V. I.   Lenin





Die Bank. A Monthly Journal of Finance and Banking (Publisher: Alfred Lansburgh), 1914, 2nd (half-year), p. 1042.

Imports and exports in million pounds sterling, from data of the Board of Trade (London):

(( [1] 7 months
1/I-1/VIII ))
(First) Half-year
Imports Exports
1912 1913 1914 1912 1913 1914
Great Britain . . . . . 296.1 319.7 375.9 225.3 257.1 255.4
Germany . . . . . . . 260.6 267.0 269.3 205.4 243.1 249.2
U.S.A.* . . . . . . . . 215.3 212.2 237.7 255.6 271.8 245.7
France* . . . . . . . . 192.2 196.4 198.6 149.0 156.4 153.8

(Ibidem, p. 713). Note on “Banks and the Post Office”. The boundary between ||| banks and the post office the banks and the savings banks “is being increasingly obliterated”. Hence complaints by the banks. The Erfurt Chamber of Commerce speaks in favour of the banks against the “recent intervention of the post office in currency circulation” (in the form of the “issue of postal letters of credit”). The editors remark that postal letters of credit operate only within the German Empire, whereas bank letters of credit serve mainly persons going abroad, and “after all, the public exists not only || this “not only” is magnificent!!! )) for the sake of the banks” (714).

From the article “Thoughts on the Thousand Million Loan”, p. 932: “A subscriber to the loan possesses liquid assets, but mostly in the form not of cash, but of a bank account or a savings bank, association, etc. deposit. In Germany these institutions control, in round figures, 35,000 million marks of such liquid assets, about half of which are at the immediate disposal of their owners, while the other half are available to them after preliminary notification—mostly after a month” (933).

What is involved is the transfer of ownership from private persons’ accounts to the state’s account (and vice versa in paying suppliers, etc.).

The credit institutions as a whole dispose of “not more than 500 million marks”, on the basis of “their total cash and deposits in the State Bank” (933).

In 1871, France paid 5,000 million in such a way that only 742.3 million was paid in gold, silver and banknotes, the remainder (4,248.3 million) being in bills. (France recovered so rapidly in 1870–71 because she did not tamper with her currency and made no excessive issue of “uncovered banknotes”.)

p. 9O3 et seq.: “The Ousting of London as the World’s Clearing House” by Alfred Lansburgh.

A very good article, explaining the causes of Britain’s power. The chief cause: “the absolute predominance of British trade and currency circulation over the trade of all other countries” (909). It exceeds German trade “by 50 per cent in round figures” (ibidem). In addition, there is the trade with the colonies!!

N.B. || “Britain accounts for three-quarters of world trade” (910).

“This means that three-quarters of all international payments pass directly or indirectly through Great Britain” (910).

“Sterling accounts” “predominate” also in Japan, China, Chile, Peru, South Persia, “the greater part of Turkey (910).—“Knowledge of English is widespread in commercial circles” (910).

Furthermore, Britain finances this trade of the whole world   (the lowest rate of interest; the most stable gold currency; one pound sterling = 7 1/3 grams of gold, etc., etc.).

Great Britain’s “vast” monetary resources, her 60 colonial banks (911), etc., etc.

The maxim of a bank director (the Bank of Brazil), K\"ammerer(a German):

(913) “The first essential for opening an overseas banking establishment is credit, an accepting banker || N.B.! || in London.”

[[LEFT-BOX-END: p. 912, note: “Regarding the difficulties encountered by German overseas banks in introducing bills of exchange in marks in South America, cf. Jaffé, British Banks, second edition, 98–101, Frankfurter Zeitung, August 29, 1914; Hamburger Nachrichten, September 15, 1914” (I omit other quotations). ]]

“For every country adopting a currency based on gold and holding, as occurs almost everywhere, a large portfolio of British bills of exchange in place of gold, not only subordinates a greater part of its international payments to the London Clearing House, but thereby also immediately assists the consolidation of British world financial power. The continual holding of a large portfolio of British bills of exchange means, in practice, that the country in question puts considerable resources at London’s disposal, which for its part London can, and does, use to further finance the foreign trade of other countries and in this way strength en its own sterling currency and its own clearing function. Thus, owing to the gold value of the pound sterling, Great Britain is always able to put at the service of her credit system, besides her own large capital assets, also several thousand million marks of foreign money” (913–14).

To deprive Britain of this role requires “huge financial resources and a low rate of interest” (916)... “And one must be in a position not only to pay out vast sums of money, but also to guarantee the absolute stability of the currency that is to replace the British, that is, one must be prepared at any time to pay in gold.”

Hence, the term “utopian” is applied to the plan of the National City Bank (Morgan’s Bank)[16] or the Swiss banks,   “which believe that a little good will is quite sufficient to wrest from London the international clearing accounts, or a considerable part of them. That is indeed a highly desirable aim, but it cannot be achieved until some other country can put at the service of world trade the amount of credit, the complex of commercial, banking and interest advantages, and the reliable currency foundation, which, prior to the outbreak of the war at least, Britain put at the disposal of world trade” (920)....

(1914, November and December.) “The Covering of War Costs and Its Sources”, an article by Alfred Lansburgh.

Quotes Lloyd George as saying (in September 1914): “In my judgement, the last few hundred millions may win this war. This is my opinion. The first hundred millions our enemies can stand just as well as we can, but the last they cannot, thank God...” (p. 998).

Says Lloyd George is mistaken. There are four sources for covering war costs: (1) “First degree” reserves = cash (France and Russia have more than Germany, but Britain less. Here Germany is weaker). (2) “Second degree” reserves: short-term debt claims in world trade (Britain is much stronger: “Whereas Britain is the world’s banker and keeps her money liquid, France is the world’s financier and invests her money”) (1001). (3) Net income from the country’s production + (4) part of gross income devoted to depreciation (or accumulation). Here, he says, we are not weaker.

In this connection, however, Lansburgh is counting on exports which though secret (“hidden”), will not disappear.

Our (Germany’s) low discount rate proves (December 1914!!!), he says, that exports are inadequate, do not correspond to “our expenditure abroad” (1103).

N.B. || Cf. p. 1112: “Only when exports suffice fully to cover imports and war expenditure abroad will the national economy be really on a war footing.”

1914, 1 (May). “The Bank with 300 Million”, an article by A. Lansburgh.

The Discontogesellschaft swallowed up the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein and increased its share capital to 300 million marks (p. 415).[2]

“Thus for the first time a really big German bank has become a victim of the concentration process” (415).

The Deutsche Bank increased its capital to 250,000,000 marks. The Discontogesellschaft replied to this by a “merger” with the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein and increased its capital to 300,000,000.[3]

“With a capital of 300,000,000 marks, it becomes, for the time being, the biggest bank not only in Germany, but in the world” (422).

The “struggle for hegemony”, which had seemed decided in favour of the Deutsche Bank, now flared up afresh:

|| “Other banks will follow this same path ... and the three hundred men, who today govern Germany || N.B. economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five, or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest move towards concentration will be con fined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates these banks favour. This, and business fluctuations, will lead to still more mergers, and one fine morning we shall wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before || our eyes, and to find ourselves faced with the necessity of substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. |||| N.B. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except that we have allowed things to follow | their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks” (426).[4] (End of article.) |

SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES”, an article by Ludwig Eschwege, p. 544 et seq. (May 1914).

Early in 1912, the big banks (yielding to the pressure of the State Bank) introduced a new type of balance-sheet.   But thousands of joint-stock companies continue to publish brief (“knappe”) balance-sheets, not going beyond the requirements of the law—the brevity of the balance-sheet being alleged to be a guarantee against speculation!!! In fact, however:

“In reality, what is achieved by this [the “brevity of balance-sheet”] is merely that a few better-informed || persons are able to enrich themselves at the expense of the mass of shareholders, especially if brevity is combined with a subtle system of misleading headings to make important data invisible to the ordinary shareholder. This gives the directors and their good friends a double advantage: being sole possessors of all information, they || can benefit from a rise in market values in favourable situations, and escape anticipated losses by a timely sale of shares in unfavourable ones.

good example! || “Thus, for example, the Spring-Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell in a few years from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board, without consulting the shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of its ‘subsidiary companies’, the Hassia Company, which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the ‘parent company’, was never mentioned in its balance-sheet; this omission was quite legal and could be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. !!! || The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance-sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders learned of the Hassia loan only much later, after it had been proved to be a mistake and when Spring-Steel shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid   of them. It was only then that the item in question was made evident by a change in the method of drawing up the balance-sheet. ||| N.B. This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards of Directors are willing to undertake risky transactions with a far lighter heart than individual business men. Modern methods of drawing up balance-sheets not only make it possible to conceal the risky deal from the ordinary shareholder, but also allow the main interested parties || to escape the consequence of an unsuccessful experiment, by selling their shares in time, whereas the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does” (545)....

“The balance-sheets of many joint-stock companies remind us of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in # order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document” (545)....

[[BOX: A palimpsest is a parchment from which the original inscription has been erased and then another inscription imposed. ]] #

...“The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance-sheets indecipherable is to divide a single business into several parts by setting up or attaching ‘subsidiary companies’. The advantages of this system || for various purposes—legal and illegal—are so evident that today big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception”[5] (545–46).

This assures “a certain impenetrability of their operations” (ibidem)....

An outstanding example is the Allgemeine Elektrizit\"ats Gesellschaft (with thousands of millions of marks in subsidiary companies)....

(( c.f. 1908. No. 8: “The Rathenau System”, Die Bank methods of the A.E.G. ))

(( ...Taxation is greater, for special taxes are imposed on them (subsidiary companies); on the other hand, profits are greater, and secrecy is assured!!... )

|| Author’s italics: “Subsidiary companies are an ideal means for compiling objectively false balance-sheets without contravening the provisions of company law” (549).

“The decisive factor is that the modern system of arranging balance-sheet items makes concealment possible” (ibidem)....

Another example:

The Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (pp. 550–51) has in its balance-sheet “holdings” = 5,200,000 marks.

What holdings? The author ascertained privately: 60 per cent are shares of the Gleiwitzer Steinkohlengruben
(and this company has debts of 20,000,000 marks!!)


Ibidem p. 340 (April) (Berlin big banks, February 28, 1914).
Balance-sheets of Berlin big banks.

sheets: February 28,
eight banks (Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Darmst\"adter Bank, Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, National Bank f\"ur Deutschland, Commerz- und Disconto-Bank + Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank).

[[BOX: Million marks ]]

Share capital =1,140.0 mill. Reserves =350.82
Bills, etc. =1,956.16 ” Consortium holdings =278.29
Debtors =3,036.63 ” Long-term holdings =286.81
Σ balances =8,103.71 ”

Savings banks (1910) (including post office savings banks)[17] (p. 446)

Germany 16,780 Denmark 603
Austria 5,333 Luxemburg 49
Hungary 1,870 Sweden 961
Italy 3,378 Norway 570
France 4,488 Spain 340
Great Britain 4,518 Rumania 50
Russia 3,019 Bulgaria 36
Finland 190 U.S.A. 17,087
Switzerland 1,272 Australia 1,213
Holland 464 New Zealand 319
Belgium 830 Japan 662

p. 496: Criticism of “statistics of issues”: || N.B.
(( for the most part these statistics (in the Frankfurter Zeitung and Deutsche Oekonomist they are largely estimates) are very inexact, giving a maximum and not the reality. The issue of shares can be the transfer
of debt into a different form.

{{2 Cf. Dr. Hermann Kleiner, Statistics of Issues in Germany, Berlin, 1914.

{{2 and M. Marx (Thesis), Statistics of Issues in Germany and Some Foreign States, Altenburg, 1913.

1914. 1, p. 316 (article by Lansburgh). “The Stock Exchange versus the Banks”:

||| N.B. ...“The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it was formerly, when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients.”[6]

(March 1914) pp. 298–99, “new era of concentration” ||| (in banking)—in connection with deteriorating business situation, etc.

(“The Bergisch-M\"arkische Bank, this 80-million Rhenish enterprise with its 35 branches, will soon be merged in the Deutsche Bank”: 298).

“For while merger does not always give strength, it nevertheless conceals from outside many weaknesses and sores” (299)—on the significance of mergers....

p. 94. “Bankruptcy statistics[18]—their significance for an appraisal of the business situation.

(From Quarterly Reviews of Statistics of the German Reich) especially “the most serious economic crashes, N.B. || i.e., cases where, owing to the lack of assets, liquidation proceedings either cannot be begun at all or have to be suspended” (p. 94).

[See the table on p. 87.—Ed.]

During this period the number of large towns has increased from 28 to 48 (and their population still more), but the percentage of very big bankruptcies (completed owing to lack of assets) was previously lower than the average, but is now higher.

p. 1 (January 1914), from an article (“Causes of Crises”) by Lansburgh: (N.B. Business situation).

ergo from 1913 |||| “For about a year now, the German business situation has been noticeably deteriorating.”

crisis of 1914 |||| “The period we are passing through reveals many, though not all, characteristic features of a crisis”...

“The most fatal cause of crises ... is progress” ...(11).

Counter-measures? “More effective (than a cartel) is a trust, which either deliberately suppresses all inventions and improvements, or buys them up, as was done, for example, N.B. good example!! || by the big German glass factories in respect of Owens’s bottle-working patent, which united into a sort of special-purpose trust to buy what appeared to them an exceedingly dangerous invention” (p. 15).[7]

My additions Total bankruptcies in the German Reich No. of bankruptcies in large towns
Declared Completed Declared Completed
[ according to Riesser ]] Total Of which No. reject-
Per cent Total Owing to lack of assets Per cent Total Of which No. reject-
Per cent Total Owing to lack of assets Per cent
Start of boom 1895 7,111 680 9.6 6,362 395 6.2 1,823 243 13.3 1,724 104 6.0
1897 6,997 639 9.1 6,077 381 6.3 1,777 251 14.1 1,466 92 6.3
Business situation good 1899 7,742 8.8
Crisis 1901 10,569 10.9
1903 9,627 15.1
Revival 1905 9,357 17.6
American crisis 1907 9,855 17.8
1908 11,571 19.0
1909 11,005 21.6
1910 10,783 22.2
“Prosperity”[8] ) {{ 1911 11,031 2,351 21.3 8,092 682 8.4 3,603 1,238 34.3 2,325 220 9.5
1912 12,094 2,885 23.9 8,356 784 9.4 4,060 1,563 38.5 2,395 241 10.1

good example! || “Transport Trust”, a note in Die Bank, 1914, 1, p. 89.

[[DITTO: || ] The formation is expected (perhaps in the near future) of a Berlin “transport trust”, i.e., an interest-community of the three Berlin transport companies—the elevated railway, tramway, and omnibus companies. We have been aware that this plan was contemplated ever since it became known that the majority of shares in the omnibus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies.... We may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services they will have economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, !! || if they desire, can subordinate the means of transportation, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Elevated Railway Company were already involved at the time the company was formed. N.B. ||| Indeed, the interests of this transport undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests and so an essential prerequisite for the foundation of the transport company was created. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run across land which, when it became !! || certain that the railway was to be constructed, this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself and some persons associated with it in the land company at the Sch\"onhauser Allee railway station.[9] For it is common knowledge that land development, and the   || resultant rise in land prices, is best achieved by means of new transport routes.” (There follows yet another example: no less than eleven lines already run to the Tempelhof area. Too many? The reason: many directors and members of Supervisory Boards live there!!! p. 90.)... ||| N.B. “A transport monopoly involves a real estate monopoly....”

The Oil Comedy”, Die Bank, 1913, No. 4 (p. 388).

Excellent note, reveals the essence of the struggle for monopoly of oil in Germany.

Before 1907. “Until 1907 the Deutsche Bank oil concern was engaged in a sharp conflict with the Standard Oil Company” (389). The outcome was clear: defeat of the Deutsche Bank. || N.B.: Struggle of the Deutsche Bank against Standard Oil Company In 1907, two courses were open to it: either liquidate its “oil interests” and lose millions, or submit. It chose the latter and concluded an agreement with Standard Oil (“not very advantageous” to the Deutsche Bank). The Deutsche Bank undertook “not to attempt anything which might injure American interests”, but... the agreement would cease to operate with legislation establishing a German oil monopoly.

[[DITTO: || ]] And then Herr von Gwinner (a Deutsche Bank director), through his (private) secretary (Stauss) (Die Bank, 1912, 2, p. 1034), launched a campaign for a state oil monopoly!! The entire machinery of the big bank was set in motion... but there was a snag. The government (though it had already draft ed a bill and put it before the Reichstag) feared that, without Standard Oil, Germany would not be able to obtain oil.

[[DITTO: || ]] See 1913, p. 736 et seq.

[[DITTO: || ]] The war preparations bill (July 3, 1913) came to the rescue—the oil bill had to be   || postponed. Standard Oil won, for the monopoly (for the time being) did not eventuate.[10]

N.B. [[BOX ENDS: The struggle of the Deutsche Bank and Germany against the Standard Oil Company. ]] ||

Die Bank, 1913, No. 8 (August).

Alfred Lansburgh, “Five Years of German Banking”.

Growth of Concentration:
Deposits (of all banks with a capital> one million marks)
1907–08 6,988 million marks
1912–13 9,806

+ 2,800 million +40%
{{ 9 Berlin big banks
48 banks with> 10 million marks capital
+115 banks with> one million marks capital

Deposits of the 57 big banks increased by 2,750 million marks.

Increase in 5 years (million marks)

Deposits Capital Reserves
{{ All banks with> 1mill. capital +2,818 +390 +148
57 banks with> 10” ” +2,750 +435 +153

{The small banks show an absolute decrease: mergers, etc.}

Percentage of total deposits (p. 728)
N.B. ||| Berlin big banks (9) Other banks with> 10 mill. marks capital (48) Banks with 1–10 mill. marks (115) Banks with <one mill. marks capital
1907–08 47 32.5 16.5 4 || 100
1910–11 49 33.5 14 3 1/2 || 100
1912–13 49 36 12 3 || 100[11]

1913, No. 7, p. 628 et seq.

The State and Foreign Loans” (Alfred Lansburgh).

The German government has forbidden foreign loans? What impels the banks towards that policy? The fact that they are already “bogged” (Mexico, China, Turkey, etc., threaten to go bankrupt).

What induced the banks to grant loans to such states in the first place? Profit!

...“There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those obtained from the flotation of foreign loans” (630)....[12] \\ /// \\ N.B. important

[[BOX ENDS: a difference of up to 7–8 per cent between the subscription price and the bank’s price; different conditions, for example, a deposit—six months’ interest as “guarantee”, etc., etc. ]]
concerning the question of imperialism!! ]]

especially— Then “high politics” (France and Germany grant loans in order to acquire allies, etc.).

|| well put! The dependence of France on Russia (“a one per cent decline in Russian securities costs France 100 million. The mere threat by Russia to stop interest payments means more to her main creditor than the loss of an army corps”—p. 633).

| well put! With such loans “it is not clear who is dancing and who calls the tune”, ibidem.

Mexico (p. 628) defaulted more than once (without complete bankruptcy), but is granted loans, for otherwise worse is threatened!!

Rivalry over Foreign Loans” (1913, No. 10, p. 1024 et seq. Editorial note).

“A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital   market. Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money markets with demands, some times very persistent, for loans. The money markets are not very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that its neighbour may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal “benefits” ||| service. In these international transactions the creditor always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favourable clause in a commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct N.B. || a harbour, a fat concession, or an order for guns...” (1025).[13] ||

[[BOLD BOX: the “benefits” of imperialism—important in examining the question of monopoly and finance capital ]]

1913, August, p. 811, note on “Savings Banks and the Banks”....

...“The keen rivalry between the savings banks and the banks, which flared up some years ago because each of these so dissimilar organisations is endeavouring to go beyond its own field of activity and penetrate that of the other, continues to occupy the attention of our Chambers of Commerce.” The Bochum Chamber of Commerce demands, for example, that measures be taken against the savings banks, including that they be prohibited from discounting bills, dealing with current accounts, etc. (but allowing them “safes”, cheques and endorsement).[14]

Same subject: “Banking Activity of Savings Banks” (p. 1022 et seq.) | The savings banks are being turned into institutions for the rich: in Prussia in   | !! they want to go “back” to small capitalism (and not towards socialism) 1909, out of 10,300 million marks of deposits, 4,780 million 46 1/3 per cent consisted of deposits >3,000 marks (15 per cent of deposits >10,000 marks). Wealthy depositors often have more than one book. Savings banks engage in risky operations (bills, mortgages, etc.) under the spur of competition (4 or 4 1/4 per cent has to be paid!!). There is a proposal to “ban” this....

An article “The Swamp” (L. Eschwege) (1913, p. 952 et seq.) on the swindles of speculators in real estate (plots sold at exorbitant prices, builders going bankrupt, workers not paid and ruined, etc. etc.). Attempts by Haberland, head of the gang, to monopolise the “information bureaus”, i.e., monopolise all building work. The concluding words are typical:

“Unfortunately, the inevitable course of modern civilisation apparently leads to the economic productive forces falling more and more into the hands of powerful individuals who use them in a monopolistic way. The economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become, in many departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase. Under such circumstances, an incorruptible bureaucracy, conscious of its responsibility, is the granite rock that can save the public good from the encroaching flood of avarice. || ha-ha! If this rock should crumble, even the widest political liberty cannot save ||| only “would have”??? us from being converted into a nation of unfree people,[15] in which case even the monarchy would have merely a decorative significance” (p. 962).

N.B. [[BOX: | The author has a book entitled Land and Mortgage Problems, 1913 (2 vols.) || ]] N.B.



[1] Figures for the countries marked by an asterisk refer to January-July, the others, January-June.—Ed.

[2] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 215—Ed.

[3] Ibid.—Ed.

[4] Ibid.—Ed.

[5] See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 229–30.—Ed.

[6] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 218.—Ed.

[7] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 276.—Ed.

[8] Die Bank, 1914, p. 5 (January 1914). —Lenin

[9] See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 236–37.—Ed.

[10] See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 249–50.—Ed.

[11] Ibid., p. 211.—Ed.

[12] Ibid., p. 234.—Ed.

[13] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 244.—Ed.

[14] Ibid., p. 217.—Ed.

[15] Ibid., p. 238.—Ed.

[16] The National City Bank (from 1955 First National City Hank of New York)—United States’ third largest bank and the centre of a financial-monopoly group embracing large industrial and financial corporations. p. 79

[17] All the data refer to 1910 ,except those for Switzerland (1908), and for Hungary and France (1909). p. 85

[18] Bankruptcy statistics—statistics of proceedings taken against insolvent debtors. p. 86


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