liberal socialists, the liberal Marxists. I have most strongly refuted, both in Yugoslav and foreign publications, precisely this attempt to saddle us with certain liberal tendencies. This would mean that we are really benign Marxists. This would mean that our desires and our goal can be influenced by slackening or tightening the reins whenever anyone takes the fancy.

Ljubomir Tadić:

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY SUPPRESS HUMAN FREEDOM

Grić might, perhaps, be quite right if one were to take into consideration only the explicit content of my speech and not its implications. I shall permit myself the liberty to point out how the implications of what I said lead straight to what he wants. What, in fact, I wanted to show was that liberalism hides the individual, man and his freedom, under the cover of private property and, as a further consequence of this, under the cover of economy. What I did not quite finish saying was that socialism has not succeeded, in escaping this basic attitude of liberalism. While liberalism has thrust the individual under the cover of private property, socialism has set him beneath the cover of socially-owned property as an *abstraction*. The individual is sovereign only as an economic individual. All the features of human freedom (and human solidarity) seem to be fatally determined by economy. Here I would like to mention an idea which Korsch, towards the end of his life, expressed in his »Theses on Hegel and the Revolution«. Roughly what he says is that even Marx in considering the problems of economy believed in the mystic power of economy which, by its automatism, i. e. the latency of movement of the forces of production, makes social progress possible. In this way, Korsch thinks, human progress has remained within the framework set up by liberal economy. Well, I wanted to say that economic determinism, despite the occasional retouches that have been made here and there, does not leave much room for human freedom. Thus authoritarian socialism as well may also be liberalized, but it cannot free man. I am deeply convinced that in this liberalization, as pseudo-liberations, there is hidden all the weakness of modern socialism, because it leaves human freedom generally or completely aside.

Trivo Indić:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERALISM AND CHANGES IN CONCEPTS

The immediacy of the topic we are now discussing can be most fully seen in the merging of two, at first sight most contradictory, historical experiences — the liberal and the socialist within a multi-level and multi-significant syntagma: liberal socialism.

Ljubo Tadić has already successfully completed the anatomy of liberalism and Grić deserves our thanks for bringing up a question which reaches down to the essence of this discussion on the common inheritance of liberalism and socialism. I would therefore propose that today, while we are still at the beginning, we should more clearly define some of our terms and more thoroughly ex-

mine the conceptual diversification within the liberal movement. For it is hard to get at the concept of liberal socialism if one does not first consider the evolution of liberalism and the contradictions which, from the very beginning, have been immanent in liberalism as an essential bourgeois ideology. If one follows the course of time one will see that this is above all a dispute which was already born within traditional English liberalism, a conflict on the one hand between freedom from pressure, from state compulsion, as in Hobbes and Locke («life, liberty and property»), though still running parallel to the classic economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*, and to the Manchester principles of free trade (which were to die out with Gladstone in 1898) and on the other hand the correction of liberalism which flourished in the 20th cent., though it had already fully evolved by the end of the 19th cent. when the radical elements in English liberalism (primarily Matthew Arnold and T. H. Green) attempted to formulate a concept of liberalism as an ideology containing a number of essentially statist elements. Thus a concept of freedom was born which differed from the traditional freedom of *laissez-faire* (Survival of the Fittest) by being based on the conviction that it is in fact the state which must be the instrument by which freedom is created. Hence this new concept of freedom automatically entails freedom to use pressure, state compulsion, and the expansion of state power and control in order to eliminate the poverty in bourgeois society of which Tadić spoke, in order to create a so-called Welfare State which, alas, is still the best model for many modern socialists. This is what I would describe as the inner nature of liberalism, its duality, which typified not only British but also French and American liberalism, especially at the early points of departure where on the one hand there is a clear attempt to establish the minimal state, to introduce individualism and the consistent application of the *laissez-faire* principle («negative state») in the ideologies of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Constant, Guizot and the July monarchy of Louis Philippe, and also in Jefferson and Jackson, while on the other hand there is an attempt to establish a liberalism with pronounced statist requirements which looks to Rousseau, Hamilton and Henry Clay as its founders. This latter variant implies the necessity of state action, that is, action through a so-called *positive state*. This distinction between the above-mentioned contradictions in liberalism is important because it is only through making such distinctions that we can handle those concepts of socialism which appear later.

Constant claims that Rousseau's concept of freedom is an illusion and declares that the «Social Contract» is the most dreadful ally of all despots. However, we can see that the politicians of the July monarchy, such as Guizot and others (the so-called *libéraux*) relied on the state primarily in order to smooth over the social differences and political contradictions of their times. But this effort led only to the creation of a new bourgeoisie on a European scale, a bourgeoisie which was to be constantly bound to the state as the instrument of representative democracy (when Napoleon III came

to power) and which was to fascinate even Marx in his studies of the state (he was so fascinated that he was not able to foresee events such as the Paris Commune).

This is exactly why I think we should direct our discussion towards clarifying the problems of the political institutions of liberalism, problems which are condensed in the question of representative democracy, the most striking feature of the socialist world today.

Representative democracy keeps pace with the state. The defenders of this system see, on the one hand, a permanent evil in French statist liberalism, and for this reason they condemn it, but, on the other hand, they always hark back to this same state when the question arises of attempts to create social coherence and social harmony within the bourgeois world. They demand enlargement of the so-called freedoms for people but this, again, requires a strong state. The state is, therefore, a useful and necessary evil (Hegel's »state of reason and necessity«). The state acts as intermediary between man and citizen, between citizen and history, between man and his freedom. The community of bourgeois society is a political community and its backbone is the egoistic individual. Its one and only form of emancipation is always political emancipation, political representation which attempts to conceal the rift between the public man and the private man. Consequently, the only possible revolution is a political revolution but this — as we learn from so-called socialist revolutions which come into being only as political revolutions (i. e. where the basic question still remains that of power) — never surmounts the limits of bourgeois society.

An edifying example is that of German liberalism, which takes one line (that of Christian Kraus) stating that Smith's work »The Wealth of the Nation« is the most important book after the Bible, and another line showing a permanent affinity for the strong and great state, that is, the triumph of state will under the protection of the Prussian monarchy, especially in Bismarck's Germany. Guido de Ruggero pointed to the bond between German liberalism and German metaphysics within the concept of freedom which was in no way related to the problem of resistance and revolt against compulsion, and in which obedience to the moral law is freedom (in Kant) and where one finds that a coincidence between the idea of the organic development of freedom and the organization of society in its progressively higher spiritual form, i. e. the state is extracted from the Kantian identification of freedom and reason (Hegel). Not even German socialism could stay immune from integration into the »liberalised« Kaiser system, from its parliamentary Circe whose voice today still dominates over social democracy (Kautsky: »The Social Democratic party is revolutionary . . . but it is not the party which makes revolutions«). Speaking of German Socialism around 1918 Michels was able to say that the Russification of one part was simply the result of the Prussification of the other.

So, the basic theme we might discuss is the overall question of representative democracy today, particularly within the scope of socialism, a democracy which cannot be understood without a knowledge of the above-mentioned evolutions of liberalism on the lines of a statist attempt to solve the antinomies of the bourgeois world. We shall probably be obliged to speak more about liberal socialism during these meetings and to see as the problem of socialism (in my opinion the most important problem) precisely those things it has not overcome, surmounted and mastered: the liberal inheritance, the problem of citizens and the representative character of authority, the true inequality of people who, in the abstraction of the forms of representation and of the policy of representative life, look on themselves as the sole truth of this world. The state as »Over-parent« according to Hobhouse is at the same time both a liberal and a socialist concept. This is the famous democracy which Stalin also accepted as socialist democracy, as state socialism plus formal bourgeois-civil rights and freedoms. Writing in 1936 on the Constitution he said: »The Constitution of the USSR is the only one in the world that is thoroughly democratic«, and this is that constitution-mindedness and legislation-mindedness which was the overture to the mass purges and concentration camps of the first socialist country.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

ONE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF LIBERALISM

I only wish to call attention to one point which, I feel, should widen the approach outlined by Ljubo Tadić. I agree with Danko Grlić that this approach is somewhat constricted and that exclusive reference to the economic basis of liberalism has led us to forget certain of the sources of liberalism — for example, certain of the ideas of J. S. Mill are contrary to those which were emphasised here. This is why I do not think it is enough for us to go simply from economy to ideology and doctrine. It is essential that we should not forget the philosophy contained in liberalism and above all the positive elements which are part of the treasury of contemporary philosophical thought, for we are not going to reduce Marx to economic theory, or to doctrine and ideology. And, when we are speaking of socialism, we take just those philosophical ideas which, thanks to their broad human character, outstrip these ideological limits and cross the boundaries of an economic theory. So I would suggest that we also keep this point in mind.

OWNERSHIP AND FREEDOM

I am not in the least disturbed by the fact that Ljubo Tadić chose to review a modern topic with a certain amount of historical retrospection, for like this we can see just how old this problem is and how much of what today exists in fact belongs to the past, although we consider it modern. What remains for us to clarify in our discussion is what Tadić calls the implications of his speech. I suggest that we go into one of these implications, the theme of ownership and freedom, since liberalism is an ideology or philosophy of freedom. We know that the most essential decree of Hegel's philosophy was also the philosophy of freedom. The same may be said of the thinking of Marx.

Marx's concept of freedom was developed in connection with economic reality. Liberalism set up its concept of freedom in relation to ownership and took private ownership as the condition *sine qua non* for the freedom of the individual. Even today liberalism very much favours the criticism of Marxist communism as the source of the loss of liberty or the enslavement of the individual precisely because communism abolishes private ownership. By abolishing private ownership, allegedly, one removes the material basis of freedom. This is not, in fact, only a liberal criticism of Marxism and socialism. Various different ideologies use the same argument in criticising Marxism. One of these ideologies is that of the Catholics. The Catholic critics go back to Thomas Aquinas and other classic Christian thinkers in order to rehabilitate a concept of private property somewhat more social than has hitherto been known. They insist, in fact, on the specific right to make use of private property without necessarily having other ownership rights. They point out that the private ownership of earthly goods is the natural right of man and that they exist for him to satisfy his rational needs. Everything beyond this is the right of others to use the goods for themselves although they do not own them. This, then, is how it stands in theory, in the Christian ethics of compassion. It is quite another matter that this relation between private ownership and the right of use was not established in positive law and that it has not been practically confirmed in history. If Christian mercy is not sufficient to establish this right of use, some power must be conceived, the state for instance, which will ensure that it is entrenched. Historical practise often negates theory. The development of the bourgeois world opposes the thinking of the classic liberal writers. They would surely be disappointed if they were to rise up from the dead just as the classic thinkers of Marxism would in many ways be disappointed by the history of socialism.

It seems to me that the theme »ownership and freedom« is particularly interesting for us by virtue of the two empirical trends of socialism involved: the authoritarian and the liberalist. Tadić's

speech showed that certain liberal tenets have been included (consciously or not — it makes no difference) in the so-called self-managing socialism of Yugoslavia. When one says that these tenets are anarchistic or liberal it does not mean that they should be automatically rejected. We should consider, on the basis of our experience and of our theoretical knowledge of history, what can be done with them without giving rise to a great historical delusion.

Seen from the formal-legal point of view, it is socially-owned property and social self-management which dominate in Yugoslavia. If facts are to be respected, we are here concerned with participation in ownership and the participants are the groups which act in the name of the workers' collectives on the one hand, and the state itself on the other. Here too we have a certain lack of agreement between the right of ownership and the right to use that which is owned, but the state remains dominant in ownership and will most likely remain so for a long time, possibly even tending to become stronger.

The hybrid nature of our system has brought out a conflict in socialism. This is the conflict of 1948 within the »great Socialist family« of Informbureau. In Yugoslavia today we have a conflict between the so-called unitarian and nationalist forces of bureaucracy while in the infrastructure there is a conflict between the state and the group use of socially-owned property. No single form represents the true social use of socially-owned property which, for this reason, is a pure legal formality. The true social use of socially-owned property occurs when the whole of society is organised in such a way that it is the only direct owner of possessions and hence the true subject or, if you like, the free designer of its own history. This state of affairs does not yet exist anywhere. When I say »the whole of society« I have in mind such an intimate organic attachment uniting all the parts into a harmonic whole, that it in no way resembles the confrontation of competitors or the mere sum or aggregate of autonomous workers' collectives. I have in mind a community which will not have a new form of ownership as its basis but will shape itself as working society on the principle of united labour, organized according to the logic of rational production and economisation in which there will in fact be no ownership any longer. The concept of a working society or community means that the social organization of work as the »sphere of necessity« would suit the dignity of the individual at work and his freedom outside work. Here one sees the essential difference between Marx and liberalism concerning the question of freedom. Even Marx looks on the sphere of freedom as connected with ownership and overall economy, but not in order to wrap a cocoon around the free personality, rather to open up space for freedom in the sense of free self-realization.

SOCIETY, THE INDIVIDUAL AND FREEDOM

I shall be very brief since the opening speech covered a good deal of what I intended to say. I feel that Danko Grlić took a harsh line more for the sake of dramatic effect than because he was genuinely disappointed with the introductory speech, for the objection we have most frequently heard — that Ljubo Tadić narrowed the scope of the topic — is not, I feel, a valid criticism. I think that in this respect the introduction was effective and that it treated the subject with the necessary breadth. The other objection — that it was too much centred around economy — is also, I feel, unfounded because here we are in fact concerned with the philosophical foundation of this question so that we are actually considering the political philosophy of liberalism and not economy, for all these economic categories, including property, are contained in the theory of natural right and later in liberalism. Here these categories are taken exclusively in the philosophical sense because they also have an important philosophical content. My only reservation is that perhaps Tadić should not have stopped here, but undoubtedly he had good reasons for doing so. Unlike Grlić, I think that this is a good way to approach liberalism because perhaps the most important task is to analyse the concept of property, in order to explain both liberalism and socialism, to go right back to the source of whole problem and particularly to demystify the modern controversies. This I think was where the introduction had its most far-reaching effect. Why is this important? I shall quote an example to show the historical consequences that may follow from an ignorance of economic categories.

It is a generally accepted opinion that the Jacobins were quickly ruined because they did not know about economics and the class structure of society. This was fatal, especially for Robespierre. Ignorance of economics led him toward mysticism, towards the religion of the Great Being, towards moralism, and ignorance of class structure led him to constant vacillation between the bourgeoisie and the poor. It was just these two facts that proved fatal for the Jacobins.

I think it would be good not to evade the philosophical basis of liberalism. However, when one is speaking of liberalism as the ideology of private property one probably has the impression that it is after all constricted and that it does have an economic character. However, the fact that this is not just a simple battle of interests was already evident at the time of the French enlightenment when it was made possible for a link to be established between natural right and liberalism, in fact for a correction to be made to the theory of interest through a correct understanding of interest. This correction, which was an attempt to justify liberalism ethically, went on to develop from Mill into an attempt to consider this problem from the standpoint of individualism and

the protection of the individual from society and from state and social institutions. And so I think that perhaps this problem — which is of great importance to socialism and which is related to the position of the individual in society — might well be a subject for discussion. In addition to Andrija Krešić's suggestion I would like to propose another topic, or rather a sub-topic to that of property and freedom and that is: society, the individual and freedom.

Božidar Jakšić:

THE LIBERALIZATION OF SOCIALISM AS AN ILLUSION

I would like to intervene by putting a question to Tadić. Now, Tadić ended his speech by concluding that Yugoslav society is a mixture of the authoritarian and the libertarian principles, and that the latter was introduced somewhat later without ever being consistently adopted in our country. I would like to ask, then, to what extent these two principles can co-exist. Have not the centres of social power in our society taken over certain liberal elements in order to be able to pursue consistently an authoritarian principle? Is not the introduction of this liberal principle in our social system in fact a piece of rhetoric? Is not this a great delusion?

Miladin Životić:

CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND LIBERALISM

Liberalism should not always be lumped together with an ideology which necessarily and exclusively defends private interests, the right to private property and private initiative. Reliance on private initiative, on the private person and on private interests certainly is a characteristic of those forms of liberalism of which Ljubo Tadić spoke. However, that liberalism always reckoned on small economic systems; it did not count on what appeared later, something which would have deeply disappointed all the classical liberal thinkers, — the appearance of state capitalism, the appearance of great systems and the take-over of the economic functions of private ownership by the state. Classical liberalism did not count on this. But liberalism did not die out at the time when state capitalism evolved, when the role of the state became stronger and when a new economic system appeared in which the state took over the most important economic functions.

A liberalism appeared which did not defend private initiative and which accepted state-owned property. On the eve of the Second World War a group of liberals including B. Russell, Morris Cohen, John Dewey and others attempted to define their position by taking up a stand counter to Fascism and Stalinism. They de-

fended liberalism, but they did not defend private ownership and the right to private initiative. They accepted state-owned property but distanced themselves from Communism. So, liberalism does not have to be based on the acceptance of private property. What liberalism cannot accept, however, is the absence of the state and political society. This is its limitation. Liberalism cannot conceive of a society without state institutions.

All that the liberals have put forward in their criticism of the Soviet state may be taken as a form of correction to the society in the USSR, a correction which that society may administer while still retaining the state as a political form of government. And, in fact, this process is happening today in the Soviet Union; we cannot claim that there is no process of liberalization taking place there. Certain elements of liberalization do exist, and soviet society can afford to allow this. But here we see clearly the limitations of liberal criticism when applied to an authoritarian society. It only criticises the process by which the state becomes alienated from the interests of society but it cannot understand these interests without the state and can never come to accept the theory of the withering away of the state, or conceive the possibility of a society such as a self-governing one.

When speaking of liberalism today one should also bear in mind this type of liberalism. This liberalism adopts state-owned property as the basic principle of its doctrine but goes no further.

Nikola Rot:

THE CONCEPTION OF MAN'S NATURE

I found Ljubo Tadić's speech rich in ideas and most stimulating and I think that the discussion has proved that it really was so. Also, I do not have the impression that he linked liberalism only to a set economic system.

What I found particularly interesting was the well-argued explanation of the connection between liberalism and a concept of the nature of man. His presentation of this point was exhaustive and most convincing; he showed that all the way from Locke to Freud there existed a carefully worked out and fully determined concept of the nature of man as an egoistic, egocentric and aggressive being. Unfortunately, even up to the present day, we have not found a better grounded psychological concept of man than this one. Every concept of society — if not explicitly, then implicitly — also contains an idea of the nature of man. Ljubo Tadić did not, however, give anything like such a detailed account of the concept of man on which the libertarian idea is based or may be based, an idea which is different to that of liberalism and even opposed to liberalism. A number of attempts have been made to explain this, but without complete success. The theory of alienation is not a

sufficiently developed or convincing concept of human nature, nor is Fromm's attempt to argue from the five basic human needs, nor Riesman's, nor any other. And so we might, perhaps at a special symposium, take the theme: on what concept of the nature of man can, and should, a truly freedom-oriented humanist socialism be based.

My other observation is related to the speech made by Grlić. He was quite right in saying that the other, different idea of liberalism, the idea which today stands for free-thinking and tolerance in the West, was not considered in sufficient detail. The concept has been worked out in this sense by many very influential thinkers and philosophers, in particular by Adorno who linked this concept of liberalism to a concept of the personality — the concept of a non-authoritarian personality. This is not a question of liberalism in the classical sense but in the sense of liberality, tolerance and free-mindedness. The reflections on this problem also deserve special attention from the psychological point of view. One can, in fact, ask what the psychological bases and preconditions are for such liberality and also whether there is any link between these psychological preconditions and the creation of a humanist socialism.

Danko Grlić:

THE DETERMINISM OF ECONOMY AND THE FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL

When I said that I thought Ljubo Tadić had paid too much attention to the economic correlates of liberalism I in no way meant that he had a narrow economic bias. I know Ljubo Tadić and his work far too well to be able to jump to such a hasty conclusion. I only said, if we understand each other well, that when he defined liberalism as the ideology of pure private property and such like, he was allowing for the preponderance of economic categories. He was even able to illustrate these categories philosophically but nevertheless he was basically thinking in terms of an economic set of problems.

He defined the very idea of liberalism on the basis of historical facts, the accuracy of which I do not doubt, and of certain historical movements whose basic trends were described within the limits of these economic correlates. I would like, however, to point out that liberalism has another dimensions outside of these boundaries and of its own economic determinant. It is not only in the economic sphere that liberalism is opposed to another conception, it is also opposed for example (even though in a timid, limited way) to a spirit which has also been mentioned as the spirit of solidarity, a spirit which in fact prefers a monolithic form of thought, which implies a system within which individual thought would be of no importance at all or even of any relevance to an entire social

system. This is also a sphere of liberalism and I think that Životić quite rightly drew our attention to it. However, I wanted — incidentally, of course — to point out that when we define certain ideas and ideologies on the basis of their economic correlates we fall into the very great danger of thus viewing economy in a rather fatalistic way and of assuming that all the consequences of a society depend on the extent of its development or, let us say, the foundations on which its economy rests. I think that this is a great prejudice which we today, with all our experience of so-called socialist societies, must overcome. Otherwise we shall be very close to defending what is basically a Stalinist concept according to which despotism in human relations is justified, for example, by lack of development in the forces of production. It is more important to face up to these facts today than it was, say, at the time of Marx. This is why I feel that here one cannot rely completely even on Marx, who inevitably, placed far more importance on production than would be necessary today after all that has been served up to us in the name of the development of the forces of production, if that is, we wanted to untangle certain knotty issues and cure some of the ulcers of our society. We must recognise the importance of many of the results of economy as well, while realising at the same time that it has been shown today that many societies with a lower rate of development have greater freedom than societies with a very high rate of economic development. How, then, can we justify the statement that private property is the one negative determining feature of human freedom and of the authenticity of human life as a whole? An insistence on opening up possibilities for the shaping of an authentic personality, and for personal freedom, and the general rehabilitation of the personality is becoming more important than the exclusive and determined development of the economic basis, allegedly made possible by an acquaintance with what is known as necessity. We may perhaps come to recognize necessity but what use is this to us if we do not go any further than the recognition of necessity? In this necessity we have recognised we shall still be moving within the sphere of necessity and not that of freedom.

Mihailo Marković:

THE POSSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES OF OVERCOMING LIBERALISM AND THE PRESENT FORM OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY

It seems to me that the basic problem of our discussion is as follows: On the one hand we, who would like to do something theoretically and also directly, practically towards the realization of democratic and humanist socialism, find ourselves having to wage a battle against liberalism, as the ideology of a bourgeois society still in existence, which, from the material point of view

and in many other ways, is more developed than those societies which aspire to build up socialism and which, therefore, exerts a powerful influence on these more primitive societies.

On the other hand, in our own country we are confronted with a liberalism which has filtered into the existing initial forms of socialist society, a society which is powerless to solve its own problems in a new, socialist way and therefore often has recourse to liberal solutions which are outmoded even in the practice of bourgeois society.

Liberalism sets out from a fixed concept of man, from the assumption that there exists an eternal human nature which is essentially egoistic, competitive, greedy and aggressive. It follows, then, that a distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the natural condition of man which is a state of all-out war without even the minimum security for the individual and, on the other hand, civilized society. Liberalism can conceive of no society other than that which is divided into two spheres. The one sphere is made up of *civil society* in which the individual is guaranteed certain rights and certain freedoms, such as: the freedom to move, to work where one chooses, to earn as much as one likes, to own property resulting from one's work, to express one's beliefs freely in words and writing, to be free to join any organization, to have the freedom of protest, to be able to freely express one's religious, political and ideological beliefs. The second sphere is that of *political society*; this inevitably involves the existence of the state. The state, representing the common interests, guarantees the minimum of order and the minimum of security so that each individual may enjoy his rights and freedoms without being constantly endangered on account of the general warfare between men. Thus, the theory of the inevitability of the state and the concept of political organization as primarily *representative organization* are of essential importance to liberalism. No word has yet been said concerning *participatory* democracy of self-government, either in the form expounded by Marx or any other. The only democracy, from the liberal point of view, is a representative democracy. The citizen surrenders part of his rights to the political powers. This is the price he must pay for his security and for the enjoyment of all his freedoms. However, by renouncing these rights, he is left unprotected before the power of the state. Liberalism does not foresee any mechanism which would enable the citizen to exert direct control and direct influence over events in the political sphere. This deficiency, however, has already been noticed.

Locke, Rousseau and Jefferson and, in general, the early revolutionaries of liberalism, were already conscious of the alienation of political power. They understood that this alienation of political power resulted from the constant possibility of usurpation and tyranny; and in such cases the people had the right to resort to force to overthrow a government which no longer represented

them, a government which no longer considered the general interests of the people and had begun, instead, to pursue its own interests.

But liberalism was not able to offer a social model which would in some other way solve the question of political organization. The gap between civil and political society remained permanent. Political society is inevitable, it can not be radically improved — this is yet another of the essential philosophical assumptions of liberalism. The concept of freedom is always *freedom from* and never *freedom to*. What was entirely lacking there was a historical conception of man, of developing human nature in which a distinction exists between the actual and the potential, between the factual form of human behaviour and man's potential capacities of sociability, of creativity, of solidarity within a genuine human community. From the liberalist point of view the individual and the social are always placed in opposition to one another. The individual forms his social being exclusively through the state; hence the state must always exist. Man remains what actually is because it is in his nature to be greedy, selfish, aggressive, acquisitive.

Ljubo Tadić accurately pointed out that liberalism is inseparable from the institution of private property and from the right of ownership. At the beginning, however, Locke firmly limited this right. One might own what one gained from one's work, and one might own only what one could directly enjoy as an individual, alone with the family. Nothing else might be his private property. Later he diverged from this attitude. In practice the society founded on the bourgeois liberal doctrine completely abandoned this limitation.

It is precisely in this respect that socialism radically differs from liberalism. Socialism is the project of a society at a far higher level of technical, economic, political and cultural development, a society in which it is already possible to make the transition from the sphere of material production (which is always the sphere of necessity) to the sphere of true freedom, freedom in the sense of self-determination, freedom for self-realization in which man forms himself through praxis (not work, and especially not alienated work).

So, when one is speaking of liberalism and socialism as doctrines, the contradictions are clear. Yet socialism as it exists has adopted certain liberalist principles and these are often the principles which have already become outmoded. For instance, there is a tendency in our society to return to a *laissez-faire* market economy, which is obviously historically outmoded. The doctrine of *laissez-faire* has been abandoned everywhere in capitalist society. It reached its culmination in America by the end of the 19th century, and since then the entire tendency has been towards the limitation of *laissez-faire*. In fact, capitalism survived the catastrophic crisis of 1929 precisely because the principle of *laissez-faire* had been abandoned and replaced by the increasingly controlling and regulative role of the state. Under such circumstances any

affirmation of unrestricted market economy means, historically speaking, a regression to a stage of social development which preceded modern bourgeois society. These historically obsolete aspects of liberalism have been taken over by bureaucracy in the sphere of economic life in order to create the illusion of freedom without jeopardizing its political power.

However, in the sphere of politics, bureaucracy, is not prepared to introduce the freedoms which liberalism proclaimed. In this respect socialism, in the form it has so far taken in practise, has not yet surmounted liberalism. Even in theory socialism has not yet managed to find an adequate solution to the problem of the alienation of political power after the successful socialist revolution. The question remains whether or not society after the revolution really must pass through the period of the dictatorship of the political *avant-garde* (which accumulates vast power by acting in the name of the proletariat). The question is, then, whether the post-revolutionary society must pass through the phase of state power. Marx constantly spoke of the armed proletariat, of the fact the working class must take power into its own hands and that, at least during a limited interval of time, it must organize its own state. But this is only a transitional stage. Marx never allowed for the possibility of this power being taken over in the name of the working class by a single party, an *avant-garde* only, or simply a group of leaders.

Unfortunately, it seems to me that Marx did not offer a theoretical solution to the problem which Rousseau, for instance, had already faced. Rousseau was fully aware that in every society which is not just one town, not just one *polis* but a large society, a problem will arise: Who represents the general will, what makes up the general will, how is the general will to be put into practise? Rousseau was convinced that all »representatives« of the people inevitably betray their people. This is why he considered a representative democracy impossible in a large society. This is a real problem and it is even more acute today than it was at Rousseau's time. How is the general will to be constituted, how is it to be expressed in a country with a population of 200 or even only 20 million? If somebody has to pass decisions in the name of this general will, in this case in the name of the proletariat the interests of which coincide with this general will, how can alienation be prevented? And during this transitional stage how is it possible to ensure that the temporary political power does not become more firmly entrenched and turn itself into a goal of its own? This question remains unsolved, indeed, it has not even been properly considered. And to this extent Marxism has not yet superseded liberalism.

When it comes to political practice we see that the relatively underdeveloped societies in which the socialist revolution took place were not able to ensure all the elementary freedoms which liberalism proclaimed and, with certain limitations, put into practise as well. The freedom of thought, for instance. In some societies

which declare themselves to be socialist, the thought which runs contrary to officially accepted attitudes, even if uttered privately in the presence of only one person, is punishable and may even lead to the concentration camp. Here in Yugoslavia the situation is better only insofar as we distinguish between gatherings of a political character and talks or discussions which are not of a political character. This meeting, for instance, does not have a political character because there are only thirty of us. But if we were to hold this same meeting in Belgrade, and if a thousand people were to attend it, then it would have a political character and we would be subject to some article of the Penal Code, let us say that which declares that our ideas might disturb the public. This is what happened in Leskovac in 1967 at a meeting of far fewer than a thousand people. The second basic freedom is related to the free expression of one's thoughts in print. The expression of critical points of view in written form concerning burning issues of immediate importance to our society, the duplication and distribution of such texts without government permission, fall directly under the Penal Code. Liberalism not only proclaimed such freedom in theory, it also long ago established it in practise. In the same way, many other rights and freedoms such as, for example the right of free public gathering, demonstration and protest etc., have still not been established in socialism although they long since ceased to be disputed in liberal bourgeois society.

This means that while socialism must struggle against liberalism as the historically outmoded ideology of bourgeois society it must at the same time find theoretical and practical solutions which will make it possible to overcome and dialectically supersede liberalism. If socialism did not do so, it would not be capable of becoming a society at a higher historical level. From the point of view of establishing and entrenching individual rights and freedoms it would be in danger of remaining even below the level of bourgeois society.

I should like to add that it will be necessary in our further discussion to formulate a precise definition of the concepts of *socialism* and *liberalism*. We must take them in their historical dimensions and constantly distinguish between theory and practise, doctrine and realization.

In speaking of liberalism one should take into account the fact that it has a lengthy past. Liberalism was already alive in the form of an idea around the 12th century in the free cities, that is, far earlier than the time when it took on a doctrinal form. The doctrine was not established until the 17th and 18th centuries. Later there were tremendous deviations in the ways in which these ideas were practised. Andrija Krešić quite rightly said that the classical liberal writers would have just as much right to be dissatisfied with the way in which their ideas were put into practice as Marx, Engels and others would have to be displeased with the concrete realization of their ideas. During the process of practical application liberalism split into many forms and directions. It must

be mentioned that among them there was a tendency towards socialism, and this was the progressive and humanist side of liberalism. For example John Stuart Mill who in his earlier works advocated the most extreme forms of *laissez-faire* economy, realised later that it led rather to enslaving than to liberating the individual. Therefore in his *Autobiography*, the last edition of his *Political Economy* and the post-humous work *Socialism* he admitted that there was considerable justification for socialist criticism of capitalist society.

There is another line of liberalism which is extremely reactionary, and those of you who criticised the liberalism of liberal parties are absolutely right. By the eighteen seventies the liberal party of England had already become distinctly imperialist, and the liberal party of Germany, supporting the Hohenzollerns, was extremely reactionary; the same goes for the Serbian liberal party.

Between these two extremes there exists a central, middle-line, reformist branch of liberalism. This is probably the kind of liberalism to which Danko Grlić paid particular attention. This is the form of liberalism which endeavours to preserve the existing structures by introducing necessary reforms. The best example is that which Miladin Životić mentioned in the discussion. The *New-Deal* programme sacrificed the principle of *laissez-faire* and introduced state intervention. In this way certain other more important structures of capitalist society were salvaged, above all, the principle of private property.

In the same way, when speaking of *socialism*, we must distinguish between the past (as far back as the utopias and spontaneous workers' socialist movements), the doctrine of Marx and, finally, the practical application which has so far given rise to a number of different variants.

At the end I should like to suggest that the problems with which we are confronted at this meeting might be grouped in the following way: in the first group we have *philosophical* questions; these are the questions involving the philosophical-psychological concept of human nature, the concept of the personality and the relations between the individual and society, the concept of freedom and finally the problem of the split between bourgeois and political society. Next we have the *political* problems; the problem of entrenching civil freedoms in socialism, the problem of representative democracy, the problem of the alienation of political power etc. Then we have the economic problems. The question that seems to be the most basic one and on which we should concentrate most heavily, particularly towards the end, might be formulated as follows: How do we conceive the surmounting of liberalism in socialist theory and practise under the conditions of an alienated political power?

Ljubo Tadić:

THE LEGAL MEANING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

In order to avoid any further misunderstanding, I should clarify the following points:

When I speak of private property as the basis of liberal ideology I have in mind primarily the *legal meaning* of private property. This is more essential than a purely economic interpretation of liberalism.

In the legal sense the concept of private property has existed ever since the times of the Romans. The economic concept of liberalism is derived from a form of operationalization of the legal concept.

The origin of liberalism, like that of socialism, lies in the interpretations of natural right (including, of course, the interpretations of social utopias, as Bloch would say) and in the later fragmentation, dispersion and disintegration of these interpretations. Since I have just mentioned Bloch, let me add something more. We must draw a distinction between the fresh morning of natural right and the late afternoon of natural right. I fear we may lose a good deal of time in disputing matters which are not disputable because the late afternoon of natural right explains much about the conservative concept of liberalism.

Nikola Rot asked several questions: If liberalism is thus far the best grounded psychology of human nature and if this side of liberalism should prove its endurance and resistance to the ravages of time, we should then ask whether egoism is so powerful a motive force that we should respect it as the psycho-social basis and incentive for progress in civilization. Has egoism, as a constitutional part of our human make-up, been so belittled perhaps by socialism, or so decried that socialist economy has lost its psychological basis and become inferior to capitalist economy, or has it not been able to find a suitable substitute for egoism and so of necessity been forced to slip egoism in through the back door? Is it perhaps true, in connection with this question, that for liberal ideology self-preservation is really more important than freedom?

The next question, in the spirit of what Andrija Krešić said, would be as follows: what is the relation between property and freedom? Is it only the freedom which guarantees the economic independence of the individual that is important for liberalism, or has liberalism as liberalism left wider scope for human freedom? In other words, can the liberal concept of freedom be linked exclusively to the principles of private ownership? It seems to me that this was Životić's point. Mihailo Marković touched on the question: what does a properly understood interest in liberal ideology mean, that is, what Locke calls a way of channeling greed? Is liberalism only an ideology of the free movement of economic forces or does it guarantee the freedom of the individual as an individual? If it does, is this freedom merely negative or is it also positive, no

matter to how small an extent. This leads us on to what I consider a most important question, the question of the natural-right inheritance of liberalism.

To continue: what is the relation between liberalism and the state, what demands does it make for limiting state power and, consequently, what is the difference between the liberal and socialist concepts of the state? At this point the question was brought up — here I think Andrija Krešić was commenting on what Božo Jakšić had said — whether the state is a condition for the stabilization of society and in what sense is it that condition? What does the state mean as a form of security or — as it is called by liberal theoreticians and by Proudhon himself — a form of security like the police? How and in what sense do the police guarantee the security of society?

We should also discuss in what sense socially-owned property should be considered the basis of socialist society. Is there a difference in principle between *nationalization* and *socialization* (not just as a play on words but in the true sense) and, therefore, is there a difference between statist and anarchist or authoritarian and libertarian concepts of socialism? How should one look at socially-owned property: is it really the economic basis for the positive liberation of man from all socially created obstacles?

The question still remains open as to how talents may be developed in a society which puts no social obstacles before these talents. What is the relation between *institutions* and *associations*? These are questions of the democratic or anti-democratic organization of society. Then we have a question which deals with reviewing the possibilities for liberalizing socialism. Here certain words recur, and certain problems which were outlined in the earlier questions, i. e. the question of freedom *from* and freedom *to*, negative and positive freedom. What is the meaning of the freedom of public speech, the freedom to gather, to influence society and social changes etc? Does liberalism deserve credit for having maintained the tradition of natural right and to what extent does it deserve credit? Here our attention must also be focused on the fact that in authoritarian socialism it is accepted that all forms of dispute or contest are equivalent to counter-revolution.

One may then ask a question which reaches to the very heart of the problem of economy in socialism. Buharin repeated Guizot's slogan: »Enrichissez vous!« (get rich!), but it was not only Buharin who said this, it was also Tomsy, the head of the Soviet Trade Unions. The so-called right wing of opposition is a most interesting phenomenon in the Soviet Union. I am drawing the concepts of right and left according to the order of the line of loyalty and on the basis of a political attitude, a relation towards certain social classes after the Revolution. Buharin's statement should, in fact, be considered within the NEP — the new economic policy — towards the peasantry, while that of Tomsy the secretary of the Trade Unions was closely linked to the position of a small group of highly educated and highly qualified workers. By representing

their interests Tomsy becomes linked with the English trade unions and the tradition of Trade-unionism. Is not this policy, which we find at the time of the NEP, also the basis of the so-called sceptical *real-politik* which we come across in all the trends of Bolshevik socialism? One should, therefore, also consider the problem of the relation between the Stalinist type of socialism and the Bolshevik party, that is, the Stalinist attitude towards the various fractions within the party, Stalin's opinion of the levellers and of the need to root out levelling. All these problems must be seen as reflections of the old original socialist ideas about the equality of men. Of course, the question of reformism and revolution is also closely linked to this. What makes up these concepts which so often seem contradictory? Does the idea of reformism, which is certainly a sceptical *real-politik* idea, involve as much exclusiveness as might at first sight appear?

In conjunction with this there is, I feel, an important question, which was touched upon by Arthur Rosenberg, an old member of Comintern, in his book »The History of Bolshevism«. It concerns the relation between so-called socialist mythology and socialist reality, or the total transformation of socialist reality into mythological reality. There is one more question that is fundamental to the modern socialist movement, and that is the question of the possibility of building up socialism in one country alone. This, then, is the theme around which the Stalin-Trotsky dispute revolved; at the same time it also recalls the old question of whether the idea of permanent revolution belongs to Trotsky alone or also to Marx, and even originally to him. I should like to quote Marx's attitude as displayed in *German Ideology*; it is not often mentioned but I happen to know it by heart: »Communism is empirically possible as the simultaneous or jointly produced act of the ruling nations«.

IV. THE ALIENATION OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL EMANCIPATION

POLITICAL INTERVENTION AND THE ABSTRACT CITIZEN

Trivo Inđić

As a question of social philosophy, liberalism raises the problem of social evolution being an inexorable process which no human action, above all state intervention, can alter or bring to end (*Le monde va de lui même*). This, I think, is the essence of liberalism in its early stages and is best expressed by Spencer in the sphere of practical philosophy as one of the theories of industrial society in which the individual is liberated and in which government is regarded as representation. Spencer is, moreover, celebrated for his catalogue of activities in which the state should refrain from interfering and for his demand that the state should confine itself to protecting the life and property of its citizens against attacks from without and within. Liberalism, as an essentially optimistic ideology, is the ideology of a young bourgeoisie, that to which Marx gave full praise in his *Communist Manifesto*.

This optimism is quite understandable when we consider that here we are speaking of the ideology of the activation of man's universe, which appears after the lengthy period of passivity and resignation inherent in mediaval society and in the mediaeval concept of the citizen and of his belief in self-realisation, not in this world but in the next. This optimism in liberalism is thus an outstanding result of the major currents of European thought, but in my opinion the philosophical and social problem lies in the fact that socialism cannot accept the concept of social evolution as an inexorable process, as a self-contained movement. Socialism is above all the intervention of man in man's world, an attempt to bring about some form of correction in this world to establish a direct relation between the individual and the world and to overcome the alienation of the individual from the community. Socialism is an attempt to surmount this self-confidence, this self-reliance within liberalism which regards social change only as a strictly determined process, a development which cannot be altered by any human action and which sets up the eternal kingdom of personal interest with the aid of an illusory »general« interest. Socia-

lism is a qualitative leap forward for the consciousness which develops within the framework of bourgeois society, it is practical humanism, the essential intervention of man — if, that is, we want to personalize the abstract world of things and the abstract citizen, and advance to a stage where we see the application of all the metaphysical principles so abundantly proffered by the ideology of early liberalism through Kant and later Hegel (e. g. that in one man we can find the realization of another, that in the state we can see the realization of the reason etc.). The basic problem here for me is: how is it that socialism accepts the means of mediation between man and history, between biography and history, that are peculiar to a liberal society? And a liberal society is, primarily, a representative and mediatory form of democracy.

How is it possible that political life and politics are guided by alienated, representative elements, by abstractions, and that in this abstraction people who are truly unequal consider themselves equal? To the same extent socialism, insofar as it concerns the problems of the abstract citizen and representative government, remains a vital problem of our everyday life, a problem which cannot conceal the true inequality of men and which cannot detach itself from a historical context in which it appears as the ideology of a society based on poverty. Liberalism also begins as the ideology of a society based on poverty, and appears as an attempt to solve the vast problem of social improvement and human happiness in conditions where not everyone is able to enjoy the fruits, the heritage of the modern economic and political sphere (politics as a private sphere which achieves its independent existence in society). It can be seen, unfortunately, that socialism as an ideology of poverty is similar to liberalism insofar as it is obliged to resort to just these forms of intervention in economic and political life in order to solve the problem of existence, which, at first sight, can be solved in no other way than by force and oppression. For how is it possible to consider democracy as the market plus political democracy if one does not seek a solution in authoritarian government? How is it possible for authoritarian socialism, which today prefers the ideal of a society of abundance to the freedom of man and the citizen, and the removal of differences between man and citizen, — how is it possible for such a socialism also to develop the rich and varied machinery of the political state, which history had already previously recognised in its liberal trappings? Socialism, insofar as it is founded on representative institutions — and all concrete empirical socialism has been such — creates its own abstractions and alienations.

Just take for example the problem of the political avantgarde: I think that the problem of this avantgarde is a question of external necessity which cannot be used to clear up the question of of the immediate non-mediatory relation between history and the subject, for this concept of the avantgarde actually impoverishes the concept and breadth of the subject of history. Man, of course, does not acquire his concrete personality through this arsenal of

representative features because these relatively alienated characteristics and abstractions become the instigators of political action and of particular, egoistic interest, and when this kind of thinking refers to man, it has in mind an abstract man, an abstraction. Naturally, according to Marx, this does not essentially change anything as regards the true position of the personality and of each concrete individual. The political representative alienates himself even more and becomes invisible, un-concrete and irresponsible. This kind of un-concrete representation of man and of political relations, limits the public and all the luminosity of political life, giving rise to apathy and indifference. Man, concrete man, cannot see his place in such a system, and still less can he see the authorities responsible — his anonymous representative and others involved in the real process of political decision-making. Position and function lead to the privatisation of power, to elitist concept of society, to the total reification of social and personal relations, to the government of alienated and powerful representation, that of bureaucracy. This is the vital question of depersonalization which is perpetuated in socialism; a lack of relationship towards each man, particularly towards the person performing a public function — which, as I said earlier, results in abstract relations between people —; the absence of solidarity, for example, which creates a feeling of isolation, powerlessness, jeopardy, privatisation and loss of identity leading to social pathology which, we might say, is manifested in the permanent political investigations and trials, mass fear and frustration, the revival of nationalism and selfishness etc. The elements of representation, secrecy and compulsion become permanent. The anonymous representative life is suitable for maintaining domination over people, it suppresses all ideas of participation or self-determination in the traditional sense of European political philosophy.

Hence, if we consider that the entire problem of liberalism at its initial stage is exhausted in the question of independence being equated to possession (i. e. you are worth your market value), we shall have to continually submit these attitudes — insofar as they are incorporated in the very marrow of socialism — to Marx's critique of the political philosophy of liberalism, i. e. revive them and remorselessly apply them in our own practise. And we must do so in the full conviction that an abstract relation towards man removes man furthest from politics and politics from the service of man (where only that which is formal really counts as something which concerns the general interest, i. e. where the rights of truly general matters really remain only formal).

Classical liberal theory, especially in the 19th century, made society conscious of the scope of human creativity and the possibility of changing the conditions of life and the welfare of man. Socialism also began as an ideology of optimism which even took over the technical and utilitarian optimism of liberalism i. e. the optimism concerning the possibilities of the technical development of society and the attainment of material welfare. But it is here

that socialist optimism comes to an end, insofar as it retains that political machinery of which I spoke — in watered down Saint Simonism. Socialism converges with state welfare insofar as it does not aspire to surpass this undetermined liberal optimism with regard to the future, the optimism of political revolution which can mechanically reform the bourgeois universe but cannot possibly revolutionise it organically. Traditional and optimistic liberal theories do not separate their optimism from democracy itself but from a democracy which anatomy is made out of the commodity market and its political complement — the political individualism of the egoistic individual disguised as a plurality of political formations (Mill, Bentham and de Tocqueville). Hence it is a highly suspect practise to represent socialism as a balanced relation between the political state and economic liberalism, aimed at increasing material welfare and founded on an optimism rooted in an increase of personal expenditure. The idea of optimism is the first fruit of all progress in the material sphere but it certainly does not exhaust itself at this point. Socialism which aims at the welfare-state does not rise above politics. In this kind of socialism man continues to be a political man, i. e. the individual man has no hope of becoming a *generic being* in empirical life.

Naturally, the first institutionalised proletarian government, as we have seen, retained entire sections of the programme of liberal political philosophy, culminating in Stalin's theory of the strong state. The classical split between the private and political sphere was retained and this made it possible to embark upon a far-reaching process of rearrangement in which man remained in his position as a citizen, an owner, an official etc., but the world around him was inhuman, broken up, automatized, devoid of all traces of his generic being, of the realisation of the generic world. Under these conditions socialist democracy also remains only a policy, a technique of government, an activity within the framework of the state i. e. within the framework of prior given political parameters of organization and party, while the real life of the people was left aside. Political society — as we have learnt from these early institutions of socialism — is difficult to dissolve, for when the state remains and develops as the basic form of the political constitution of society, when the soviets, as the basic organs of direct democracy, become etatised — like the Bolshevik movement itself — one does not find that the duality has been removed between man and citizen, private and public life, people and politics, state and people, coercion and spontaneity. This is the problem of a socialism that can be created only with difficulty, a socialism of scarcity which grows into a stratified non-homogenous society, a society which of necessity perpetuates the classical political institutions.

This kind of socialism does not consider it fitting, either, to make use of the democratic experience left to us in the fund of representative democracy. A famous example is Stalin's theory concerning the so-called formal bourgeois freedoms, a theory

which still holds today although in 1936 he offered these freedoms in the Soviet Constitution as something which, when integrated into a socialist state, stood for the supreme realization of socialism. It was not only for Stalin and his contemporaries of the Third International that democracy of a representative type, political democracy of a class society, remained as a political ideal. Representation remained the form of a perfect bureaucratized society whose truth lay in co-opting and investiture accompanied by occasional plebiscites. This was the result of the institutionalised »dictatorship of the proletariat«, as class power, under the management of a political state which was identified with the avant-garde proletariat. This meant that the last barriers lying between Jacobinism and its natural end in despotism had been removed. I think that when we regard the so-called »political soul of revolution« (Marx) we must still pose the question of the change of political revolution as an essentially political act, that is, the question which Korsch raised in his treatises on Marxism.

The basic question of socialism, in fact, still remains how to overcome the political soul of revolution, how to establish the conditions for its becoming a social and universal act of total human emancipation. To this extent it is essential to constantly deepen one's criticism of the representative system of government by criticising every form of mediation in socialist society, especially the so-called »partocracies«, government by a party apparatus which relies exclusively on the state, the power of decree, the army and police, in which the avant-garde is always above the state and the constitution, beyond the reach of class and of the public, where elections are reduced to plebiscitary declarations which are in fact a form of guided administration of public affairs.

We might return to the question of how to achieve political emancipation in the sense in which it is imposed upon us by bourgeois society, how to take over its rational nucleus and outgrow it through universal human emancipation — for it is known that political emancipation is not the ultimate form of human liberation, but it should be the ultimate form of human emancipation within the existing social system. Every day we come up against political emancipation, which is undoubtedly a sign of great progress, but it is a point from which we must move further for we cannot be satisfied with political liberation. It is really just the threshold of the authentic life, of authentic freedom and creativity,

Here it would be most worthwhile to point to the contribution of libertarian and anarchist ideology and practise as an essential corrective to authoritarian »political socialism« from which not even Marx himself was immune. A careful analysis of Marx's practical tactics during and after the First International might reveal Marx as a politician following *realpolitik* who was able to refuse discussion and dismiss his assistants. For example, comrade Gluščević has cited the 1864 *Inaugural Address* to which I would only add that it is the result of Marx's compromises with a number of diffe-

rent attitudes and that it was written in a situation which forced Marx to agree to discussions with the libertarian movement and to allow them certain concessions which he later retracted (at the International Congress in the Hague, 1872). There are numerous situations in which Marx showed himself unwilling to accept the corrections offered by libertarian socialism, for example when he expresses his doubt that the proletariat is capable of organizing itself, and that the action of the proletariat must always be covered by the action of an organization — and frequently this is just a paternalistic gesture made by him and Engels. One need only read with some care the correspondence between Marx and Engels in which they discuss, for example, the British Labour movement, to see that they were often inclined to believe that it was absolutely inadmissible for this movement to develop without their personal intervention. And so it is once more necessary to open up the question of this complete obsession with the authoritarian means which supplement the theory of the avantgarde, in order to come to grips more successfully with the contemporary situation, to develop the critique of political emancipation, of the ideology of Staatsräson which is dominant in modern socialism, the critique of representative democracy as the sole possible democracy offered to us, a democracy whose basic presupposition is man as a subject. For, as long as we have on the one hand a select and dedicated avantgarde (men of real mettle) with a monopoly on truth and revolutionary action, and on the other hand a senseless, amorphous, uncultured mass (which is simply material for the builders of history), we shall always have to bring in those elements of mediation, thus stabilising the minority rule and depriving the rest of the community of the chance to participate in history, to solve the basic socio-philosophic confusion of socialism: how to avoid social evolution as a remorseless process, a predestined form of behaviour in which all human action is superfluous? We are agreed that socialism is conscious intervention born from man's real need to intervene in human history, and the most important question of socialism is: what are the possibilities for this kind of intervention, how far does it reach and what instruments does it use in the struggle to surmount the overripe world of the liberal structure? The empirical, authoritarian socialism of our times, as we have said has not often even attained this maturity shown in the fruits of our times.

From this standpoint we must also criticise the concrete expression of the Yugoslav socio-political system. Self-management as the potential negation of authoritarian politics has been forced into the background and so one asks, with justification, to what extent it is at all seriously intended. The basic requirement of socialism: *All power to the councils* (the workers councils, peasant councils etc) long ago became a jubilee slogan reminiscent of the romantic decade of the armed class struggle. There is no hope of raising the numerous serious questions of global social strategy in a way which at least would not offend the accepted norms of poli-

tical emancipation. Instead of allowing priority to the social question they offer us a national renaissance as the solution to all difficulties. Direct communal and labour democracies fade away before the renewed authority of an indirect, undercover policy inaccessible to the public. Parliamentarianism is becoming lost, suppressed by the agreement of elitist political institutions founded on national-territorial representation, in which the class and social content is completely neglected and succumbs to the interests of political pragmatism and egoism. Unemployment, socio-economic differences, economic instability, the withering away of moral values and the haziness of social goals etc. only help to augment this process.

Danko Grlić:

THE BOURGEOIS LIMITATION OF POLITICS

The critique of liberalism, that is, our standpoint in relation to liberalism and also to socialism, has thus far mainly revolved within the limits of certain partial problems, the limits of what liberalism represents as a political doctrine and as political ideology, and what it means in relation to certain other political ideologies and political doctrines. If we are to take our lead from the opening speech we might also discuss the question of what liberalism is like in relation to the state, then we might also ascertain what other doctrines exist which look differently on the relation between the state and the individual. We might also go into the question of how much socialism can become liberalised and how much it cannot; we could also discuss how much liberalism as an economic doctrine is based on private ownership, and set it up against other doctrines based, for instance, on social ownership. But in this case we will always be approaching the concept of liberalism from a more-or-less different but still political doctrine. When I said briefly that I did not think it was fundamental for liberalism that it is based exclusively on private property, I was thinking at the time primarily of the fact that a serious criticism, a real criticism of liberalism is a criticism of all policies, that the limits of liberalism are more-or-less, like those of many other similar doctrines, the limits of all political doctrines. It is not, then, only private ownership which is decisive in determining the true boundary of liberalism, for we heard that there are certain texts, even by the classic liberal writers, in which private ownership is rejected.

I have the feeling that we should be speaking of something different. What it comes to is this: we should be discussing what, in general, is meant by the political sphere as such. To put it more directly: I think we should show quite simply and clearly that all politics is mediation because all forms of politics need a kind of organization which must, quite simply because it is political, stand above those it represents. All forms of politics, then, always have in

some sense the same ambition -- to be the real, true and best (whichever you like) representative; that is, they aspire to be a representative avantgarde. This wery ambition means of necessity that in every political sphere there must emerge again a group of privileged, chosen people — call them, if you like, politicians or representatives — who will allegedly best represent the interests of the people themselves and, naturally, not work in the interests of politics as politics. This has never yet been acknowledged by any politician of any existing party, thus it is clear or, if you like, »normal«, that a profession should work primarily in the interests of its own profession. Consequently, if we are to criticise liberalism in relation to socialism, I completely agree with Trivo Indić that we should in the same way submit socialism, as an exclusively political doctrine, to criticism, that is to show simply that although many things have changed, even many things of importance in the economic sphere and also in the social sphere (e. g. public health insurance etc.), the role of political society as such has not radically changed. And political society, according to Marx, is bourgeois society, just as every political revolution is a bourgeois revolution, including the revolutions which often bear a socialist name. However, precisely because of this political character, they can still remain bourgeois revolutions and not social revolutions. But when the suggestion is raised that we can only reach true freedom through political liberation — and here I do not agree with Trivo Indić, if I have understood him correctly — in other words, that is is only, as they often say, by means of politics that we can abolish politics, then I cannot agree.

Trivo Indić:

Excuse me, I was against that.

Danko Grlić:

If you'll forgive me, I have written down: political liberation is way to true freedom.

Trivo Indić:

As long as no use is made of the machinery inherited from the liberals.

Mihailo Marković:

IS IT POSSIBLE TO ABOLISH POLITICAL MEDIATION

In listening to Trivo Indić and Danko Grlić one finds oneself asking: are you speaking of socialism or of what comes after socialism? Is socialism only a transition period or is it regarded as a society in which there are perhaps no longer any forms of intervention, or did Trivo Indić perhaps mean by intervention that in

socialism there should no longer be any forms of representation of the people in the central institutions of social power which are concerned with organization and control? Or is the criticism in fact chiefly aimed at the alienation of these social powers? If not, then not only does all Marxism collapse but all other possible schemes of modern developed society as well. One cannot really even imagine society without certain central institutions, no matter whether they be called congresses of workers or something else.

The kind of society Marx spoke of was a society which has already attained a high level of development in its production power and which in the battle against nature has already succeeded in solving some of the key questions of human survival and human development. Any such highly industrialized and integrated society requires some institutions concerned with organization and control. The basic problem is, in fact: how can one avoid alienation, how can one prevent this organized general will from becoming an alienated will? Actually, there will always be representatives at the top who continue to speak in the name of this general will, who continue to speak in the name of the people, but who in fact already have a clearly formed particular interest, people who will do their best to secure their own place in the hierarchy of power and, if possible, stay there for good. Thus, socialism, or whatever comes after it, must decide first how to prevent the alienation of the organs of representation and, second, how to achieve a synthesis between direct and representative democracy. Now, following from what Danko Grlić said, another question arises: if we agree that in all previous class-structured societies the political sphere was one of alienation and that all political institutions, above all the state and political parties, have been institutions which alienate the social power of man, we are still left with the problem of politics in the widest sense: as the organization and control of a developed and integrated society. It is certain that Marx used the term politics in this sense. He undoubtedly considered that in a reified society a political revolution (speaking first of political emancipation and later of political revolution) was essential in order to break down the apparatus of alienated social power and to build up a new communist society.

Ljubo Tadić:

But there are different solutions and different kinds of socialism.

Mihailo Marković:

No more radical solution can be seen. That is, political revolution means the breakdown of alienated political power.

Trivo Indić:

But not of the conditions which very often create politics.

Mihailo Marković:

That is quite another question. A political revolution is essential; whether one should begin with it, however, is another question. I think that a radical transformation of society may begin with a cultural or even an economic revolution, and not with the abolition of the existing political power. I do not feel that one is necessarily forced to begin with a political revolution. However in this total revolutionary transformation a political revolution would mean the breakdown of the alienated social power which had become entrenched in a political form. This kind of political revolution is a necessary condition for making the transition from a reified society to communism. With Marx the solution is quite clear. One cannot speak of permanently setting of a new political government. Marx says that an armed proletariat must hold the power and at times he also says that they should organize themselves temporarily as a state so that all the institutions of alienated power might be progressively abolished. Following this surgical operation on capitalism one would have to move as soon as possible towards forming an association of immediate producers. A society organized into associations is, incontestably, highly organized and highly integrated. This leads to a synthesis between direct and indirect democracy, so that we are no longer left with the state or with politics in the old sense of the words. This is the solution given in Marx's theory. I would be interested to see an alternative solution, if one exists. It is not clear how the state, which has to prepare the ground for the association of immediate producers, will ever of its own accord take its last bow from the stage of history. Nor is it clear how the state will be forced off the stage or who will make it go. One might perhaps suspect that Marx was naive or over-optimistic. He did not, it seems, foresee all the dangers of the transition period, for there is really no guarantee that in this transition stage the institutions holding indirect political power will not grow stronger, settle in, develop a vested interest in the preservation of the *status quo*, and consequently turn into political institutions in the old sense of the word.

Miladin Životić:

I should like to point out something: nowhere did Marx speak of the possibility of a political system of government by the working class as a class. This attitude does not appear anywhere. Government by the working class is impossible in the form of the state.

Mihailo Marković:

In Marx's works it is perfectly clear that by »the dictatorship of the proletariat« he understands the existence of a »workers state«. I have just been re-reading the passages in question and can state with certainty that there are several passages in Marx where he speaks of the fact that the working class, the proletariat, must organise itself as a state.

Ljubo Tadić:

That is, set up a democracy. But what is the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat if not political power?

Mihailo Marković:

Quite so. Marx himself emphasized that precisely the idea of dictatorship of the proletariat constituted his own contribution to the theory of class struggle. This is what I wanted to say. This is why it is instructive to study liberalism, especially that liberalism which has gravitated towards socialism. Liberalism was conscious of this problem and found some solutions to it. If we were also to accept these solutions and put them into practise we would find ourselves on a far higher political level than we are today. The principle of rotation, for example, is a principle of liberalism. I am not thinking here of rotation in the same level among the upper echelons of the state. What is meant is true vertical replacement. People who are elected for a certain period of time must leave the positions of power when their mandates expire. Or, to take another example, liberalism introduced the principle of the division of power, the principle that judicial power must be independent from legislative power, and both from executive power. This principle has not been practised anywhere under socialism. Or, again, take the principle that the leaders should be elected, instead of being professional functionaries, for life or for many decades. Then there is the principle of decentralization. This idea appears in Jefferson: that the entire country should be divided into self-governing local units which would decide not only on local matters but also on all important social questions. These questions would, at a certain moment, be discussed in all the units: the conclusion reached would be collected at one place and serve as the basis for decision making. It is only in this way that the individual citizen could exert direct influence on decision-making and on broader social questions. This entire political concept is based on the idea of pluralism instead of the idea of the monolithic nature of a political system. In the earlier progressive liberalism there are many such ideas which help to set up some partial, limited barriers to the process of alienating political power. In the authoritarian forms of government, in socialism, we come up against a far higher degree of political alienation than we had in certain liberal societies. I think that the central problem of our discussion is: how to prevent — in the very process of revolution, or, more precisely, even before the beginning of revolution, during those first stages in the organising of the revolutionary forces — how to prevent all that has happened in previous socialist revolutions, that is, rapid alienation of the revolutionary *avantgarde*?

ALL POLITICS IS ALIENATED

I should just like to say a few words concerning prof. Marković's remarks. First of all, I do not consider that anything has been solved simply because it was solved by Marx. I think that it is, in this case, after Marx that we really have exceptionally rich experience which has led us to be far more radical than even Marx himself in raising the question of the political sphere altogether, and not of certain possible corrections within it, for instance progressive or less progressive politics. When we speak, for instance, of the fact that liberalism began as an ideology of optimism, and when we speak of how the socialist countries at the beginning, after October, had an optimistic vision of the world etc., and then immediately go on to say that they changed into something different, we must then ask what it was that caused all these movements to change into something different, something opposed to these first fresh resurgences. I think it is politics, and nothing else.

Politics is of necessity an alienated form of existence, but when I say »of necessity« I want at the same time to stress that we are not talking at all of evil people, of immoral or bad people who need some improvement, whose characters need to be changed : in some way, we are talking of the political sphere which of necessity produces deformed, alienated forms of life which, as something unavoible, stand for the battle for power and the establishment of the existing order. Nothing here is essentially changed, not even when, let us say, some »good« man turns up, and says: »Well, look, I don't need to rule over anybody, I don't need all the prerogatives of power, I don't wish to curtail anybody's personal freedom, I reject all that, I don't want to be a self-styled politician, I am democrat«. Whith the best will in the world he will not be able like this to change the institutions which have been created as political institutions and which, in effect, exist in order to become involved in the life of a society — as long as he is a politician he cannot destroy them. Of course, there are politicians and politicians, and they must be judged differently, but still politics as a whole does create a certain type of man who, no matter whether he is moral or immoral, must be included in the sphere, which has to function in the way that all political spheres work. He must be disciplined if he wants to be a politician, he must adopt certain attitudes, even when his own opinion may be diferent, he must obey the orders of his superiors and the party hierarchy etc. He will, perhaps, be a slightly better man and, in one of his brighter moments, may say: why not leave the philosophers to talk freely about whatever they like, then the problem of philosophers will be apparently solved in the framework of politics as well. But it certainly will not be solved because this kind of politician will always have institutions behind him which will enable him, whenever he feels it necessary, to quash this very same free discussion. This will always be a truly unavoi-

dable fact as long as the political state exists as a political state, as long as the politician has the power to govern people — and he must have this power, for a politician without it is worthless. He must — according to his profession and the sphere to which he belongs — work in this way, as we have seen so far in all political structures, so it is indeed sad that we philosophers must here have recourse to the empiricism and not to the logic of things. For if some people do not find this contained immanently in the very concept of politics, then I hope it is still evident that the entire empirical reality of all political doctrines points to it. I would be glad if somebody could quote me an example to the contrary.

Mihailo Marković:

The Paris Commune.

Danko Grlić:

The Paris Commune suffered in the political world precisely because at a certain moment it ceased to be political, for, as we know, the Central Committee itself, as the political power, handed in its resignation. Not so? Thus, it ceased to be a political revolution and this, in fact, is its greatest value. We need only recall the declaration of the Central Committee: »Unknown until a few days ago we return unknown to the people, and we shall show those who govern that a man can walk down the steps of the City Hall with his head held high«. This is rarely quoted; even when the Paris Commune is mentioned with enthusiasm it is not mentioned. It is, in fact, this handing over of political power, this negation of politics as a political sphere, that is forgotten. Finally, I should just like to say this: let us not equate this negation of the political sphere, as political, — though this is often done now and, in my opinion, wrongly done — with the negation of all possible social organization. These are two different things. Marković said that I deny the possibility of all organization and so, too, the possibility of any workers corporations etc. If I deny the political sphere, I am not denying but rather affirming the possibility of *direct* organization of the working class.

Trivo Inđić:

SOCIALISM AS A STATE OF CONSTANT IMPERMANENCE

I have only two brief remarks to add. First, I think it would be dangerous to use the concept of representation in the technical sense. So I would like to define it rather a method of withholding the individual from all forms of engagement and not a speech in the name of the individual in the colloquial sense — which again leads us towards the point where we might confuse the problems of

centralisation and democracy, for I think that they do not exclude one another. You have yourselves mentioned Jefferson and Jackson, but I have the impression that socialism is inevitably a form of federalism, not federalism as we most often imagine it — which is founded on a national basis — but the federalism of social, manufacturing and human associations. The second question touches upon the definition of what you said about socialism as a transitional phase. I think that the vital question is: how should socialism itself be regarded? Is it a transition platform, a cleansing post which will lead us straight to communism or is it, unfortunately, something else, a phase, an interim phase which takes for granted the fact that one will pass straight on to the social revolution once power has been taken over? Unfortunately, this questions is often shrugged aside because socialism is always considered as a state of constant impermanence. And in the name of this impermanence nothing is done, nothing changes and a state of uncertainty is permanently established, allowing for discretionary power and authoritarian government, leading even to the most terrible consequences — personal despotism. It is my conviction, since we are now talking of socialism, that it is by no means an interim phase living a life of its own, but one of those indispensable links in the chain which must pull us further towards a concrete utopia, and hence I feel it is most necessary to criticise Lenin as a person who contributed, in a most shortsighted way, to the destruction of the soviets. During the early period he immediately separated the soviets and the party, and so at the start weakened the labour and party democracy. I need hardly mention the libertarian trend which was brought out in the Mahno movement where the masses, several million people, tried to lead a federalist life, even under the most difficult conditions, when there was armed intervention by the imperialists (1919—1921). These people managed through self-organization to form organs of defence, of education and economy, under conditions which were far harder than those faced later by the soviet government. Not to mention other movements, such as the Spanish Civil War and the C.N.T. So, I feel that socialism cannot be considered as a state of constant impermanence because this only helps to postpone the problems of the implementation of the social revolution and the problems of surmounting political authoritarianism.

Mihailo Marković:

My impression is, however, that the evil is not in the fact that organs of representation must exist but that under certain circumstances they cease to be truly representative organs and turn public and general matters into their own private affairs, so that politics becomes the sphere of alienation. Grlić's question is as follows: is this necessary, that is, is this necessity incorporated in the very nature of politics as such? Experience thus far has shown that this problem of alienation has always been with us. But is alienation necessary? This is now the question. Is it conditioned by the very

nature of politics as such, or is there some more specific answer to this question? It is not a good thing, I feel, to treat this only as an economic problem, just as it is also not good to treat it as only a political problem. The two must be linked right from the start.

Andrija Krešić:

ON SOCIAL OWNERSHIP

It seems to me that this necessity is not given in politics as such but that the politicians' habit of turning public affairs into their own private matters, so often attested empirically, enters the category of economics and comes into close touch with existing forms of private ownership . . .

Danko Grlić:

In the Soviet Union, for example?

Andrija Krešić:

. . . No matter where. I shall now tell you what I mean by private ownership. I do not take private ownership to be simply the private property of the owner, I have in mind all those forms of ownership which exist at the cost of depriving somebody else of ownership. We know that family ownership is also private ownership. This means that it is, in a sense, private ownership because it deprives somebody else of private ownership.

Ljubo Tadić:

Private ownership as deprivation.

Andrija Krešić:

The concept of socially owned property ought to mean the opposite of all kinds of private ownership. And collective ownership is private insofar as it deprives somebody else of the same goods. Group ownership is also a type of private ownership and forms the basis of liberal thought and behaviour, and even of the system which is somewhat more liberal than the one we call Stalinism.

In this time Stalin had a reason for considering *kolhoz* ownership a historically lower form of *sovhoz* ownership, but at the same time he identified state ownership (the *sovhoz*) with social ownership. State ownership is again a form of private ownership because the state is not the same as society as a whole.

If we have established that private ownership of a certain type is the basis of the liberal concept of society and that social ownership is the basis of the socialist concept, then socialism, as the antithesis of liberalism, can only mean the abolition of this and all other types of private ownership. This brings us to another

question: is it possible to set up a truly social form of ownership as a negation of private ownership altogether without eliminating the effect of the law of value?

I think that socialism, from the economic point of view, is in fact an elimination of the law of value and an affirmation of the law »to each according to his work« and, finally, »to each according to his needs«. The stress shifts on to the use value which, in the end, is all that is left. True social ownership at this level, however, is possible only when people lose the need for ownership, especially for the ownership of the means of production, in order to satisfy their human requirements. This already implies a state of material plenty in which the principle »*everything is everybody's*« will prevail because it will be unnecessary for anything to belong to anybody. The law of value is completely abolished and it is possible to imagine a state of total social ownership.

The question must be asked: What form of ownership is possible here today that would signify a historical step forwards in emancipating man from the sway of material things? It is clear that on the agenda we will not have a victory of social ownership in the full sense, with full identity given to social ownership and public use. But we may come round to considering the direct establishment of a true *working class* disposition of socially owned goods to replace the present duality between state and group disposition. This is a real historical step forward, although, as I have already pointed out, the difference remains between the right of ownership and the right to use what is owned. When the working class as a whole directly handles socially owned property, there still remains the *group* disposition of *common* property, but the conflict between production and disposition is removed. Now personal participation in production is a measure for personal participation in the use of socially owned property. Here the class as a subject is not open to intervention either from the state or from the law of value. What matters now is simply how to organise this so that class regulation should really be the concern of the working class as a whole and not that of somebody acting »in the name of the class«.

Miladin Životić:

THE AMBIVALENCE OF MARX'S CONCEPT OF THE STATE

I should like to offer two observations. When touching upon the criticism which has been directed here at Marx and his theory of the need to organize the proletariat into a state after the victory of the socialist revolution, and of the proletariat's relation to the state, one should speak of the ambivalence of Marx's thinking. One should bear in mind the different ways of treating the role of the state which are offered, on the one hand, by the theory of the

emancipation of all mankind, and, on the other hand, Marx's criticism of the anarchists, for example, especially of Proudhon. I think that despite this ambivalence, Marx's thinking cannot be used to serve the ideology of a Stalinist or neo-Stalinist type concerning the rule of the working class and socialism as a political system in which the working class can take over power. Marx's critique of socialism as a *political* system is very well known. I think it is sufficient for us to recall the enthusiasm with which Marx greeted the political acts of the Paris commune, by which political power was limited. It is hard to find in Marx a foothold for a theory deferring any kind of postponement whatsoever of this direct withering away of politics immediately after the socialist revolutionary victory.

When talking of Marx's polemic with the anarchists one should not forget his insistence on the fact that a process of withering away of the political sphere is necessary and that revolution is not an act which can directly and immediately destroy the political sphere. I do not think that it would be easy to consider Marx's theory a good point of support for Lenin in his battle against workers' opposition.

When speaking both of human nature and of the working class, Marx has no illusions about man in general or about workers. He speaks of the need to change the working class from a class *in itself* to a class *for itself*. The working class as the force behind the emancipation of all mankind is a transcendental concept. Hence, one should distinguish between empirical and transcendental concepts. These latter, philosophical concepts only give expression to the possibilities which man and class carry within them and on the basis of which they are enabled to be something different from what they in fact are. If we are justifiably most sceptical when it comes to considering the Party as *avantgarde*, this is a very good reason for wondering what would be an adequate form for raising the working class from the level of the existing, the empirical, to the level of self-awareness. This is certainly not the Stalinist theory of the *avantgarde*, but would it be wise to reject the idea outright in any form whatsoever?

Ljubo Tadić:

One brief observation, not mine, but a passage which might serve as a stimulus to reflection about the national tribune: The letter written by Joseph Proudhon on the 25th July 1855 to Alexander Herzen runs as follows: »Before attacking the despotism of rulers is it not more often necessary to begin by destroying it in the soldiers of freedom? Do you know of anything more like tyranny than a national tribune, and have you not often been struck by the fact that the wrath of the persecutor is as odious as the intolerance of the martyr? Do you believe, for instance, that Russian autocracy is simply the result of brute force and dynastic intrigues? Does it not have its hidden foundations, its secret roots in the Russian nation?«

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

I find a question arising from what Danko Grlić insisted upon: to what extent, within the framework of politics and using political means, can certain of the basic aims of socialist and human emancipation be achieved? I would put this question in a concrete form (I think it is of great importance that we should be discussing it at the present moment): is our state dying away within the framework of politics or is it dying away as political power? I think that here the state is dying away only within the framework of politics and so I think that what Trivo Indić said is far more acceptable. Systems of representation are spreading and spreading. We have had general elections, direct elections; now we are moving on to elections through representatives. The borough councils elect our representatives and not we, ourselves, directly. The network of the delegatory system is constantly spreading in the communes. So, precisely because we are today involved with the dying away of the state only within the framework of politics, we can say with certainty, I feel, that in our country the dying away of the state as political power has not yet begun. This is the key question.

Trivo Indić:

I have only one question, but I think it is a vital question: how can we overcome the diabolic state in which the avantgarde begins to doubt in human material? I think that Miladin Životić did not have his full say on this point. What does it mean when we ask whether we can rely on human material? This question involves Stalin's principle that everything should be handled by the cadres, leading directly to a party elitism, and this doubt, this lack of trust in the people means, in my opinion, simply a postponement of restoration no matter whether it is in 1918 or 1968. Fifty years of socialism has not cleared up the problem of human resources. We have restoration in 1968.

Dragoljub Mićunović:

Since we are still moving within the circle described for us by Danko Grlić, I think that in this case it is important to decide whether or not we are caught up in a misunderstanding. What we are speaking of is political emancipation. There is no need to mystify this concept. For Marx emancipation meant equality under the law, the assurance of legal equality for all; this means the freedom of each citizen to share equally in public life. And it is here that the concept of political emancipation ends for Marx.

Danko Grlić:

I fear that in the heat of discussion we may have forgotten two of Marx's important attitudes. One is that political revolution is a bourgeois revolution, i.e. not a revolution determined by any particular form of politics — all political revolutions are bourgeois revo-

lutions. That is the first. The second is: political man is *homo duplex*, every political man and not just man under a specific form of politics.

Mihailo Marković:

It is the alienated politics of which we spoke.

Danko Grlić:

No. Marx does not say — and he does know what he's talking about — that an alienated political revolution is bourgeois, but that a political revolution is a bourgeois revolution. It is most important that this should be understood. In fact, I wonder whether a non-alienated politics exists at all.

Miladin Životić:

This is not a question of essential importance. What is essential is whether politics will die away or be abolished, whether one can use political means to bring the political sphere to an end. I agree that Marx is ambivalent at this point, when he speaks of the political revolution as a step in the social revolution. But he also speaks of the social revolution which goes beyond all political horizons.

Mihailo Marković:

Everywhere he speaks of the political revolution as the first step of the social revolution.

Danko Grlić:

But at the same time he speaks of political revolution as being exclusively bourgeois. He never says that political revolution is social revolution.

Mihailo Marković:

No, just the first step of social revolution. How can one abolish the political apparatus of the bourgeoisie without political revolution?

Danko Grlić:

No, it isn't the first step of the social revolution because then politics would immediately become independent.

Trivo Inđić:

The aims must already be contained in the means.

Ljubo Tadić:

I think that this entire discussion arises from the habit of taking Marx's thinking as authoritative and final. But in Marx's thinking there is a constant ambivalence between the authoritarian

and libertarian principles. And I think he remained ambivalent all his life — this is an elementary fact we should always bear in mind. I shall never forget one of the texts of his early period — when he had already formulated his attitude to the proletariat — the passage in which he criticises Robespierre. I quoted this text in my paper on »The Socialist Revolution and Political Power«. Now, he criticises Robespierre for remaining within the limits of »political reason«. Marx used the word »*Verstand*«. His entire criticism of the failure of the French Revolution is based on this political limitation. However, in a letter to Wiedermayer, in which he outlines his idea of dictatorship of the proletariat, one can feel the resigned attitude of a libertarian breaking out, that is, Marx's ambivalence emerges and he returns to Robespierre's limits of political reason when he says that the transition period must be a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. I am making a special point of this because all socialist revolutions have been literally impregnated with this ambivalence. They were half plebeian and anarchist, half inspired by the principle of rule. Trivo Indić expressed his faith in the »plebs«, by which he meant that there is no revolution if it is not a revolution from below, and also that there is no democracy if it is not a democracy from below. Revolution from above is *contradictio in adjecto*. This is the basic idea and, so to speak, the *memento* of libertarian socialism.

Dragoljub Mićunović:

There is no revolution without thoughts and personalities.

Ljubo Tadić:

Bakunyn was the one who insisted most on that. I once quoted a passage from Bakunyn — a passage which leads to confusion. He was writing about the revolutionary minority which acts as the pilot of revolution. Revolutionaries emerge as the bringers of happiness to the people, as those who act on behalf of the unconscious masses — the masses whom Miladin Životić, with some justification, considers dangerous and capable of lynching. But why the masses should turn to lynching is another question. It all boils down to the meaning of the word »people«. The Romans drew a distinction between »*populus*« and »*vulgus*«, between the people and the masses, the mob. Bakunin offered an interesting idea concerning the people as the »unbridled poor«. Unbridled means without reins, that is, *liberated*.

Trivo Indić:

A critique of the theory of the avantgarde is essential because it implies a lack of trust in the people from the very outset. This is why I think that anarchism, in certain of its variants — precisely with regard to trust in the people — differs radically from communism of the authoritarian type. One cannot, I think, imagine any kind of renewal of Marxism unless the impoverished subject of the

political and social revolution is consistently criticised, but this, in the long run, leads to the theory of of the avantgarde. I feel that the concept of the people should again be emancipated (in the sense of the revolutionary plebs) from politics, which is the characteristic trait of authoritarian manner of thinking. Marx not infrequently has an aristocratic scorn for the mob, the people, unlike his contemporaries who belonged to the libertarian movement. This is why Marx did not understand even the Paris commune, that is, he did not foresee such an event happening. Marx never lived among the people, he never »joined the masses«; Marx was more often to be found roaming around congress halls and libraries, unlike Blanqui, Bakunin, Malatesta and others — and this is an important human difference between anarchists and authoritarian socialists. This is why I think that the anarchist inheritance lies essentially in reviving faith in the concept of the people, in the plebs as a historical factor, in the so-called broad popular initiative about which we are constantly boasting but which, in fact, we utterly ignore.

Kosta Čavoški:

THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF LIBERALISM IN THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

I should like to try to examine once again what is, in my opinion, the basic problem of liberalism — the question of its relation to political power. Most people who spoke in the debate today rightly pointed out that the only true communist solution is to be found beyond the political power as a repressive order. Since, however, it is by no means certain that this day will soon come, it might be a good idea to consider the organization of power from the liberal point of view and, as Mihailo Marković said, search for certain permanent values and trends in liberalism which could stand up to judgement even in our times.

In his introductory speech Ljubomir Tadić said that liberalism both wants and does not want democracy, but this to a great extent depends on what is understood by democracy. If democracy is taken in its original sense, as the rule of the plebs — or of the poor — then the liberals, especially John Locke and the American founders of the Constitution, viewed this kind of democracy with considerable mistrust. Democratic theory normally begins from the belief that power is least dangerous in the hands of the majority and that all people are more or less equally capable of using it reasonably and responsibly. Wariness and lack of faith in those who hold the power, and optimism and faith in the ability of the people to handle the public affairs, are the essential principles of democracy.

The liberals, however, did not have great faith in this kind of democracy. They quite rightly observed that majority rule can give

rise to its own antithesis, a tyranny of the majority over the minority and individuals. This is why the guarantee for the democratic order is not sought only in the direct and responsible participation of the people in active government, but also in such an organization of the government itself as will enable the government to be limited within itself so that there would be less threat to individual freedom and the rights of the minority. So Locke expounded his idea of limited government, a government which, in the name of popular sovereignty, would be limited in its aims and methods and which would not encroach upon the sphere of the natural and inalienable human rights and freedoms. Later the founders of the American constitution enriched this idea with their principle of constitutionalism, which would ensure that the constitution had a favourable standing vis-à-vis the power-holders and public authorities, and would provide a counterweight to all forms of self-will and usurpation of power. Of course, they were thinking primarily of the protection of private property, but the principle of constitutionality always afforded a means of defence for other individual rights and freedoms which, unlike private property, stand above all times through their constant worth.

The idea of constitutionality in America is rooted in the idea that there exist fundamental principles which form the foundations of society and the state and which curb political power and the people who wield it. Mistrust is expressed particularly in the unlimited power of the majority, manifested in the sweeping powers of the Legislative Representative Assembly. In his celebrated *Notes on Virginia* Thomas Jefferson said that the 173 despots who made up the legislative body of Virginia would certainly be just as despotic as one tyrant. And those who doubt this, says Jefferson, need only consider the experience of Venice whose government was turned into *electoral despotism*.

The most celebrated liberal of the 19th cent., John Stewart Mill, developed his idea of freedom along the lines of this tradition of mistrust in the unlimited power of the majority. The concept of democracy as majority rule, which even in ancient Greece had a somewhat plebeian understone, always tends towards the idea of positive freedom, freedom for something. As a liberal by choice, Mill preferred the idea of freedom as the absence of any kind of limitation or compulsion, the idea of negative freedom, freedom from something. His lasting merit lies in the fact that he revived the idea that democracy might be misused, and that the individual and the minority would be completely subordinated to the community or the majority. In stressing the need for unlimited intellectual freedom, Mill was to a certain extent defending this freedom from democracy as well. Realising, however, that absolute freedom for private initiative need not lead to the establishment of social freedom for all, Mill inclined partly towards the idea of positive freedom as well. But not even in his most famous work, *On Freedom*, did Mill manage to overcome this dualism. Thus in the first, second and third chapters, in which he considers the political and

intellectual aspects of freedom, Mill lays weight almost exclusively on negative freedom, freedom from compulsion, and all other limitations, including mediocrity rule and the pressure of a mass of commonplace spirits in democratic society, while in the fourth and fifth chapters, in which he is concerned with the social and economic aspects of freedom, he makes a significant approach towards the idea of positive freedom without abandoning his basic orientation.

The idea of constitutionality as a means of limiting omnipotent power, regardless of whether this power is in the hands of individuals, a minority or a majority, stands for one of the permanent trends of liberalism which may also be applied to political power in socialism. The principle of constitutionality, however, does not mean what it is normally considered to mean — the existence of a written constitution providing for the organization of the highest organs of government. The meaning of the words *constitution* and *constitutionality*, in their original sense, is very well shown by the word »ustava« (a dyke or dam) from which the word »ustav (constitution) originates in Serbo-Croatian. During the reign of Prince Miloš, the first Serbian constitution was designed to dam back the absolutism of Miloš, to curb the ruler's self-will and to act as barrier to all absolute and unlimited power. Constitutionality, considered in this light, as a dam against power and a guarantee of the freedom and rights of the individual and the minority, has not been achieved even in modern socialism, not even in our country. The very fact that the Yugoslav constitution is frequently and rapidly changed — so that for many it is merely a temporary political arrangement which will be changed again a few years later when the power structure is altered at the centre of political might — eloquently testifies to how little importance is given to those principles of constitutionality established by liberalism.

The second important heritage of liberalism is the idea of the rule of law, which is indeed older than liberalism but which flourished fully only under liberalism. This idea is not quite caught by the German word *Staatsrecht* which is to a certain extent simply an apology for the state, the means of rationalization and the perfection of state power. The English term Rule of Law is better suited to the idea, for, like liberalism, it is rooted in the theory of natural right and expresses deep and lasting distrust for the government of state leaders. This idea of the rule of law, which stresses the value of human freedom and human dignity, is a principle which modern socialism can only accept and develop further, especially when it comes to guaranteeing the rights of individuals and of the minority. Yet it is just in this respect that socialism has let us down the most. This elementary guarantee of legal security, beginning with the principle that a man cannot be arrested without good reason and legal justification, which was already coming into practice in England in the 18th cent., has yet to be satisfactorily implemented in modern socialist countries, including Yugoslavia.

The principle of the rule of law is based on a particular form of the division of power, that is on the independence of the judiciary in relation to the executive government. If today, under the influence of the Jacobin government and the Paris Commune, we dispute the strict division of power into executive and legislative, the independence of the judiciary assumes an indisputable political worth. The moral dignity and independence of the judges have offered a means of defending the individual from the self-will of executive powers which, it seems, make an equally necessary appearance in socialism as well. In socialist countries, however, the basic centres of political power have never seriously accepted such a role for the judiciary, instead they have attempted to turn it into a mere weapon and to fill the judiciary with people who will more be governed by reasons of immediate political suitability and less likely to pass judgement in conformity with the intellectual dignity and moral integrity of their profession and with the more permanent principles of law and justice. How can one otherwise explain the fact that in Yugoslavia a person can be a Public Prosecutor and move on immediately to being head of the Supreme Court, or that someone can first work on state security and in the Home Office, and then become a judge?

I would like to mention just one more principle which was established by liberalism along the lines of the ancient model — the principle according to which the government can be changed, and also the principle that nobody is indispensable. At the end of the 18th cent., when the United States won their independence and became a new form of federal community, the possibility existed that George Washington, who enjoyed immense popularity and whose authority was everywhere acknowledged, might turn his presidential power into something permanent and introduce a form of monarchy. After two successive presidential mandates, however, Washington refused in 1796 to run for a third time as presidential candidate although the constitution of 1787 allowed for such a possibility. He felt that his great personal popularity and the reputation he had gained as President might prevent others, equally deserving and worthy of respect, from running in the campaign. And for almost 150 years respect was paid to the political principle of limiting the possibility of re-election after two successive mandates. Then came Franklin D. Roosevelt, who ran four times for president and was each time elected with a greater majority. But after his death the XXII amendment to the 1787 Constitution was adopted, thus making it constitutionally impossible for anyone to be three times elected president.

In socialist countries, however, fundamental changes in the political leadership are far from regular. New people do not move in and out of the highest positions at regular intervals. This is why it is usually left to nature to do what cannot be done by man. If changes do come about which are not effected by natural necessity they are the result of internal and secretly prepared court revolutions and fractional party showdowns (as with the deposition

of Krushev), or else changes wrought by force in times of open crisis when a part is sacrificed to save the whole (as with Gomulka in Poland). So far there have been no regular changes following the more permanent heritage of liberalism; instead the methods of excommunication or disguised deposition are being used. Hence one must again stress that it is necessary and just that people who have been in power should return, when they are no longer in power, to face public judgement on their past rule. In its time this was the great heritage of liberalism in relation to the despotism of the Middle Ages.

Today this liberal heritage does not, I admit, represent the greatest achievements in revolutionary and humanist thinking; I also admit that the attitude of liberalism towards political power usually revolves around the better or worse organization of power, that is, as Danko Grlić wittily put it, the problem of whether we will have a better or worse head of police. Well, if only this choice remains, I'm sure you will admit that it is better to have a good head of police.

V. CULTURAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGICAL A PRIORI AND DOCTRINAIRE ATTITUDES

Dobrica Ćosić

I shall read you a few notes which were directly inspired by your reflections and by the debate. I am naturally conscious, like yourselves, of the intellectual risks involved in this kind of improvisation and in this polemical simplification which, through lack of time, I was unable to avoid when formulating these arguments.

First, a word or two in general about our attitudes and approaches in understanding and evaluating the historical issue of liberalism and socialism. I have the impression that in the approaches we use to gain this understanding there is still to be found a subtly formed but nevertheless fully present ideological a priori attitude within the frame work of Marxism, even when we declare ourselves with theoretic convincingness to be opposed to certain clearly untenable decrees. By and large our spirit is permeated and burdened with nineteenth century ideological doctrines: too fierce and emotional an emphasis is placed on the political view of freedom, man's existence is simplified and history politicised. I have the impression that, in relation to the past, our universal-humanist and temporal vision has sometimes been obscured or even completely extinguished. If we are in principle opposed to the so-called political society, with all its implications, then it is logical and essential that in history and human practise we should incorporate culture as a whole, the heritage of civilization and the technical and organizational power of social communities. That is, we should truly and convincingly strive to approach a totality of the human historical being. It is hard to realise that in 1971 we are thinking about liberalism and socialism, at the time of the technical and technological civilization, that is, from a qualitatively new historical situation for man. Our historical reality is new but the effective ideology of socialism in all its various forms, including the already abandoned Programme of the Yugoslav League of Communists,

formulated in 1958, is as a whole anachronistic and powerless to inspire the people, the working class, and the nation to build up new socialist civilizations.

Let us return, however, to the main topic of our gathering. Have we not, perhaps, underrated the historical heritage of the philosophy of liberalism? In considering the social issues of liberalism we have not even uttered a word about its effect on culture, art, and science, and especially about its merits in affirming the layman's spirit and thoughts, man's entire personality and individuality. If we are to think more consistently it is difficult to ignore the fact that our entire modern culture is based on liberalism and bourgeois society — which was essentially constituted around the philosophy of liberalism. With the emergence of modern science a new art developed which, in essence, went beyond Christian civilization, opening up new frontiers and more integral humanist possibilities for man. Although I was most convinced by the critique of the ideology of liberalism which Ljubo Tadić formulated with such lucidity, and although this conviction was confirmed by the other speakers debating the pros and cons of the same line of thought with equal strength, I must, upon reflection, put the question both to myself and to you: has not the ideology of liberalism, as the forerunner of the idea of freedom of the personality in recent history, been too easily underrated? I mean, have we not slighted the historical merits of the philosophy of liberalism, which — with all its historical limitations and all the motivations of the so-called »egoistic epoch« — has actually helped to develop and enrich thinking about freedom, provided it with an economic and legal basis, and placed the greatest emphasis on the social and human value of freedom in all recent history? I have, of course, gone to some pains to understand and see through to the degradation and degeneration of liberalism under present conditions and to appreciate the reasons for the politically and ideologically reactionary form it has taken on today. But then I find myself asking: is it not in fact liberalism, in the so-called new age of European history, that is the fullest and most lasting effective European ideology? If it is, then we don't need Hegel to come to such a conclusion.

There may be serious empirical reasons why the possibility of making socialism effective today is conditioned by a complex of multiple factors, for traditional socialist and reigning ideology have dogmatically simplified, to the point of inefficacy, the factors and motivations of socialism under modern conditions. The fact that the socialist programme has not been realised cannot, I feel, be more fully and exactly explained merely by offering proof of the betrayal of Marxist ideology, of the party programme etc. Betrayal, as is well known, is a markedly theological, and moralistic concept. If we were really concerned only, or chiefly, with the betrayal of ideology, then the historical drama of socialism would be only a second showing, another chapter in the traditional chronicle of power and of the morals of human power-hunger and egoism. In

socialist government despotism and monarchy, the frequent and determined use of brute force and terror, the policy of total repression and the curtailment of freedom, can no longer be convincingly explained away by that all-purpose metaphor, that concept shrouded in mystery-alienation. Can one today, after two and a half thousand years of European political history, still believe in the possibility of so-called non-alienation of the subject of government? Whoever believes in this wins my true admiration for his agility of mind. Modern man is certainly not just a poor fellow who reads the newspapers. Modern man is Sisyphus whose stone is ideology.

Man's first question today is, I feel: what can man do, what is he no longer allowed to do? There are historical reasons, I should say, for the fact that we inject our intellectual powers a strong dose of imaginative scepticism. Both in principle and all round. In this age of industrialised, ready made, consumer optimism, there are good reasons for spreading integral scepticism and the consciousness that man's future remains uncertain. It strikes me that imaginative scepticism towards the powers, aims and projects of the modern world, is one of the richest and most satisfactory forms of humanism today, if not the only true form of humanism. We are forced, I think, to incorporate the following question in our application of socialist aims and principles: how much power does man have to realise his ideology and ideals, and, in particular, how much human power is involved in the realisation of a programme of integrally conceived positive values? Is not that damned, loathsome and wonderful human nature very, very limited, is it not powerless to realize an integral vision of society which will bring both good and freedom? I know that you have many facts against eschatological socialism, but these facts are again, at least for the most part, a doctrinal negation. I don't wish to widen the topic, but it is truly vulgar self-delusion if, after more than fifty years of the twentieth century, we cannot realise that the forces of evil, stupidity and irrationality in man are in easily altered proportion to their antipodes. This naturally leads me to a conclusion, though I am not inclined to historical fatalism: I wish simply to stir up some thought concerning man's mental and psychological condition as a factor in the programmed formation of an integrally positive project of society. I wish, in fact, to stress the reality of a certain eternal quality in man's essential characteristics, or rather his »negative nature«.

The other factor influencing the possibility of creating an effective, human and modern socialism (modern is not a rhetorical adjective but a more qualitative definition), is the cultural, spiritual, political and moral inheritance of civilization and the energy available to a social community, a people, who through revolution or some other political act have directed themselves towards socialism. There are obvious reasons for no longer blaming all the evils of socialism on the existence of bureaucracy as such, nor can that bureaucracy be simply explained and deduced in a doctrinaire or ideological way from the political nature of power to be shown as

tyranny over the people in order to pocket the profits. What I am trying to say is this: in principle I do not believe that socialism is possible today in an unenlightened, uncivilized, uncultured country, that is, in a primitive human community.

In our age one must, I feel, consider the forms of political freedom and of other freedoms from the point of view of the existing civilization and also from the point of view of the new and decisive role of present and future technology. Since I have already written a book called »The Fairy Tale« there is no need for me to assure you that I do not believe in the paradise of the post-industrial era, or in the so-called world of leisure. And as far as optimism altogether is concerned, let it be mentioned in passing that optimism is above all the philosophy of politics. But is it really possible today, in spite of everything, to be a historical optimist? It is my misfortune that I cannot count myself among those lucky ones.

Perhaps, however, the way out of social despair and depression in the world lies in emphasising the complementary nature of conditions and factors, that is, in multiplying the factors of socialism. In the fields of culture and science more and more socialist factors are appearing. The markedly political and dogmatic ideologies, such as the reigning ideologies of socialism today all the way from China to Yugoslavia, are neither able nor willing to see the new and important motive and constituent factors of a more reasonable and humane socialism.

Now something about our faith in the people. I look on this faith as the last refuge for our historically defeated hopes. If the people is both the source and the refuge of the traditional concept of democracy which, like art — at least for this generation of ours — cannot be understood without its ancient Greek postulates and motivations, then in the present technical and technological civilization which has at its disposal the fascinating and absolute means of spiritually manipulating the people, faith in the people may be last illusion of revolutionary romanticism. If the people are to rise to the possibility of being the source, strength, content and criterion of democracy it is essential, I feel, to have a rational social and cultural radicalism which could, in the long run, be carried by this unfortunate but no longer classically conceived proletarian avantgarde. I do not now believe in this possibility but I am certainly in favour of striving towards it.

Allow me to end with a completely liberal reminder — so that I might at least confirm my professional preoccupation for you. That is, Prometheus, who is our revolutionary myth, a myth chosen by the rational utilitarian Marx for his own, this fire-bearer of freedom and culture, this sower of dreams, this traitor of the Gods, this rebel against Zeus, is such only in the first part of Aeschylus' trilogy. In the third part, to our disappointment if not to our good fortune as well, Zeus and Prometheus come to terms and end their quarrel, as Aeschylus says, »through maturing in time«. Time, then, transformed both principles, both total antinomies, retaining

what was eternal in them and uniting them in a historical and human integrity. This outcome, naturally, transcends the limits of political and ideological considerations and conclusions, and is not to be recommended to any political philosophy. It is only offered to our luxurious art.

Radojica Bojanović:

DESPOTIC SOCIALISM AND THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

I should like to speak of the possibilities of overcoming authoritarian socialism with regard to human nature. Dobrica Ćosić expressed the opinion that belief in the people is the last refuge for our defeated hopes and then went on to say that he did not believe in the possibility of socialism in unenlightened surroundings. This claim might be set against an idea of Erich Fromm's, which he brought up in an unknown interview. Fromm claimed that man is capable of acting in all kinds of ways — he is capable of being a killer such as those who filed the ranks of the Fascists and he is also capable of creating a humanist society. To a certain extent this belief in the unlimited flexibility of human nature conflicts with the pessimistic attitude of Dobrica Ćosić.

Fromm's claim, however, remains on the level of the most general assumptions, which are difficult to prove. And it is just in this belief of his that we find the great dilemma which must be explained. My basic question is this: is it possible to overcome despotic socialism and is it possible to establish humane socialism, human nature being what it is?

I think that authoritarian socialism, like any other system, forms the kind of mentality which is a powerful factor in preventing changes to that system. Authoritarian socialism endeavours and succeeds, *to a certain extent*, in forming a personality structure among the people at large which impedes the humanization of socialism. In the same way Western society creates a psychology which prevents changes in that society. Let us just recall the results of those sociological investigations which show that in certain Western countries the most conservative attitudes are shown by those sections of the population who would be least expected to think that way, those who are, for the large part deprived of rights and impoverished.

The basic premise of the assumption that authoritarian socialism forms the psychology of its subjects who are opposed to changes in the authoritarian system, is contained in the attitude that the personality structure of the members of a society is not formed only by »lower order« factors — various institutional and group factors — but also by the social climate as a whole. This premise is also supported by investigations which I carried out together with students of psychology to determine the factors motivating

workers in their jobs, and certain other aspects of the behaviour of workers in their groups. The results of these investigations showed that the workers are motivated to a far greater extent by factors on the level of the entire community than by factors from the worker's immediate environment — his group at work.

Since there are no examinations of the influence of despotic socialism in creating a specific psychology for its citizens, there is nothing we can do except offer certain conclusions concerning this matter based on facts from literature, descriptions of political trials, analyses of the press and many other documents written with other aims in mind.

Fromm's explanation that the authoritarian system is accepted, and the authoritarian psychology formed, because of man's desire to escape from freedom and uncertainty and hide beneath the protecting wing of authority, is inadequate. I also do not think that the problem is solved by the dilemma which Ljubo Tadić formulated as follows: does selfishness enter socialism through the back door, and is this perhaps the reason why the humanist vision of socialism is impossible to realise?

I think that one of the explanations for the difficulty in developing humane socialism lies in the fact that in many people living under despotic socialism an inferior personality structure is developed thus making them unfit for more liberal relations, for a more humane society. A characteristic of this inferior personality structure is that it is not geared towards freedom or spontaneous activity — despotic socialism destroys those qualities which threaten or endanger it. This personality is geared towards the lower existential motives. It is characterised by a syndrome which, I think, incorporates a prevalent desire to maintain existence, a feeling of menace, inferiority, paranoia and a sense of guilt.

The feeling of guilt is perhaps the most important element in this syndrome. Those who hold the power in despotic socialism develop a sense of guilt in people both consciously and uncsciously, because it paralyses all forms of free thought and all action. It makes man thoroughly inferior. The feeling of guilt is strengthened by means of fearful trials and the anathematising of all those who think critically, as opponents of socialism, the people etc. The authoritarian regime constantly drives people to re-examine their conscience whenever they are not »sticking to the line« and casts moral degradation on any deviation from the official attitudes. Since such deviations are necessary man is constantly under a burden, even though it be only a personal one, of self-examination, and frequently oppressed by a feeling of guilt which can, in principle, be easily develop in him. One must also pose the hypothesis that the numerous declarations and resolutions, being an instrument of authority over men under despotic socialism, are designed to undermine the personality and increase the sense of alienation and obedience, but in the final count they lead to an increase in the sense of guilt.

Paranoia also to a great extent characterises the psychology of those living under despotic socialism as well as the psychology of those living under any other kind of authoritarian regime. Paranoia has an incredibly paralytic effect on man's ability to think and hence on his ability to set out to change the system. Although it is difficult to offer empirical proof of these constellations among the subjects of authoritarian socialism, I still think that it is an essential part of their psychological make-up. Stalin's entire system, which included a great number of people, was a paranoid system. In an authoritarian system man is easily tried for thinking and easily called to answer for his actions, so it is hardly surprising that a paranoid state is induced in him. I would like to remind you of the novel for which Daniel was tried in the Soviet Union. His novel describes the life of an »ordinary« soviet family in a simple way. One member of this family, an elderly man, constantly has hallucinations that his pursuers are coming and that he should flee. The old man is gripped with uncertainty and with the feeling that his pursuers are near.

Naturally, in attempting to overcome this personality structure one comes up against great problems. Mihailo Marković once wrote that the intellectual elite must help overthrow the bureaucratic set-up by informing the public at large of the real forces and relations of society. It seems to me, however, that this kind of battle against the existing set-up is not sufficient because under these conditions a great part of the population is made up of a mass of people who are not conscious of the motives behind their behaviour and attitudes. They are not aware that they are being manipulated and that their motives are largely structured not to satisfy their vital needs but to maintain the authoritarian set-up. Thus the mass is an alienated mass. This alienation is the outcome of the manipulation of people under authoritarian socialism. So the masses, let us say, are manipulated in such a way that their aggression and dissatisfaction, which is rooted in real social problems, is focussed on individual groups of people who become the scapegoat at any required moment. Many people, under such conditions, are not even aware that they are being manipulated through their aggression and dissatisfaction, and that — since they have already been deceived once — they are being deceived again, that they are behaving as an alienated mass, and that they are satisfying the needs of a bureaucratic management which is doing its best to shift the focus of attention from the true trouble spot to the sidelines. I feel that the way of thinking which is favoured in despotic socialism must be distinguished from that which would develop in democratic socialism. This way of thinking prevents the true social problems and relations from being understood and thus itself stands in the way of change. Thinking is deformed because it is guided and bounded by the desire to maintain existence and security. Every day we can observe this distortion, this pathology in thinking, on a micro-level — among people who comment on political action and political writings in the press, in public debates

etc., though frequently this distortion is, in fact, deliberate. Both art and science, which have both been extensively subjected to dogmatism, make use of the establishment of this kind of system. Since freedom is the basic premise for the development of true art and science, it is met with only in mature and extremely powerful individuals who have the honour of struggling successfully for the spread of nondogmatic science and art in spite of all the temptations set before them by bureaucracy.

Changes in motivation, that is, in human psychology, follow changes in the most powerful social factors, but they too are partially causal factors of social changes. The democratization of the social system may result in changes in the structure of human motivation, but if the democratization of social relations is to be achieved, human motives and attitudes will have to be changed. It is only through information that they can be changed, and that with difficulty, because many people living under authoritarian socialism have developed a mentality which sets up a barrier to understanding facts. In such circumstances, it seems to me, one needs a kind of collective psychotherapy. This therapy should contain information explaining the psychology of manipulation and enabling the vast mass of people to see through their own motivation: this would also help to make them feel less alienated.

Mihailo Marković:

The intellectual's role cannot be reduced to that of merely informing society for he must develop the critical self-consciousness of society and indicate alternative ways of development. Furthermore, he must give proof of exceptional courage and moral fibre, showing through action his yearning for freedom and utter integrity. I should just like to add two brief remarks. Nobody, in fact, will lightly undertake this role for it holds no promise of reward, except perhaps honour and it lays one open to reprisals. Nobody, then, who accepts this role should go out of his way in order to evade repression — as long as he wishes to continue in the part. He must allow himself to be subjected to the act of repression because this is the only way of unmasking and demystifying social forces which shelter behind a progressive facade and which show themselves incapable of facing up to free thinking which points to the deformities and to the alternatives. This is in fact how a regime shows that it is not able to respect its own legality. Through naked, open repression a society demystifies the legality which it struggled so hard to establish for itself. This is an unavoidable and essential step in the process of liberating people from spiritual bondage.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

LATENT AND TRANSPARENT RESISTENCE TO THE EXISTING ORDER

I shall put this question to you: if human nature is so flexible that we can shape it as we like, where does the latent discontent of the people spring from? The people cannot be discontented if they are really well incorporated in the social system; if the people have been so well shaped that they are completely integrated, they cannot be discontented. But this latent discontent stirs up the hope that the people are not ready to accept *everything*.

Mihailo Marković:

Latent discontent preceded the May disturbances in France; it conditioned them.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

Yes, latent dissatisfaction which breaks out here, too, in periodic explosions but which is perhaps deeper than these periodic explosions would indicate. I would like to mention another point which is often forgotten when mentioning examples drawn from research. I think that Bojanović also knows of this. When we carry out empirical research, no matter whether it be sociological or psychological, we get through to an area of the personality structure, we succeed in uncovering official opinion because this opinion is stated during the investigation. As soon as I appear as the examiner before the person being examined, I structure his answers to a certain extent so that he will, first and foremost, give me the official answers. In research one least often reaches to the hidden, intimate thoughts. Whenever I have put aside the questionnaire, closed my note-book, put down my pen and moved on to free conversation, saying »well, that'll do for the books« and stayed on to chat, I have learnt far more than I did through formal contact. I think this is a point which is frequently forgotten. I am not saying that the person I was examining gave an answer, during the formal contact, simply because he thought it was the one we wanted to hear. No, this also counted as an attitude in his personality structure; but his total consciousness is not made up of just one attitude, and the problem is, simply, that another attitude figures in his personality structure, one which is hidden, to which we have not reached, and which is really the reason for this latent dissatisfaction. I think that humanist action can call upon just this latent dissatisfaction, and this for me is a source of hope — the fact that there is a hole in the personality structure of the individual, that not everything in the personality is so well integrated, so well incorporated into what the social character demands of the individual, and that something is left which can be counted upon in social action.

When we speak of the »masses« and begin to discuss them in the way one normally does, then it becomes clear how much they have been underestimated and to what extent there is a lack of understanding as to how these masses came to be formed. A point of support must be found to help raise the masses out of the situation in which they now find themselves thanks to history, thanks to their having been downtrodden, oppressed and undervalued. I am not pleading for enlightenment but I do think that if we are in favour of humanistic and activist Marxist we must search for those points where we can influence the self-enlightenment of the masses.

Danko Grlić:

REBELLION BY THE PEOPLE MARKS A TURNING TOWARDS THE FUTURE

I shall be referring briefly to certain attitudes expressed here, especially to Dobrica Ćosić's extremely interesting speech. In a certain sense Dobrica both disappointed and delighted me: he disappointed me in that he announced a polemic which I did not hear, and delighted me above all with his insistence on the need for us to help within the sphere of modern thought, modern history. But what does it mean to be modern, what does it really mean to think historically through the dimensions of the time in which we live? At one point Dobrica Ćosić said: »For this we do not need Hegel«. I apologise to the philosophers who probably know this, but I think it is here that we most need Hegel because, if nothing else, Hegel saw what it means to be within the horizon of history, i. e. when an act becomes truly historical. And that is when it unites the past, the present and the future. Hegel is generally looked on as an abstract philosopher who constantly tends towards the abstruse, so I am sure that Dobrica Ćosić will find what I have just said (that one can unite in a single point the past, the present and the future) mere nebulous philosophising. Let me then recount one of Hegel's brilliantly concrete examples in which he explains what it really means to unite these three dimensions of time in one moment. This is also to a certain extent connected with what Zaga Pešić-Golubović put forward when speaking of rebellion by the people. Caesar crossed the Rubicon. A man crossed a river. Thousands of people have crossed rivers. There is still nothing historical in this. What was it then that made this crossing historical? It was the fact that Caesar crossed the river. But what made Caesar Caesar? The fact that he had previously, i. e. in the past, crossed the Alps, won many victories and become Caesar. But this act was still not historic, because many generals have crossed many rivers without performing a historic act. What then made it historic? The fact that Caesar was heading for Rome. That is, he was moving in the dimension of the future because of the direction in which he

was going, because of his destination. As we can see, in this one moment we have a synthesis of past, future and present, and this then becomes history. So when we speak today of the need to be on an historical level it is just this dimension, I think, we should have in mind. And this is why we should also have faith in the people and in their traditions, for the true past of the people is that which is borne through the future, i. e. their past of rebellion. For rebellion is nothing but an impetus towards the future, and for this reason the people have a past. The people do not have their past in something that is merely a historical happening, part of the everyday grind, the patient endurance of their afflictions, something which was not borne forward by anything with a dimension of newness, a dimension aspiring towards something more human, just and free. This, then, is the real reason and occasion for believing in the people of whom we have spoken so much. So I think that today we should try to assess what this historical moment really is, i. e. to affirm both in Marxism and in socialism only those elements which have been borne by something of the future, but not those which simply happened, because they will not be able to carry us to the new shore. From establishmentism, from bureaucratism, from philistine conservatism, from nationalism or from the tyranny of socialism — from all those terrible deformations which have been faithfully borne, from the glorification of princes and feudal overlords we will not come to see the historical moment and we will not be on the level of history. This cannot help us at all. But we can already be helped today by those new trends, in socialism as well, which bear something of the stamp of the future and not something conserved in the present, something which is the *status quo*, the philosophy of hanging on, of confirming that which exists, such as the philosophy of accommodation. Accommodation is a term I unfortunately heard too often in the otherwise brilliant speech of our friend Čosić. I think that man is really on a historical level insofar as he makes as little effort as possible to accommodate himself, because as soon as he does accommodate himself he starts tending towards the present and so no longer lives either in the contemporary or in the historical sense of which I spoke.

Nikola Rot:

THE PERMANENT AND THE CHANGEABLE IN THE PERSONALITY STRUCTURE

There has been a fair amount of discussion about psychological problems. I do not think one should have too much faith or too much respect for psychology when referring to it in speaking of a specific structure of the personality. Psychology today can indeed offer us a good explanation for many psychological processes, for instance, the process of perception. But whenever anybody, psychologist or not, speaks about the structure of the personality he is

treading the ground of free thought. This is why I found my colleague Radojica Bojanović very daring in his explanation of the inferior personality structure in authoritarian socialism. Undoubtedly his opinion is founded on certain facts, but I suspect that in any system where force was being used, where fear existed, we would have reactions similar to those described. I feel, however, that not even in the worst system of pressure does there exist such a fixed and widespread personality structure as might be described by the word paranoid, with a constant feeling of guilt. A feeling of guilt certainly does appear in many, and especially among people who have been closely linked to a certain ideology which they supported, only to discover later that their belief in its value has ceased and that they are in a dilemma, as happens to persons such as those mentioned in Radojica Bojanović's example. It is hard to say that there exists a paranoid personality formation, which, once created, continues and prevents any further progress or development. It is another question whether there exist in man certain fundamental sources of selfishness, egoism, and aggressiveness, certain sources of evil energy — as Dobrica Ćosić put it so nicely — and, altogether, whether there exist any lasting characteristics. I think that when conceiving and creating the concept of a form of social organization — and this always means the organization of people — one can never avoid the issue of certain general human characteristics. I agree with Dobrica Ćosić. Man has certain features which are constant, which are bound to him as a species. Amongst these is the desire for self-preservation. This is the force which stimulates the human individual to develop into a creative person, but it can also be a source of evil. I can quote several examples — not empirical verifications but empirical illustrations. One is the observation of the eminent psychologist Bettelheim. When men of otherwise high intellectual calibre, with inbred humanist values, ended up in Nazi concentration camps many of them behaved very badly. They supported the behaviour of their Nazi torturers. Often they behaved towards one another as the Gestapo guards behaved towards them.

When the basic biological existence is endangered, the desire for self-preservation becomes manifest as egoism, often as heedless egoism. This, however, — and I have the impression that nobody has stated this — does not bring into question the possibility of man's development and of the realization of a socialist humanism. But this kind of socialist humanism must consider man's biological being as well, as a being with fixed biological urges and needs. If alienation is treated as the loss of some former perfection which was a natural characteristic that man lost, then the concept of alienation will not be of much help to us. I also think, if we are to speak of the authentic personality as something which is given and exists without being afforded the chance to emerge, we will again be taking up an assumption and a concept which will not be of great use to us. One must build up a system of freedom and full humanity which will be the basis and condition for the develop-

ment of a more humane personality. In achieving this, as Dobrica Cosić pointed out, the spread of culture and enlightenment is of great importance. Social solutions do not depend on enlightenment and culture but it is quite certain that these are the basic conditions essential for development. Prejudice, including the worst forms of racial prejudice, is most often found among the least educated. This is proved by research.

Ljubo Tadić:

The concept of the Vendée in the French Revolution.

Nikola Rot:

Indeed. That is why I think that this idea should not be underestimated. I would like to give support to the importance of culture. We are again moving towards a real situation in Yugoslavia. We have been strangely neglectful of the culture of the people: what we once began — cultural centres in the village, which used to seem quite useless — we have not continued. We are not concerned today to see that the people really acquire culture as quickly and as completely as possible.

Radojica Bojanović:

IN REPLY TO THE COMMENTS

I shall try to give a brief answer to the remarks made on my speech.

As far as concerns Rot's remark that my speech was too brave, I am inclined to accept this as a compliment. Upon reflection, however, it would seem that I was not as brave as Rot. What I mean is that Rot spoke of the need to discuss what psychological characteristics would suit humanistic socialism. This means one should be brave enough to speak of things for which there is no foundation; for we have no experiment on the basis of which we could suggest what kind of consciousness would develop as the result of humanitarian socialism. I was less courageous in speaking of the psychology of an existing, authoritarian socialism, and running the risk of missing the mark.

Rot's second observation was that the structure of motives of which I was speaking is encountered in situations in which man is endangered. I agree with this. I even set out from the point that authoritarian socialism exerts constant pressure on the personality. In everyday life, especially in party life, each opinion is constantly evaluated as correct or incorrect, each attitude is regarded as an attitude which is either in conformity with the line or hostile to it. Free thought is often regarded as hostile. It seems that authoritarian socialism is constantly irritated by those motives we were discussing. People who do not succumb to such pressures are rare.

The next remark was that man's nature is not so flexible, and that the psychology of authoritarian socialism should be drawn from more permanent and reliable psychical qualities such as selfishness. There can be no doubt that certain psychical qualities undergo change with difficulty and that others are highly changeable. I have spoken of motives and attitudes, and it is a notorious fact that motives and attitudes are very plastic psychical qualities. As far as selfishness is concerned, it may be a permanent human characteristic, but despite the existence of such a permanent human characteristic man forms various kinds of social relations. This means that one must search for the specific psychic characteristics which will link themselves to certain kinds of human relations.

I accept Zaga Pešić's opinion that there exists something which the authoritarian system cannot eliminate, though the dissatisfaction she refers to may spring from various sources. I also accept that not all people in an authoritarian system can be deceived. These attitudes are not in disagreement with what I said. I took these facts as understood, but I wanted to stress that the authoritarian system also forms certain psychical constellations which stand as a barrier against overcoming this kind of system.

I also accept Mihailo Marković's intervention concerning his point about the role of the intellectual in overcoming the bureaucratic set-up.

Dragoljub Mićunović:

THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF MODERN THEORIES

I wanted to say only that Bojanović's great courage was nothing unusual and that many psychologists have successfully tested their courage on this plane, — to mention only Fromm.

However, concerning the personality and the system and the relation between the personality and the system, it is important to remember the following: if human nature was not distinctly flexible — which does not mean that there may not be certain lasting elements within it — we would not be able to explain the relative permanence of social systems. How could we possibly explain why certain social systems which we consider bad and inhuman have endured for so long, if human nature did not have this flexibility enabling it to adapt to them? There are numerous factors affecting this adaptability — partly it is due to imitation, partly to repression and fear. I should like to quote an example from literature, which is at the same time a historical example but important to a discussion of modern times.

The book in question is Andzheyevski's »Darkness Covers the Earth«, in which he describes the activities of the great Inquisitor Torquemada. There is no need for me to speak of the Inquisition — what happens is well known to us all. Here, however, I should like to use an example to illustrate one particular point. Torque-

mada took on as his personal secretary one of his fiercest enemies, a noble young monk who wanted to assassinate him because he was disgusted by the crimes of the Inquisition. But in time this young secretary, a good humanist and honest Christian, slowly began to give way to the corrosion of his nature and justify the crimes, the burnings etc. And he didn't stop there: he began to accuse the friends who had saved his life, he even began to accuse himself, and progressed alongside Torquemada through the hierarchy of the Inquisition. Torquemada, who was dying on his way to Toledo, sought to make his confession to his young secretary whom he wanted to become his successor. In his final hour Torquemada realised the fearful result of his actions and announced that the Inquisition should be stopped. He now, on his deathbed, realised that it had all been a great mistake. »We have ruined the land, darkness reigns everywhere, and we have not saved either God or the Church through the Inquisition«. He wanted the courts of the Inquisition to be disbanded immediately, »drive away the fear and darkness over this land« — this was the last command and the last wish of the great Inquisitor. On hearing this, the secretary, instead of reciting prayers slapped the great Inquisitor, who died on the spot. The astonished secretary then said to himself as he stood by the dead body of Torquemada: »But what would we do then?« The question was a logical one because the system of the Inquisition had shaped a great number of people to its needs, and they now had to struggle furiously to make sure that the system was maintained, for without it they would be unnecessary and rejected. The departure of Stalin had the same consequences. He did not, perhaps, have the same reflections on his deathbed as Torquemada, and I don't know what his secretaries thought, but one of the reasons why de-Stalinization went so slowly in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was that there were many people whose nature was so structured that Stalinism grew to fit it, not like clothes but like a skin. And this is the reason why de-Stalinization will not progress so quickly. I think that this kind of resistance is to be met with in all countries which have passed through the phase of Stalinism or are passing through it. This does not mean that there does not exist something lasting in human nature. That quality which is lasting is far more difficult to discover and define. I do not even know whether it would be of any use.

And now a word about what Dobrica Ćosić said. Some of the objections, those which were lexical, have already been made, so I shall not repeat the discussion about pessimism, optimism and the meaning of history. However, one of the important criticisms he made of our debate — and, no doubt, it is not unfounded — is that this discussion is perhaps slightly outmoded because we are caught up in the circle of 19th cent. optimistic ideas. But one might reply that he is being optimistic if he thinks that the 20th cent. has great ideas, especially when it comes to socio-political problems. One of the characteristics of the 20th cent. is, in fact, the lack of origi-

nality in socio-political ideas, which would not be epigonic in relation to the 19th cent. This century does not have such ideas, but it has developed technology and brought about a great technical revolution without, I feel, introducing a single new idea which would prove radically new and important. And all the movements which have emerged, expressing protest or proclaiming some revolution or changes of any kind — from the student movements to the labour movements, black power or any other — all these movements stem from Marx, Bakunin or Blanqui etc., and all are locked within a 19th cent. circle of ideas. We may ask why this is so; the answer is not to be found only in the spiritual poverty of the 20th cent., it is also to be found in the fact that we are still living in social structures similar to those of the 19th cent. — the main actors in the world of social events are still on the strage. Within the foreseeable future we do not even have so much as a suggestion of a new historical actor who would, at the same time, provide a new ideology and bring a newness to historical events. But this revolving within the circle of 19th cent. ideas does have a good function in that it stimulates some recollection, that it brings about some demystification when people want or try to show the same things in a modern way. This is why it is perhaps a good thing to review them once more. When I spoke earlier of the demystification of modern theory it was just this I had in mind.

Andrija Krešić:

THE PSYCHICAL FRAME OF MIND AND THE CHOICE OF ACTION

Dobrica Ćosić took a somewhat sceptical standpoint in his speech. I accept this attitude and, to be consistent, would like to view that standpoint itself with a certain amount of scepticism. I shall not be being original if I draw an analogy between the behaviour of societies and the behaviour of individuals. Generations and societies, like individuals, have their moment of birth, their youth, maturity and age. It seems that optimism, pessimism and scepticism can be linked with certain periods in the life of a society. Optimism, it seems, is at its height when freedom is at its height: this happens at exceptional moments in history, when societies are born, or during revolutions. Not long ago, in 1968, in France or Belgrade, one could have felt how much the behaviour of the youth was fired with optimism. They were behaving as though history was then really in their hands, as though they were the true makers of history, who could manage even the impossible. Usually, however, after such an outburst of optimistic enthusiasm (and these are among the rare historical moments of freedom), these optimistic expectations are not fulfilled, and a mood of pessimism sets in. After both these conditions have been sufficiently experienced, maturity follows, then old age and the twilight of life. Maturity is

greatest in the twilight of life, when the »owl of Minerva flies«. This is when there normally prevails a state of scepis, which allows of no absolutes, no sacred things in the real world, but which also does not make an absolute of evil destiny as the pessimists do.

I think that a standpoint of scepis must allow for the the possibility that optimistic expectations may be fulfilled. Here I understand the concepts of scepis and pessimism as a disposition of the spirit but also as a form of practical behaviour. The real question for man, for an epoch, for a movement is always: »What's to be done?« because this implies all possibilities — I do not think only one possibility is left open and that the world should be governed by absolute necessity. The question implies human choice of action; i. e. it leaves room for freedom.

Trivo Indić:

THE TYRANNY OF CULTURE AND THE RESISTANCE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS

I intend to speak in somewhat greater detail because I feel that Dobrica Ćosić is a serious man and because I think that on this occasion he should be given a proper hearing. I am sure that he is experiencing evolution and that it would be worthwhile hearing what kind of programme he is supporting today. I have already said that for me the key question is that of the so-called tyranny of culture, the deification of culture which has appeared with liberalism as a cultural movement throughout Europe. I would like to begin with Dobrica Ćosić's belief that liberalism brought the democratization of culture into Europe for the first time on a European scale. That is, with the appearance of the bourgeoisie we have, for the first time, the democratization of culture, the appearance of lay culture, of enlightenment, of experimentation, of intellectual adventuring in the fullest and most faithful sense of these words. In order to explain what I mean by this, let me mention the novel, which is a form typical of bourgeois society. The novel as an aesthetic-intellectual form (for I believe that artistic and intellectual forms have their own life, their existence and their death) began, in fact, by ridiculing the culture which had preceded it, and continued by chance, so to say. It was a spontaneous expression of the bourgeoisie attempting to demystify feudal culture (Fielding, Cervantes, , etc.). In Fielding's novels one finds christian names and surnames. This is the first time that culture becomes seriously personalised — in relation to feudal culture — the first time that it breaks away from theology and the first time that it enters into the lives of true people, people of the third class, people from the bourgeoisie. It is also interesting to consider that the novel in its first lease of life is a novel of fable, a history of customs with a strictly didactic orientation. Didactically it is a powerful weapon in an artistic form, in the battle of liberal ideas against the establis-

ment, as is especially evident in Sterne, Thackeray and Swift. In the course of time, however, the novel took root as a typical bourgeois institution, so typical that one feels the tyranny of the novel in European literature and the tyranny of this artistic form. Then what happens? There comes, I think a most understandable and acceptable revolution. It does not matter whether the European novel finished with Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks*, in its classical form, or even with Proust. I think the first blow to be struck against this kind of novel was, in fact a blow struck against established culture, against the deification of a culture which had grown up to suit bourgeois dimensions. This is the revolt being carried on in France by André Gide, where there has emerged a novel of ideas, a novel of decomposition, a novel of totality, later of the »stream of consciousness, Proust's and Joyce's novels etc. i. e. we have seen the emergence of a novel of non-acceptance. What I am saying is that this tyranny of enlightenment, this tyranny of culture, may very often end as an attempt to provoke many revolts and these are revolts which, I feel, are justified. I would not agree with the opinion that the Europe of the 19th cent. did not make any effort to produce a new ideology. Especially if one considers literature and artistic form. A Mallarmé, a Lautreaumont, a Rimbaud, cannot be taken as something less than a violent spasm, as a disruption which, in the sphere of art, followed the struggle against the established, initially optimistic, bourgeois liberal culture. This culture was above all Cartesian, it was based on the Certasian *cogito*, on the supremacy of reason which has tyrannised us from the enlightenment to the most subtle forms of present day analytical philosophy. Weber's *Wertfrei* sociology was born, then functional architecture, constructivism, atonal music, technical ideology, the triumph of technicality, of efficacy, of adaptation. This is all part of the European culture which has its beginnings in liberalism, in those first blows against the deified theological culture, but it is a culture which itself did not succeed in avoiding a new theology, a new deification. I think Dobrica Ćosić was right to esteem the attempt to understand culture within the range of wider intellectual changes; however, I should like to point out that the tyranny of culture has fearful consequences. Take, for example, the struggle of a typical representative of liberal bourgeois culture in the 20th cent., Thomas Stearns Eliot (a bank clerk who wrote poetry, who was a clerk during the day and who, in the evening, discovered the metaphysical poets, wrote essays and offered a completely apocalyptic vision of bourgeois civilization in his *Waste Land* and his *Four Quartets* etc). This same Eliot rejected Whitman, hated Dylan Thomas, Shakespeare and Lorca, denied all that was plebeian in him, all that was life-giving, all that did not have the stamp of academicism or the aristocratic touch which, for instance, Victorian literature had. This Eliot ruled like a tyrant in Anglo-Saxon culture for several decades, nothing could be done against him, and only William Carlos Williams succeeded — (perhaps thanks to the

fact that he was living in Switzerland at the fateful time when European culture began the battle against established bourgeois culture, when Dadaism, psychoanalysis, futurism, surrealism etc. appeared) — succeeded in joining a life and death battle with Eliot, a battle for the new poets. So this example of a culture which had become academicised, which had become officialised, which reached its limit, perhaps, in various awards and prizes beginning with the Nobel, the Goncourt, the Pulitzer etc, and which has become established in the fullest possible way through modern mass-media. This is a culture which, one might say, stifles all opposition, all possibility of creating a counter-culture. And this is why I feel it is important to realise that it is a tyranny of the established, official culture and therefore, in the modern version of socialism, dangerous. For it rests on the best traditions of established bourgeois culture, which socialism has firmly embraced, and we need have no illusion that we will really accept the most life-giving impulses of surrealism, the philosophy of existence, of experiment and doubt. If socialism wants to open up and outstrip liberal culture it must accept this counter-culture which is growing up in bourgeois society, it must make use of its greatest efforts, of its best aspirations, to offer a challenge within its own spiritual field. It is not by chance that have here a modest, occasionally depressing, inexperienced display of anti-drama, anti-film, anti-culture etc. This is certainly the culture of challenge, but it is still a culture which reaches us via the television, the press, and the established means of mass communication.

I expected more of Dobrica Ćosić — I expected him to offer us a programme of challenge, of the critical function of culture, which would be more than useful to us at this juncture. I accept the fact that one can never have enough of culture, but I fear that this absence of culture might at the same time be turned into tyranny as happened in the cases I mentioned. I am sure that a possible topic for our future discussions might be: how, or along what lines, are we to overcome this repressive culture of socialism which has thus far always been affirmed as an integral part of the bourgeois established culture?

Mihailo Marković:

CRITICISM, OPTIMISM AND RADICAL THOUGHT

I should like to thank Dobrica Ćosić for taking the trouble to move on a step further those views of his with which we are familiar and which would not provoke any special discussion. This is something which everyone should do when coming to such a symposium, for it is only in this way that we can enrich one another's thoughts and stimulate discussion. We have in fact been debating for two hours about certain views which Dobrica Ćosić formulated in a new way. Beauty of expression was something to be expected

here, however, I was surprised that Dobrica in fact spoke as more of a philosopher than we philosophers ourselves. We have allowed ourselves to be too much tied to one side of the whole issue. Dobrica Ćosić obliged us to expand our topic, and this turned out to be most worthwhile. There have been certain formulations (I use the word »formulations« rather than »ideas« because I am not sure whether these formulations are an adequate expression of his ideas), formulations which stir up, and have already stirred up disputes, which are, perhaps, too severe and one-sided. These are formulations in which Dobrica strongly insists on scepticism and in which he speaks of optimism as the philosophy of ideology and politics.

There are, in fact, three kinds of philosophy: one *accepts the world* (whether in an apologist or conformist form); the second *removes itself from the world*; the third tends to *transcend the world*. Scepticism reduced to a single consistent attitude (i. e. scepticism) is the philosophy which removes itself from the world. It can provoke the wrath of the bureaucracy or the bourgeoisie or any ruling class which expects support and would like to compel the intellectuals to become its ideologists. But once it realises that this is not possible it can quite easily accept a philosophy which removes itself from the world and which restricts itself to merely expressing doubt in all that exists. For a philosophy which expresses universal doubt is not capable of mobilizing the existing social forces for action and, therefore, cannot practically bring an end to the existing state of affairs. There is also a third possible philosophy — this is the philosophy which *aspires to transcend the world*. In this philosophy there is present an element of scepticism, for a philosophy which aspires to transcend the world must begin from doubt in all that is offered as sacred in the existing world. But this doubt is just a fragment of the entire vision of the future. So, when we begin to try and explain our standpoint, I would far rather that we called it a critical, radically critical standpoint than simply a sceptical attitude. This kind of critical view, no matter to what extent it was radical, would involve an element of optimism. Without an element of optimism in this critical view it would not be possible to have any leftist, any revolutionary, any radical thought which aspired to change the world.

All such critical though distinguishes, aboveall, between present human behaviour and, therefore, a human nature which appears in a given society, and that which is potential in human nature. This is the first distinction that must be faced, for without it there can be no radical thought.

Furthermore, this critical view must, in considering the potential, really bear in mind the tendency towards evil and the real possibility that man can be evil, that he can be destructive and flee from freedom and responsibility. Undoubtedly, however, there exists an opposing latent tendency towards creativity, towards freedom, solidarity and sociability. And, no matter how much the

given conditions may lead to the predominant appearance of one of these two contradictory sides, the other side may always be strongly brought out by changes in social conditions. Conditions may be such that they favour the evil, conformist, uncreative, captive side of human nature, but after some time (as all history has shown) saturation point is reached, resistance and revolt take place. They are latent at first but then burst out explosively. There are numerous examples of destructive behaviour in the 20th century, but one must not overlook the almost constant readiness on the part of the large groups of people to behave unselfishly, readiness for ultimate and decisive commitment to the new. I shall not repeat the examples which have been given: France 1968, all the revolutions which have already taken place, our own student movement, the workers' strikes. One should reflect on the appearance of underground culture, the new left and the hippy movement.

Most of these phenomena make the impression of eruptions which were not prepared by anything — prepared in the sense of manipulation, that is. No institutions, no means of public information led to these unexpected forms of behaviour, to these outbursts of resistance and revolt. What is in question is the potential of man to be free, to be creative, to be social, to be united. This is the result of thousands of years of history. It is something formed in human nature and has for a long time existed in this potential shape. If we were not able to rely upon it we would have absolutely no philosophical reason for believing in any revolutionary project.

However, when this has been said, it is not simply faith in the people, it is not simply faith in the poor, the so-called »unbridled« poor of whom we spoke yesterday. Marx is essentially right when, in his *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts* he speaks sceptically of the possibility of socializing a man who has not yet reached the stage of private ownership, far less gone beyond it. But there is something here that is at first sight contradictory: that is, if the proletariat is simply made up of the poor and becomes even more impoverished until it is absolutely degraded, how can one expect this proletariat to carry out fundamental social transformation and bring about disalienation and general human emancipation? This is not completely clear. It is certain, however, that a man who has not yet developed his senses and all the wealth of his varied needs, can only create what Marx described as primitive, crude, rough communism in which there is a widespread envy and a widespread desire for levelling down of differences. With the wisdom we have acquired in recent decades we must realise certain essential limits of a underdeveloped society which has still not gone beyond the level of private ownership and which in its practice has never passed through a stage of Enlightenment and liberal bourgeois society. Such a society can aspire to create only certain elements of socialism but in many respects it will remain below the level of developed bourgeois society. Consequently, in such a society we cannot speak of socialism as something existing,

or even as something envisaged in the immediate future. In this society man can fight only for the further development of the existing elements of socialism, for general development, including the establishment of those tenets of liberalism which are a precondition for further development. It is only in a developed society, however, that is a society which has already achieved a state of material abundance and thus released man from the burden of merely maintaining his existence, in a society which has already changed the scale of values, in a society in which there are more and more people who see no value in accumulating material goods, more and more people who find no powerful attraction in authority and who place a higher value on other forms of human power which are not authoritarian (creative power, power in culture, in science, in philosophy) — it is only in such a society that one can expect to find the programme which Marx described being put into practice. This is what leads me to believe that in the next few decades the fate of socialism will be decided in the world's most developed countries. That is where socialism will, after all, have its greatest and most real chance, through a general transformation of society during which the islands of the new will rise out of the sea of the old, the already existing. The development towards socialism, towards communism will either take place in those countries or nowhere.

In a certain sense, however, one cannot be as optimistic today as Marx was. I mean, one can no longer simply believe in the *necessary* emergence of communist society or in the *necessary* disalienation. Today one can be optimistic only insofar as one believes that this is still a *historical possibility* (no matter how unlikely one) and that with human commitment and proper practical engagement this possibility can be made real. Well, there you have it; in this sense one can still be an optimist, and if one is not an optimist in this sense one cannot be a radical thinker at all.

Danko Grlić:

Has not Marković to some extent tried to give credit only to that form of scepticism which would be critical within certain limits, for a certain time, and would then somehow have to stop being sceptical? As opposed to scepticism which is permanently sceptical, you had in mind, did you not, a different form of scepticism — limited scepticism?

Mihailo Marković:

Scepticism in criticism.

THERE CAN BE NO CRITICAL THOUGHT
WITHOUT PERMANENT SCEPSIS

Excuse me, but you spoke of two forms of scepticism. One of them, the worse scepticism, could be exemplified by the compromised title of scepticism. And, by the way, I do not agree with what Alexandrov and others said about Greek scepticism, for I think that Greek scepticism was really far more profitable than many of the Ancient Greek philosophies. Permanent scepticism is, after all, the *condition sine qua non* of not only philosophy but also of all true social action. As soon as we feel at any moment that the sceptical attitude towards something (even something which we may have positively established through our earlier scepticism) should be broken off, so that with unsceptical delight we establish, and simply affirm, all that we had formerly achieved through scepticism, then I think true thought and true social criticism come to an end. For the entire experience of all formed movements, even the most sceptical, clearly shows that a great deal of what, in my opinion, was wrongly called simply deformation stems from the fact that at a certain moment we allowed ourselves to stop being sceptical. It should, however, also be stressed in particular that this is by no means intellectual defeatism or resignation. This kind of scepticism in no way precludes commitment; in my opinion, it even sets up the preconditions for true human commitment in which man simply no longer believes blindly, as part of an organization or movement, in what those who think along the same lines have dished up to him. Instead he has his own attitude towards everything, he has a commitment to doubt in everything, so that apologetics of all kinds will be constantly and repeatedly broken down, so that criticism will become a permanent sceptical relation, a constant organon which will question all that exists, even those things to which we once came with great pains and difficulty. In philosophy Descartes, for example, began with scepticism. We know that *de omnibus dubitandum est* is the first premise of his philosophy. This scepticism, however, led him on to a positive attitude, to a great principle which he considered unquestionable. This principle, *cogito ergo sum*, became the strongpoint of his system, a principle in which he believed it was no longer possible to doubt.

The entire development of philosophy, however, continues to develop in a critical relation to this positively established principle of his, and perhaps there would not have been any more philosophy if this positively established principle of Descartes' had remained absolutely beyond suspicion. Doubt in this principle, i. e. that existence can be shown only by means of the *cogito*, that the *cogito* is the only possible and incontestable principle of the comprehension of the world, stimulates philosophical reflection. Thus doubt in Descartes' infallibility has, I think, made possible the sceptical re-examination which was so profitable to the subsequent

development of philosophy. Mihailo Marković, with whom I completely agree in certain further inferences, used some very characteristic words in relation to scepticism which ought to be analysed. For instance, he said that once we had become constantly sceptical towards ourselves we would cease believing in fine programmes, in our own potential, in . . . etc. Yes; we would cease believing, but there is no need for us to believe. There is no need for us to believe! — this is the fundamental point, and here lies the essential problem. There is no need for us to believe in anything. As soon as we begin to believe in anything at all, we swiftly become believers, we become apologisers and turn into the very thing we are fighting against. This is not a theological question. One should not believe in anything. One should doubt all things, including one's own theories. When Dragoljub Mićunović said that »There are no great ideas in our century«, I should have replied that it is perhaps a good thing there are no great ideas, at least, not the sort of ideas in which we believe absolutely. And perhaps the greatest modern idea is that today good ideas are no longer needed, that we are sceptical towards all ideas when they are only great ideas and great programmes in which we are supposed to believe unquestioningly. This is the greatness, I am deeply convinced, of all I find of positive value in the student movement, which is constantly and repeatedly blamed — to the point of tedium — for the grave defect of not having any great, mature and solid ideas. But these critics do not see that the greatest idea of the student movement is that it has not accepted such definitive ideas. It has accepted no programmes, no ideas, nothing which was believed in without reserve. Frequently (yet perhaps even too rarely), the student movement has taken a critical look at itself, always going back to the beginning, and this, I think, is what we should accept: a constant and permanent critical relation, not only towards all that surrounds us but also towards ourselves. When we are sure that we have arrived at something which we might call our great idea, the definitive result of all our efforts, then we must be critical, then we must be sceptical towards it. It is only like this that we will really do something new and it is only like this that we will avoid lapsing into old schemes which would involve us in new disappointments.

We have had enough of ideology, enough of pathetic programmes, enough of rose-coloured ideas. All ideas have proved deceitful, all programmes have turned out false. Why should we create new, grandiose, epoch-making, definitive programmes, why have new ideas, why breed new careerists for new government posts? This is all a terrible lie which we have been living ever since we believed blindly in something. Let us not believe in anyone, let us not begin from anything, let us ourselves be constantly critical for only like this will we create a work worthy of our efforts. It is only by starting from nothing that we will create everything.

Mihailo Marković:

You have written a text on the problem of liberalism in which you say: »Not liberal but democrat«. You speak of democracy. You believe in socialism, you believe in communism. In this discussion words do not always conform to real attitudes, and I still don't believe that our real convictions and attitudes differ very much. You speak of scepticism first as an initial step, and then of permanent scepticism as an element of a permanent criticism which undoubtedly includes some positive convictions. If you only call scepticism what I call a moment of dialectical negation in every critical thought — then the issue is rather one of language. If, however, you have really changed all your earlier opinions and are now beginning to move towards complete scepticism, leading to the absurd, then we differ fundamentally. I should prefer to think, however, that this is just a mood of the moment, that it is not an expression of your thoughts but of certain emotions. You have spoken here of the future like a deluded husband about women.

Dragoljub Mićunović:

THE POSSIBLE COMPARISON OF LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM

Discussion about such a widely formulated topic (liberalism and socialism) of necessity requires a certain amount of precision.

At all events these two concepts, two ideologies, two movements, two forms of social reality, must be compared since they have already been given together in the title. I think it is possible, even essential — in order to avoid misunderstanding — to bring about this confrontation on the following levels: I think it is necessary to confront (1) the ideas of liberalism with the ideas of socialism, (2) the ideas of liberalism with the political practise of modern bourgeois states, (since these are two things), (3) the ideas of socialism with political practise in socialist countries, (for this is not the same), (4) the ideas of liberalism with their relevance to the practise of socialist countries, (5) the ideas of socialism with their role in bourgeois states, and lastly (6) the political practise of socialist with that of bourgeois states.

First, the ideas of liberalism confronted with the ideas of socialism. I had intended to speak at greater length about this, but much of this has been mentioned in today's discussion so I shall not return to certain themes. I should like, however, to stress something when making the comparison between liberalism and socialism, and this is that both ideas have their roots in the natural-right theories of the 17th and 18th cents. and the works of the enlightenment, and that they not only have a great number of points in common, they even have many common principles. Ljubo

Tadić has already spoken sufficiently about this and so I should like to sketch only a brief outline: the most important principle is certainly that of the unity of reason and freedom i.e. that the expansion of rationality is the first precondition for the expansion of freedom. This principle is common to both liberalism and socialism. Both liberalism and socialism believe that the expansion of freedom can be achieved through the expansion of rationality. This conviction that reason and freedom are reciprocal is so firmly entrenched that even in psycho-analytical theory it is shown that the individual, if he is to be free, must become rationally more conscious (at least for Freud). However, this reciprocity between reason and freedom took on a practical form in the French revolution. Hegel points to this at a well-known point in his *The Philosophy of History* where he hails the French Revolution as the sunrise and remarks that for the first time reality has been stood on its head, that is, based on reason. The reciprocity of reason and freedom inspired optimism and was the guarantee of progress, of the advancement of history, of the triumph of science and technology and of the enlightenment of the people. From Galileo to the Encyclopaedists reason triumphed through discovering natural laws and bringing its victories to the attention of the masses. The universality and exactness of the natural sciences inspired social thinkers and sociologists to search for equally universal and exact social sciences. They searched for human nature in order to build up a *natural order* in accordance with it. I shall not speak further of this since it has already been mentioned. However, this search for the natural order and for human nature did have a fixed economic and class background (of which Ljubo Tadić also spoke). The authority of nature replaced divine authority, and so the social order could be drawn authoritatively from nature and not from God's decisions. A theory of social contract grew up out of natural right, and this contract became the basis of social relations. It was with this ideology that the third estate, led by the bourgeoisie, turned to revolution. This gave rise to a historically unique situation: never before in history had philosophical attitudes, and one philosophy as a whole, been so directly built into the legal order as was liberalism — and this can be proved by the texts themselves. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, of 26th August 1789, gave the strength of legislation to the philosophy of natural right. Article 1 states: »Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights«. »These are natural and inalienable rights«, says article 2. These are the rights of freedom, property, security and resistance to oppression (This is all a paraphrase of Rousseau's *Social Contract*).

Freedom is defined as the right of man to do whatever will not cause harm to others, article 4. (Locke would have said the same). Freedom is primarily freedom of the person, personal freedom, and guarantee against accusation and arbitrary arrest (art.7). As masters of their own persons people may speak, write, print and publish (art. 10). They may freely *acquire* and *possess*, and according

to art. 17 property is an *inviolable and sacred right* which cannot be taken away from anyone, except legally, by proper compensation. Equality is bound up with the freedom which was of such vital interest to the bourgeoisie in their battle against the aristocracy, and to the peasantry against the great landowners.

This, however, was only a general proclamation of principles. Later laws tried to limit these principles. Following the law of 22nd December 1789 the Constituent Assembly gave the right of vote only to persons holding private property, and this is where the true differentiation begins. Citizens were divided into three categories: *passive citizens* who, according to abbot Sieyès, the formulator of this nomenclature, had the right to defend their person, their freedom and their property, but did not take part in the formation of the state government. This category affected about three million Frenchmen. *Active citizens*, whom Sieyès describes as the »true« participants in the great social effort, were those who paid direct taxes worth at least three days wages. This counted for about four million Frenchmen. Finally there were the *voters*, little more than 50,000 in all. These were the people who paid high taxes. The differentiation was introduced. Robespierre protested in parliament, claiming that this was anti-constitutional: »All citizens, no matter who they may be, have the right to be represented in the Assembly«, he said. Marat pointed out angrily that through this kind of census the government would pass into the hands of the rich. »The fate of the poor cannot be improved by peaceful means. Just as the oppressive yoke of the aristocracy has been broken so, too, will the yoke of the rich be broken«, declared this »friend of the people«. The liberal constitution which followed in 1791 was founded on the principles of *laissez-faire*. »Man's freedom,« says the constitution, »is the freedom to create and produce, to seek for wages and to use them as he thinks fit«. Differentiation in effect grew sharper and sharper, pressure from the masses drew stronger and stronger, led by the Paris sans-culottes, and Gironde was brought down. In 1793 the Montagnards passed a new constitution. Article 33 of this constitution states: »When the government violates the rights of the people, rebellion is the most sacred and undeferrable duty of the people and of every part of the people«. For the first time an authentic legal expression of popular sovereignty! Not even this constitution, however, was able to strike at ownership. In art. 16 ownership is defined, according to Robespierre's stylised formulation, as the right by which each citizen may keep his property and use it, and use the profits he may gain from it. The representatives of the »angry ones« demanded that possessions accumulated to the detriment of public property, through speculation, monopoly and usury, should become the property of the people. Jacques Raux swore that the sans-culottes with their staves would ensure that these decrees were carried out. But it was here, before private property, that the Jacobins halted. They had neither the will nor the courage to take the next step towards soci-

al revolution. But in turning their heads away from socialism they did not realise that they were turning them towards the guillotine, as one French historian put it.

Marx criticised the constitutions of the French Revolution precisely because of this liberalistic limitation, because they were content to rest with mere political emancipation. »Freedom then,« concluded Marx in his analysis, »is the right to do whatever does not cause harm to others. The limits within which one can move without causing harm to others are determined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is fixed by a fence. This is the freedom of man as an isolated monad turned in upon himself. Man's right to freedom is not based on man's connection with man, but, on the contrary, on man's separation from man. This is the right of this separation, the right of the *limited* individual, limited to itself. The practical application of man's right to freedom is man's right to *private property*«. Marx criticised liberalism from a position which was far superior to liberalism because it was superior to the sphere of politics to which liberalism was limited. The political revolution is a revolution of bourgeois society, this is what Marx says (and Danko Grlić was right about this). Political emancipation is, on the one hand, the reduction of man to a member of bourgeois society, to an *egoistic independent* individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, to a moral personality. »Political emancipation does not satisfy even the proletariat, and it must not satisfy man as a whole: it must pass on to the emancipation of all mankind«. But the question is now — when? (Here Danko Grlić and I do not agree as to when human emancipation begins. He insists that it should begin at once. However, Marx would not agree with him on this.) Although Marx was still not engaged in polemics with the anarchists (here in *The Jewish Question*), his position did differ from theirs: »Only when the real individual man brings back the abstract citizen to himself and, as an individual man, becomes a generic being in his empirical life«, was Marx's reply.

It is from this point that socialism can look at liberalism not only as a competitive ideology but also as an ideology which may be subsumed from a historical viewpoint.

Second, liberalism and its realization in bourgeois states. The basic ideals of liberalism: the free individual protected by private property and freedoms of citizens, are disappearing more and more from modern bourgeois society. In what way? Above all through the transformation of property. In a study made of the new middle class in America (*The White Collar*) Wright Mills explains how this transformation has been brought about. Smallholdings suited the democracy of Jefferson's America; at that time America was a country of farmers, self-employed people and members of the free professions. Mills, however, shows how in fact the crisis in liberalism came about in the USA, and he does so on the basis of statistics describing the disappearance of the smallholders of the old middle class and their transformation into office-workers —

»white-collar workers«. He follows the gradual disappearance of democratic norms in democratic life itself and shows how the concentration of economic power led to a concentration of political power. So liberalism was gradually turned into mere rhetoric and began to disappear in real American politics and in real life. With the appearance of state capitalism and the transformation of vast numbers of self-employed workers into employees and civil servants, the guarantee of freedom and independence which comes from the ownership of property, a guarantee which up till then the citizens had enjoyed, now began to disappear. Gigantic organizations sprang up — the focus of rationality and decision-making shifted from the individual to the organization. As a result the individual was suppressed, badly informed and, finally, subjected to all forms of repression. So it is that in modern industrial societies liberalism has not, in fact, left a single important trace of its original ideas. Tocqueville's words now sound ridiculous in which he foresees the future of American democracy and the danger threatening it: »If freedom ever perishes in America it will be as a result of the working class ever been achieved? *Second*, has the society rity to a state of despair — and from then anarchy will rule«. Today this prediction of 1835 seems very wide of the mark, when we see that the majority has no chance of being informed, not even about whether its country is at war or not, and far less about any other situation. The degree to which the masses are manipulated and the elite organized in their irresponsibility has completely overthrown the principles of liberalism and the traditions of Jefferson's democracy.

Third, the ideas of socialism and the practice of socialist countries. This might be a theme for a symposium; this is why I shall now restrict myself to asking those questions which are in my opinion unavoidable when discussing this topic. Whether the ideas of socialism can be linked to the practise of socialist countries depends on how we answer the following questions: *First*, has the rule of the working class ever been achieved? *Second*, has the society of the existing socialist states ceased to be a class society? *Third*, is the ownership of the means of production truly social, do the members of society have real control over it? *Fourth*, has production become rational? *Fifth*, is there any social control over the centres of management? And finally, sixth, have exploitation and oppression died out? Each of these questions involves research and argument, but they must be faced if we are to get a true picture of »socialism in practise«.

Fourth, the ideas of liberalism and the practise of socialism. Is liberalism in any way relevant to socialism as a social order? Kosta Čavoški spoke of this and so I shall shorten that part considerably. We can agree that the legitimacy of government decisions and respect for the law is something which is sorely lacking in the practise of socialist countries, and their immanence in the idea of socialism is also shown by the fact that no country

will admit to the lack of legality or the absence of legitimacy in government decisions. This is a practise which does not dare to recognise itself and must constantly try to deceive itself and others that a high level of democracy is being maintained, even the highest and historically unsurpassed degree of legality and democracy, and that all this is far above »rotten« liberalism. But if we review the question more attentively we will realise that the problem has not been solved by the rejection of »rotten« liberalism. Marx's views on the freedom of the press, on censorship and the public opinion are completely in keeping with the spirit of liberal principles and there is no evident reason why they should be left out of the practise of socialist countries. In his well-known treatise on freedom Mill proclaimed principles of which no socialist system would need to be ashamed. The individual is free and protected not only from the state and government but also from any kind of pressure from the majority or from public opinion. If all people, says Mill, were of one opinion and only one man thought differently, not all humanity would have more right to force this man to be silent than he would have, if he so wanted, to command all humanity to be silent. If, to paraphrase the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, we say that there is no free society without free individuals, then we are saying the same thing.

I shall now quote a writer who speaks in the spirit of liberalism, although one would not expect this: »Every man inherits freedom from birth so that he may answer to his calling here on earth. Only a free man rules over himself, can develop his qualities and perfect his talents, which are a gift to enable him to conceive, to recognize and carry out his tasks and his rights and duties. Out of the freedom of the members of a nation, the freedom of individuals, there comes the freedom of a nation and out of this freedom there grows the total freedom of all. Just as freedom advanced and perfected an individual personality, so too it advances, develops and perfects a collection of these individual personalities, an entire nation . . . Quite simply, whatever has raised man's dignity and revived the strength of a nation is all the outcome of man's freedom«. These words were written by the king Petar Karađorđević I in his introduction to Mill's essay *On Freedom*. If we were to compare his reflections on freedom and his view of the need of freedom for the progress of a nation with the reflections of certain party officials on freedom, we would be completely confused: who then is further from socialism? The practise of socialism does meet up with liberalism but so far, in all contacts we have had with that practice, it has disappointed us: not only when it rejects the heritage of liberalism in the political sphere but also when it tries to approach it in the economic sphere by imitating the past of liberalism.

Fifth, the ideas of socialism and the political life of modern bourgeois states. It appears that the student movements, by and large socialist oriented, as well as the appearance of the new left and the revival of Marxism have brought about a great show of

interest for socialist ideas in bourgeois states where, perhaps, these ideas may fall on fertile soil. This question is connected with the discussion on the outlook for socialism in developed capitalist societies, and I only mention it because it is one of the key questions of our discussion. If one had discussed the outlook for socialism in these countries, it would have been necessary first to see how and to what extent the pressure of socialist ideas has influenced the modification of capitalist society. This, of course, is not possible in our discussion.

Sixth, the political practice of bourgeois and socialist countries. Here I should also like to mention just a few questions I consider essential. *First*, is there a convergence between the systems of modern industrial societies? This is a question which has often been raised but not often properly analysed. *Second*, are the modes of government rapidly approaching a common model of government (the domination of the elite, manipulation by great political organizations)? *Third*, is the technocratic ideal something which is common to both kinds of countries? And *fourth*, is the superiority of bureaucracy to be found in both kinds of countries? Although it may at first sight seem that these questions can be answered affirmatively, it would be necessary to prove or reject this through data and analysis.

After a comparison has been made between liberalism and socialism and the social forms which are invoking their principles, the question arises: what is the outlook for modern society? There have been many pessimistic analyses. These analyses were particularly widespread before 1968, particularly in the works of the greatest philosophers and sociologists, Marcuse, Mills and others. In these works the fate of bureaucracy was strongly felt. Power, repression, manipulation, the appearance of the »happy robot«, flight from freedom, the loneliness of the crowd, the one-dimensional man — this was the picture of the world. There were simply no prospects. New trends, however, have shown that not all is »dead«, or, more precisely, that nothing has »died«. The new trends in a society which seemed to have become solidified, have opened the way for new discussions on the prospects and possibilities for maintaining the existence of freedom in modern society.

Ljubomir Tadić:

LIBERALISM IS A CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

I said earlier, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that one should distinguish natural-right thought about freedom from liberalism. It is constantly being repeated, however, that the natural-right idea of freedom is identical to the philosophy of liberalism. This means that you entirely surrender the natural-right origin of freedom to liberalism. I feel that you are mistaken and do not

agree with this at all. I cannot agree with the idea of giving an eminently *conservative* ideology the dignity of *revolutionary* thought, or the thought of a revolutionary era, when there was still no differentiation in the »third estate«. You attribute a meaning to liberalism which it did not have historically or sociologically. I shall have more to say about this later.

I completely agree, for instance, with what Čavoški said and I found his speech attractive and instructive. But he, in fact, spoke of the »political liberalism« which has retained the idea of natural-right. The writers mentioned by Čavoški represent the revolutionism of the era. We meet them later as well (e. g. John Stewart Mill, of whom Mićunović spoke), but this is exceptional.

I should like to say that as opposed to authoritarian, or, still better, despotic socialism, the liberal acknowledgement of the bourgeois freedoms is more advanced and on a higher social level. Here there is nothing to be disputed. The dispute only arises around the illusions which defend the pathos of human freedom and link it to an ideological trend which is in thought and practise historical and in essence conservative, and cannot be anything but conservative. Let me repeat: it is conservative because in it the right to private property has suppressed and absorbed the freedom of the individual. Or, to be more specific: the freedom of the individual is accessory here, and not an original, fundamental right.

Unfortunately, I neglected to mention earlier what logically follows from a critical analysis of liberalism, that is, I should have said more about the two forms under which socialism has appeared in modern history — the despotic form and the democratic form. There is no time now for me to go into this in detail. I should like simply to remind you of certain basic points which, if time allows, could be more thoroughly examined in later discussion. What I have in mind is the conflict between the authoritarian principle (this is the question raised by Božo Jakšić) and the democratic principle in socialism. Now we must ask: to what extent can the authoritarian and libertarian principles co-exist at all?

How is a socialist revolution possible? Is it the product of an *organic* growth, as the libertarians said, or is it an *organized* thing? But can a revolution be called a revolution if it is organized? This, it seems to me, is the fundamental question. The problem was also raised by Danko Grlić when he spoke of politics as the organization of power. In brief, it can be summarised as — »revolution from below« or »revolution from above«? Revolution is either a movement of the people to ensure their vital needs, or a matter of organization by the so-called »conscious minority« who influence the »unconscious mass« and prepare them for a rationally calculated clash with the existing and established order. It is no mere chance that this problem intruded in the revolutionary upheaval of 1968, not only in Paris or Belgrade, but wherever there was a movement.

Danko Grlić:

I should just like to make a modest addition to what Ljubo Tadić said. The people become the mass really only when they have opposed to them a truly organized elite; this elite tries to include the disorganized, shapeless mass into its aims and only in this way to justify the need for its organization. In other words, the people, *considered as a mass*, are the product of such an elite.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

LIBERALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM

I should like to return to the question which Dobrica Ćosić raised, and which has been discussed at some length, as a critical counter-position to a narrowing-down which Ljubo Tadić has made from the very beginning of the concept and scope of liberalism. I think that he has been looking at liberalism in a way which does not reflect all that is worthwhile in liberalism. He has been considering it, primarily, at the stage or — so to say — in the form through which it became an ideology, a doctrine. In other words, his treatment has been too doctrinaire, and I feel it is important for us to get to the roots of liberalism and all its limitations, though it is also important to establish those ideas which are influential and which will be important to socialism as well.

Ljubo Tadić has somehow managed to conceal these ideas and so I think it is also important to consider Dobrica Ćosić's question whether liberalism, as a philosophy of freedom, has not been underrated. I feel that it has and so I should like to recall certain ideas in liberalism which have been neglected.

It is rather strange that Ljubo Tadić passed so lightly over John Stewart Mill. Even if John Stewart Mill is an exception, his thinking is often so important that he should be taken into account. Dragoljub Mićunović quoted from Mill, and I shall add something to this quotation to show that we have been too narrow in our treatment of the idea of freedom in liberalism by referring to the private property and egoism. I should like to remind you of just those ideas of John Stewart Mill's which transcend the limitations of the egoistic individual and show this philosopher in quite a different light than that in which Čavoški has portrayed him. For he said that even Mill was afraid of democracy. My impression is that it is in certain of his ideas that the idea of democracy can be seen to have matured, for he does not seek only freedom for the individual, he also seeks freedom for the spirit, freedom for the people and freedom for the people to develop. I think, then, that in liberalism one can find the idea of *the liberation of the individual as a person, and not just the liberation of man as an egoistic individual*, as has been continually emphasised here. This is why I felt that Ljubo Tadić was being over severe in declaring that libe-

ralism is largely a conservative ideology and that it contains nothing revolutionary. One cannot agree if one takes liberalism with all its ideas and concepts that are worth considering and examining. For a start, the idea of human nature which John Stewart Mill developed is very close to that of Marx. For example, Mill compares man, human nature, to a tree which branches freely, and says that if the tree is to branch out freely there must be free space for the trunk, i. e. for human action, and so no fixed mould should be cast to confine this freedom. This is actually the idea that there is dormant potential in man, that is, the idea that the aim of society is to enable this dormant potential to develop and emerge. And not just to emerge — I think. Rot was right to stress that there is nothing in human nature which is ready-made and simply emerges — but rather to develop so that man should be drawn to let this human potential which is hidden, suppressed or even only embryonic in him, expand and fully manifest itself. Mill then speaks in support of man's right to develop his true individuality but not his egoistic side. He says, for instance, that the government has no right to prescribe man's happiness because the choice which the individual himself makes for his own happiness is the best choice because it is made by him — not that it would necessarily be the very best choice — it is his and nobody else's. So, he speaks of the individuality which can be a form of liberation if man wants to become a person, if he wants to become a man in the true sense. Man is his own person, and this is not ownership — it is something in his nature and not some form of possession from without.

Mill then speaks of the democracy which must be respected, but will ensure the freedom of the people, freedom of thought, freedom of expression and the freedom of all to develop their minds and give expression to this development. He does speak, it is true, of the tyranny of the people, only he does so in the sense we have used here — that the people can become a tyrant. On the other hand, he says at the same time that it is only in democracy that man can completely develop his individuality and his reason. Reason, of course, is here understood as something common to all people, something invaluable because it is specifically human. I must remind you of a passage on freedom which really shows that this is not the freedom of egoistic individuals, or even the individualism normally attributed to liberalism. Mill says that the freedom of thought is not important only, or primarily, in order to create great thinkers. On the contrary, it is far more necessary to enable the *average* human being to acquire the spiritual breadth of which he is capable. There have been, and may well be again, great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of spiritual enslavement. But there has never been, and never will be, an intellectually active populace in such an atmosphere (*J. S. Mill, On Freedom*). The stress, then, is on *activity*, on the creation of *real individuality* for all, not just for a few of the elite, a few individuals, a few persons who, on the grounds of their property, remain socially apart. In John Stewart Mill we find support for certain general

human values and not just for a few purely individual and selfish personal interests. As I have said, he feels it is most important to create an atmosphere in which all people can make use of their freedom and develop their reason; a people who have submissiveness developed as their most important quality cannot achieve their own freedom and cannot achieve what is important for man and for true human communication. Mill goes beyond some of the limits of which we have spoken and of which Dragoljub Mićunović spoke today. To a certain extent J. S. Mill goes beyond the concept that freedom is the domain of the isolated individual, the atomised individual, and not of man in relation to other men. He strongly condemns the manipulation of people; this is why he condemns the state which consciously counts on the members of its society remaining spiritually stunted so that it can govern them more easily. But, as he points out, such a state must sooner or later realise that with little people — little in the sense of stunted, people who have not yet shown their full potential — great things cannot be done.

These are, undoubtedly, ideas which should not be underestimated and which could also be influential within the framework of Marxism and of socialist ideas, which have already, without doubt, had their effect on Marxism and added in a limited, but positive, way to the content of Marxism. I should also however, like to point to a limitation. Although individuality is not considered exclusively as the privacy of man, as the egoism of an isolated individual, these ideas still lack a definition of the sociability of the individual and a vision of how to transcend the present situation, and also of how to achieve what John Stewart Mill is pleading for, in other words, how to aid individuality and the realisation of individuality by creating true sociability. This is why it happens that in John Stewart Mill we find an appeal to protect the individual from society, and here society is still seen in its entirety as a danger threatening the individual, in other words, the concepts of state and society are interchanged. So, *the idea of sociability*, in the true sense, does not appear in liberalism although it can be briefly spotted here and there.

But how, then, does Marxism stand vis-à-vis the idea of individualism and sociability? It is usually said that Marxism, as opposed to the theories beginning from individuality, begins from sociability, from collectivity. I do not think that this could be said of Marx himself, and we are all well acquainted with the works of Marx in which one can see that for him the ideas of individuality and sociability are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are complementary ideas. And when Marx speaks of a united social force as a free association of individuals and of the way in which alienated sociability is to be overcome, he is also relying including the development of individuality. In a community which is going to be humane, the individuals as individuals may engage as such in free association. Not, that is, as members of a class, not as members of a particular social group, but simply as individuals, as de-

veloped persons, and only then will free association be a united social force in the true sense. In this sense, then, Marx's concept of man's freedom is deeper and more dialectical; so when one compares the ideas of Marxism and liberalism it must be said that Marxism is certainly richer in this respect, that it sees the limitations of liberalism and succeeds in surmounting them theoretically. But Marxism cannot avoid the positive heritage of liberalism in the sense of which I have spoken here.

Kosta Čavoški:

THE SUPPRESSION OF INDIVIDUALITY AND THE DEFECTS OF DEMOCRACY

Since Zagorka Pešić-Golubović has particularly insisted on John Stewart Mill as the most valuable liberal thinker, I should like to say a few more words about him. There can be no doubt that his work marks the summit of the liberal idea as such. What he later tried to develop was already an endeavour to form a social basis for the realisation of this idea of freedom. Nevertheless, I think it is correct to say that in a certain way he defended this freedom from democracy itself, having in mind a different concept of democracy from the one which is so familiar today. Mill was not so concerned with imitating the democratic ideal which Pericles expounded in his famous speech in honour of the fallen Athenians; he was more influenced by the defects and the abuse of Athenian democracy, the democracy which cost Socrates his life — though it should not be forgotten that Socrates managed to live a full 70 years under this democracy. Mill rightly observed that a democratic government of the majority is often hostile towards exceptional personalities and towards everything that deviates from the average.

Mill was a contemporary of de Tocqueville, and he wrote the preface to the first English edition of de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, which is probably still the best work by an European on America. In this book de Tocqueville shows that he is conscious of the value of American democracy but he also describes its defects. He considers that democracy is the best, but not the perfect form of government. It is undoubtedly true, says de Tocqueville, that in the United States the best people are rarely found in public positions and it must be admitted that those few became even rarer as democracy moved further and further away from its old limits. It is evident that in half a century the class of American statesmen was considerably reduced. He also pointed out that there is always much discussion in America before decisions are passed and as long as the majority continues to doubt, but as soon as the majority opinion has been irrevocably expressed, everyone falls silent and friend and foe alike hitch onto the bandwagon, so that almost

nobody has the courage to persist in a belief which differs from the opinion of the majority. De Tocqueville also pointed out that the sweeping powers of the majority favour the spread of conformity.

Like de Tocqueville, Mill noticed this growing conformity and discovered the reasons behind it. At the end of the 19th cent. and especially in the 20th cent. the typical way of life — the spread of uniform education and the influence of the industrial consciousness — led to increasing spiritual and psychological standardization among people, who were reading the same things, listening to the same things and looking at the same things with the result that they swiftly became inclined to renounce their individuality. Thus in a democracy of this sort everything was brought down to the level and standard of mediocrity; the tall shoots were pruned and the short ones lengthened, thus opposing the true values which are the motive force behind social progress. Mill tried to secure institutional powers which would favour the development of the values of individuality. In his essay on *Representative Government*, Mill speaks of the suggestion of an Englishman to introduce an electoral system which would include the use of separate candidate sheets for those who might not perhaps make themselves felt in a small electoral district but would probably win sufficient votes on a national scale. These people would not get into parliament through the weight of their support, but through their quality and intelligence.

Unfortunately, in Europe today and in our country as well, democracy has been only partially established, so that one cannot properly see those defects which Mill observed when defending individuality from democracy as well; what are evident are the other defects which make it more despotism than democracy.

Dobrica Ćosić:

THE ROYAL THRONE OF ART HAS LONG SINCE BEEN DESTROYED

For all his lucidity and inspiration, Ljubo Tadić has not altered my feeling that his approach to liberalism is incomplete, doctrinaire in certain points and unacceptable from certain sides. I have illustrated my feelings from the sphere of culture. I must remain there, and repeat that it is only the philosophy of liberalism which has realized the spirit and ideas of the Renaissance in culture and in art, as well as its concept of freedom and of man. That is, it has realized the Renaissance. It is another question what happened to the bourgeois social and political subject of culture, and what has been happening since man's work became commodity.

A few words more about faith in the people: in my understanding of this faith in the people I firmly assume a lack of faith in the masses. To be more precise, I look on faith in the people as faith in the possibility of their appearing and confirming themself-

ves in the act of conscious and creative persons. All the experience of literature substantiates the value of this faith and the existence of the people as a historical subject without which, to my mind, any real ided would be inconceivable.

Mićunović somewhat surprised me by the pleasant ease and certainty with which he declared that this age has no new ideas. It is right here that our discussion should begin, and on the basis of this assumption I have tried to offer some criticism of the ideology and ideologization of the history of the world. It may be that there are no new ideologies and it may be that these new ideologies could not be fashioned for reasons which are very well known. But as far as ideas are concerned, the 20th cent. has created numerous important scientific disciplines and developed magnificent research projects in all spheres of human society, life, the microcosm and the macrocosm, not to mention the many evolutions in culture and philosophy. I do not know what thinker could neglect this.

I am rather flattered that I am responsible for the erudite survey of culture as Trivo Indić made. Unfortunately, I am not prepared to give an improvised account of my own notion of the development of culture in the epoch of the bourgeoisie. I might, however, point to two or three differences which are not without significance. I consider the first bourgeois novel to be none other than Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, not because *Don Quixote* is inspired by mediaeval literature, because it comes to terms with a myth of feudal society, but because *Don Quixote*, in the spiritual and philosophical sense, is a grand anticipation of the epoch. If I were to add anything to Trivo Indić's stack of associations concerning nature and the development of the social being in the art and culture of the bourgeois epoch, then I should point out that the autonomy of art and culture has been disregarded and that the law of aesthetic autogenesis has been overlooked. We better admit that the sphere of art and philosophy is not so easily subjected to the forms of economic, social and political determination. The danger that culture might become deified, which Trivo Indić warned us of, is a very luxurious danger. To start with, this deification is not in the nature of culture, particularly cognitive culture, I might say, particularly modern culture. Deification is possible and it has undoubtedly existed, and still exists, both in the bourgeois epoch and in the bureaucratic Stalinist epoch, but its basis is social, ideological, political. So, this deification is not immanent in culture; it has always been part of the pragmatic concept of the ruling class. Since Trivo Indić has already brought up Sholohov, we two will very soon agree that his deification did not spring from *Quiet Flows the Don* but from the author's party function and his political personality. It might be proper to soften the category of deification by introducing that of aristocratization, and here too we will probably reach a swift agreement. In non-democratic societies, and not only in non-democratic societies, there is a traditional aristocratic scale for evaluating human activities and in such a hierarchy it happens very often and very easily that culture, and

especially art, takes on an aristocratic form. I am sure that the royal throne of art has long since been destroyed, it was destroyed by art itself. I am not given to the easy belief that psychology is a science possessing lasting methodology or, accordingly, that it has achieved more reliable results; the results of its research and experience are not so reliable as they are today made out to be in the hope of belittling the proven worth of literature.

Trivo Inđić:

EROS: THE AESTHETICIZATION OF LIFE

I have never believed — and I must say this to Dobrica Ćosić — that art can be interpreted through art, just as I do not believe that economics can be explained by economics itself, law by law or philosophy by philosophy, etc. I must say that an integral approach to the general phenomenology of the spirit is taken for granted in these discussions, and that I would very gladly welcome the aesthetic principle of existence in its most aestheticized form, as presented, let us say, by the Frankfurt School, in Adorno's aesthetics, but only insofar as it is a realization of man as total man. But I do not in principle accept it insofar as it is a realization of man as an aesthetic being in the narrow professional sense, that is, insofar as it is not Eros in the wider, wilder sense of Marcuse, for it is impossible to interpret art without *criticology*, without poetics, without a spiritual armoury which constantly comes to its aid, but which is still born within a wider, civilized, cultural atmosphere.

Naturally, since you have mentioned Kosik's words, I would never accept the kind of politician of culture such as Lenin or Gramsci was, for the same reasons as I would defend the aestheticism of existence from them, fighting at the same time against our aesthetics which imposes its purism by sticking in a very narrow and very uncivilized way to its aesthetic position. I believe that there exists a life of aesthetic forms which as correlative with life and civilization in the widest sense of the words, but I do not believe that it is possible to accept as most representative the kind of aesthetic research which is offered, for instance, by a variant of Marxism close to Krleža and Lucien Goldman, although it is far more refined than in Trotsky, Lenin or Lunacharsky. But I think that if we do not take aesthetic life in a wider sense, as an Eros in the sense of Marcuse, we have achieved nothing. The kind of aesthetic life you offer would throw us back on a defensive position, on sticking to self-satisfaction, and so I would like to defend a still superficial attempt to sociologize the wider, civilization-oriented questions of bourgeois culture, the way of proving that it is just this low utilitarian relation towards aesthetics, towards culture, that leads to the tyranny of culture, to the tyranny of an essentially utilitarianized and ideologized aesthetics within the

framework of bourgeois society, a tyranny which, naturally, does not end by chance with the aesthetic of superman in Marinetti, Junger etc. This aesthetics, to my mind, has lost its basis critical standpoint, and this is the human standpoint in the widest sense. This is why I feel there is no point in dwelling on details, about whether we dispute the autonomy of the artistic etc. Autonomy, undoubtedly, exists, just as there exists autonomy of philosophical thought, but if this autonomy is too rigidly and too singlemindedly taken, it cannot be a worthwhile illusion, as are many of our actions connected with attempts to step beyond reality.

I have never believed in Marxist aesthetics as something particular in itself, nor even in so-called bourgeois aesthetics such as offered from Wolf to Croce, just because of the principle of Eros, the principle of an intensive, all-round existence. I believe that every form of partialization and particularization of all that is human leads us nowhere — into a blind alley. I would find it silly to disagree with Dobrica Ćosić if he were always to speak from his position of the autonomy of the artistic act, for I find his view to be essentially an attempt to aestheticize life, though in a way which does not exclude other forms of human engagement, which is, on the contrary, complementary to them. It is only in this complementary relation, I feel, that an aesthetics can be realised in politics, that it can bring about the aestheticization of politics and the politicization of aesthetics, a socialization of art, economy and law — the artistic shaping of social life. So much for an additional explanation of certain finer aesthetic positions.

Dobrica Ćosić:

THE DANGER OF THE POLITICIZATION OF ART

It is almost incredible that in these two days of debate and discussion we have quite forgotten to point out the value of traditions for the modern world, the value of tradition for our thinking about our world. I have the impression that in the years in which we are living entire worlds of values are being broken apart vis-à-vis tradition. Modern culture, that is, the art which is being produced today, shows a philosophical antihumanism toward tradition; or else it is returning to tradition in a romantic way through very basic impulses. If I have the right to make a certain fundamental criticism of myself and my friends from the disciplines of philosophy, sociology and political science, if it seems to me that there is a strikingly weak point in their philosophy, their scientific opinion and their relation to contemporaneity and the whole ideological formation of our society, then I should say that it is indifference and scorn for the value of tradition and for the entire cultural inheritance in national culture. This is clearly shown in the approach to old liberalism. It is difficult to understand that we deny the value of such traditions of bourgeois culture

as that of liberalism, for this would mean that we deny the historicity and the organic development of culture which is still the most humane affirmation of our existence in this world. It is a pity that today we are not able to relate ourselves philosophically to tradition in the field of national culture and its heritage.

The politicization of culture is particularly striking in our times. My feeling is that culture should be defended from this terrible process. The basic reason for its happening is the limitation on the freedom to create; this politicization begins from bureaucratic positions, it is part of the bureaucratic power of society and represents the ideology of bureaucracy. There is another motive for politicization, inseparable from the first and at present taking on a more and more aggressive form, so much so that it has become the monopolising idea in certain republics and among certain peoples in Yugoslavia, this motive is nationalism. There is also a third cause which must be faced, one which comes from the so-called left wing in art, from an avantgardism. This politicization is extremely effective because it is morally motivated. We would be very short-sighted and programatic if we did not see the danger this politicization holds for the creative autonomy of art. It makes no difference that it is undoubtedly anti-bureaucratic, anti-dogmatic and anti-conservative.

The aesthetics and poetics of this art is, on the whole, naturalism. If anything in this art deserves serious and complex aesthetic criticism it is naturalism. For naturalism as a style never lasted, nor did it leave behind any great works. The ideological anti-ideologism of the so-called left and modern art is of particularly problematic value to me.

I feel that it is a good thing today to point to the politicization of an art which proclaims nonconformity. There are many reasons for submitting this nonconformist politicization to more critical appraisal and evaluation.

Now, something about the autonomy of art. Here we face great temptations. If we do not stress the autonomy of art and culture, it is natural and immanent that we immediately open up the right for ideology and bureaucracy to criticise and intervene in art; we inevitably limit freedom. On the other hand, if we overemphasise the autonomy of culture we deprive ourselves of the possibility of affecting the humanization of our contemporaneity. How can we make our work effective, not in the moralistic or moralizing sense, how can we give it, how can we shape for it, a real humanist capacity and function? The question is dreadfully difficult. The entire modern history of culture offers us mostly defeats. I have taken commitment in culture to mean the possibility of fighting for freedom, as the right to choose the means and methods of action, that is, the right to free choice and action.

Trivo Indić:

To what extent does this go, this determination of the subjective act?

Dobrica Ćosić:

There is no security for objective tests.

Mihailo Marković:

You say, Dobrica, that we must not endanger art, not even from the point of view of the totality, the universality and self-realization of man. What can be the danger for art from this point of view?

Trivo Indić:

Is this the same as what the politicians say when speaking of the autonomy of politics, of the autonomy of commerce?

Nebojša Popov:

Dobrica Ćosić has declared himself in favour of an area of consideration in which one find the widest possible differences among the speakers. One question emerges, at least for me, from what he has just said, a question which touches deeply upon his resistance to a doctrinaire relation to the world, to the existential situation. I fear that his last plea would lead to a moralistic criticism of the defects and inadequacies of doctrinaire criticism.

The extra-historical determination of the standpoint for the relation towards the existing world is expressed in the attempt to treat on the same level certain, one might say, very dissonant and even deeply conflicting tendencies such as bureaucratic voluntarism and administrating, nationalism as the absolutization of tradition and a left-wing attempt to oppose the alienated world and consider three essentially different trends as equal parts of a unique ideological madness in our times. One should see what is unique here and what is not, on what grounds they can be placed on the same level and viewed from the same level, and what possibilities altogether are offered in relation to the undoubted madness of modern civilization which is so difficult to resist and to which we do not consent.

Dobrica Ćosić:

I mentioned three causes of the politicization of culture. From the moral point of view the differences are undoubted in their motivations. I am highly conscious that my standpoint involves a generalization which deserves criticism and demands that I should define my position more definitely with regard to every tendency to politicize art.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

I should like to make an observation. I think it is good that Dobrica Ćosić also mentioned the two other sources of politicization, but I also think that there is much substance in Popov's war-

ning that the term politicization may tempt us to even out the differences between various forms of politicization and view them through one lens.

Now I should like to ask whether the humanist content of the various elements of culture, art, philosophy is a heteronomous element or an immanent element, apart from the aesthetic element in art? Hence, if we make a socio-anthropological analysis or criticism which does not pass over the essential autonomy — this is now a question of degree — is this then a heteronomous approach and can it then be sufficient basis for our equating those fairly different forms of politicization? That is the problem.

Dobrica Ćosić:

They are united by a subjective dictate, a style. This art is always situational, it must of necessity be temporary. It is of present importance, it is naturalistic in style and this is where its basic limitation lies. If I have left the impression that I overemphasised the anti-politicization of art and culture as a whole, I think that this is an attitude which is far from the real capabilities of intellectuals in our time. And not only in our time. If we glance at the history of literature, for example, we will very easily establish that the greatest people in literature paid their toll to the times, and that they were also political beings. But . . . Aeschylus was a commander in the war against the Persians, and he wrote a play called *The Persians*. What did he say, what did he sing of? He told of the pain and suffering of the defeated enemy. That was that — he was as brilliant as he was mean. It is the problem of the talent to find the possibility of turning the political content into something of real and permanent value, into a new quality, an original form.

Andrija Krešić:

It might be possible to put the question in a highly principled form: does art, the life of art — one of the many components of real life — serve as a means of life, or is the reverse true: is art, as a reality for itself and in itself, the aim of real life? I would be inclined to opt for the second answer. I think that at the zenith of the world's historic path this existence according to the laws of beauty is precisely what makes up man's life, and that every attitude which requires that art should act in its service is anti-artistic and anti-humanist.

Mihailo Marković:

ART AND PRAXIS

I think that we are continually confusing two different things: one is politicization and the other commitment in a far wider sense, that of the existence of a basic orientation, a basic attitude towards

the world. For all three orientations described by Dobrica Ćosić are, if I understood well, politically oriented. One is bureaucratic apology, the second is nationalism and the third is a left-wing political propaganda. We have seen the film by Anyes Varda (*The Black Panthers*), which is a documentary film but completely political in character. There are various films which have been made in the spirit of New Left ideas and which are also full of political overtones. Art, then, has the right to demand autonomy in relation to all these other particular spheres of human consciousness and human activity, such as politics, religion, science etc. A basic orientation towards the world, towards life, is nevertheless present in art whether the artist likes it or not, and — not to repeat what I said yesterday — this may be an orientation towards accepting the world, withdrawing from the world or changing the world and humanizing it; any of these three is possible. The demand that art should not be closed in on itself and that it should not insist on its autonomy in an absolute way, should simply be taken as a demand that art become committed in this sense.

But now we come to the very question raised by Andrija Krešić: is not art, perhaps, just that totality above which there is no wider or more universal totality? Does not what we call *praxis*, does not free human creative activity fully coincide with an activity according to the laws of beauty? If everything which is not activity according to the laws of beauty was not *praxis*, then one could really say that there is no other aim and no other ideal than to raise life to the level of art. It seems to me, however, that activity »according to the laws of beauty«, as Marx said at one point, is *only one* of the essential characteristics of *praxis*. There are several other important characteristics. Free human activity, *praxis*, need not be only art, it can be a game, it can be love, it can be any other creative act through which man affirms his individual human power, through which he satisfies the genuine needs of others, which is an end in itself and which is free. It strikes me, then, that *praxis* is a wider concept than just this aesthetic production and aesthetic experience.

Trivo Indić:

What we are speaking of is *agathon*. How is *agathon* possible today? One formula for experience is a political one, in its original sense. Dobrića Ćosić said that no kind of intervention is possible in the field of aesthetics. He is a liberal *par excellence*, this is what I meant when I said there was no difference between him and Spencer — *le monde va de lui même* — all goes by itself.

Mihailo Marković:

Accordingly, the philosophical orientation I am supporting is quite compatible with the demand of the artist. Autonomy is negative freedom, autonomy is freedom from something. The humanist orientation I support is fully compatible with the demands of this

negative freedom, that is, with the demand that art should be autonomous in relation to science, politics, religion, etc. It seems to me, however, that just as one can, from this humanist standpoint, criticise a science which wishes to be pure, neutral, and autonomus — so from this same standpoint one can criticise an art which strives to be only independent, separate, »free from« etc., and which involves the possibility of an escape from the world or an acceptance of the world, which, to a certain extent, does not have a radical attitude towards the world.

Dobrica Ćosić:

We must distinguish the scientific act and the scientific work from the aesthetic work.

Trivo Indić:

Is this possible in the original sense of the words?

Dobrica Ćosić:

We shall immediately draw the distinction. What is, in fact, the autonomy of the creative act? Creative autonomy assumes the right to a free choice of subject, of the form of expression, and an absolute by free and subjective confirmation of one's personality in the work. And not only this. What is the error of all possible pragmatisms from those of the enlightenment, the church and theology, right up to those of the present day? The error lies in their belief that it is possible to have an organic interpolation of the so-called social directive, the ideological tendency into the structure of the work of art. This interpolation is, in my opinion, very difficult to bring about. The so-called directive of ideology cannot be accepted if it is not immanent in the subject of creation.

Miladin Životić:

AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM

The concept of autonomy must be defined, particularly since we use it very vaguely and diffusely. It is most often used to mean the need to divide work and the spheres of interest. The artist must do his work and he must live together with the politicians. Each must know his own sphere, his preserve. The artist must react whenever the politician encroaches on his preserve. The artist is a specialist, a man who has specialized for a particular duty. But art is not a separate form of activity, it is a form of life, a way of life and an aim in life. Art as a whole has anyway not been able to fit in harmoniously with the other forms of social consciousness which produce the so-called positive values, i. e. the values which must serve as the norms for human behaviour, for integration into the existing social structures. Art has never been able to do this as

long as it has been art. It has always been a form of the negative consciousness, a form which has always opened up the horizons of the future and broken through to the unknown. In this sense it has always been autonomous, because man has created values, not heteronomously, not on the basis of other forms of social consciousness and not on the basis of what already exists.

If the autonomy of art is understood in its original sense as *freedom*, then Dobrica Ćosić's criticism does not hit its mark and might be taken as a demand that art's domain, its framework and boundaries, should be determined. As far as competence to speak of the world is concerned, art has no boundaries, and it is detached from politics, law and other spheres by the very fact that it wants to be an integral and not a partial consciousness. Can one really, for example criticise Sartre because as an artist he passed on to politics and left his artistic preserve, his enclosure, his domain? But this is done in certain aestheticised critiques in which the autonomy of art is considered as the desire to determine clearly a particular sphere in which only the artist will be competent. The artist will, therefore, leave others the right to do as they like in their own spheres. This is the position of the division of the spheres of interest and co-existence, which is just what the artist can never stand. I think it is here that the misunderstandings about autonomy arise.

VI. LIBERALISM AND MARXISM

SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING LIBERALISM AND MARXISM

Zdravko Kučinar

This discussion on liberalism and marxism started out from the claim that the topic was not academic but historically of great immediate importance. During the discussions, however, the very immediate importance of the topic has in a certain way been brought into question, or, on the other hand, differences have emerged in the way of looking at the causes of the historical immediacy of liberalism today.

If, in fact, one is to claim that liberalism is a thought (idea, ideology, policy or way of existence) of the 17th., 18th. and 19th. cent. and if Marxism is a thought (idea, ideology, movement etc.) of the 19th. cent. — as has been stated here, and often before — then we have reason for asking how this topic is of immediate importance today. Are we living in the 19th cent., are we solving the problems and questions of the 19th cent., and has the 20th cent. raised no important new questions?

1. When speaking of liberalism and Marxism (socialism) one must distinguish between the idea, the ideology and the practise of social movements through which a fixed ideology is realised. This has already been partly shown in these discussions.

In history, ideas are effective through ideology (the programmes of political and other movements). The eternal human ideas, the basic humanist ideas of justice, freedom, equality, brotherhood and solidarity etc. become very diverse and even contradictory in their concrete socio-historical form as the aspirations of social classes and as ideologies. Even the ideologies themselves become operationalized to different degrees and emerge as most effective in the programmes and practice of political movements and parties. This practice leads to modifications in the ideology (fundamental attitudes) and even in the original ideas, which, in the widest sense, seem to be almost universal.

This is why, in this debate on liberalism and socialism, we must consider whether our concern is with basic ideas, ideologies or varieties of practise (with the socio-economic and political system of relations).

2. If we now return to the attitudes which bring into question the immediate importance of our theme by insisting that we are concerned with the ideologies of past centuries, we shall first have to determine whether Marxism is really a thought of the past century.

What is the basic idea of Marxism (socialism/communism)? It is the idea of human emancipation. It is only this idea that goes beyond the thought of political emancipation, i. e. goes beyond the basic requirement of the bourgeois world. So far no more fundamental idea has been formulated to transcend the idea of the liberation of all mankind as a partial idea (as this idea transcended that of political emancipation). This idea is not a mere requirement; it is already developed and has shown, both theoretically and practically, the possibility of its application.

(It should be mentioned at once that it would be possible to find fault with Marxism, taken in this narrow sense, reduced to a socio-political doctrine in which the philosophical element has disappeared. The criticism is serious and this is not the place to go into it thoroughly. One can only mention that the notion of complete human emancipation is not divorced from the idea of creative and humanist practise, the practise of humanising the world and naturalising man, nor is it divorced from a view of man's world, for social emancipation is brought about through man's relation to nature and the reverse. The idea of human emancipation is, then, primarily the philosophy of freedom and practise, as is best shown by Marx's work. This idea is central to Marx and to Marxism in that it comprehends all the philosophical, sociological, economic and other questions of Marxism).

So, if we are to give an answer to the question whether Marxism is a nineteenth century idea, our answer may be both positive and negative. It certainly is a nineteenth century idea, for this century already pointed out the limitation of the idea of political emancipation (which at the beginning of the century had been put forward as an idea of general liberation), and then, theoretically through Marx and practically through the Paris Commune, put its own emphasis on the idea of human emancipation. Marxist thought, however, became truly far-reaching and effective in the 20th century. This is why one may say that Marxism is not a nineteenth century idea, because that was the century of political emancipation, i. e. of bourgeois revolution. Although the organized labour parties at the end of the last century began with Marxism, they too aspired towards political revolution (part bourgeois, part proletarian) and remained, essentially, within the bourgeois field of ambition. An eloquent testimony of this is the history of social-democracy (especially in Germany). Marxism (as the thought of Marx) suits the requirements of the 20th cent., no

matter whether or not this age will put his ideas into practise, and no matter whether or not modern socialist revolutions are chiefly carrying out what is left over from bourgeois programmes.

3. Since we are on to Marxism (above all, the thought of Marx himself), it is worth bearing in mind the divalency we have already mentioned i. e. the two aspects or poles of this thought. Here we are concerned with differentiating between authoritarian and libertarian socialism, both in Marx and in Marxists.

It seems to me, in the light of this distinction, that one must recognize a logical and historical current in Marx's teaching, which moves from (1) a fundamental idea (that of human emancipation) through (2) a basic ideology (sociological and economic teaching about the class structure of society and exploitation and reification) to (3) operationalized ideology (teaching about the party and the tactics of socialist revolution).

This is the process in which the basic idea, its realization, its supporters and intermediaries are formulated. Revolution, as the realization of the interests of all mankind, is brought about as a result of class and particularly party interests, so it is inevitably a form of liberation and alienation; it always gives rise to fresh alienation as the outcome of particular interests. This is convincingly illustrated by history.

Marx's thought is at the same time the thought of universal, class-proletarian and party-communist interests, but it is Marx's only because of this totality and not because of any part in particular. Marx is often compared with other great socialists — Proudhon, Lassalle, Bakunin and others, but in a certain sense it can be said that he comprehends Proudhon (the critique of the bourgeoisie and the idea of associations of the producers), Bakunin (the destruction of the state), Blanqui (the role of organization) Lassalle (the role of the state) and Lenin (the dictatorship of the proletariat). These internal »moments« of Marx's thought, taken independently or absolutely, stand as separate kinds of socialism or Marxism in our time.

Marx's conclusions about the Paris Commune help us to understand the full complexity of his thinking. As opposed to those who aim for universal interest without a socio-historical intermediary (the class and party), as opposed to the concept of the pure spontaneity of the class struggle or the absolute domination of the party, Marx clearly stressed the unity of these elements both in strategy and in tactics. In speaking of the Commune he came to the conclusion that there can be no effective class struggle without an organized proletarian party, but he also emphasised that the revolution is the work of the proletariat itself. Marx gives weight to the importance of both the party and the class. Many later socialists and Marxists, in fact, set the class spontaneity of revolution against the party and military readiness of revolutionary action, and vice versa. This opposition emerges as the opposition between authoritarian and libertarian socialism. Both look to Marx

for their support, and to a certain extent they find it. If, at a concrete moment in the revolution (The Commune) Marx stressed the need for party organization as an instrument for taking over power (that is, an instrument of the first but not the essential act of the revolution), he by no means considered that the party was the demiurge of socialism, as many Marxists think today, looking on the party even as an instrument of one person which is building socialism.

4. But, since we are speaking of the relation between Marxism and liberalism, we must ask what liberalism itself is. Sufficient has been said about this in the opening speech, though one might add a philosophical foundation of liberalism through the ideas of individualism in the sense of which Z. Pešić-Golubović spoke. Liberalism is primarily an ideology (in the above-mentioned sense) in whose foundations are to be found the ideas of natural right. It is through the ideas of natural right that it affords expression to universal human requirements, while in its concrete form, as an ideology of private interest, it is a markedly class-oriented standpoint. This distinction must be drawn to allow for a clearer survey of the meaning of liberalist ideas and liberalist ideology in existing socialism.

Socialism began to develop in socially and economically backward countries where the ideas (communist) which they wished to implant did not find a satisfactory response in reality itself. The reality of these countries aspired towards different ideas. This historical bifurcation led to very complex occurrences. The basic humanist ideas of Marxism, and Marxism as an ideology of class and party, were both operative at the same time. The first of these became »abstract humanism« under conditions when reality did not gravitate towards its ideas and when the party, as the leader of the revolution, was led astray by the aspirations of reality itself, of »objective circumstances«. The second (Marxism as the aspiration of the proletarian class) as a movement of workers' councils was stopped short before it could be established, because it was »premature«, and so a third solution was adopted — party dictatorship and dictatorship over the party. But in finding its full realization in this third form, socialism has never eliminated the two forms of Marxist socialism mentioned earlier, it rather nourishes them as potential forms. Pre-socialist, and so also liberalist, aspirations were enlivened by the logic of an undeveloped society and by resistance to dictatorship. The former factor leads to the invigoration of the ideology of private enterprise and interests, while the latter goes back to the fundamental ideas of liberalism, to natural right and the ideas of equality and freedom. What we are considering is the revival of the demand for the heritage of the bourgeois revolution, for civil law, dignity, autonomy etc., that is, we are here involved with the revolutionary ideas of the bourgeois revolution, i. e. those initial universal demands which every class makes when it enters the arena of history.

It must be pointed out straight away, however, that liberalism cannot operate *within the framework* of Marxism, as Z. Pešić-Golubović has said, and that what we have is a *parallel* or simultaneous working of Marxism and liberalism, of two ideas and ideologies in countries which are building up socialism and finishing off the bourgeois revolution. In the existing forms of socialism where pre-bourgeois, bourgeois and socialist forms of social life are intermingled, the ideas of liberalism concerning human right and dignity, bourgeois freedoms, economic interests etc. have a historically progressive function. Thus the critique of existing socialism is historically positive from the point of view of these ideas. However, a relapse into liberalism is as great a danger as authoritarian socialism to the true integration of society which aims to establish socialism on the basis of workers' councils. Liberalism destroys solidaristic integration of society. Today this problem also appears in the dilemma of how to stimulate the economic interest of the individual without turning the social system into a system of private interest. This is a concrete form of the question as regards liberalism and socialism today.

(I should like to make a small digression by mentioning one of Marx's attitudes related to these questions and to our present situation. Namely, it is well known how severely Marx criticised primitive egalitarian communism, but with this explanation: »But one of the most *important principles of communism*, according to which it differs from all forms of *reactionary socialism*, consists in the empirical understanding, based on the nature of man, that differences in brain and intellectual capability do not in any way bring about *differences in the stomach and physical needs*, and that consequently the false attitude, based on our existing relations, — »to every man according to his abilities«, must, if it refers to *enjoyment in the narrower sense*, be reformulated as — »to every man according to his needs«; in other words, differences in activity, in work, cannot be the basis for any kind of inequality of for any privilege in terms of property or enjoyment.« (Marx-Engels, German Ideology, III, 303))

5. As far as the relation between liberalism and socialism is concerned, it is possible to consider it also as the relation between private and socially-owned property, as was done in the introductory speech. Tadić himself has shown in his book *Order and Freedom* that liberalism begins from natural right in its revolutionary sense (human dignity), and that socialism begins from social utopias (human happiness), so that, according to Bloch, they have a common source in hope. This is how the link between liberalism and socialism is described, but they must be very clearly distinguished even when they are formulated in very similar positions, as in those we shall be referring to. We shall take Kant and Marx, although this is perhaps not the best comparison that could be made in this instance. Kant says: »A constitution which would guarantee the *greatest human freedom* by means of the law, which would ensure that the freedom of each individual might

exist together with the freedom of all other people . . . is after all a necessary idea from which one must begin not only in making the first draft of a state constitution but also in all laws . . . « (Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*). Let us compare this with Marx's famous demand for: . . . »an association in which the *free development of each individual is the condition for the free development of all*«. (Marx-Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*). The first attitude is liberalist because it sees society as a collection of isolated individuals: this is an individualist conception. In the second quotation we have socialized man: society is determined by the individual as much as he by society. Liberalism looks on this as a fatalistic concept. Contemporary socialism is not a proof that Marxism is a totalitarian thought; the point is that socialist aspirations have, under certain historical conditions, been replaced by totalitarian practise — which, in fact, happened to liberalism as well. Research into why this happened both to liberalism and socialism would be a subject for historical analysis.

Božidar Jakšić:

POLITICAL FREEDOM AND FREEDOM-ORIENTED RHETORIC

Liberalism and that circle of ideas which we may conditionally refer to as communist, and which have their roots in Marx, can be considered on three different planes: (a) as two circles of social ideas (b) as two types of ideology, and (c) as two types of political practise based on these ideologies. When speaking of political practise one is thinking, primarily, of political parties, but also of the political organization of society as a whole, in those societies where these parties are in power.

The basic difference between liberalism and communism lies in the fact that the former belongs to political (bourgeois) society while the latter represents the true human community. Although both orientations are directed towards the problem of man's freedom, it may be said that their different concepts of freedom mark the basic dividing-line between them. Freedom, from the libertarian outlook, is political (bourgeois) freedom; from the communist outlook it is the freedom of man.

By the very fact that liberalism is the ideology of the citizen as a free private owner and entrepreneur, it must be a conservative ideology if we regard it in the light of communist requirements. I naturally do not wish, in saying this, to dispute the fact that at a certain historical moment in the formation of bourgeois society, liberalism, unlike feudalism, was progressive. Here I completely agree with Tadić. But most often liberalism is not — although it might be — a reactionary ideology, like all other ideologies in fact. Liberalism is conservative simply because it wishes to maintain bourgeois society, but it does not shirk radical reforms within this society. I might remind you that in relation to other bourgeois

parties in Great Britain, the Liberal Party has worked out an important programme of social reforms. They place great stress, for example, on the need for participation by the workers in running industry.

There is no need, I feel, to demonstrate the difference between the expression »conservative« and the expression »reactionary«. This distinction is important because the conservative character of liberal ideology should not blind us to the fact that liberalism played an important historical role in the battle for civil freedoms. With this in mind it would be worth giving some reflection to the fact that the political emigré Karl Marx, thanks greatly to the practical and effective power of liberal ideas and values, wrote his »*Capital*« in the British Museum, and that until recently he would have had a better chance of doing this same work in the same place than in any Marxist-Leninist Institute. At all events, in the battle for the elementary civil freedoms, the freedoms relating to man as a political individual, liberalism achieved results which have made a permanent contribution to the progress of human society. Some of these results have not yet been achieved by societies which declare themselves to be socialist. If one is to compare the number of death sentences pronounced in the liberal Czechoslovakia of Masarik and Beneš with the number pronounced in the Czechoslovakia of Novotny's time, is not this a powerful warning of the truth of this statement? Thus, it is quite logical to ask whether a society may be considered socialist which is below the level of the bourgeois freedoms, which has not gone beyond certain elementary libertarian ideas and values.

One of the basic contradictions of the historical point in time through which modern society is living is that liberalism is being abandoned without any guarantee of an orientation towards socialism. Modern industrial society has been transformed into a massive consumer society which is abandoning one by one the liberal values, above all those of civil freedom and security. All the strategic decisions, on which the fate of millions depends, are passed, as Mills says, »behind people's backs«. So it could happen that a country which might once (but no longer!) have been looked upon as the classic example of liberalism — Great Britain — was able to expel Rudi Dutschke on the grounds that he might be dangerous. He did, it is true, find asylum in another country which, it seems, is abandoning liberal values more slowly — in Denmark, where the liberal party is in power. However, the fact that someone is condemned simply because he might be dangerous (which in this particular case, considering Dutschke's state of health, is pretty incredible), indicates that the idea and practise of the civil freedoms are being replaced by the idea and practise of total repression.

I only wanted to use this example to illustrate the idea that liberal values are vanishing from the practise of bourgeois society. There can be no doubt that the USA, for example, has long since ceased to be a society of »impossible possibilities« and »free initiative«, principles which were for a long time almost a fetish in

America. The monopolies stamped them out long ago. Even the most intimate sphere of life has fallen under the wakeful eye of »administration«. Today it is impossible for a new Henry Ford — that symbol of American success — to appear. It seems that the supermarket has come to symbolize the new mass consumer society, in opposition to the small tradesman who has now disappeared from the scene and with whom it was still possible to have a friendly chat. The friendly chat has been replaced by endless goggling at the television, and the free citizen of liberal doctrine by the »bright robot« of a repressive civilization.

Although there are many interesting conclusions to be drawn, I shall leave aside this personalistic line of analysis. The consequences of the disappearance of liberal values in modern industrial consumer society are far more drastic on the worldwide socio-historical plane. Instead of seeing an expansion of the social space for civil and human freedoms we are now witnessing the worldwide confrontation of two imperialist camps, both of which are characterised by the highly rational and highly effective development of their functions! In connection with this I should like to express certain reserves concerning the idea of »great rational and effective systems«, and this reserve will last until I learn more about the character of the rationality and efficacy of a great system.

Considering that liberalism has failed as the basis for the political practise of modern bourgeois society, it seems strange that there is still a sphere in which it dominates. This is the sphere of political rhetoric, above all of formal political declarations, which the centres of social power do not for one moment intend to respect seriously. This shift of liberalism from political practice to political rhetoric must be a source of grave concern to modern man. For does not a similar fate await the ideas of socialism and communism?

On the other hand it is far from strange that a reminder of the liberal values of civil freedoms and security will be greeted sympathetically by intellectuals in so-called socialist countries: often civil freedom is lost without human freedom being gained. This is why I can understand, but not accept, the view which Čavoški so attractively put forward. There is, I feel, a trap hidden here: the social system of so-called socialist countries can with a quiet conscience offer or accept some of these ideas themselves, for they have a stabilizing influence, they are positively active in maintaining the *status quo*. This is why it is not strange that so much is said in these countries about democratization (and not about democracy), liberalization, unfreezing, the spring etc. If we take a closer look, it is not difficult to realise that almost nothing more definite can be said about the essence and historical meaning of these processes. This is how it happens that »historical« decisions are made only to be forgotten after six months. Democratization and liberalization are usually »one step ahead«, but it is not clear

in relation to what — that is, in which direction. This sinks back into the fog of political rhetoric, which uses many words (in all languages and in all variants) to say little.

And just as the ideas and values of liberalism are vanishing from the scene in bourgeois systems, lingering on only in the sphere of political rhetoric, in the so-called socialist systems the ideas of communism are more and more becoming decorations to facades (although I do not exclude the possibility that there are individuals and social groups fighting sincerely for them.) If we peep behind these facades we must ask if a society can be socialist even when it invades a sovereign country in which it already exerts a very stable influence and has interests of its own? Can we speak of socialism in a country where the army fires upon the proletariat? Can we speak of socialism if a country exports one quarter of its labour force and has hundreds of thousands who are left unemployed for a long time? What does it mean when a generation takes upon itself public debts which the next generations will have to repay? Have not the communist values and ideas become the rhetoric of the centres of power in these countries — a rhetoric which conceals the fury of group and private interests?

Miladin Životić:

1. LIBERALISM IS NOT EVEN A CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

Boža Jakšić has tried to save an inadequately thought out definition of liberalism as a conservative ideology, a conservative philosophy, by distinguishing the conservative from the reactionary. I accept that such a distinction must be made, but the question remains whether liberalism is a conservative idea. In my opinion there are historical and theoretical reasons which run counter to such a definition. Historical — because it is hard to speak of liberalism as a conservative mission during the time when bourgeois society was in its ascendancy and routing feudalism, that is, during the battle for a new society. This is, primarily, the liberalism of Locke and Mill, and that — to my way of thinking — revolutionary liberalism goes right up to Herbert Spenser. The liberalism of the Anglo-Saxon countries developed in a particularly forceful way right up to the time when it attempted to generalize the results of the science of its time in order to form a theory which would serve to stabilize the system of competition and help develop the trend towards the increasing cohesion of bourgeois society. In the ascendancy of liberalism, however, we do not come across any desire to stabilize an already formed society, nor even any insistence simply on the concept of stabilization and cohesion. Here we have a libertarian idea without which it would be impossible to imagine even the most authentic notion of socialist society.

Futrhermore, when speaking of liberalism as a conservative ideology, one forgets that liberalism contains strong universal elements without which it would not be possible to build up the idea of universal emancipation. For instance, liberalism never stressed national particularism as an element of its ideology. Marx's notion of the development of the individual as a condition for the development of society as a whole, could not be understood without those ideas upon which Mill particularly insisted when speaking of the freedom of the individual as a condition for the development of all society, etc.

We cannot speak of liberalism as a conservative idea because we must face up to the manipulation of the ideals of liberalism, which is something that is present in modern bourgeois society. The ideas of liberalism are manipulated because they can still serve to demystify contemporary bourgeois society, a society which, the more it develops state capitalism and bureaucracy the further it goes towards standgling the civil freedoms and the deeper it spies into the most intimate areas of life, etc.

It seems to me that there we have drawn a fairly good distinction between ideal and ideology on the one hand, and a certain liberalist practice, political practice, on the other, which makes use of certain ideals. If we were to observe the practice of liberals in our time we would realise that it more and more serves the manipulation of liberal ideals. The ideals of Marx's socialist humanism are manipulated in the same way. It has been said here that we do not have any great ideals in this century. An attempt was made to dispute this by mentioning many fact which speak of the fantastic spread of knowledge. However, if we take the term idea in its philosophical sense, as a basis for the rational endeavour to synthesise the spiritual trends of the times and to create an entire picture of the world, a view of the world, then we really do not have such great ideas in our century, except for the ideas of liberalism and Marxism, which are in many respects complementary. For the ideals of liberalism can be fully realised only when they pass into the ideals of socialism. These are ideals which our times have not realized and are, therefore, not able to create new ideas.

2. MARX'S PHILOSOPHY IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 20th CENTURY

In connection with this I should like to say something more about Marx's theory. *Marx's philosophy is not thought of the 19th century but of the 20th century.* This is well known to historians of philosophy. There are by no means few philosophers whose effect is felt in times considerably removed from those in which they existed physically.

In Marx's theory we must make a distinction between what is general philosophical theory and what is the limited application

of this theory to the conditions of the 19th cent. Marx is not, to my mind, a thinker on whom we can rely when he is writing about the tactics of the International's activity. These writings are not *philosophically* relevant to me. For me the doctrinarian is only the person who takes Marx's *entire* theoretical activity as a philosophically relevant thought in our time. It is only when we are in a position to distinguish between a general philosophical vision, a conception of the world, and the way in which it is applied, that we can determine whether it is a thought of our times or not. We cannot require that Marx's theory should, without fail, provide a fully detailed solution to the problems of our times. But our times cannot be understood without the philosophical vision, that basic vision of the world, which is bound to Marx's name. Only through his basic philosophical *ideas* Marx is a philosopher of the 20th cent.

Today in the world, philosophical ideas and trends are widely dispersed. What do the other philosophies offer me? They have no great ideas. I cannot find great ideas in positivism, which has refused to solve the humanist problems of the times in which we live, nor in operationalism, nor in structuralism. Nor am I offered much by the philosophy of existence, which, though it is often exceptionally penetrating when it comes to describing man's alienation, does not provide any solutions.

The fate of Sartre's existentialism is most instructive. There is no philosophy today which, if it means to take up the fundamental problems of man, does not go back to Marx's ideas, ideas which emerged in the nineteen forties. This return to Marx, within the structure of modern philosophy, is of great importance when considering what *philosophy* is in Marx, and whether this *philosophy* is *ambivalent*. Nobody goes back to Marx when he is solving the concrete problems of the 19th cent. labour movement. It is only Marx's philosophy that is important for us; it is a vision without which we cannot think philosophically about our own times.

Trivo Indić:

I do not quite understand you: how can you extract a philosophical orientation from practical action? Is not this the contemplative position of which Marx spoke with disgust?

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

For goodness' sake, Indić, Sartre wrote that you cannot become so concretely committed, because as soon as you commit yourself you lose your freedom.

Mihailo Marković:

Well what then are we quarreling about? Cannot one criticise and eliminate all that is transient and ephemeral? Why should anyone now wish to keep the sacred Marx in one sphere and the

soiled Marx in another? Why? We can speak of Marx as a whole, but we can also speak of the separate elements of his thought which concern the concrete society of his times and which contain attitudes and solutions which have for the most part been passed over and are no longer relevant. What is worthwhile in him is related to a whole epoch, and we are still living in the epoch in which he lived.

Trivo Indić:

I am delighted that Miladin Životić has just revealed to us an ambivalent Marx, the Marx of authoritarianism. We used to look at Marx as taboo and admire him without any critical examination. Yugoslav philosophy deserves merit for the process of de-dogmatizing his thinking from certain interpretations following the III International; and this is fine. We have succeeded in defending a Marx from the Stalinists, but I think it is now time to discuss — and this is a very serious and responsible job — the discrepancy between the practical and, so to say, theoretical content and effect of Marx. One could clearly discuss Marx from the point of several historical periods in his activity, etc. However, I think that his greatness lies in the fact that he often succeeded in correcting himself, for example, after the Paris Commune, for he had said three or four months before the Paris Commune that the labour movement in France was played out, that there was nothing to be looked for in France, that Germany was the place to go, and that this would be easier for him and Engels because in this way they could free themselves from Proudhon and from the set of ideas that Proudhon and Blanqui had imposed on them. Naturally, I do not see that this duality is justified in Životić. Either we must look at the matter *in toto* or we must give up philosophical thinking as such.

Zaga Pešić-Golubović:

Do you include *in toto* Marx's behaviour as an ordinary man? man?

Trivo Indić:

Not only as a man — I also include his practical, political, cultural and civilized being.

Mihailo Marković:

Well, is the gap really so great between these two points of view? Is Trivo Indić willing, let us say, to reject Marx *in toto*, and are there, on the other hand, any people who consider there is nothing to be criticised in Marx's theory?

Trivo Indić:

The totality of Marx as a practical and theoretical man is now on the agenda in Yugoslav philosophy, and the same job awaits

us with Lenin. I think we must strive to see things as a whole, to make Marx relative and to see our way through to him, past the mass of those components and trends which preceded him and which he himself offered.

Mihailo Marković:

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our conversation is right now reaching its most interesting point and it is really a pity that we have to bring it to an end. It has been shown that there was good reason for choosing the theme we did for this symposium. It is a very sensitive matter, in our society and at this particular moment in history, to discuss liberalism in the way we have discussed it here. There are many reasons for not accepting the ideology of liberalism. It is the ideology of an historical form which has been superseded, and it is very limited, both in its concept of human nature and in its close ties with the institution of private property and with the state as the intermediary between individuals.

Liberalism, however, cannot be simply characterised as a conservative ideology. The matter is by no means so straightforward. For liberalism was and still is a revolutionary ideology in relation to feudalism and the conditions of feudal life. Let us recall that liberalism was the ideology of a new progressive social class which took up the battle against self-will, arbitrariness, privilege, against kings and princes deciding how many people can work and where they can work, and how many organizations can exist, against their giving monopolies to certain organizations and taking away all rights from others. These were circumstances under which, in absence of a law, powerful individuals were able, for instance, to break into somebody's house without any cause, to arrest him, to have him burnt at the stake for his beliefs and to confiscate his estates. This was the society in which the king was infallible. As long as we live in a society in which there are infallible kings who have their own armies, who have their own apparatus of power and physical force, as long as we live in conditions in which monopoly and privilege exist, or in which legality is not guaranteed in practise, as long as we live in a society where somebody can be sent to jail merely for expressing and publishing his opinion, as long as such historical conditions exist, some ideas of liberalism will continue to play a revolutionary role.

Naturally liberalism has developed, and a very good analysis of that development was given at this gathering. In practice liberalism has never been completely realised, furthermore, it broke up in many directions and markedly reactionary trends appeared, trends which strove to maintain the *status quo*. It has been quite rightly shown here, however, that there was also a variant of liberalism which went towards socialism. Mill, for example, in his

posthumous essay on Socialism, already fully accepts the criticism of liberalism made by the socialists of his time, especially Fourier and Louis Blanc, and he already arrives at three basic conclusions. First, that capitalism has no moral or intellectual justification because of poverty being so widespread, because of the way in which individuals are rewarded, because of the unbelievable wastage of human life and human energy and possessions, and because of the tremendous ineffectiveness of society as a whole. The second conclusion is: the very moment when competition ceases to be an important factor in increasing the efficiency of production, in improving the quality of goods, and in reducing prices, it too loses its value, and there comes a time when society itself must begin to control the companies. Third: all inequalities arising from birth and wealth must be removed by law. And an adequate and universal education must be secured for all by law.

These ideas later saved capitalism. We often ask how capitalism managed to survive and how, in particular, it managed to survive the dreadful crisis of 1929 and the succeeding years. One might say in answer to this that the intellectuals did not play their historical role, that they did not develop critical self-consciousness and that they did not point to alternatives. This is part of the answer. The other part of the answer is that capitalism was saved because liberalism received an important transfusion of socialist blood. That is, liberalism took on a number of socialist demands and these demands can be clearly seen in the programme of the *New Deal*.

In one of his speeches to Congress in 1944, Franklin Roosevelt gave a new declaration of human rights and freedoms which included the right to a job, and to a well-paid job at that, the right to a standard of living, the right to a good education, the right of all families to a decent apartment, and the right to protection for the old, disabled, sick and unemployed. In addition to security offered through the police, this liberalism, which included certain socialist elements, succeeded in providing a significant degree of economic and social security. By sacrificing certain essential principles, e. g. the principle of *laissez-faire*, and taking on such demands as those mentioned, capitalism managed to survive and keep its basic structure. All this must be taken into consideration when trying to explain why revolution did not occur in the most developed countries.

The next question I should like, briefly, to consider is the dispute over anarchy. The key problem remains for us how to make the leap from a reified to a humanised society without classes, without the state, a society organized as a federation of workers' councils? Marx did not give an answer to this which would satisfy us today because he saw the intermediary, at least for a short while, in a different type of state and in a different type of political organization, but still in one which, in practical application, allowed for bureaucratization and the complete abandonment of

the ideals of universal emancipation. Anarchy has never succeeded in showing how this mediation should be introduced. The very idea of a federation of workers councils is anarchistic and Marx took it over from the anarchists. This is a historical truth. It is also true, however, that mediation was not shown. The tacit assumption has always been an over-optimistic concept of human nature. Our discussion has shown very well how many distinctions in the concept of men must be made and how much we can rely only on certain latent dispositions in man, dispositions which are not exclusive, which always have a counterweight in some completely opposing, destructive, antisocial dispositions which are also present in man. Thus this problem has not yet been solved, nor is it solved in a completely satisfactory way in Marx, and nor has anarchism attempted to solve the question of mediation. The point is, naturally, not simply that anarchy has never succeeded in getting through to the masses. In the Civil War in Spain it was by far the strongest organized movement.

Trivo Indić:

And practically solved this mediation . . .

Mihailo Marković:

How? Two million organized workers found themselves in anarchist syndicates, the power was running loose in the streets but the anarchists did not want to take over, and they had no other solution.

Finally I should like to say a few words on the question of what is to be done. There is a possibility that vital changes will take place because dissatisfaction is very severe. Our society is passing through a deep crisis and, in a certain sense, is disintegrating. So, some eruptions of revolt are possible. I do not, however, believe that we have ahead of us a real revolution which might lead to a federation of workers councils. I am afraid that we have too many poor people who are satisfied to be eating bread made of flour instead of corn meal, who are glad to have any kind of secure wage, no matter how minimal, because until recently they did not have one at all. The fact is that in the wood industry, for example, which is the most primitive and where wages are lowest, there no strikes, while those industries where the workers are best paid suffer the most strikes. These are reasons for a certain amount of scepticism. Regardless of this, however, I feel that the basic principle to be strived for is: *all power to the workers councils*. This is, in fact, the solution. A federation of workers councils without professional intermediaries, an organized society founded on self-governing units in which there is direct democracy. Insofar as there are elements of mediation and they are indispensable at the higher levels of social organization, this mediation should not be professional, it should not carry any privileges, it should not

involve permanent power. These are matters which are already well known. At the same time, however, we must insist on general development of society.

Many have pointed out in the discussion here that socialism, as Marx conceived it, presupposes a high level of industrialization, therefore a long and painful prehistory. Hence, we must go all out for development, especially for cultural development. I fear that with somewhat more than twenty per cent illiterate in our population we cannot go far. Also, we must carry on the battle against ideologies which try to fill out the vacuum which exists in our society. The vacuum does exist. The elite of our society does not offer very impressive spiritual socialist values. This is why the church, on the one hand, and nationalism on the other have been dragged in. Nationalism is, in fact, the surrogate for all other social values and — as we have already made sufficiently clear — national bureaucracies themselves have resorted to nationalism because it is now the last means by which they can still gain some support on their own territory and survive.

When speaking of our relation towards liberalism, I think we must stress that it is essential to realise all those revolutionary and universal elements in liberalism — that is, freedom, the principle of the sovereignty of people, the principle of the right to rebel etc. These are the ideas of liberalism which are an element of all progressive and all revolutionary theories. These are ideas which are included in all present or future humanist and revolutionary ideologies. On the other hand, in our relation to liberalism, we must also strongly insist on the removal of those conservative forms of liberalism which have been historically superseded. In a situation in which it was necessary to decide whether to return to a bureaucratic, Stalinistic form of society or to make possible the further development of self-government and the integration of self-government and deprofessionalised politics, our bureaucracy chose to return to the principle of *laissez-faire*; it chose to return to a classical form of the market, which, in this form, has already been superseded in present bourgeois society.

One must, it seems to me, lay particular stress on the right of the coming generations to determine their own life and the form of society under which they will live. There is, in our society, a widely-held attitude that the young must move within the framework of the existing order and that they must be only constructive, that they must continue to build up the type of society offered to them. The young, however, have the right to build up from the beginning, to call everything into question, to choose what they want to take over from what they have at hand and what they want to set up in a completely new way.

And now, at the end, I should like to read a few passages from some letters. For instance, when speaking of the rights of every generation: »No generation should be bound by the previous generations. Every new generation has the same rights as the past, but these rights do not come from the preceding generation — they

come from nature itself. These are, then, the natural laws. Just as one nation has the right to be independent of another, so one generation has the right to be independent of another«.

The following fragment is on the right to rebel: »God forbid we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all and always well informed . . . If they remain quiet under such misconceptions, it is as a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty . . . What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that this people preserve »the spirit of resistance. Let them take arms.«

The man who wrote these letters was also the founder of a declaration in which it was assumed: »We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that all have certain inalienable rights, amongst which are the right to life, the right to freedom, the right to struggle for one's happiness.« »To secure these rights«, the declaration goes on »governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . .« »Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute new government.«

This man was Thomas Jefferson, and this was written in the 18th century.

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