Paul Frölich

The Ruhr War and German Social Democracy

(5 April 1923)


From International Press Correspondence, Vol. 3 No. 31 [13], 5 April 1923, pp. 241–242.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
Public Domain: Marxists Internet Archive (2021). You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet Archive” as your source.


Two facts characterize the position of the German government iu the Ruhr war: The decree issued by the president of the republic, Ebert, against military, political, and economic spying; and the speech delivered by the chancellor Cuno, the essence of which was: Let us talk no more of negotiations, let us hold out. Both facts give the impression of great strength and determination. In reality they imply the contrary.

The German front against Poincaré is beginning to crumble. The authorities are beginning to submit to force. The industrial undertakings are beginning to break through the boycott in every possible manner, a fact the more accentuated by their desperate denials. But what is most significant is the increasing acuteness of capitalist antagonism. The heavy industrial magnates have already drawn enormous profits from the Ruhr war in the form of fabulous rises in prices, of monopoly of coal transactions with England, of speculative utilization of the mark ramp, and of immediate unearned gains, the decisive question in the Ruhr war is concerned solely with their interests. But the industries working up the products, and wholesale trade, suffer through the conflict. In Germany almost all prices are below the level of the world market price. The stagnation in the selling markets is becoming more and more dangerous, losses are inevitably caused by the fluctuating prices and the future darkens. At the same time these circles feel a growing longing for peace. However much they try to maintain their attitude externally, behind the scenes they are plotting and intriguing. Even within the government there is a fraction striving after negotiations. This fraction is led by Hermes, who appears to possess an ambition for preparing every new government within the old. Perhaps some other ambition is hidden behind this. One thing is certain, he is cooperating with prominent social democrats for the formation of a left coalition government capable of taking up negotiations, just as at one time he saw the salvation of Germany in the Cuno government, also “capable of negotiating”. Cuno is associated with heavy industry, with the Helferich wing of the German Nationalists, and the Bavarian government. Ebert’s decree and Cuno’s speech only signify a demonstration for the stratum of capitalists ruling at present They disclose the weakness of their position.

In this situation the policy pursued by German Social Democracy is of special significance. It is perfectly clear that in a situation of such tension, and with the bourgeoisie thus internally disunited, the policy of a labor party could be extraordinarily fruitful. But the significance of this policy does not lie in this. Social Democracy officially is following entirely in the wake of governmental policy. Although Social Democracy is fully aware of the plutocratic character of Cuno’s government, although it has been able to observe the anti-labor machinations of the government from the very beginning, although it knows that the object aimed at by Cuno’s government in the Ruhr war is the realization of the desire oi heavy industry for power, and although it plainly sees the great dangers involved for the working class in every outcome of this policy, still it proceeds with the government hand in hand. Where Social Democracy ventures to criticise, it is in a very mild form and merely intended to soothe its own followers. Though one scandal be linked to another, though the corruption in Germany poisons the air of heaven. Social Democracy never once ventures to exercise pressure upon this government.

The policy thus pursued by the majority of the party, or, strictly speaking, by the majority of the leaders, has to contend against a strong opposition. This may be seen from the utterances of a number of party publications, and has been very emphatically expressed at times. A large number of resolutions passed by local organizations have also expressed it clearly. But it is characteristic that this opposition broke down completely at a conference of the party committee held about two weeks ago, the oppositional elements, it is asserted, involving themselves in demagogic phrases.

This opposition demands that the Cuno government and the great capitalists be combatted. Even on this first point its attitude is very uncertain, as far as the leaders are concerned, for it does not venture on any joint work with the communists. It sabotages the shop stewards’ movement and the action of ihe control committees. What it wants is a war of words and not of deeds. Its political aim in the Ruhr war is purely pacifist; it strives for an understanding with Poincaré.

To thoughtless political dilettantes this may appear to he a case of only two alternatives: Either the fight with Cuno against Poincaré, in the national united front, or the conclusion of the Ruhr war by means of an agreement with Poincaré. For the bourgeoisie the question indeed takes this form. It need not be explained here that the policy of the national united front signifies nothing more nor less that a furtherance of the game being played by the Stinnes clique. The policy pursued oy the social democratic majority is, as a matter of fact, the logical continuation of its war policy, the yoking of the working class in the service of its deadly enemies. What is the real meaning of the watchword of an “understanding”? The ultimate objective of the Ruhr war is admittedly the question of who is to rule the coal and ore trust. The understanding, whatever form it may take, is bound to lead to a mighty economic and political extension of the power of the trust magnates. Just as the policy of the majority has thrust the burdens of the war onto the working class, the policy of the opposition subjects the proletariat to the disastrous results of a conclusion of peace. The policy of the majority converts the German working class into one of the auxiliary troops of heavy industrial capital The policy of the opposition in the present hour of danger, consoles the working class with the hope of help from above. It does not regard the working class as a political factor at all. It does not strengthen the consciousness of power in the working class, but renders it the plaything of hostile powers.

It is extraordinarily characteristic that this opposition is led by Paul Levi, who, during the war, and at the time of the conclusion of the Versailles peace, overwhelmed this very same policy with contempt and derision. For this policy is indeed, but a continuation of the old cowardly tactics of the former independent Social Democrats.

Both lines of policy serve the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie. Both are pursued purely on bourgeois grounds. They completely deny the vital and future interests of the proletariat, and weaken the power of the proletariat instead of strengthening it. There is only one labor policy the policy whose aim is singly and solely Ihe utilization and strengthening of the class power of the proletariat. If the proletariat will carry on the combat against the Ruhr war today, not with the object of obtaining an understanding among the capitalists, but with the aim of revolution, then it will fulfil that same task that was set it during the world war. Whether it is possible to attain this goal of revolution, depends naturally on the extent to which we succeed in mobilizing the working class in the countries concerned.

But even should the capitalists come to their understanding first, still this revolutionary policy signifies an enormous success. For then the working class is neither bound to heavy industry, as would be the inevitable result of the policy of the social democratic majority, nor is it defenceless against the dangers of a capitalist peace. It is armed and prepared, ready to take up the old battle again under the fresh conditions just created, whatever tactics it pursues. Social Democracy sacrifices the immediate and the future interests of the proletariat, and drives it towards disastrous defeat. The communist policy, on the other, protects the proletariat against the dangers of today and tomorrow, and strengthens the power enabling it to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

From the above it may be plainly seen that the old fissure in the United Social Democracy has never been welded together; in the question of foreign policy it gapes as widely as if there were still two parties. But one thing must not be forgotten: that at the present time there is a great fermentation in the masses of the social democratic adherents, shown for instance very distinctly in the manner in which the Saxonian government question was dealt with in the social democratic national conference. Even if these social democratic workers have not yet reached perfect clarity, still they are already filled with strong distrust of the policy of their own party. They want an unqualified break with the bourgeoisie, and their faith in the Communist Party has increased mightily.



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