My task is to present the question of the participation of the Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government. It may seem strange, at first glance, that such a question should have arisen. One might think the cause of Social-Democracy to be thriving and the probability of its participation in a provisional revolutionary government to be very great. Actually it is not so. To debate this question as an immediately realisable prospect would be quixotic. But the question has been forced upon us not so much by the actual state of affairs as by literary polemics. It must always be borne in mind that the question was first raised by Martynov, and that he raised it before January 9. He wrote in his pamphlet Two Dictatorships (pp. 10-11):
“Imagine, dear reader, for a moment, that Lenin’s utopia has been realised; imagine that the Party, whose membership has been narrowed down to only professional revolutionaries, has succeeded in ’preparing, timing, and carrying out the general armed uprising of the people’. Is it not obvious that it would be this Party which would he designated as the provisional government by the will of the whole people immediately after the revolution? Is it not obvious that the people would place the immediate fate of the revolution in the hands of this Party, and no other? Is it not obvious that this Party, not wishing to betray the confidence previously placed in it by the people, would he forced, he in duty bound, to assume power and maintain it until it had consolidated the victory of the revolution by revolutionary measures?”
Incredible as it may seem, this is actually how the question is presented: Martynov believes that if we were thoroughly to prepare and launch the uprising, we should find our selves in a desperate predicament. If we were to submit our dispute to a foreigner, he would never believe it possible for the question to be formulated in that manner and he would not understand us. Our dispute cannot be understood without a knowledge of the history of Russian Social-Democratic views and the nature of the tail-endist views of Rabocheye Dyelo. This question has become an urgent question of theory and must be clarified. It is a question of clarity in our aims. I urge the comrades when reporting on our discussion to the members engaged in practical Party work in Russia to emphasise strongly Martynov’s formulation of the question.
Iskra, No. 96, contains an article by Plekhanov. We have always held Plekhanov in great esteem for the “of fence” he has repeatedly given to the opportunists, which, to his honour, has earned him a mass of enemies. But we cannot esteem him for defending Martynov. This is not the Plekhanov we knew. He entitles his article “On the Question of the Seizure of Power”. This artificially narrows the issue. We have never thus presented the question. Plekhanov presents things as though Vperyod called Marx and Engels “virtuosi of philistinism”. But that is not so; it is a slight substitution. Vperyod expressly stressed the correctness of Marx’s general conception of this question. The charge of philistinism referred to Martynov or to L. Martov. Well disposed though we are to hold in high esteem all who collaborate with Plekhanov, it must be said, however, that Martynov is not Marx. Plekhanov errs in seeking to hush up Martynovism.
Martynov asserts that if we take a decisive part in the uprising, we shall be in great danger of being forced by the proletariat to take power. This argument has a certain original logic of its own, although a logic of retreat. It is in reference to this peculiar warning against the danger of victory in the struggle against the autocracy that Vperyod asks Martynov and L. Martov what they are talking about: a socialist or a democratic dictatorship? We are referred to Engels’ famous words about the danger involved in the position of a leader who has been given power in behalf of a class that is not yet mature for the exercise of complete domination. We explained in Vperyod that Engels points out the danger to the position of a leader when he establishes post factum a divergence between principle and reality, between words and facts. Such a divergence leads to disaster in the sense of political failure, not in the sense of physical defeat ; you must affirm (this is Engels’ thought) that the revolution is socialistic, when it is really only democratic. If we promised the Russian proletariat now that we could secure its complete domination immediately, we would fall into the error of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. It is this mistake of the Socialists-Revolutionaries that we Social-Democrats have always ridiculed—their claim that the revolution will be “democratic and not bourgeois”. We have constantly said that the revolution would strengthen the bourgeoisie, not weaken it, but that it would create for the proletariat the necessary conditions for waging a successful struggle for socialism.
But since it is a question of a democratic revolution, we are faced with two forces: the autocracy and the revolutionary people, viz., the proletariat as the chief combatant, and the peasantry and all the different petty-bourgeois elements. The interests of the proletariat do not coincide with those of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Social-Democracy has always stressed, the fact that these class differences in the midst of a revolutionary people are unavoidable. In a hard-fought struggle, the object of the struggle may change from hand to hand. A revolutionary people strives for the sovereignty of the people; all the reactionary elements defend the sovereignty of the tsar. A successful revolution, therefore, cannot be anything but the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, whose interests, equally opposed to the sovereignty of the tsar, coincide. Both Iskra and Vperyod are agreed on the slogan “To march separately but strike together”, but Vperyod adds that striking jointly means jointly striking the final blow and jointly beating off the enemy’s attempts to recover the ground he has lost. After the overthrow of the autocracy, the struggle will not cease, but become more intense. That is precisely the time when the reactionary forces will organise for the struggle in real earnest. If we are going to employ the slogan of the uprising, we must not frighten the Social-Democrats with the possibility of victory in the uprising. When we have won the sovereignty of the people, we shall have to consolidate it—this is what is meant by the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. We have no reason whatever to fear it. The establishment of the republic would be a tremendous victory for the proletariat, although, unlike the bourgeois revolutionary, the Social-Democrat does not regard the republic as the “absolute ideal” but merely as some thing that will guarantee him freedom to wage the struggle for socialism on a broad basis. Parvus says that in no other country has the struggle for freedom entailed such tremendous sacrifices. This is true. It is confirmed by the European bourgeois press, which is following events in Russia very closely from the outside. The autocracy’s resistance to the most elementary reforms is incredibly strong, and the greater the action the greater the counter-action. Hence the autocracy’s utter collapse is highly probable. The entire question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship hinges on the complete overthrow of the autocracy. Possibly the history of 1848-50 will repeat itself with us, that is, the autocracy will not be overthrown but only limited in power and converted into a constitutional monarchy. In that case a democratic dictatorship will be out of the question. If, however, the autocratic government is really over thrown, it will have to be replaced by another. This other can be only a provisional revolutionary government. It can base itself for support only on the revolutionary people—on the proletariat and the peasantry. It can be only a dictatorship, that is, not an organisation of “order”, but an organisation of war. If you are storming a fortress, you cannot discontinue the war even after you have taken the fortress. Either the one or the other: either we take the fortress to hold it, or we do not storm the fortress and explain that all we want is a little place next to it.
Let me pass on to Plekhanov. His method is totally incorrect. He evades important questions of principle to indulge in quibbling, with an element of misstatement. (Exclamation by Comrade Barsov: “Hear, hear!”) Vperyod maintains that Marx’s general scheme is correct (that of replacing the autocracy first by a bourgeois monarchy and then by a petty-bourgeois democratic republic); but if we set out beforehand to restrict the limits to which we shall go in accordance with this scheme, we shall prove ourselves philistines. Thus, Plekhanov’s defence of Marx is verlorene Liebesmühe (love’s labour’s lost). In defending Martynov, Plekhanov refers to the Address of the Central Committee of the Communist League to the League membership. Plekhanov misstates this Address too. He draws a veil over the fact that it was written at a time when the people had failed to score a complete victory, notwithstanding the victorious uprising of the Berlin proletariat in 1848. Absolutism had been superseded by a bourgeois constitutional monarchy, and, consequently, a provisional government backed by the entire revolutionary people was out of the question. The whole point of the Address is that after the failure of the popular uprising Marx advises the working class to organise and prepare. Can thEse counsels serve to clarify the situation in Russia before the uprising has begun? Can they resolve the moot question which presupposes the victorious uprising of the proletariat? The Address begins thus: “In the two revolutionary years 1848-49 the League proved itself in double fashion: first, in that its members energetically took part in the movement in all places.... The League further proved itself in that its conception of the movement [as set forth, by the way, in the Communist Manifesto] turned out to be the only correct one.... At the same time, the former firm organisation of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual circles and communities allowed their connections with the Central Committee (Zentralbehörde) to be come loose and gradually dormant. Consequently, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, organised itself more and more in Germany, the workers’ party lost its only firm hold, remained organised at the most in separate localities for local purposes and in the general movement (in der aligemeinen Bewegung) thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats” (Ansprache, p. 75).
Thus, Marx found in 1850 that the petty-bourgeois democrats had gained in organisation during the Revolution of 1848, which had run its course, while the workers’ party had lost. Naturally, Marx’s chief concern was that the workers’ party should not lag behind the bourgeoisie a second time. It is “extremely important that ... precisely at this moment, when a new revolution is impending, the workers’ party must act in the most organised, most unanimous and most independent fashion possible, if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as in 1848” (An sprache, p. 76).
It is because the bourgeois democrats were better organised that Marx did not doubt that they would definitely predominate, should a second revolution take place at once. “That, during the further development of the revolution, the petty-bourgeois democracy will for a moment (für einen Augenblick) obtain predominating influence in Germany is not open to doubt” (Ansprache, p. 78). Taking all this into consideration, we can understand why Marx does not mention a word in Ansprache about the participation of the proletariat in a provisional revolutionary government. Plekhanov, therefore, is entirely incorrect in asserting that Marx “considered inadmissible the thought that the political representatives of the proletariat could work together with the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie for the creation of a new social order” (Iskra, No. 96). This is not correct. Marx does not raise the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, whereas Plekhanov makes it appear as though Marx decided this question in the negative. Marx says: We Social-Democrats have all been lagging behind, we are worse organised, we must organise independently for the eventuality that the petty bourgeoisie will come to power after a new revolution. From these premises of Marx, Martynov draws the following conclusion: We Social-Democrats, now better organised than the petty-bourgeois democrats and constituting undoubtedly an in dependent party, ought to shrink from having to participate in a provisional revolutionary government in the event of a successful uprising. Yes! Comrade Plekhanov, Marxism is one thing and Martynovism another. To bring out more clearly the great difference between the situation in Russia in 1905 and that in Germany in 1850, let us deal with some further interesting passages in the Address. Marx did not even mention the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, for he believed in the direct socialist dictatorship of the proletariat immediately after the petty-bourgeois revolution. On the agrarian question, for instance, he says that the democrats want to create a petty-bourgeois peasant class, but that the workers must oppose this plan in the interests of the rural proletariat and in their own interests; they must demand that the confiscated feudal landed property remain state property, and that it be used for labour colonies in which the associated rural proletariat should employ all the means of large-scale agriculture. Obviously, with such plans in mind, Marx could not speak of a democratic dictatorship. He wrote, not on the eve of the revolution, as the representative of the organised proletariat, but after the revolution, as the representative of the workers in the process of organising. Marx emphasises the first task as follows: “After the overthrow of the existing governments, the Central Committee will, as soon as it is at all possible, betake itself to Germany, immediately convene a congress, and put before the latter the necessary proposals for the centralisation of the workers’ clubs....” Thus, the idea of an independent workers’ party, which has become with us bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, was then something new. We must not forget that in 1848, when Marx was editing the free and extremely revolutionary newspaper (Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung), he had no working-class organisation behind him. His paper was supported by bourgeois radicals, who nearly wrecked it when Marx made his scathing attack on the Paris bourgeoisie after the June Days. That is why the Address has so much to say about the independent organisation of the workers. It deals with the formation of revolutionary workers’ governments parallel with the new official government, whether in the form of workers’ clubs and committees or of local communal councils and municipalities. The point made therein is that the workers should be armed and that they should form an independent workers’ guard. The second clause in the programme states that working-class candidates, preferably members of the League, should be nominated for these bodies alongside the bourgeois candidates. How weak the League was is shown by the fact that Marx had to argue the need for nominating independent candidates. The inference to be drawn from all this is that Marx did not mention and had no intention of deciding the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, since that question could have no practical significance at the time; the entire attention was concentrated exclusively on the organisation of an independent workers’ party.
Plekhanov says further in Iskra that Vperyod produces no relevant evidence, but confines itself to repeating a few favourite catchwords, and he alleges that Vperyod seeks to criticise Marx. With what truth? Do we not see, on the contrary, that Vperyod puts the question on a concrete basis, taking into account the real social forces engaged in Russia in the struggle for the democratic revolution? Plekhanov, on the other hand, does not say a word about the concrete conditions in Russia. His stock-in-trade consists of a couple of inapposite quotations. Monstrous, but true. The situation in Russia differs so greatly from that in Western Europe that even Parvus was prompted to ask: Where is our revolutionary democracy? Unable to prove that Vperyod wants to “criticise” Marx, Plekhanov drags in Mach and Avenarius by the ears. I cannot for the life of me understand what these writers, for whom I have not the slightest sympathy, have to do with the question of social revolution. They wrote on individual and social organisation of experience, or some such theme, but they never really gave any thought to the democratic dictatorship. Does Plekhanov mean to say that Parvus, perhaps, has become a disciple of Mach and Avenarius? (Laughter.) Or perhaps things have come to such a pass with Plekhanov that he has to make a butt of Mach and Avenarius without rhyme or reason. Plekhanov goes on to say that Marx and Engels soon lost faith in an imminent social revolution. The Communist League broke up. Petty squabbles arose among the political emigrants abroad, which Marx and Engels put down to the fact that while there were revolutionaries there was no revolution. Plekhanov writes in Iskra: “They [Marx and Engels, who had lost faith in an imminent social revolution] would have formulated the political tasks of the proletariat on the assumption that the democratic system would be predominant for a fairly long time. But for this very reason they would have been more emphatic than ever in condemning the socialists’ participation in a petty-bourgeois government” (Iskra, No. 96). Why? No answer. Once more Plekhanov uses democratic dictatorship interchangeably with socialist dictator ship, i.e., he falls into Martynov’s error, against which Vperyod has time and again strongly warned. Without the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry no republic is possible in Russia. This assertion was made by Vperyod on the basis of an analysis of the actual situation. Unfortunately, Marx did not know this situation and he did not write of it. Therefore the analysis of this situation can neither be confirmed nor refuted with simple quotations from Marx. As to the concrete conditions, Plekhanov says not a word.
Even less felicitous is the adducing of the second quotation from Engels. For one thing, it is rather odd of Plekhanov to refer to a private letter without mention of the time and place of its publication. We could only be grateful for the publication of Engels’ letters, but we should like to see their full text. We have, however, some information which permits us to judge of the true meaning of Engels’ letter.
We know definitely, in the second place, that the situation in Italy in the nineties was nothing like the present situation in Russia. Italy had been enjoying freedom for forty years. In Russia the working class cannot even dream of such freedom without a bourgeois revolution. In Italy, consequently, the working class had long been in a position to develop an independent organisation for the socialist revolution. Turati is the Italian Millerand. It is quite possible, therefore, that even at that time Turati advocated Millerandian ideas. This assumption is borne out by the fact that, according to Plekhanov himself, Engels had to explain to Turati the difference between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution. Thus, Engels feared that Turati would find himself in the false position of a leader who did not understand the social significance of the revolution in which he was taking part. Accordingly, we must say again of Plekhanov that he confounds democratic with socialist revolution.
But perhaps we might find in Marx and Engels an answer which, though not applying to the concrete situation in Russia, would apply to the general principles of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat? Iskra at any rate raises one such general question.
It states in issue No. 93: “The best way to organise the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state is to develop the bourgeois revolution from below through the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power.” Iskra goes on: “Vperyod wants the pressure of the proletariat on the revolution [?] to be exerted not only from below, not only from the street, but also from above, from the marble halls of the provisional government.” This formulation is correct; Vperyod does want this. We have here a really general question of principle: is revolutionary action permissible only from below, or also from above? To this general question we can find an answer in Marx and Engels.
I have in mind Engels’ interesting article “The Bakuninists at Work” (1873). Engels describes briefly the Spanish Revolution of 1873, when the country was swept by a revolution of the Intransigentes, i.e., the extreme republicans. Engels stresses the fact that the immediate emancipation of the working class was out of the question at that time. The task was to accelerate for the proletariat the transition through the preliminary stages that prepare the social revolution and to clear the obstacles in its way. The working class of Spain could utilise this opportunity only by taking an active part in the revolution. In this it was hindered by the influence of the Bakuninists and, among other things, by their idea of the general strike, which Engels criticised so effectively. Engels describes, in passing, the events in Alcoy, a city with 30,000 factory workers, where the proletariat found itself master of the situation. How did the proletariat act? Despite the principles of Bakuninism, they were obligated to participate in the provisional revolutionary government. “The Bakuninists,” says Engels, “had for years been propagating the idea that all revolutionary action from above downward was pernicious, and that every thing must be organised and carried out from below upward.”
This, then, is Engels’ answer to the general question of “from above or from below” raised by Iskra. The “Iskra” principle of “only from below and never from above” is an anarchist principle. Drawing his conclusion from the events of the Spanish revolution, Engels says: “The Bakuninists repudiated the credo which they had just proclaimed: that the establishment of a revolutionary government was only a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class [as Plekhanov is trying to persuade us now], by figuring quite complacently on the government committees of the various cities, and at that almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and exploited politically by the bourgeoisie.” Thus, what displeases Engels is the fact that the Bakuninists were in the minority, and not the fact that they sat there on these committees. At the conclusion of his pamphlet, Engels declares that the example of the Bakuninists is “an example of how not to make a revolution”.
If Martov confined his revolutionary work exclusively to action from below, he would be repeating the mistake of the Bakuninists.
Iskra, however, after inventing differences on points of principle with Vperyod, comes round to our own point of view. Martynov, for instance, says that the proletariat, in common with the people, must force the bourgeoisie to consummate the revolution. This, however, is nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of “the people”, viz., of the proletariat and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie has no wish what ever to consummate the revolution. But the people cannot help wanting this because of the social conditions of their existence. The revolutionary dictatorship will educate them and draw them into political life.
Iskra writes in issue No. 95:
“If, however, we should finally be swept into power against our will by the inner dialectics of the revolution at a time when the national conditions for the establishment of socialism are not yet mature, we would not hack out. We would make it our aim to break down the narrow national framework of the revolution and impel the Western world towards revolution, as France impelled the East a century ago.”
Thus, Iskra itself admits that, were it our misfortune to be victorious, we should have to act in keeping with the Vperyod position. Hence, in the practical aspect of the question, “Iskra” follows “Vperyod” and undermines its own position. The only thing I fail to understand is how Martov and Martynov can be dragged to power against their own will. If ever there was idiocy!
Iskra cites France as an example. But that was Jacobin France. To make a bogy of Jacobinism in time of revolution is a cheap trick. A democratic dictatorship, as I have pointed out, is not an organisation of “order”, but an organisation of war. Even if we did seize St. Petersburg and guillotined Nicholas, we would still have several Vendées to deal with. Marx understood this perfectly when in 1848, in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, he recalled the Jacobins. He said that “the Reign of Terror of 1793 was nothing but a plebeian mariner of settling accounts with absolutism and counter-revolution.” We, too, prefer to settle accounts with the Russian autocracy by “plebeian” methods and leave Girondist methods to Iskra. The situation confronting the Russian revolution is singularly auspicious (an anti-popular war, the Asiatic conservatism of the autocracy, etc.), and it justifies the hope that the uprising may prove successful. The revolutionary temper of the proletariat is mounting almost hourly. At such a moment Martynovism is not mere folly, but a downright crime, for it saps the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, clips the wings of its revolutionary enthusiasm. (Lyadov: “Hear, hear!”) It is the mistake Bernstein made in the German Party, under different circumstances, on the question, not of the democratic, but of the socialist dictatorship.
To give you a definite idea of what these celebrated “marble halls” of the provisional revolutionary government are really like, I shall quote still another source. In his article “Die Reichsverfassungskampagne”  Engels recounts how he took part in a revolution in the precincts of these “marble halls”. He describes, for instance, the uprising in Rhenish Prussia, which was one of the most industrialised centres in Germany. The chances for the victory of the democratic party, he says, were particularly strong there. The thing to do was to rush all available forces to the right bank of the Rhine, spread the insurrection over a wider area and try to set up the nucleus of a revolutionary army with the aid of the Landwehr (militia). This was precisely what Engels proposed when he went to Elberfeld to do everything possible to put his plan into operation. He attacks the petty-bourgeois leaders for their inability to organise the insurrection, for their failure to furnish funds, for instance, for the maintenance of the workers fighting on the barricades, etc. They should have acted more energetically, he says. Their first step should have been to disarm the Elberfeld Citizens’ Army and distribute its arms among the workers, and then to levy a compulsory tax for the maintenance of the workers thus armed. But this suggestion, says Engels, came only and exclusively from me. The highly respectable Committee of Public Safety was not in the least inclined to take such “terrorist measures”.
Thus, while our Marx and Engels—that is, Martynov and Martov (Homeric laughter)—try to frighten us with the bogy of Jacobinism, Engels castigated the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie for its disdain of the “Jacobin” mode of operation. He understood that going to war and—in the course of the war—renouncing the State Treasury and government power meant engaging in an unworthy game of words. Where, then, will you get money for the uprising, if it becomes an all-people’s uprising, gentlemen of the new Iskra? Not from the State Treasury, surely? That is bourgeois! That is Jacobinism!
Concerning the uprising in Baden Engels writes that “the insurgent government had every chance of success, in that it found ... a ready army, well-stocked arsenals ... a full State Treasury, and what was practically solid support of the population”. After the event everyone understood what had to be done under the circumstances. What had to be done was to organise an army for the protection of the National Assembly, to drive the Austrians and Prussians back, to spread the revolt to the neighbouring states, and “bring the trembling German so-called National Assembly under the terroristic influence of an insurgent population and insurgent army.... It was necessary, furthermore, to centralise the power of the insurrection, put the necessary funds at its disposal and win for the insurrection the sympathy of the vast farming majority of the population by immediately abolishing all feudal burdens.... All this should have been done at once, however, if it was to be carried out promptly. A week after the appointment of the Committee of Safety it was too late”.
We are convinced that when the uprising starts in Russia the revolutionary Social-Democrats, following the example of Engels, will enlist as soldiers of the revolution and will give the same kind of “Jacobin” advice. But our Iskra prefers to discuss the colour of the ballot envelopes, relegating to the background the question of the provisional revolutionary government and of a revolutionary guard for the Constituent Assembly. Our Iskra will not act “from above” under any circumstances.
From Karlsruhe Engels went to Pfalz, where his friend D’Ester (who had once freed Engels from arrest) was, on the provisional government. “Official participation in a movement that was utterly alien to our party was plainly out of the question in this case as well,” Engels says. He had “to take the only position in this movement that anyone working on the Neue Rheinische Zeitung could take: that of a soldier.” We have spoken of the break-up of the Communist League, which deprived Engels of practically all ties with the workers’ organisations. This clarifies the passage we quoted: “I was offered many civilian and military posts,” writes Engels, “posts that I would not have hesitated for a moment to accept in a proletarian movement. Under the circumstances I declined them all.”
As we see, Engels did not fear to act from above; he did not fear that the proletariat might become too organised and too strong, which could lead to its participation in the provisional government. On the contrary, he regretted that the movement was not successful enough, not proletarian enough, because the workers were completely unorganised. But even under these circumstances, Engels accepted a post; he served in the army as Willich’s adjutant, took over the delivery of ammunition, transporting under the greatest difficulties powder, lead, cartridges, etc. “To die for the republic was (thenceforward) my aim,” writes Engels.
I leave it to you, comrades, to judge whether this picture of a provisional government drawn according to the words of Engels resembles the “marble halls” which the new Iskra is holding up as a bogy to frighten the workers away from us. (Applause.) (The speaker reads his draft of the resolution and explains it.)
 See pp. 279-80 of this volume—Ed.
 “The Campaign for an Imperial Constitution”.—Ed.
 Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, March 1850. (See Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 106-17.)
 The Communist League—the first international association of the revolutionary proletariat, founded in the summer of 1847 in London at the congress of delegates from revolutionary proletarian organisations. The organisers and leaders of the Communist League were Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who were commissioned by that organisation to write the Manifesto of the Communist Party. The Communist League existed up to 1852. Its most prominent members eventually played a leading role in the First International. (See Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 338-57.)
 Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung appeared in Cologne between June 1, 1848, and May 19, 1849, under the management of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Editor-in-Chief was Marx. Under the blows of reaction the newspaper ceased its existence after issue No. 301. On the Neue Rheinische Zeitung see Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 328-37.
 The reference is to Engels’ letter to Filippo Turati dated January 26, 1894, and published in the Italian hi-monthly CriticaSociale, No. 3, for February 1, 1894, under the heading “The Future Italian Revolution and the Socialist Party.” (See Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 551-55.)
 The Russian translation of Engels’ article “Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit. Denkschrift über den Aufstand in Spanien im Sommer 1873” (published in 1873 in “Internationales aus dem Volksstaat”), was edited by Lenin and issued in pamphlet form by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva in 1905 and in St. Petersburg in 1906.
 Vendle—a department of France where, during the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century, a counter-revolutionary insurrection of the backward, reactionary peasantry took place against the revolutionary Convention. The revolt was engineered by the counter-revolutionary clergy and landlords with the help of religious catchwords.
 Lenin quotes from Marx’s article “The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution. Second Article”, written on December 11, 1848. (See Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 67.)