ON the evening of May 12th the “British Worker” announced “How Peace Came.” It said that “The Trades Union Congress General Council is satisfied that the miners will now get a fair deal.” The capitalist press announced it was an “Abject Surrender,” and the General Council was annoyed because its reports were not couched in better language—an “honourable settlement” for example. The miners recalled their national executive which promptly turned down the Samuel Memorandum and announced that it had been no party to the calling off of the strike or the accepting of the memorandum. They declared:
“That the Miners’ Executive have given grave and patient consideration to the draft proposals prepared by the T.U.C. Negotiating Committee and endorsed by the General Council representing what they call the best terms which can be obtained to settle the present crisis in the coal industry. The Miners’ Executive regret the fact that no opportunity for consideration was afforded the accredited representatives of the Miners’ Federation on the Negotiating Committee in the preparation of the draft or in the discussions of May 11 leading thereto.
“At the best the proposals imply a reduction of the wage rates for a large number of mineworkers, which is contrary to the repeated declarations of the Miners’ Federation and which they believe their fellow trade unionists are assisting to resist. They regret, therefore, whilst having regard to the grave issues involved that they must reject the proposals. Moreover, if such proposals are submitted as a means of calling off the General Strike, such step must be taken on the sole responsibility of the General Council of the T.U.C.”
To this was added the further resolution:
“That after hearing the report of the representatives of the T.U.C. we re-affirm our resolution of May 11 and express our profound admiration of the wonderful demonstration of loyalty as displayed by all workers, who promptly withdrew their labour in support of the miners’ standard, and undertake to report to the conference to be convened as early as practicable.”
This contradiction in the attitudes of the two bodies to the same document intensified the bitterness in the ranks of the workers. But the General Council was not to be outdone in explanations. In its organ the “British Worker” of May 14, the explanation is given that the General Council acted on the basis of the reply to the Negotiation Committee before the Strike which I have shown to be the moment of capitulation (when the questions of Mr. Baldwin showed the miners they had been tricked into something which was giving their real position away and immediately recovered by the uncompromising reaffirmation of their position against reductions in wages.) After nine days of the General Strike the General Council reappear before the Government with the same capitulation in detail, in the form of the Samuel Memorandum, but in a decidedly weaker position. They had thrown away the power of the strike, and appeared before the Prime Minister like whipped children not only renouncing the General Strike, but throwing the unions back upon their own resources without the slightest effort to ensure them against the victimisation of their members.
When they approached the Prime Minister they said nothing about the Samuel Memorandum, which at the best is only an amplification of the Coal Commission Report, and was a document that bound nobody. Before this actually occurred it would seem inconceivable that a body of responsible leaders, representing 5½ million men and women, the major portion of whom were on the streets, could entertain conversations with an outsider, who frankly confessed that he was an outsider, frame up a document with him, and on the strength of his goodwill go straight to the head of the opposing forces who had demanded the unconditional calling off of the strike as a preliminary to any further conversations and say to him, “We agree. We call off the General Strike. And we appeal to your good feelings not to victimise the men who have done what we asked them to do and what you wanted them to do. We will now help you to turn the workers against the miners, and by our desertion and your pressure no doubt the miners will sooner or later accept the reductions of wages which we all agree will be necessary.” Yet such in effect actually happened.
Mr. Baldwin accepted the capitulation. What else could he do? It was complete enough. No generals of any army surrendering its forces had ever put before their conquerors less obstacles in the way of “settlement.”
Naturally the employers were ready to seize the situation as a very good one for pressing home advantages won and railwaymen, transport workers, tramwaymen, busmen, printers, were promptly met with astounding terms of reinstatement. The railway companies insisted upon the workers signing a document which said:
“You are hereby re-engaged. Your re-engagement is on the understanding that the company reserves any rights it possesses in consequence of your having broken your contract of service.”
The busmen and tramwaymen were met with demands for reductions varying from one shilling to two shillings and threepence per day. Dockers were being called upon to tear up their union cards. Printers were faced with notices about the “open shop” and a number of newspaper establishments declared that they would only employ non-union labour.
But they counted without the workers. Immediately the workers were faced with this situation they refused to go back. The “British Worker” of May 14th, says that “up on instructions from their unions they refused to go back.” But this is putting the cart before the horse. The workers refused to go back and then the Union Executives sent out to their members messages such as this:
“You must not sign any document or accept any conditions for resumption of work except the conditions obtaining before the dispute. The men must all go back together. The E.C. of the three railway unions are meeting to discuss the question of reinstatement.
“Throughout the country the men are solid in their attitude not to resume work under the companies’ conditions. Men urged to stand solid and await the decisions of the joint executives which will be sent at the end of the conference.”
The General Council gaspingly issued a manifesto calling upon the workers to stand together and handed them over in batches to be dealt with separately by the separate union executives. It said:
“Fellow Trade Unionists,
“The General Strike has ended. It has not failed. It has made possible the resumption of negotiations in the coal industry, and the continuance, during negotiations, of the financial assistance by the Government.
“You came out together, in accordance with the instructions of the executives of your unions. Return together on their instructions, as and when they are given.
“Some employers will approach you as individuals, with the demand that you should accept conditions different from those obtaining before the stoppage began.
“Sign no individual agreement. Consult your union officials and stand by their instructions. Your union will protect you, and will insist that all agreements previously in force shall be maintained intact.
“The trade union movement has demonstrated its unity. That unity remains unimpaired. Stick to your unions.
“General Council, Trades Union Congress.”
A wonderful “victory” which ends with an appeal to “stick to your unions”!
The union executives did meet the bosses and did come to an agreement. In each case except that of the printers and the furnishing trades, it was made with the same panicky haste that had marked the capitulation of the General Council. They made not the slightest attempt to reconstitute a central leadership in place of that which had thrown them overboard and ignored the pledge of May 1st. Each sought to get the men back to work as quickly as possible.
The printers held on for several days and secured the least onerous terms of re-instatement (except for the furnishing trades, which got good terms by the threat of a strike a few weeks later). The Labour leaders made an appeal to the “goodwill of Mr. Baldwin,” and the latter, alarmed more by the fact that the workers were still out and any delay might lead to the possibility of a new leadership taking the place of the “peacemakers,” denounced the idea of the employers taking advantage of the situation to reduce wages. Meanwhile the union leaders were eating dirt. They as little wanted the responsibility of reconstructing the united front as the General Council itself. So they signed “agreements” such as the following while the press joyfully proclaimed a “victory for the Nation.”
1. The agreements between the parties which were in existence previous to May 1st, 1926, shall remain in force.
2. The Employers’ organisations will recommend their members to give preference in engagement to former employees who left their work during the General Strike as and when required.
3. There shall be no lightning or sudden stoppage of work of any kind in the works of any member of the Employers’ organisation.
4. The trade unions agree that there shall be no interference with the contents of any newspaper, periodical or other matter printed or published by members of the Employers’ organisation.
5. No chapel meetings shall be held during working hours.
6. There shall be no interference with recognised apprentices in any trade dispute.
7. That works and departmental managers not engaged on production work shall not be called out during any dispute.
8. To prevent any stoppage of work or interference with work in consequence of a dispute or any question arising in or out of the trade, without first exhausting all the possibilities of the J.I.C. Conciliation machinery before the customary notice is given by either side.
9. That there shall be no interference by trade unions or their members with the conduct of business or with the discharge of members of the unions signing the agreement, the right of management to engage, employ, promotement.
10. That the temporary arrangement as to day to day engagement be continued to a date to be hereafter agreed. In order that as many of the former employes as practicable may he re-engaged short time may be worked in any department, if desired, subject to the details of arrangement being mutually agreed. This arrangement shall not preclude the working of overtime when necessary.
11. Workers who left their employment without giving proper notices are not legally entitled to holiday pay, but in this instance the Employers’ organisation recommend their members to make holiday payments under Hours and Holiday Agreement and rulings of the Hours and Holidays Committee to all employees who thus left their work provided that this agreement is ratified.
12. Strict observance of agreements in the Printing and Kindred Trades shall be regarded as a matter of honour affecting each individual employer or employee.
13. This agreement is made without prejudice to legal rights of either side, their associations or individual members.
1. The port employers in London will re-engage labour on the terms of the National Agreement which the unions admit they have broken.
2. The men to present themselves for work at their usual places of engagement at 7.45 a.m. on Monday, May 17th, 1926.
3. Employers will take on as many men as work is available for.
4. Permanent men, whether supervisory or labourers, shall be re-instated in their former positions on resumption of work.
5. The union undertakes—
(a) Not in future to instruct their members to strike either nationally, sectionally or locally for any reason without exhausting the conciliation machinery of the National Agreement.
(b) Not to support or encourage any of their members who take individual action contrary to the preceding clause.
(c) To instruct their members in any future dispute to refrain from any attempt to influence the men in certain supervisory grades (to be specialised hereafter) to take strike action.
6. After general resumption of work any arrears of pay due to men at the time of the stoppage to be paid.
1. The principle of Clause (1) of the settlement of May 14 that “men who have gone on strike shall be taken back to work as soon as traffic offers and work can be found for them” will be maintained, subject to a temporary suspension of the guaranteed week clause in the National Agreement of April, 1919, on the following conditions:
2. The suspension of the guaranteed week will be administered in such a way as not to cause expense to the companies, and will not be applicable to men who did not take part in the strike.
3. The railway companies will aim at finding employment at each station or depot for as many men as possible in the respective grades, on the basis of so distributing the work amongst the men in each grade as to yield, on broad lines, an actual weekly earning equivalent to three days’ pay at ordinary rate.
4. If at any station or depot the available work for any grade is less than the minimum mentioned in Clause (3) endeavour will be made:
(a) To find employment at a neighbouring station or depot, where work is available, to which the men can travel without cost to the company to take duty at the times required.
(b) To transfer men at their own expense to other stations or depots where work is available.
The company to be relieved from any obligation under these arrangements in respect. of men who decline to trade or to be transferred.
5. If at any station or depot the distribution of the work under the foregoing clauses would not yield to the whole of the men earnings equivalent, on the average, to three days’ pay at ordinary rate, the work will be distributed on the basis of three days minimum to a portion of the men each week under a weekly rotation.
6. Subject to the foregoing clauses, the work available in each particular grade at each station or depot will be distributed in such a manner as to equalise, as far as practicable the earnings of the men in each grade.
7. In distributing the available work in any grade, during the continuance of this agreement, regard will not be paid to age or seniority in the service.
8. The companies will arrange, as far as possible, that reemployed men entitled to holidays with pay will be relieved so that they may take their leave during the period of suspension of the guaranteed week.
9. The companies agree that men whom it is not possible to re-employ under these arrangements shall be recorded on waiting lists, and, during the continuance of these arrangements, will be accorded privilege ticket facilities, provided they are not in other employment yielding three days’ wages or more.
10. These arrangements will continue in force until it is mutually agreed to restore the guaranteed week.
11. Persons entitled to Unemployment Insurance Benefits will be excluded from any participation in these arrangements, if by sharing in the available work they would prejudice the non-insured employees.
12. The existing National Agreements will continue in operation except as varied by the foregoing arrangements.
13. These arrangements to come into operation as from the first day in the next pay week after Whitsuntide.
In a memorandum issued at the headquarters of the National Union of Railwaymen, it is stated that the companies intimated that, while they were unable to agree to a similar arrangement with regard to the supervisory and clerical grades not yet re-employed, owing to the peculiar nature of the work, they will endeavour to treat them on similar lines, subject to work being available for which they are individually suitable, and subject also to the companies not being involved in any additional cost. The companies stated that they would arrange early meetings with the trade unions concerned to give effect to the above arrangements.
Mr. Thomas thought the railway agreement an excellent agreement and hoped the workers would emulate the generous spirit of the employers Mr. Cramp thought it the greatest achievement of his career.
Within twenty-four hours these “agreements” had been secured, and what little possibility there had ever been to reconstruct the front had vanished. The Communist Party and the Minority Movement Central Committees, seeing in the situation on the Wednesday a slight chance to make the effort in this direction, had sent out a call to all their members to do their utmost to hold the unions together locally on the basis of the May the 1st pledge for a simultaneous return on pre-strike conditions, and to maintain the support for the miners. They urged immediate local conferences of the strike committees with a view to organising a national conference of delegates from the Councils of Action, together with the union executives who had declared for a fight against the terms of re-engagement.
But the shock of the betrayal of the General Council was too great to make any quick throw up of a new leadership possible. The conditions which had governed the strike and the collapse at the centre made such development impossible unless a number of union executives were willing to give the lead. The fact that the instructions during the strike had been coming through the union executives weakened the central grip of the General Council, and obstructed the centralising efforts of the local councils. So it was only to be expected that when the General Council collapsed the workers looked at once to their own particular unions. When these in turn accentuated this, by individual action and separate agreements after the withdrawal of the wage reductions at first put forward, there was no possibility whatever of reconstructing the united action and leadership of the unions.
It may be asked why the Minority Movement and the Communist Party did not set up a new leadership. The answer is a simple one. Both are in a minority, and whilst the influence of both organisations is a growing influence neither have a sufficient organic control, that is have not yet sufficient leading positions in the unions to be able actually to control the unions even in the crisis without an accession of strength arising from sharp and big divisions in the existing leadership of the unions.
Had the General Council been divided and the Left Wing leaders proved themselves to be fundamentally different from the Right Wing leaders, had they been bold enough to stand in a minority and fought their way on the straight issues of no wage reductions, the story of the strike and its conclusion would have to be written in another way. But they were not different. One by one they fell before the drive of the Right Wing which never slackened its push to call off the General Strike which they had called on. The strike ended with the masses feeling intensely bitter, but with a confidence in their own strength and solidarity which bodes ill for the men who had let them down.
And the miners were isolated.
Conscious of the tremendous volume of resentment they had created the General Council appealed that there should be neither discussion nor recriminations. They decided to call a national conference of the trade union executives and explain at a date when they hoped the miners’ question would be settled. Considering that they claimed they had won a victory, it is remarkable that it should require an explanation. A victory that is worth anything is surely discernable to those who have won. This victory however is of a very special kind. It needs an explanation. And the General Council was so conscious of it that it proceeded to undress in public. First came Messrs. E. Bevin, R, B. Walker and A. A. H. Findlay. They sent the following to “Comrades, National and International.”
“Recognising our responsibilities as members of the General Council, as well as the tremendous feeling roused by the calling off of the strike and very natural desire for information concerning Mr. Baldwin’s repudiation of the Samuel memorandum, we desire to say that Mr. Baldwin’s statement as to the extent to which the Government was committed is not in accordance with our information.
“Let the truth be known and broadcast. The terms of the memorandum were put forward to the General Council and finally accepted in good faith by them on the definite assurance that they would be accepted by the Government as a basis for negotiation. On that understanding the General Strike would be declared off and the lock-out notices withdrawn.”
To which Sir Herbert Samuel replied:
“The question is whether there were any consultations between Mr. Baldwin and myself on the terms of the memorandum which was sent by me on May 12 to the chairman of the Trades Union Congress Council. The answer is that there were none.
“I held several conferences with representatives of the council, at none of which, to the best of my recollection, were present any of the three members who have put the question. At these conferences, I made it plain, not once, but repeatedly, that I was not acting in any way on behalf of the Government, and that, the Government having declared that they would not enter into any negotiations while the General Strike continued, I was unable to ascertain their views, either directly or indirectly, on any of the points to be included in the memorandum. . . .
“There was undoubtedly an honourable understanding between the members of the Trades Union Congress Council and myself that I would use my best endeavours to secure the adoption by the Government of the proposals of the memorandum. I felt justified in entering into such an understanding because I had been chairman of the Royal Commission, the recommendations of which had been accepted as as a whole by the Government, and I believed that any further suggestions that I might make, none of which were inconsistent with the report of the Commission, would not be without weight, although made only in an individual capacity. . . . Finally, I knew that the Government had been disposed to consider favourably the definite adoption of the principle of a National Wages Board for the gaining industry, containing a neutral element, which had been recommended in a tentative form in the report of the Royal Commission. This proposal was the central provision of my memorandum.
“As a matter of fact, all the points which are suggested in that memorandum for inclusion in a settlement of the coal dispute, and which might arise at the present stage, are covered by the Government’s recent proposal, with two exceptions. One of these is the suggestion that some allowances, beyond the ordinary unemployment pay, should be given, for a time, to miners who may be displaced by the closing of uneconomic pits, and for whom employment elsewhere cannot be found. Since, however, the Government proposed to set up a Special Committee to consider the assistance to be given to displaced miners, it may be held proper to reserve this suggestion for examination by the Committee. The other point is the proposal that the Wages Board should be required to fix rates—in addition to the minima for the lowest paid grades—below which the wages of no class of labour could be reduced. In view of the alarm caused by the employers’ proposals for wage reduction—which go far beyond the reductions contemplated by the Royal Commission and indicated in general terms in the report-this provision seems desirable.
“With regard to the first paragraph in the memorandum of May 12, which contemplated a resumption of negotiations on the coal dispute after the ending of the General Strike and the renewal of the subsidy meanwhile so as to enable mineowners’ notices of reduced wages to be withdrawn, it is obvious that the document must be taken as a whole; this paragraph must be read in conjunction with the later paragraphs, which clearly contemplated that some wage reduction may be found to be necessary, and expressed certain conditions that should attach to it. The Miners’ Federation, having rejected the memorandum for the very reason that it contained these provisions, and having again declared that they would agree to no reductions of wages of any class of labour in any circumstances, it is plain that negotiations cannot be resumed with any probability of success. The question of the renewal of the subsidy and the withdrawal of the notices pending the negotiations, cannot therefore arise.
“At the outbreak of the General Strike, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in the House of Commons that they had then been prepared, if necessary, to renew the subsidy for a period of two or three weeks during the negotiations, and that funds were available for that purpose, but that they needed the assurance that the negotiations would not again be futile. I am confident that if the Miners’ Federation had accepted the memorandum of May 12, and had declared their willingness to resume discussions with a recognition that some wage reduction might be found to be inevitable, and with a determination to reach a settlement, no deadlock would have taken place on the question of renewal of the subsidy for a short period while these discussions were proceeding.
“Finally, let me say that, so far as I know, the members of the Government were wholly unaware of the contents of the memorandum of May 12, or even that such a memorandum was under discussion until I presented a copy of it, with the correspondence that accompanied it, to the Prime Minister on the morning of that day, when the members of the T.U.C. were already on their way to Downing Street to announce the termination of the General Strike.”
What would have happened, I wonder, if the Allied Generals in the 1914-18 war had come to an agreement with a German lieutenant and stopped fighting on the ground that they had come to an “honourable agreement with a person of influential position who will use his influence to get the German general staff to agree”?
Before this A. B. Swales, George Hicks and Ben Tillett had published a statement:
“The General Strike has ended, having served the purpose of urgent and necessary defence . . . .
“The Government and the employers, even after our courageous gesture of peace, have with wiliness and chicanery endeavoured to misrepresent the logical meaning of our act as being one of surrender. How meanly false this cowardly travesty of the truth is, will be obvious in a few weeks if not in a few days.
“The distinct lessons arising out of the dispute are, firstly, a demonstration of power and, comradeship . . . .
“Secondly, it showed the economic grip of the workers upon all industries . . . .
“Thirdly, we closed a virulent and vehement capitalist press . . . .
“Finally, it brought together every class of wage worker . . . It brought forth. from the Russian Trade Union Movement a spontaneous gesture of good will.”
Very nice indeed! But they do not explain why they signed the “gentlemen’s agreement” and were parties to the calling off of the Strike without any guarantees that the miners’ wages would not be reduced. On the contrary they had agreed to the reduction of wages plan outlined in the Coal Commission’s Report. Hicks fought strenuously against the acceptance of the Russian trade unions’ “spontaneous offer of good will” and Tillet made the soft soapy oration that retained the “services” of Mr. J. H. Thomas. Each of them have been propagandists of class war, declared their belief that the capitalists will surrender nothing except as the result of the exercise of the workers’ power. Why then this rubbish “The capitalists must realise, etc.”?
Mr. MacDonald proceeded to dissociate himself from any responsibility for the strike and for any of the decisions, and to denounce the General Strike as a weapon of the workers.
First he said at a Hammersmith meeting on May 18th, “I was present at many meetings—not to take part in, because I never did—I was present at the meeting in order that I might know what was in the minds of these men in order that I might be able, when the time came for the House of Commons to deal with the issues, to deal with them on first hand knowledge. Never for a moment, never for an hour did I hear any man—I don’t care whether he is regarded as Right Wing or Left Wing of the Party—I never heard a single member of the General Council whisper an idea, give a piece of advice, suggest a move that was aimed at a political issue.”
A question at once arises. Did Mr. MacDonald speak at the Memorial Hall meeting on May 1st in support of the policy of the General Council or did he not? Second, speaking as he did speak, without warning the Conference as to the dangerous position they were in regarding the lack of preparations for so great an action, the workers must perforce hold him responsible as much as any other leader for the declaration of the strike, for the lack of preparation as well as for a continuous assistance to the Government and the mineowners towards getting the miners compromised towards wage reductions. To make virtue out the political bankruptcy of the General Council, to sit tight while the Council makes blunder after blunder because they did not raise or see the political issues they were inevitably raising by the General Strike, is to prove himself a party to the breaking of the strike.
Mr. Thomas also says, “I told you so. I have always been opposed to the General Strike. It was bound to fail.” But Mr. Thomas was a party to the unanimous decision of the General Council to call the strike. He signed the orders. Why did he not warn the Trades Union Conference before it was too late, before the decision to strike that it was useless and fatal? Possibly he was as anxious as Mr. Baldwin to get the strike in order to defeat it.
And so the undressing goes on and we are able to see these men more and more without clothes around their bourgeois souls. Mr. Clynes follows naturally and denounces the General Strike after the event instead of at the Trades Union Conference of Executives. So does Mr. Cramp, who bursts forth again into a “never, never” policy. Why, it is necessary to ask again and again, did not these people, members of the Executives of the unions, tell the Trades Union Conference of May 1st that they were making the blunder of a lifetime?
Meanwhile the workers are paying the bitter price in victimisation, in unemployment with hunger and misery in its trail, while those who have re-started work are wondering how long it will be ere the threats of wage reductions made at the moment of re-starting are put into operation. That depends upon the outcome of the miners’ struggle and the miners have been let down.
Next: VI. The Casualties