MIA > Archive > Tim Hector
Fan the Flame, Outlet, 18 July 1997.
Online here https://web.archive.org/web/20120416011318/http://www.candw.ag/~jardinea/fanflame.htm.
Transcribed by Christian Høgsbjerg.
Marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
A great modern scholar, still living, Sir Isaiah Berlin in a recently published work, wrote this:
“To live is to act. To act is to pursue goals, to choose, accept, reject, pursue, resist, escape, be for or against an entire way of life or some ingredients of it. The self conscious know this.”
It can be safely said that the unself-conscious do not know this. They are merely in the grip of forces they do not understand, taking the line of least resistance: going along to get along.
The more I examine and reflect on West Indian history, the more I think it is unself-conscious. In that we do not act, pursue goals, choose, accept, are for or against an entire way of life or ingredients of it.
Chaguramas and the West Indies Federation is a case in point. Chaguramas destroyed the Federation at its beginning. At its very beginning in 1958. I had hoped to deal with Chaguramas and the St Hilaire’s Jamaica Oil and Chemical Ltd both of which destroyed the West Indies Federation in concrete terms, and not so much the Jamaican Referendum which was its formal termination. Both issues, Chaguramas and the St Hilaire Jamaica Oil Refinery, are so big, that it is impossible to deal with both in a single article. Here goes on then Chaguramas. You, however, dear reader, will have to make up your mind how self-conscious or unself-conscious is West Indian history, in the crucial matters I shall relate.
Chaguramas was, as everyone knows, a U.S. Base in Trinidad, a naval base, leased by the British government to the U.S. government for 99 years, in the Land-Lease Agreement of 1941.
We have to step up to World history here to better understand briefly the background to Chaguramas.
1940 was a disastrous year in World War II for the Allies. In that year the British were forced to evacuate Dunkirk. Then Nazi forces overran France almost in the twinkling of an eye. The flow of American armaments and supplies to Britain was under severe attack from German U-boats operating on the Caribbean Atlantic route. Germany was bombing Britain. A German invasion of Britain seemed imminent. Hitler had begun his invasion of Russia and, was at the start, unbelievably successful. Russians fell in the millions. Hitler’s forces swept all before them.
Lest those unfamiliar with these events think that through brevity I exaggerate, let the Prime Minister of England at the time, Winston Churchill, describe the situation.
“I expect,” said Churchill on June 18, 1940, in the House of Commons, “that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the continuity of our institutions and our Empire ... But it we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of the Dark Ages.”
Churchill you will note, was most self-conscious. It was a defining moment. He therefore had to be aware of the need to act, to choose, to resist etc. It does not matter here that it was not true that “Christian civilisation” was threatened with extinction. The enemy were not heathen Visigoths, but themselves Christians, though Nazi Christians. But Churchill was rallying a nation. And too, warning the United States, that their non-involvement in hostilities could not last. Better to join now than later, for later might be too late and they would then “sink into the abyss of the Dark Ages.” It was pure hyperbole, but it was no doubt necessary as rallying cry at the desperate hour.
So then in August 1940 it was agreed that a chain of Atlantic Naval and Air Bases had to be established for American defence, running from Newfoundland in the north, veering close to the American mainland in Bermuda, Jamaica and the Bahamas, as a screen covering the South Western Atlantic, with bases at Antigua, St Lucia and Trinidad. In exchange for these bases, the British were promised 50 U.S. Navy Destroyers of 1,200 tons each. Of course, through the bases the U.S. had now established a beach-head, so to speak, in the British Empire. A Britain weakened by war, would mean that the Empire would fall in American hands by the end of the War. The Americans consciously pursued their goal, by direction and indirection.
So Chaguramas became a U.S. Base. Like all U.S. Bases the tenure was for 99 years, rent-free, tax-free, free of all charges except private property acquired or damaged would be duly compensated. The poor Caribbean was paying for the defence of rich America. In the event of a war or emergency the U.S., according to the Agreement, throughout the Caribbean area, could exercise “all such rights, powers and authority as may be necessary for military operations deemed desirable by the United States.” In plain terms, the US could take control of the islands.
The Governor of Trinidad & Tobago in 1940, Sir Herbert Young, objected to the terms of the lease. The British and U.S. governments simply by-passed him, and the Chaguramas Lease Agreement was not put to the Trinidad Legislature.
Chaguramas developed as a modern U.S. Military Base on which the U.S. spent some US$100–150 million. Trinidad oil increased its strategic importance to the U.S.
I will add now a little known fact. These U.S. Bases in particular the Chaguramas Base (as well as those in Antigua) played shall we say, a not too small role in the World War II in defence of the Americas. In 1942 the Germans had sunk 182 ships carrying armaments and supplies for the Atlantic theatre of war. In 1943, only 45 ships were sunk after Chaguramas was fully operational and in 1944–5, only three ships were sunk. German U-boats were rendered ineffective in Caribbean waters.
Now we leap 12 years. By 1957 Chaguramas had served its military purpose and was downgraded. The area of 11,741 acres, or eighteen square miles, mini-skirted the northern arc of the Gulf of Paria. At Chaguramas there were especially attractive beaches, probably the best in Trinidad. Chaguramas was composed of mainly flat coastal lands, with small narrow valleys making a picturesque sight and site. There were piers and wharves, sea-planes, ramps, hangars and sea-lanes, shops, a hospital, an hotel, water, electricity, internal roads, and numerous administrative buildings.
In 1957, contrary to the British Report of the Mudie Commission, Trinidad was chosen as the Federal Capital of the West Indies Federation. Some historians of sound merit, suspect today, that Barbados was first chosen because it was the home town of Sir Grantley Adams, the first and only Prime Minister of the West Indies Federation. As early as 1956 they hold that Sir Grantley Adams had already been chosen “as the American stooge” as one wrote. I do not give credence to conspiratorial views of history, and discount them altogether. Not that conspiracies do not exist. It is that I do not believe that persons can orchestrate the history of other nations according to a prepared plan. They may attempt, but failure is foregone.
Anyway a curious accident took place. A site Committee was chosen to determine the best place for the Federal Capital in Trinidad. They determined the north-west peninsula including Chaguramas as number 1 of 7 spots. They included the two U.S. bases in the 7 spots, Chaguramas and the Air Base at Walter Field. The Site Committee flatly declared that the U.S. Bases were included “purely on the ground of their suitability per se and did not take into account consideration of any of the political, legal and strategic implications.” Was this innocent or unself-conscious? Whichever, some portentous events would follow.
Even less self-consciously, as if deliberately obscuring history, the Site Committee proceeded to say:
“It is not for this Committee to pick out the best site but we would be failing in our duty if we did not report the following conclusions at which we arrived. The North West Peninsula is unique in its appeal as a suitable capital site. It is scenically beautiful with its sea-coast, and has obvious opportunities for development. We are of the opinion that this site could hardly be equalled.”
They were not choosing, they said, but they had chosen. Nor did they leave the matter there. They continued this way “We should also state here that it is our unanimous opinion that should a United States Base be selected and made available the U.S. government should be requested to surrender the entire Base absolutely.”
Requested reads like required. Does it to you? And the U.S. “surrendering the entire Base absolutely” is a total misunderstanding of the U.S. They surrender nothing. But I am going ahead of the story.
The Standing Federation Committee met on May 6–17, 1957, to consider the choice of site. Robert Bradshaw of St Kitts led the way. The Capital Site would be Chaguramas. Norman Manley and Grantley Adams gave enthusiastic support. And guess who? Yes, you are right – V.C. Bird of Antigua. Bramble of Montserrat, Barron of Dominica and Dr la Corbiniere of St Lucia, were less enthusiastic, fearful of the Americans, or as some would say now, being more pragmatic.
Dr Williams who has gone into history, or his version of history, as the champion of Chaguramas dodged the issue by abstention. Dr Williams said, at the meeting, verbatim, this: that he and his party had given “a clear distinct and unequivocal guarantee before our election [in 1956] that we would honour all international obligations including the U.S. Bases Agreement. The Chaguramas base was vital for the defence of Trinidad and its oil – an important basis of Federal revenue. If Trinidad supported the resolution, she would be exposed to the charge of using the Standing Federation Committee to break international commitments. If Trinidad opposed it, she would be suspected of trying to foist some other site upon her federal partners.” Dr Williams was neither fish nor fowl on Chaguramas!
Follow this carefully. Grantley Adams was furious about Dr Williams’ position and regarded it as “frustrating a national objective.” “National” the word alarms. The West Indies Federation of 1958–62 did not have independence. It was still, at best an Associate State, or a colony, but with a Prime Minister! The British were mainly responsible for this total anomaly. The West Indian leaders had adopted this malfunction, going along, to get along. But I divert myself.
Bradshaw formally moved the resolution calling for a conference with U.S. authorities, including the President, to discuss the release of Chaguramas and a new defence Agreement between the U.S. the U.K. and the West Indies, which Bradshaw dubbed and “the three nations”. And the meeting concurred! West Indian leaders obviously laboured under the illusion, that the colonial concoction they and the British had produced was in fact a nation in full sovereignty.
Bradshaw, be it noted, though given to “Englishness” almost to the point of the absurd, was the most consistently anti-colonial of all the West Indian leaders, Manley, Adams, and Williams inclusive. But that is not particularly germane here, though it would have been a violation not to state it. Especially since the representatives of the smaller territories are always treated as incidental, if not marginal.
Bradshaw proved right. The US consented to the meeting not in Washington, but in London on July 16, 1957. A distinguished American, John Hay Whitney, then Ambassador to England, headed the U.S. delegation, with a bevy of U.S. Admirals and Generals. The British delegation was headed by Selwyn Lloyd then Foreign Minister, though it was the later infamous John Profumo, Parliamentary under-secretary of State for the Colonies who was present all of the time, Selwyn Lloyd claiming other pressing engagements.
Dr Eric Williams was present. Manley led, Adams, Bradshaw and Barron. Dr Williams was at first silent. The Americans had circulated a document known as the United States Memorandum on United States Naval Base, Chaguramas, Trinidad.
The U.S. position was clear. Though the U.S. was not unwilling to help the West Indies, it would not release Chaguramas. No way. The U.S. said it was essential on military and economic grounds. Chaguramas was in furtherance of US responsibilities to NATO. It was an open and shut case. The Americans were prepared to hear, but not discuss, let alone negotiate.
Manley would have none of it. Chaguramas was the best site for the Capital, said he, a great nation such as the U.S. had a duty to show it was willing to assist its neighbours, who were not unstinting when called upon. It was a speech so moving, that even John Hay Whitney, an experienced diplomat, could not help but be moved. Moved he was, but his military advisers screwed his courage to the striking place. The U.S. stuck by its position, an immovable body. At any rate, it could not be moved by irresistible and compelling arguments.
Dr Williams, meanwhile was furious. In a controlled monotone, he shifted the argument from its liberal moral tone, to rejection of the 1941 agreement. He cited the historical records. Trinidad, through its legislature, had never concurred. A small country had been, to use his word, “bulldozed” by two mighty powers. And, the coup de grâce, the same methods were being used, to continue, to perpetuate, to exacerbate an international outrage. Dr Williams concluded that the military obligations of NATO were but a smokescreen, and the U.S. position was “utterly indefensible.” So indeed.
All save, Bradshaw were startled by what was termed Dr Williams’ “outburst”. Bradshaw loved it. “We, little we, as David, was standing up to not one, but two Goliaths.” Dr Williams had changed sides, reactively, and perhaps, unself-consciously. But change sides he did.
For once Washington did not know what to do. The telephones between Washington and London jangled, overtime. But there would be no change. Except in Dr Williams. He now saw Chaguramas as his personal hobby-horse. It must be returned. Woodford Square would hear some speeches never before made, and never again. A genuine anti-imperialist movement had now arrived in the English-speaking Caribbean.
In the end, the meeting agreed to set up a Joint Commission of experts from both sides “To investigate all angles of the BWI request to make Chaguramas available taking into full account military and economic considerations.”
Looking back from the distance of 40 years now, I conclude that the answer was contained in the question as posed. Chaguramas would remain under U.S. control.
In the meeting in London, a rift was to come between Manley and Adams, on the one hand, and Dr Williams on the other. In the private meetings in their hotel Manley and Adams felt that Dr Williams was brilliant but undiplomatic. Williams, in turn, felt that they were admonishing him, to use his own words, “like a small boy.” Dr Williams, I remind, was quite short as a person. The short-man complex bristles at admonitions. However, something Manley said on that occasion rankled Dr Williams forever. Williams, they say, was a man of deep and abiding resentments. A fault-line had developed in the Federation. Here the personal was definitely the political.
The point is, the West Indian delegation had gone as individuals. No one knew what the other would do. It was unself-conscious. There was no shared perspective either on Federation or a view of the world between the Big Three so to speak, though they belonged to the same West Indian Federal Labour Party.
The Joint Commission reported. The Chaguramas military base was the most suitable base in the Gulf of Paria. It met U.S. strategic and military plans. Partition of the base, between Federal Capital and Military base was impractical. Any other site the U.S. said would cost it as much as US$248 million. The West Indian case was abolished in short shift. The American military argument was bogus, from beginning to end, mere trumpery and fakery. They were determined to frustrate West Indian national objectives.
It was agreed among the West Indian leaders that the report of the Joint Commission would be rejected. On the grounds that its purpose was “fact finding” not conclusive. A conference of all the West Indian territories would be called to decide what to do next. New talks, though, had to be held between “the three nations,” namely US, UK and the West Indies.
Mr Manley announced this plan after a meeting of the Big Three in Trinidad on May 23, 1958. Grantley Adams, now Prime Minister had agreed on the plan. After the May meeting he returned to Barbados to rest. Speculation has it that the Americans and British prevailed on him, as he “rested,” to break ranks. That may or may not be so. And no one will ever know, except U.S. Secret files.
Suddenly, Prime Minister Adams returned to Trinidad. After meeting with his Cabinet, and fearing his government would fall, so divided was the Federal Parliament over Chaguramas (I would have to write two more pages to give the details.) that Parliamentarians of both parties had switched sides as if in a game of blind-man’s buff.
Adams issued a statement rejecting the Joint Commission report and repudiating the British and American position to have no more talks on the subject of Federation. So good so far.
Then Adams’ statement departed from the agreement between Manley, Williams and Adams, by recognising the military “essentiality of Chaguramas to the United States”. Bad enough so far. But worse was to follow. The Adams statement said “So long as the present state of world tension exists the Federal Government refrains from a decision which at this stage might make the defence of the Western World (sic) more difficult”. The defense of the Western World, it seemed, depended on the West Indies! The West Indian nation in the making, had to be subordinated to U.S. Cold War misperceptions, distortions and sheer obstinacy. The Federation began to unravel.
The capitulation to the U.S. was complete.
For sure Williams and Adams could set no horse again. Williams and the PNM tongue-lashed Adams without mercy in Woodford Square, in the Trinidad Parliament, everywhere and anywhere. Adams, in turn, said he was not going to join any anti-imperial Yankee-go-home, infantile protest. It was a mis-perception, as profound as it was wrong.
Sparrow, meantime, expressed the new nationalist sentiment in a timeless calypso: “Yankees gone, Sparrow take over now.” A take-over was not in Adams’ head. He, after all, was a born-again Cold Warrior. But Adams was no cheap-jack. He had made a sacrifice to be in politics. He was, as he said, an “Asquithian Liberal”, and therefore out of place, and out of time. But he was a very decent man. The times, however, demanded more than decency.
Adams, to be fair, felt that the Federal capital was a Federal problem to be solved by the Federal government of which he was head, and not by any meeting of the Heads of government of the Federal territories. Vanity became a factor. Truth to tell, Adams did not want the tail, a self-governing unit, to way the Federal dog. But to capitulate totally to the Americans on Chaguramas, and to scuttle all agreements, was to make a mockery of the principle he purported to uphold. In short and in sum, there was no perspective. And worse, no shared perspective rooted in the history of ideas.
To be sure, Dr Williams and Adams were rent asunder. A refinery would rent Adams and Manley asunder later, and neither God nor man could put the trio together again. Not Humpty Dumpty, but West Indian unity, however half-baked, would have a great fall. It has not risen since.
Last updated on 30 May 2022