Willy Münzenberg

Report on Workers’ Relief

(December 1922)


From International Press Correspondence, Vol. 2 No. 116, 22 December 1922, pp. 976–979.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
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Comrades, I have divided my report into two parts. I will devote a few minutes to our past Famine Relief, and take up the rest of the time with the second part of my report, with the Economic Relief.

Naturally, I will not spend any time on the causes, the magnitude, and the course of the famine. These facts are only too well known to most of the Delegates. Every organ of public opinion reported on last year’s famine in Russia which Lenin characterised as the greatest hardship in the reconstruction of Soviet Russia. It suffices to say that 40 million people were directly affected by the famine and that about 3 million of these died of starvation.

It is very important to know that the famine was vanquished and finally overcome not so much by foreign relief, nor by the bourgeois or workers’ organisations, but by Soviet Russia. I had promised myself to quote no figures, but i will give two figures in this matter because public opinion is absolutely uninformed of the actual work of relief done to overcome the hunger. All the foreign, governmental, Red Cross, A.R.A., Nansen, Quaker and Workers’ Relief sent 33 million poods of grain to Russia until August 1922; during the same time Russia herself gathered 165 million poods of food and 31 million of sowing seeds, altogether 196 millions. All the foreign countries, all foreign relief did not accomplish one sixth of what famished Russia herself did to combat the famine. The famine on the Volga gave birth to a manifestation of labour solidarity such as we had never seen in the history of the Socialist movement before. The action began spontaneously, before any organisation, any Party, had made direct appeal to the workers. German, Austrian and Dutch workers responded to the first call for help with large collections. The campaign spread to all countries, to Japan as well as to India, to North and South America, to every European country; all responded to the call for relief.

The campaign lasted undiminished for a year. It gave rise to a great many touching manifestations of solidarity towards the Russian working class. In England and especially in Holland a great number of working class women gave up their last jewels, even their wedding rings, for the starving Russians, children emptied their saving boxes, sold their pencils and their copy books, prisoners gave up their miserly pay for the relief of the starving Russians.

No action in the past decade has been so popular, or affected such large masses of the proletariat as the campaign for famine relief. I will not bore you with figures, only allow me to read to you these few lines from the report from Bulgaria:

“Whenever anyone celebrated a marriage, or childbirth, whenever anyone was buried, or whenever any other event happened, the starving Russians were remembered. Many cases have been recorded when women gave up religious observances and used the money thereby saved, for the Russian relief. Many gave up smoking for weeks, others did not shave, it even happened that comrades sacrificed several meals a month to come to the help of their Russian brothers.”

These are small individual manifestations. I quote them as a proof that this action affected the broadest, non-communist masses and awakened and increased the interest in and solidarity with Soviet Russia.

Comrade Zinoviev in his report said that this action was one of the most remarkable campaigns in the past years. It is indisputably true that almost all Communist Parties and groups with very few exceptions took part in this action and helped to make it a success. At the same time it must be stated in this connection that many comrades took quite a different attitude towards the campaign. In Germany, there were groups who saw in this campaign nothing but a philanthropic charitable action and acted accordingly. I believe that nothing could be more false than to see in the past campaign and the pending economic action, nothing but a charitable collection, an action of a purely philanthropic character. Its primary importance is political not charitable.

The past relief campaign had a great political task to accomplish, which was only partly done because the Communists first began to carry on the campaign on the necessary scale only when they were forced to it by the masses. What were the immediate results when the famine broke out? The immediate results were that a great number of bourgeois governments attempted to increase their attacks against Soviet Russia. In September and October 1920 the world rang with the sword rattling of Polish and French militarism. And just as the English workers were able to prevent the English government from pursuing the Anglo-Polish-Russian war and put a stop to England’s military support of the Russian interventionists, the famine campaign of the Comintern and the partial support of the Trade Union International and the large masses of unorganised workers created such a sentiment which forced France to give up some of her plans against Soviet Russia. As is well known, at the first news of the famine, France had prepared an extensive plan for armed intervention in Russia. The pressure of the masses and the change of public opinion in favour of the famished forced even such reactionary governments as France to vote funds for the relief of the famine.

Our second political task in this campaign was brought about by our differences with the Second and Two and a Half Internationals and their affiliated unions. Forced by spontaneous mass manifestations, the official leaders of the Second and Two and Half Internationals, the adherent Trade Unions and the affiliated Parties declared themselves in favour of a large relief campaign for the benefit of the starving Russians. A few months later when the pressure from the masses became less urgent the leaders changed their course and attempted to use the famine catastrophe as propaganda against Soviet Russia. A savage campaign began in all Social Democratic newspapers whose dominant tone was”: Now you can see where Communism, where Bolshevism lead to! It is a return to barbarism! I only wish to recall the words of Wels at the last Congress of the Social Democracy. He declared, “What is Bolshevism? It is the return to capitalism through cannibalism”. This was the propaganda of the Social Democratic papers for months. This made necessary a counter campaign on the part of the Communist Party to show the true causes of the famine. Those responsible for the catastrophe were not the Bolsheviks, but those who had prevented the lifting of the blockade and given their support to military interventions against Russia. Our press only partly came up to this task. (Quite true) The Social Democratic press conducted a much wider and more intensive campaign against Russia than the Communists for Russia.

Comrades, this was the great political significance of the famine relief campaign. To this campaign which awakened the interest of the large masses of the working classes in Soviet Russia by mean of public discussion of the famine on the Volga we should have added a political propaganda explaining the course of the Russian Revolution and showing that the present famine was one link in the long chain of sufferings which the Russian proletariat had to undergo in the interest of its revolution. Everywhere where our committees and Parties have done this, we scored many political successes. I only wish to recall the case of America and Japan, two very typical countries. The campaign tor the famine relief enabled us for the first time to conduct Communist propaganda among the Trade Union workers of North America, and to unite these workers in a relief action under the control of the Communist Party. The same thing happened, in Japan. There large associations were created, consisting primarily of workers’ organisations, Trade Unions, and even of a bourgeois Women’s League which acted together and were controlled secretly by the Communist Party. In this way we were able to bring for the first time before the masses the questions of Soviet Russia, proletarian revolution, etc.

I will be brief, but I would like to mention another political fact of importance in this connection, and that is the question of the famine campaign in Russia herself. The bourgeois organisations attempted to use the catastrophe against Soviet Russia not only abroad, but they also attempted to incite the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia against the Soviet government and plotted for its overthrow. Together with every plate of soup the A.R.A. distributed a leaflet which read: “We the American bourgeoisie are helping you after the Bolshevik regime has thrown you into this frightful situation.” For several months the Trade Union International sent several delegates to the famine districts where they attempted to win the peasants and workers over to the Amsterdam International. This is why we gave over our distribution apparatus and especially our hospital stations in Samara, in Saratov, in Orenbourg, in the Ural, and in the Crimea, to the Soviet government in order to put a stop to this exploitation of Russia’s misery against the Bolshevik regime, and we gave the piece of bread or meat which we could afford to bring to the suffering peasants and workers in the name of the Communist International. These Russian peasants and workers naturally do not stand on the same cultural plane, as for instance, the members of this Fourth World Congress of the Comintern. This thing took a very simple form in their mind. Till then they had heard of the Comintern only through the Congress reports in the form of resolutions of the Western workers in favour of Soviet Russia. For the first time they felt the presence of the Comintern in flesh and blood. They saw practical action in their support. In this way the famine relief produced positive political results for the Comintern in Russian also. Comrades allow me a few more words on the relief work itself. This is also known to most of the delegates here through our constant reports. Under advice of the Executive, we attempted to form a United Front of the workers on the famine relief. We entered into negotiations with leaders of the Second and Two and a Half and Trade Union Internationals, we had two common conferences in Berlin, which had no positive results. Only in Italy and Czecho-Slovakia were we able to create a temporary committee of representatives from various parties, Trade Unions and cooperatives. However, a few months later the committee broke up when it came to the question of the disposal of the collected funds. The Czechoslovak Social Democrats wanted to give those funds over to Amsterdam.

Two great organisations took part in the workers’ relief for the Russian famine, the Trade Union International and the Communist International. Allow me a word on the work of the Amsterdam International. The work of the Trade Union International found support in all the Social-Democratic parties and the still existing independent centrist parties. Under pressure of the spontaneous manifestation of the will of the masses to come to the help of Soviet Russia, the Amsterdam Bureau used very pointed and wise language.

Manifestoes were published in the papers saying “Workers, help Soviet Russia; if Soviet Russia falls misfortune will fall upon all Europe!” These manifestoes were ignored by the Centrist and other social democratic organs. As the agitation in the Press continued, the Amsterdam Trade Union International took the matter up, and now, after a year and a half, we can regard the work as established. The trade unions and the social democrats have contributed according to the audit of April 1922, altogether 1,400,000 Dutch gulden. With this sum 40,000 children have been fed for several months and about 50,000 railway workers have received rations.

The aid of the International Cooperators has not been so great, as only the Czecho-Slovakian and Italian cooperatives have sent substantial shipments of clothing etc.

Now a few words with regard to the action of the Communist International. After the plan to form a powerful united front of working class unions and parties against the Russian Famine was wrecked, the Communist Party endeavoured to win support from as large a number as possible of the workers in the factories and the unions. This has been done in many countries with great success. For example, in Switzerland, in Holland, in Scandinavia, and also, to some extent in America. Large groups of sympathisers and considerable numbers of indifferent workers, were won over to the cause of famine relief through the activity of the Communist committees and parties.

The material results of this work were unexpectedly good. When we initiated the campaign, none of us would have thought it possible to amass such great sums as those which have been collected. You have heard, in the report of comrade Eberlein, how weak from a organisation point of view, the parties in the Western countries still are. To this we must add severe unemployment in America, England, Switzerland, and Norway, which materially hampered our activities, while in Austria and Germany, as a result of the continually rising cost of living, the position of the workers was thereby so impoverished that it was difficult even for the best of communists, to request further sacrifices of these comrades.

Altogether, the activity of the communist relief committees in goods, money, and valuables, realised over 2½ million dollars.

To illustrate the magnitude of this result, I would like to make a comparison. In Switzerland 250,000 trade unionists and social democrats, who organised a special campaign of their own, collected only 80,000 Swiss francs. On the other hand, the Swiss relief committee of the Communist Party, which had only a few thousand members, collected 540,000 Swiss francs. (Applause) These are figures which tell us distinctly that the Communist committees have been able to penetrate into many sections of the masses which were hitherto indifferent, and to obtain from them financial support.

1 said just now that the Amsterdam International, with over twenty million members, collected 1,400,000 Dutch gulden. The Relief Committees of the little Communist Party of Holland, up till about a fortnight ago, collected half a million Dutch gulden. I believe that the Dutch Party has only four or five thousand members. And these have raised about half a million gulden, while the Amsterdam International with its 22 million members, up to the 15th March, had only raised 1,400,000 gulden. I believe that these figures show that it was possible to obtain good results when the Communist Parties conducted a skilful agitation. These figures also show the goodwill and self-sacrificing spirit of large sections of the working class.

With the 2½ million dollars, about 30,000 tons of foodstuffs and other relief material were sent to Russia. The relief work started in Russia in November. In December the first relief trains arrived in Kazan and other parts of the famine area. I will not detain you with figures especially as some of our comrades, working in the famine area, have not compiled exact statistics, as they forgot to include in their reports to whom relief was accorded. But it is better to forget to enter someone in one’s statistical report, than to forget to aid him, as has been the case, I believe, by certain bourgeois organisations. During the famine months, we gave full relief to about from 200,000 to 220,000 people, and also supplied certain rations to railway workers and other workers in different necessary factories. At present the famine relief continues still in the form of aid to the children. We have taken over some Children’s Homes in the different famine districts, in which at present 14,000 children are completely supported by us. We have also equipped a number of these homes.

That which distinguished the relief work of the C.I. from that of the bourgeois philanthropic societies, is that we have, from the beginning, united the famine relief – that is, the actual feeding of the hungry – with aid towards the reconstruction of Russian agriculture and industry which were destroyed in the famine area.

I now come to the second part of my report: the economic help campaign. I must now take a brief glance at the past. The will of the West European and American workers to render to Russia, not only political aid through their Communist Parties, but also practical economic aid, has shown itself for several years. Already in the autumn of 1919, and still more markedly in the Spring of 1920, American, Swedish, Norwegian and German workers groups emigrated to Russia and there, with much idealism and little skill, endeavoured to restore Russian industry. Most of these experiments have ended in a complete fiasco. I am reminded now of the Kolomna affair, so well remembered in Germany. About a year ago, and mainly as a result of the famine relief campaign, an increased determination to extend economic aid to Russia has shown itself among the West European, and particularly among the American workers. In Germany a number of machines have been sent to Russia, besides tools and agricultural machinery. In Italy the cooperative societies played the most important part in economic aid. They intend to undertake the cultivation of 100,000 hectares of land. In England, in Switzerland, and Czecho-Slovakia groups are being formed, for example construction groups, who wish to emigrate to Russia with tools and a small capital. This tendency is also found in South Africa and is particularly strong in America. There are several large groups in that country adhering to the enterprise of the Dutch engineer Rutgers, who have established several thousand construction and other workers in the Cuznetz Basin, and have taken over mines and land sites for development.

In America there is the Friends of Soviet Russia, which is closely connected with the Communist International, and which has already supplied considerable economic help for instance, the 20 tractors which are now at work in the Perm district. In the United States there is also the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia which also sent several tractors to Russia; this organisation has several branches and several thousand members. Then we have Comrade Hillman’s plan which proposes to raise a loan of one million dollars for Russia and which has arranged with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers to found large-scale clothing factories in Russia.

In the last few days the Russian Government has established a special commission, under the control of Comrades Eiduck and Tartens, which will bring over 8,000 American workers to Russia next Spring.

I believe it is the duty of the Communist International to define its position with regard to these matters. In America there are at least 20 000 people who are interested in these enterprises; in Europe perhaps an equal number. We must know how to deal with these things. Perhaps they are not good – then they must be changed into large-scale campaigns for economic help. Among most of the workers in Europe and America who are inclined to emigrate to Russia, the desire to aid Russia is mingled with the desire to aid themselves. They have the idea that within the next few years there will be great political crises in America or Europe. Russia, however, is at present in a state of improvement. Therefore, think they, let us shoulder our burdens and start for them. So far, the Communist International has refused to take up a position with regard to this; but it must now assume a very definite attitude. In the face of such a plan, the bringing of eight to ten thousand emigrants to Russia, we of the Communist International are in duty bound to tell our Russian comrades that we have given our best thought to this subject, not only to the work which these emigrants will do here, but to the consequent weakening of the revolutionary movement in the countries which they leave, through their withdrawal. There is no reason why we should mitigate the tremendous economic crises in France and Czecho-Slovakia by bringing a great mass of unemployed to Soviet Russia. I believe that we should unconditionally take up the attitude that, as a Communist Party, we are strictly opposed to any mass emigration of European and American workers to Russia. Such emigration implies no further support for Russia but only a relieving of the crisis in the Western capitalist countries.

It is quite different, however, when for certain factories, certain skilled specialists are needed who cannot be found in Russia. In such cases the bringing over of European or American workers, under the control and with the consent of the Russian trade unions, might be advisable.

Comrades, whatever position we take with regard to this, it must at least be definite. Either the immigration of foreign workers is a good thing or it is a bad thing, and our attitude must be governed accordingly.

I am of the opinion that the question of economic help is a matter which deserves the support of the Communist International to the fullest extent. Only we must be absolutely clear as to the character of this help. We must finally break with such fantastic conceptions as that the economic help is a new campaign to solve the world problem, that it is the struggle of the classes to introduce new production as some comrades seem to think. Here a distinct division must be drawn.

There are a number of comrades who have great doubts with regard to economic help. They see in it the danger of the opportunistic petty bourgeoisie, they fear economic experiments which will have deteriorating effects on political propaganda. They remind us of Kolomna and other similar cases.

It is true that Famine Relief, and ever, more so economic help, is a very ticklish problem, especially when the Communist International supports it. It brings with it many great dangers. But there are no tactics which do not contain within themselves certain dangerous factors. We discussed the United Front for nearly a year, and the whole Congress was of the opinion that it implied dangers both from the Right and from the Left. Yet it was unanimously accepted. Because certain tactics may involve certain dangers is not an argument that they should not be introduced, if they be possible, useful, and productive of good results. One must take precautions, on a national and on an international scale, to reduce this danger to a minimum.

Comrades, I believe that the problem of economic help is above all a problem of expediency and practicability. The principal thing is that we should ask ourselves whether the expenditure of effort is justified by the results. There should be no doubt left in this Congress that the Communist International should agree that the first and best support of Russian economic reconstruction lies in the pressure exerted by the Communist and other working class parties upon the governments of their respective countries, so that they may recognise Soviet Russia and conclude advantageous trade agreements with her, and that, in these countries, the revolution be accomplished also. Therefore those comrades who are at present occupied with this work have no doubt but that the economic aid for Russia, just as the political aid, should not be in the least diminished or enfeebled. We stand absolutely upon the ground that the political revolutionary struggle in each country is the best and most necessary support for Soviet Russia.

The only question which we have to settle in this Congress is: Is the political struggle the only method which the proletariats and the Communist International may use under the present political and economic reconstruction.

We are all united as to the importance of Soviet Russia. Through the addressee of Lenin, Trotzky and Zinoviev, the Congress has once more affirmed, what is really the A.B.C. to every comrade, that without Soviet Russia a continuation of the present proletarian revolution is impossible. A new immediate release of proletarian power would be impossible. And the higher the waves of Fascism rise in other countries, the more must Soviet Russia be supported as the only line of retreat for the proletarian armies of the world. Therefore we ask, has the world proletariat to support Soviet Russia only by its political power? I say, No! It has yet a minimum of economic power. It is true we have no machines, no factories, – they belong to the capitalists but we have technical knowledge, professional knowledge, and knowledge of organisation. This minimum of economic power should be mobilised through the economic help and placed to the credit of Soviet Russia in its economic war with the imperialists.

And now, comrades, let us take up a few of the tactical objections, which have been made by certain comrades. They say, this is perhaps all very well, but we can do no more today. We are exhausted. The Famine Relief, which has lasted a whole year, has so tired us, that we cannot continue it.

Comrades, this is a reason which, among all the objections, is the most to be considered. It is true that some of the proletariat – especially the workers of Central Europe – have exhausted all their strength through the length of the campaign. And there is no doubt that we must cease our collections, in the form in which they were made previously.

The means we adopted in the past can no longer serve the purpose. But it is a different question, how we are to carry out the action from the standpoint of technical organisation after we have decided that it is necessary on principle and properly conceived. The collections in their present form should be discontinued. Other means could be devised for the purpose of mobilising the maximum of financial support for Soviet Russia.

Another objection was raised, that the financial resources of Party officials have been exhausted. All the appeals in the world will be in vain, since these people cannot give any money. This objection does not reflect upon the action itself, but rather upon those comrades who raised the objection. We have never demanded from the Communist International, nor from any Communist Party, to so tax the financial resources of its officials and workers that they should not be able to pay their Party dues. Our demand was that every Communist Party should make use of its officials to arouse the interest in those quarters that are passive but sympathetic to Soviet Russia, and we find that wherever this proposition was properly understood, it gave good results.

One of the important objections is that the appeal for economic aid is likely to be detrimental to the political revolutionary struggle of the Parties, taking away the best comrades. That is not true. Such parties like the German Party, with a membership of 200,000, do not consist entirely of political workers. As soon as we organise the Communist Party as an open Party which anyone can join on becoming converted by our agitation, we get a good many elements which could not eventually devote themselves to daily political activity. Here we have thousands of workers and comrades unoccupied by Party work, and every Communist Party could – by a proper selection of forces in the same manner as is done for activity among the youth, for Party work and for educational work – get together many forces everywhere for the special work of economic aid.

But we are told that the political character of the Party would become tainted with petty-bourgeois philanthropy. This only goes to show that these Parties do not make the best use of the tactics. It would be similar to saying that we ought to reject the United Front because some Party group might be likely to apply it wrongly. It is economic aid activity that furnishes a hundred points of contact with the masses to arouse universal interest for the Russian question and the general revolutionary questions associated therewith, to bring influence to bear upon the large masses in the daily political struggle and to lead on the proletarian revolution.

Finally let me deal with the principal objection. The comrades ask, what is the use of it all? We mobilise hundreds of Party members, we give half a column in our press week by week, and what is the success obtained? In my concluding words I will deal with the material success, but for the present let me speak of the political success.

Comrades, we are well aware that as workers and as the Communist International we could not hope to build up Soviet Russia by our own financial resources. If that were possible, our Executive would long ago have carried out this book keeping transaction. Unfortunately that cannot be done. As against the few cases of overestimation of partial successes there are a majority of comrades inclined to underestimate the financial support which we are able to render. Most of the comrades have no idea of the vast amount of good that could be done by the international proletariat, if a wide mobilisation of forces for financial aid were to be carried out. In the famine relief campaign five million dollars were directly or indirectly collected by the proletariat. That amounts to ten million gold roubles. Comrades, you will recollect the speech of Comrade Lenin in which he said, that the greatest achievements of the economic policy of last year consisted in the saving of twenty million gold roubles for the reconstruction of the heavy industries. The entire State machine effected a saving of twenty million gold roubles, yet the proletariat got together ten million gold roubles for famine relief without exhausting the resources of a single Communist Party, nor of the trade unions, the co-operatives and other labour parties. If all our Party forces would put their shoulder to the wheel, there is no doubt that the results would be doubled. I can easily imagine occasions when economic aid by workers, would be ridiculous irony, but under the present economic situation of Soviet Russia the financial force of the proletariat is an important factor.

There is another objection, that the workers’ relief organization already has a number of its own enterprises in Russia: fisheries, farms, shoe factories etc. There were times when 30,000 workers were directly employed in the industrial enterprises maintained by the workers’ relief organisation. Think of the words of Comrade Trotzky who said: One million workers in the State industries, and 40,000 in the capitalist industries!

Comrades, with a slight increase in our activity it would be possible to increase the number of workers employed in our industries and enterprises to 50,000 and more, perhaps to one tenth of the number of workers employed by the State in its industries, and at least as many as are employed in the petty capitalist enterprises.

I repeat that the main purpose of our economic relief activity for Soviet Russia is to give the world proletariat an opportunity of rendering practical aid without in any way retarding the progress of the political revolutionary movement.

As I have already said during the last nine mouths, we successfully conducted various enterprises in Russia. We maintain three farms in the vicinity of Kazan which have yielded sufficient produce to feed over 100 children. We have established a successful fishery in Astrakhan, where we caught large quantities of fish which we are now distributing in the famine regions. At the present moment we are negotiating with the Russian Government for the realisation of a million dollar loan. We may use that fund partly in reorganising the leather industry. Just now we are asked to arrange for the supply of millions of railway sleepers on a five-year contract. Thus we see that all our experiences so far demonstrate the possibility of practical aid in the reconstruction of Soviet Russia.

As I said, we have floated a million dollar loan in order to get more money for our enterprises Russia. It is interesting to recall the reception that was accorded to this loan. Not only the workers and the Communists, but even among the bourgeoisie there were liberal subscriptions to this loan. The Deutsche Bank of Berlin and the State Bank of Brussels were among the subscribers to the loan, as well as great numbers of the middle class. The Dutch workers subscription cards brought in the sum of 75,000 florins. I therefore have no reason to doubt that by the coming spring the one million dollar loan will be fully subscribed, furnishing us with new resources for our enterprises in Russia.

My answer to the question of the effectiveness of this financial activity can only be in the affirmative. The experiences as well as the prospects indicate the assurance of mobilising a sufficient amount of money for doing practical work in Russia.

The purely material side of this loan is a secondary consideration in our economic aid. The main purpose of our economic activities is to influence the large masses to whose primitive way of thinking our ordinary communist propaganda can hardly make effective appeal. This economic action affords us the opportunity of approaching the indifferent masses by means of moving pictures and through the newspapers, and this constitutes the great propaganda value of this work. On these grounds we expect that the Congress will decide in favour of continuing the work of famine relief in the shape of economic aid.

The next step is the attempt to centralise all the existing groups. We have made a beginning by uniting with the Dutch engineer Rutgers. The tendency of all the organs of economic aid is mainly in the direction of uniting all the active groups and forces.

I think it of importance in a few words to indicate the political tendency of this work once more. It is a question of recognising that there has been a good deal of exaggeration, which I readily admit, but it cannot be gainsaid on the other hand, that our economic aid will be a useful practical supplement to our political activity. This activity will not be necessary of course if the revolution should triumph tomorrow in Germany or France, but in the present political situation of the world, and in view of the circumstances in Russia, the economic aid activity will be a useful and direct adjunct to our political action, and will mean the practical assistance of Soviet Russia.


Last updated on 2 December 2020