Tony Cliff

Trotsky: Towards October 1879-1917

3. The 1903 Congress

Trotsky and Factional Disputes

When reading this and the succeeding chapter, the reader should keep in mind the following story that Lenin was fond of quoting. Leo Tolstoy, on seeing a man squatting in the street and gyrating strangely, decided he was looking at a madman. Coming closer, he saw that the man was attending to necessary work – sharpening a knife on a stone. The analogy is with the faction fight inside the RSDRP, the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and the continuous squabbling inside the Bolshevik faction itself. These must have looked to an outsider like the gyrations of madmen. In reality, however, they can be decisive to the effectiveness of a revolutionary party’s intervention in great historical events. The faction-fighting sharpened the Bolshevik Party, shaped its theory and practice, selected its cadres and steeled them. Alas, in this area, before 1917 Trotsky’s ideas and practice proved weak.

Trotsky comes into his own during great historical events. He is at his best as a thinker and actor during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. He is brilliant when dealing with the German revolution of 1919-23, the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, the Popular Front in France, the civil war in Spain. His strength also appears when great threats of counter-revolution and reaction face humanity: thus among the best of Trotsky’s writings are those of the years, months, weeks and days preceding the victory of Hitler. Trotsky as an artist of the revolution needed a large canvas and a palette with many rich paints.

Trotsky rose to greatness during the revolution of 1905, when he led masses of workers, led the Petersburg Soviet, and developed his greatest contribution to Marxist theory, the theory of Permanent Revolution. And he was only 26 years old. In the preceding two years he was involved in a faction fight not of his choosing, between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, in which he took the wrong position.

After Rosa Luxemburg’s death Lenin quoted about her the old Krylov fable: ‘Eagles may at times fly lower than hens. But hens can never rise to the height of eagles.’ After listing what he considered her mistakes, Lenin emphasised that Rosa Luxemburg was an eagle. [1] The same judgment could justly be passed on Trotsky. This becomes clear if one contrasts his stand in the factional squabbles in 1903-4 with his soaring to the heights during the 1905 revolution.

It is frustrating, nay, depressing, that in writing the present biography one has to deal – and at length – with the faction fight in the RSDRP, before dealing with the great events of 1905. Unfortunately there is no alternative.

It is not only a question of chronology but also of political honesty. Marx argued that Communists do not lie to the class. If the working class is the subject of history, not its object, then workers have to know the truth, warts and all. Anyhow Trotsky would never have countenanced hypocrisy in his defence. To play down his role in the faction fight in the RSDRP – his opposition to Lenin’s irreconcilable split from Menshevism that continued right up to 1917 – would make many of the future events in Trotsky’s life inexplicable. The position he took on the nature of the revolutionary party dogged him for years. Above all it blunted his influence in the Russian revolutionary movement, preventing the Bolsheviks paying much attention to his great theoretical contributions prior to 1917.

The beginning of Congress

Massive efforts were put into the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP) in 1903, and much was hoped from it. This was the foundation congress of the party. The former congress of 1898 had been a tiny affair, with only nine delegates, from Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, the journal Rabochaia Gazeta and the Jewish socialist organisation the Bund. It had failed to adopt a programme or a paper. Its only achievements were the issue of a manifesto, drafted by Peter Struve (an ‘economist’ who later became a liberal leader and then a monarchist), the promulgation of the idea of a nationwide party, and the election of a central committee of three. Eight of the nine delegates and two of the three central committee members had been arrested a few days after the end of the conference.

The 1903 Congress, however, took a completely unexpected course. Instead of being a unity congress, it was a congress in which the Russian Marxists split into two separate trends and organisations – the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

At the beginning of the Congress things went well for the united leadership of Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Axelrod, Zasulich and Potresov. Of the 51 votes, 33, or a clear majority, belonged to adherents of the Iskra position. Lenin’s careful preparation had helped to make this a certainty. Iskra’s chief rival, Rabocheye Delo, the ‘economist’ paper, had only three votes, the Jewish Bund had five, and six of the remaining delegates were unaligned. Plekhanov and Lenin called these last ‘the swamp’, as they sometimes voted with the Iskra supporters, sometimes against them. If the 33 Iskra supporters stuck together, they could certainly carry the day on every issue.

The first three sessions of the Congress (out of a total of 37) were devoted largely to trivial matters of procedure. The first serious controversy at the congress concerned the Jewish Bund, which demanded autonomy within the party, with the right to elect its own central committee and frame its own policy in matters affecting the Jewish people. It further demanded that the party should recognise the Bund as the sole agency among the Jewish workers. It urged the party to advocate not merely equal rights for Jews, as it had done, but also the right of Jews to ‘cultural autonomy’, the right to manage their own cultural affairs and maintain their own schools with teaching in the Yiddish language. Organisationally the Bund was massive compared to the Russian Social Democratic Party. The latter had at most a couple of thousand members while the Bund had more than 20,000.

On behalf of the Iskra people, Martov, who had been one of the founders of the Bund, repudiated these demands. He tabled a motion against the Bund; and only Jewish delegates (twelve in number) put their signatures to it. Trotsky was one of the most aggressive speakers against the Bund. He argued that if the party accepted the suggestions of the Bund, it would turn into a loose federation of parties and groups. [2] Trotsky infuriated the delegates of the Bund; they protested vehemently against this speech, and suggested that he deliberately set out to insult the Jews, and appealed to the chairman, Plekhanov, to protect them. When the chairman found Trotsky’s remarks unexceptional, the Bundists tabled a motion censuring the chairman. Their position boiled down to an insinuation that Russian party members would not wholeheartedly support Jewish workers.

‘The Bund,’ Trotsky exclaimed amid a storm of protest, ‘is free not to trust the party. But it cannot expect the party to vote no confidence in its own self.’ [3] The party as a whole would not remove its right to address Jewish workers without yielding to Jewish separatism. The Bund’s demand for ‘cultural autonomy’ also sprang from separatism. Jews should have the right to have schools in their own language if they so desired, but this should not be part of the national education system. Trotsky moved a motion to this effect, supplementing Martov’s general resolution. [4] Both resolutions were carried by an overwhelming majority.

Marxism, Jacobinism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Following the discussion on the Bund, a dispute took place between the Iskra people and the ‘economists’. The latter’s spokesmen, Martynov and Akimov, upbraided Iskra for its dictatorial, ‘Jacobin-like’ attitude. Trotsky disparaged the ‘economists’. He ridiculed the charge of Jacobinism, defended party centralism, stating that the statutes ‘represent the organised distrust of the party for all its sections, that is, control over all local, district, national and other organisations.’ [5] This speech earned Trotsky the description of ‘Lenin’s cudgel’. [6] (It was but a short time later that Trotsky used the charge of ‘Jacobinism’ and ‘ultra-centralism’ against Lenin! – a charge that he was to repeat for many years.)

Then came the discussion of the party programme, which was the most important item on the agenda. This was introduced by Plekhanov. The main question, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, drew practically solid support from all except the ‘economists’; Martynov and Akimov. When the programme was finally adopted, everyone voted for it except Akimov, who abstained.

Akimov attacked the programme for its spirit of party tutelage over the proletariat:

The concepts ‘party’ and ‘proletariat’ are set in opposition to each other, the first as an active, causative, collective being, the second as a passive medium on which the party operates. The name of the party is used throughout as subject, in the nominative case, the name of the proletariat as object, in the accusative case. [7]

(A charge of party tutelage over the proletariat became central to Trotsky’s criticism of the Bolsheviks after the Second Congress).

How could the endorsement of the dictatorship of the proletariat be reconciled with the demand for a democratic republic? One of the delegates, Posadovsky, asked the Congress whether the party ought to subordinate its future policy to this or that basic democratic principle, as having an absolute value, or ‘must all democratic principles be subordinated exclusively to the interests of the party?’ Plekhanov gave a clear and decisive answer:

Every democratic principle must be considered not by itself, abstractly, but in relation to that which may be called the fundamental principle of democracy, namely salus populi suprema lex. Translated into the language of the revolutionist, this means that the success of the revolution is the highest law. And if the success of the revolution demanded a temporary limitation on the working of this or that democratic principle, then it would be criminal to refrain from such a limitation. As my own personal opinion, I will say that even the principle of universal suffrage must be considered from the point of view of what I have designated the fundamental principle of democracy. It is hypothetically possible that we, the Social Democrats, might speak out against universal suffrage. The bourgeoisie of the Italian republics once deprived persons belonging to the nobility of political rights. The revolutionary proletariat might limit the political rights of the higher classes just as the higher classes once limited their political rights. One can judge of the suitability of such measures only on the basis of the rule: salus revolutiae suprema lex.

And we must take the same position on the question of the duration of parliaments. If in a burst of revolutionary enthusiasm the people chose a very fine parliament – a kind of chambre introuvable – then we would be bound to try to make of it a long parliament; and if the elections turned out unsuccessfully, then we would have to try to disperse it not in two years but if possible in two weeks. [8]

Plekhanov’s statement precisely described the actual policies of the Bolsheviks, especially in 1917; he lived bitterly to regret his own words. [1*]

Martov, who by the time the Congress ended had become Lenin’s opponent, did not at this stage disagree with Plekhanov’s statement regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. However his definition was much less extreme. A few weeks later, in a report on the Congress to the League Congress of Russian Social Democrats Abroad, Martov tried to ‘defend’ Plekhanov by toning down his statement:

These words [Plekhanov’s] aroused the indignation of some of the delegates; this could easily have been avoided if Comrade Plekhanov had added that it was of course impossible to imagine so tragic a situation as that of the proletariat, in order to consolidate its victory, should have to trample on such political rights as freedom of the press. (Plekhanov: ‘Merci’). [9]

Trotsky, who at a later stage in the Congress sided with Martov against Lenin, at this point, in defending the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, missed the harsh reality that the dictatorship has to be directed against the conservative ideas spread among the masses by the old system of society which is still fighting for survival. He rose to the defence of the programme with a paraphrase from the Communist Manifesto:

The rule of the working class was inconceivable until the great mass of them were united in desiring it. Then they would be an overwhelming majority. This would not be the dictatorship of a little band of conspirators or a minority party, but of the immense majority in the interests of the immense majority, to prevent counter-revolution. In short, it would represent the victory of true democracy ... The dictatorship of the proletariat will ...the political rule of the organised working class, constituting the majority of the nation. [10]

Later at the congress Trotsky repeated the same idea: ‘When the socialists win the majority, then there begins the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ [11]

This, of course, was not an answer to Akimov’s argument, especially for Russia, where the proletariat was a small minority of the population. In this case its dictatorship, while supported by the majority of the proletariat, would still be a dictatorship of a minority.

The programme adopted by the Congress was practically the same as the draft submitted to it. The only differences were the addition of a demand for elected judges, and a few modifications of detail in the demands relating to legislation for the improvement of working conditions. It is interesting, in the light of what happened after the congress, to note that during the debate on the programme Martynov, one of the ‘economist’ delegates, delivered a sharp attack on Lenin’s pamphlet What is to be Done? but got no support at all.

Lenin versus Martov on party rules. Trotsky supports Martov

It is worth repeating, in the light of later events, that the programme was adopted unanimously, with only one delegate abstaining.

The unity of the Iskra supporters appeared less complete by the 16th and 17th sessions of the congress. Several very close votes revealed that a number of the delegates were voting with the Bund or the ‘economists’ against Lenin and Plekhanov. But these votes were all on small points.

The bombshell of the Congress exploded in the 22nd session, devoted to the party rules. The occasion was the discussion of the draft statutes, which defined membership. Lenin proposed that Article 1 should define a party member as one’ who recognises the party’s programme and supports it by material means and by personal participation in one of the party organisations.’ Martov proposed an alternative starting off in exactly the same way, but with the final italicised phrase reading ‘and by regular personal association under the direction of one of the party organisations.’

Lenin, taking the floor again and again, explained his formulation. He wanted a tightly organised party of revolutionaries:

The party must be only the vanguard, the leader of the vast masses of the working class, the whole (or nearly the whole) of which works ‘under the control and direction’ of the party organisations, but the whole of which does not and should not belong to a party. [12]

Martov too spoke repeatedly. He was for a broad party. He said:

The more widespread the title of party member the better. We could only rejoice if every striker, every demonstrator, answering for his actions, could proclaim himself a party member. [13]

Axelrod also argued against Lenin’s narrow definition of party membership:

Let us take, for example, a professor who regards himself as a Social Democrat and declares himself as such. If we adopt Lenin’s formula we shall be throwing overboard a section of those who, even if they cannot be directly admitted to an organisation, are nevertheless party members. [14]

Trotsky took a similar position.

Lenin argued that the party should organise only the vanguard of the proletariat, its most class-conscious element. The party must lead the class. It could not be as broad as the class. He spoke against Trotsky:

He has told us here that if rank after rank of workers were arrested, and all these workers were to declare that they did not belong to our party, our party would be a strange one! Isn’t it the other way round? Isn’t it Comrade Trotsky’s reasoning that is strange? He sees as something sad that which a revolutionary with any experience at all could only rejoice at. If hundreds and thousands of workers who were arrested for taking part in strikes and demonstrations proved not to be members of party organisations, that would only show that our organisations are good, that we are fulfilling our role of keeping a more or less exclusive circle of leaders in secrecy and drawing the widest possible masses into the movement ...

It would be better if ten who do work should not call themselves party members (those who really work don’t run after titles!) than that one chatterer should have the right and the opportunity to be a party member ...

... we must not forget that every party member is responsible for the party and that the party is responsible for every one of its members. [15]

Lenin and Trotsky clashed on the issue of the relation between the definition of party membership and the spread of opportunism. Trotsky said:

I do not believe that you can put statutory exorcism on opportunism. I do not give the statutes any sort of mystical interpretation ... Opportunism is produced by many more complex causes than one or another clause in the rules; it is brought about by the relative level of development of bourgeois democracy and the proletariat. [16]

Lenin commented on this statement by Trotsky in his pamphlet One Step Forward Two Steps Back. Trotsky, he argued, simply gave a passive description of opportunism instead of wrestling with it:

The point is not that clauses in the rules may produce opportunism, but that with their help a more or a less trenchant weapon against opportunism can be forged. The deeper its causes, the more trenchant should this weapon be. Therefore, to justify a formulation which opens the door to opportunism on the grounds that opportunism has ‘deep causes’ is tail-ism of the first water. [17]

Plekhanov rallied to Lenin’s side:

I have one preconceived idea, but the more I reflect on what has been said, the stronger is my conviction that the truth lies with Lenin ... Intellectuals may hesitate for individualistic reasons to join the party, so much the better, for they are generally opportunists ... For this reason if for no other, the opponents of opportunism should vote for his draft. [18]

The Iskra supporters were split and Lenin’s proposal was outvoted 28 to 23. Martov’s majority included the five Bund delegates and the two ‘economists’. These seven gave Martov and his supporters a majority against Lenin sufficient to dominate the congress thereafter.

After this decision regarding Article 1 of the party’s statutes, Lenin repeatedly found himself in a minority. In the 23rd to 26th sessions Martov – now constantly opposing Lenin – successfully carried the day on one issue after another. The issues, however, were of quite small significance.

Split on the composition of Iskra’s editorial board

Things changed at the 27th session. Lenin regained the majority. In this session the Bund was defeated (by 41 votes to five with five abstentions) in its desire to be the sole organisation of the Jewish workers and to preserve its autonomy in the party. Soon afterwards the five Bund delegates walked out of the congress. Then the two ‘economists’ also walked out, because the congress decided that the Iskra supporters’ League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats Abroad should be the sole representative of the party abroad. Martov thus lost seven votes at one blow, reducing his support to twenty votes, while Lenin kept his twenty four.

The congress now had to elect the leading bodies of the party. It had already agreed on the central structure. The rules had designated a central committee of three to operate inside Russia and had appointed Iskra as the central organ of the party for ideological leadership. Standing over both of them was to be a party council consisting of five members – two appointed by the central committee, two by Iskra, and the fifth elected by the congress.

With his majority, Lenin got through his list of candidates for the central committee of three. It was the editorial board of Iskra which presented the difficulty since it was generally assumed that the original six would be elected. Four of these – Martov, Potresov, Axelrod and Zasulich – were now opponents of Lenin. Lenin moved an editorial board of only three – Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov. This question was the one upon which the party split into the Bolsheviks (majority) and the Mensheviks (minority).

Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov were elected editors. Noskov, Krzhizhanovsky and Lengnik, ‘Leninists all three’, were elected as the central committee. Plekhanov was elected chairman of the party council. The discussion of the membership of the editorial board – whether to re-elect the six existing members, as Martov wished, or the three whom Lenin suggested – went on and on and on, for nine long sessions of the congress. The debate was bitter and acrimonious.

The issue of whether there should be three or six on the editorial board, over which the party split , seemed like a storm in a teacup, a question of personal wrangling too insignificant to split a serious movement. Lenin saw the differences as a conflict between those who accepted the party spirit of appointment of officials on the one hand, and those accustomed to circle attitudes and ‘the old boy network’, a conflict which had a large personal element. He was not at all sure, at the time, whether this justified a split.

Trotsky, a supporter of the old editorial board of Iskra, used such arguments as:

The congress has neither the moral nor the political right to refashion the editorial board ... Let us allow the board to make its own changes in composition, if it finds need for any. This is too delicate a question for the congress to get its hands on. [19]

Lenin’s comment was:

Such arguments simply put the whole question on the plane of pity and injured feelings, and were a direct admission of bankruptcy as regards real arguments of principle, real political arguments ... If we adopt this standpoint, which is a philistine and not a party standpoint, we shall at every election have to consider: will not Petrov be offended if Ivanov is elected and not he, will not some member of the organising committee be offended if another member and not he is elected to the central committee? Where is this going to land us, comrades? If we have gathered here for the purpose of creating a party, and not of indulging in mutual compliments and philistine sentimentality, then we can never agree to such a view. We are about to elect officials, and there can be no talk of lack of confidence in any person not elected: our only consideration should be the interests of the work and a person’s suitability for the post to which he is being elected.

He argued against ‘the old snug little band who insist on their circle “continuity”.’ [20]

These people are so accustomed to the bell-jar seclusion of an intimate and snug little circle that they almost fainted as soon as a person spoke up in a free and open arena on his own responsibility ... Intellectualist individualism and the circle mentality had come into conflict with the requirement of open speaking before the party. [21]

When Martov refused to abide by the congress decision regarding the editorial board, announcing ‘We are not serfs!’, Lenin argued against this ‘aristocratic anarchism’ and said that they ‘must learn to insist that the duties of a party member be fulfilled not only by the rank and file, but by the “people at the top” as well.’ [22] Why did Martov and his friends try to deny the actual inefficiency of the old editorial board now removed by the congress? Lenin answers:

The old board of six was so ineffectual that never once in all its three years did it meet in full force. That may seem incredible, but it is a fact. Not one of the forty-five issues of Iskra was made up (in the editorial and technical sense) by anyone but Martov or Lenin. And never once was any major theoretical issue raised by anyone but Plekhanov. Axelrod did not work at all (he contributed literally nothing to Zarya and only three or four articles to all the forty-five issues of Iskra). Zasulich and Starover [Potresov] only contributed and advised, they never did any actual editorial work. [23]

Explaining his own motives, Lenin stated that, in the forty-five issues of Iskra, Martov had contributed 39 articles, Lenin 32, and Plekhanov 24. Zasulich had written only six articles, Axelrod four, and Potresov eight. [24]

The desire to express well-mannered support for the veterans instead of subordinating everything to the needs of the revolution was completely foreign to Lenin. He was far too honest intellectually, too devoted to the cause, to sacrifice the needs of the organisation to his own sentiments. Those who were ready to subordinate the needs of the movement to secondary considerations were later to show themselves to be conciliators, not revolutionaries.

It was far more difficult for Trotsky to be ruthless regarding the veterans. He was some ten years younger than Lenin. Unlike Lenin he had not worked with the veterans over a number of years and become convinced of their weaknesses, nor had he the same confidence in his own contributions. He was still an inexperienced youth – only 23 years of age. As Trotsky remembered years later in his book On Lenin:

I came to London like a raw provincial in more senses than one. Not only had I never been abroad, I had never even seen Petersburg! In Moscow, just as in Kiev, I had only been in the transfer prison. [25]

Trotsky Tell in love’ with Vera Zasulich, Pavel Axelrod and Lev Deich – the veterans of the movement. (It was only after Zasulich’s and Deich’s support of the Tsar’s war in 1914 and Axelrod’s ambivalent attitude towards it that his reverence was shattered.

That Trotsky sided with Martov surprised Lenin. According to Krupskaya Lenin ‘least of all thought that Trotsky would waver.’ [26]

Attitude to the liberals

On the last day of the Congress Potresov, supported by Martov, Zasulich, Axelrod and Trotsky moved a resolution on socialist support for the liberals on three conditions. First, that the ‘liberal or liberal-democratic trends’ should ‘clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government they will resolutely side with the Russian Social Democrats’! Secondly that the liberals ‘shall not include in the programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the working class or democracy generally, or obscuring their political consciousness’. And thirdly, that they should make universal, equal, secret and direct suffrage the slogan of their struggle. [27] Potresov’s resolution was to become a cause of widespread misconceptions in the revolutionary potential of the liberals. It gives a foretaste of Menshevism in 1905 and after.

Lenin commented on this resolution in One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back:

... the ‘liberal or liberal-democratic trends’ shall ‘clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government they will resolutely side with the Russian Social Democrats. ‘...can Comrade Starover [Potresov] possibly think that ... sections of the bourgeoisie ... can “resolutely side with the Social Democrats”? That is absurd, and even if the spokesman of such a trend were to ‘declare it clearly and unambiguously’ (an absolutely impossible assumption), we, the party of the proletariat, would be obliged not to believe their declarations. To be a liberal and resolutely side with the Social Democrats – the one excludes the other ... [Starover’s resolution stating that the liberals] ‘shall not include in their programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the working class or democracy generally, or obscuring their political consciousness’ ...there never have been, nor can there be, liberal-democratic trends which did not include in their programmes demands running counter to the interests of the working class and obscuring its [the proletariat’s] political consciousness. [28]

It is really astonishing that of all people Trotsky, the future author of the theory of permanent revolution, should support Potresov’s resolution!


1*. In the discussion neither Plekhanov nor his opponents distinguished between proletarian democracy and bourgeois democracy – a distinction that is not made until 1917. There are also situations in which the revolution can only be carried forward by Jacobin, undemocratic methods. This becomes a question of life and death (as it was to be in Russia from 1918 onwards), but has inbuilt all sorts of dangers – which one would hope to avoid in a revolution in a more advanced country.


1. Lenin, Works, volume 33, page 210.

2. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP (Moscow 1959), page 22.

3. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, pages 71-2.

4. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 198.

5. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 169.

6. Krupskaya, page 70.

7. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 127.

8. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 374.

9. Protokoly 2-go ocherednogo sezda zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revoliutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii (Geneva 1904), page 58

10. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 169. 20.

11. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 255. 21.

12. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 276. 22.

13. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 263.

14. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 262.

15. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, pages 276-7.

16. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, pages 273-4.

17. Lenin, Works, volume 7, pages 273-4.

18. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, pages 271-2.

19. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 326.

20. Lenin, Works, volume 7, page 363.

21. Lenin, Works, volume 7, page 286.

22. Lenin, Works, volume 7, page 395.

23. Lenin, Works, volume 7, page 31.

24. Lenin, Works, volume 34, page 195.

25. Trotsky, On Lenin: Notes towards a biography (London 1971), page 40.

26. Krupskaya, page 99.

27. Vtoroi Sezd RSDRP, page 430.

28. Lenin, Works, volume 7, pages 330-1.

Last updated on 18 July 2009