A. Thalheimer

The Program of the
Communist International

(November 1922)


From International Press Correspondence, Vol. 2 No. 112, 14 December 1922, pp. 933–937.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.


Comrades, you have four programmes before you: that of comrade Bukharin, a Bulgarian programme, a German programme, and finally the programme of action of the Italian Party. I have not come here to praise the German programme above all others. It is only a first draft which has to be improved and enlarged both in form and content. But this is true for all programmes: the German programme is no exception. As they stand now, all these drafts are only a basis for a final programme and for international discussion. The final programme I believe can only be the product of the collective work of all. I agree completely with Comrade Bukharin that the final programme may be decided upon only at the next Congress. Today we can only prepare and introduce the work, therefore, it is necessary to bring out clearly the differences which exist between the various programmes: this will constitute the main part of my speech. I do not wish to repeat Comrade Bukharin’s excellent speech to prove the theoretical bankruptcy of the Second and Second and a Half Internationals: I only wish to bring out a few typical examples.

First of all I would like to point out that in his programme. Kautsky rejects even the fundamentals of the Marxian conception of capitalist economics. For instance one of our basic conceptions is that the regulating law of capitalism is the production of surplus value. Suddenly, Kautsky discovers that capitalism is based upon the needs of consumption. There could be no more absolute, no more fundamental capitulation to capitalist economics than this.

I would also like to say a few words on the proposals of the reformists which Kautsky regards as a way to a Socialist regime. Comrade Bucharin was quite right when he said that we did not disagree with Kautsky only on the question of the tempo of transformation from capitalism to socialism, but that our basic difference is this: we believe that this transformation first begins after the conquest of power by the proletariat while he says that this takes place before and without the conquest of political power.

Today, Kautsky totally agrees with Bernstein on all these points. He has accepted all Bernstein’s reformistic proposals and declares them to be the true Marxism. I will not discuss these things any longer theoretically, but practically. What is the purpose of these proposals. They go along the well known paths of Municipalisation, and secondly of Guild Socialism, a new importation. To prove his new theories à la Bernstein, Kautsky who is usually a very sober thinker writes the most fantastic nonsense. For instance, take Guild Socialism. The Guild Socialists believe that, without the conquest of political power, the Trade Unions may introduce Socialism step by step, so to speak behind the back of capitalism. One need only look at the Trade Unions and realise their financial situation in the disruption of capitalism to see that this is a pure phantasy. At a time when the Trade Unions had the greatest difficulty in gathering strike funds, who can expect them to introduce socialist economy behind the back of capitalism.

Another favorite hobby horse of the reformists is Municipal Socialism, Municipalisation. Anyone, who has any knowledge of the situation in the West knows that the most striking characteristic of the Western countries is the bankruptcy not only of the State, but also of the municipalities; and that this is the problem of today for the municipalities, not the transformation to Socialism, but the defence against the attacks of capitalism who wish to gain control of the municipal industries.

A third point. To render the transformation more easy it has been proposed to take over capitalist property, and pay compensation. You all know that Karl Marx has said that eventually the English Landowners would be bought out. But he did not mean this, in the sense that this could take place before the conquest of Power, but only after the proletariat had captured political power. What is the situation in the greater part of Europe. Let us suppose that we have captured political power, that the question before us is the expropriation of the capitalists. Everyone knows that the first requisite for the reconstruction of the Socialist Society is the liquidation of the tremendous weight of debts which weighs upon industry. This mild method of buying out the capitalists is just as much a Utopia as Kautsky’s idea of Guild Socialism or Municipalisation.

I would like to point out another beautiful point of Kautsky’s theories, namely the problem of the State bureaucracy and that of State capitalism or State Socialism. According to Kautsky there are only two States in which the bureaucracy plays a great role. The first is France, the “Republic without republicans”. The second, says Kautsky, is Soviet Russia. Apparently, democracy has been introduced in Germany to the extent that the State bureaucracy has disappeared. As a result, in Germany and in the other bourgeois democratic States, the Social Democrats have nothing to do with the Democratic bureaucracy. But we know that the whole question of social democratic politics is limited to introducing Social Democratic officials in place of bourgeois officials.

In his treatise on State Socialism and State Capitalism, Kautsky suddenly discovers that the State bureaucracy still exists, and, what is more, is quite incapable of managing the capitalist enterprises. The bureaucracy is conservative, and is rigid, only the capitalists themselves can manage these industries.

What does this mean in Germany today? It means the direct coalition, the cooperation with Stinnes and his like, who will be charged with socialisation. Kautsky has already given his theoretical blessing to, and justification of the Second and the Two and a Half Internationals, of the U.S.P. and S.P.D. in Germany. Should a Stinnes Government be now created in Germany with the cooperation of the social-democrats, a Stinnes Government, which will seek to place in capitalist hands those industries which are still socialised, it would have Kautsky’s blessing.

I only wish to speak of these points because it characteristically shows the theoretical capitulation of the Second and Two and a Half Internationals.

I would also like to add something to what Comrade Bukharin said on the Marxist decadence and its disruption.

This is what I would like to say in this connection: Our conflict with the Marxist decadence in Germany and other circles of the Second International already began after the first Russian Revolution. The first conflict was over the general strike; since then this conflict has widened. The main conflict was the theoretical debate on the causes of imperialism, and in connection with it the political question of Disarmament. The first theoretical battles in Germany were fought around this point; and here was laid the foundation of the division into the Marxian centre, including the U.S.P.D. and now the V.S.P.D. on the one side and the K.P.D. on the other.

A few more remarks to bring out more clearly what Bukharin said on the theoretical capitulation especially as it appeared in the programs of the Second and Two and a Half Internationals, and the Görlitzer programme. All that Bukharin has emphasised and argued here as if he were lecturing to a class of boys, the dismissal of the impoverisation theory, of the crisis theory etc. all this has appeared clearly in the commentaries on the Görlitzer programme.

Kampfmeier, Bernstein. Stampfer, have shown clearly this capitulation.

Now with regard to debatable questions, I will deal with the following:

  1. The basic section, the theoretical explanation of imperialism in connection with the theory of accumulation.
     
  2. The questions of temporary measures, of partial demands before the conquest of power, which I consider as the main question for the preparation of a general programme as well as programmes of the individual parties.
     
  3. A few brief remarks on economic measures after the conquest of power, war communism, and N.E.P.
     
  4. The form and construction of the programme.

I will speak at once on the first point, the theoretical explanation of imperialism. I do not wish to begin here a theoretical debate. All I wish to do is to present the question clearly as an introduction to the theoretical discussion which I believe necessary. It is clear that we can reach a decision in such questions only after a through discussion in our press and in our pamphlets. What I wish to do is to make the question clear, and ring out its importance for our theories and our program.

I have already said that the differences in theory and tactics in the old social democracy of Germany originated from this theoretical consideration of Imperialism. There were two main questions which entered here: first, the more important: is Imperialism an inevitable phase of capitalist development? The second is a theoretical explanation of this inevitability of imperialist development. In Germany, this was the main question which separated the Left from the Centre Marxists. The main point around which the whole debate turned is this: Imperialism is an economic problem of accumulation, of capital growth or enlarged production. This enlarged production, this capital growth, this spread of capital growth, this spread of capital into non-capitalist territories is an historical fact, which does not commence with the appearance of capitalism. From the beginning of Capitalism, began also Colonial wars, colonial conquest, trade wars, etc.

When we say imperialism, we do not mean only this colonial expansion of the capitalist States, but the special form of expansion under the present imperialist conditions. Comrade Luxemburg formulated this special form of expansion, the special conditions of capitalist expansion in the period of imperialism as follows:

“In the Imperialist era, we are confronted with a struggle for the rest of the non-capitalist territory, for its new division, and finally, in connection with this, with the expansion of the capitalist and political basis of power.”

These facts have been known for a long time and cannot be contradicted. The question is an explanation of these facts: Is the imperialist era with its catastrophes and crises an historical accident or a necessity? Here comes in the political question: Is it possible to go back from this imperialist era, to the Manchester period, into the period of liberal capitalism, free Trade, peace, pacifism, or is there only one way out, namely the revolutionary conquest of the imperialist era; is Socialism the only way out? On the solution of this question depends also our political tactics.

If we assume that imperialism represents the interests of only a section of the bourgeoisie, that the interests of the whole of the bourgeoisie are represented by the Manchester method, what follows therefrom for our tactics? There follows the possibility that we might unite with one part of the bourgeoisie against the other. Here is laid the theoretical foundation for the coalition policy. The opposite view naturally would lead to an opposite policy.

Theoretically the question presents itself in the following manner: – Is the unlimited expansion of capitalist accumulation possible within the bounds of capitalism, or does this accumulation find other limits than capitalism itself? That, simply formulated, is: Can capitalism expand without limit, or are there certain necessary theoretical bounds to this growth? Some people have objected to this theory of accumulation that it is a sort of fatalism, according to which capitalism reaches a point when it breaks down mechanically. This point, at which capitalism no longer finds any field for expansion and must break down mechanically, is an abstract limit, a limit in the mathematical sense. What it actually means is something different. It means that capitalism is forced into an imperialist phase which sharpens the class antagonism, that it is forced into the most severe political and social catastrophes. It follows therefrom that it is not this limit which will determine the end of capitalism, but the severe crises into which imperialism leads it.

She then states further:

“In proportion as capital, assisted by militarism, extends this power abroad doing away at the same time with non-capitalist strata and lowering the living conditions of the toiling masses at home, in that proportion does the daily history of capitalist accumulation become the history of political economic crises, rendering eventually impossible all further accumulation, and bringing upon the stage of world history the rebellion of the International working class against the rule of capital as a historical necessity this process setting in long before capitalist accumulation has reached its own natural limits.”

This is one side of the question. And now, Comrades, let us examine for a moment the opposite position occupied by the staunchest opponents of this theory. Hilferding dealing with the Marxian theory in his book Finance Capital says that capitalism has in it the possibilities of unlimited expansion. As to Bauer – not to miss the Austrian head of the school – he has advanced a remarkable theory, namely, that capitalist development is conditioned and regulated by the increase of the population, namely of the working class population. This means turning upside down the Marxian theory of population, which says exactly the opposite.

Let me now give you some illustration of the political consequences of such a conception. In this connection it should be stated, that there are many who though denying the accumulation theory, have not reached these political conclusions from it. This does not prove their argument but merely shows their lack of consistency.

In order to prove this I find it necessary to quote the remarks of Comrade Luxemburg. The following is from her work directed against the criticisms of the accumulation theory.

“Accumulation is impossible in a purely capitalist milieu. This is why from the first beginnings of capitalist development, it exhibits the following tendencies: expansion of capital to non-capitalist strata and countries, the ruin of artizans and peasantry, the proletarianisation of the middle class, colonial policy, capitalist pentration and the export of capital. The existence and further development of capitalism is possible only by continual expansion of capital to new domains of production and new countries. But this expansion, in the course of its worldwide development, leads necessarily to a conflict between capitalistic and pre-capitalistic forms of society. This gives rise to violence, war, revolution, in short, to continual chaos, which has been the distinguishing feature of capitalism from beginning to end.”

Comrade Luxemburg then goes on to inquire whether the objective limits of capitalism must necessarily be reached, and whether capitalism can actually reach that point, and her answer is as follows:

“This is, after all, only a theoretical fiction, for accumulation of capital is not merely an economic but also a political process.

“Imperialism is just as much a historical factor, necessary to the existence of capital, as it is the most certain means of securing a final end to it by the shortest route.

“This does not mean that this end will be reached according to set dogma. The very tendency of capitalism to move in this direction expresses itself in such forms as lead to the period of capitalism a catastrophic character”. (The Accumulation of Capital, p. 425)

First of all these are the views of Kautsky in his writings from 1912 until 1922. On April 26th, 1922 Kautsky writes in the Neue Zeit.

“Competition in armaments rests upon economic causes, but not on economic necessity”. – A particularly fine piece of scholastic sophistry – ”and its cessation is by no means an economic impos sibility”.

There you have the theoretical key to the position assumed by the Independents and by Kautsky during the war.

Bernstein spoke in a similar strain at the Party National Convention at Chemnitz in 1912. It is very interesting to find that these two opposite poles met on this point already as early as 1912. Bernstein said:

“I could say much in answer to the charge that what we demand here, namely, disarmament, is utopian and reactionary. It is not so ... The world development has often taken a false path.”

This reminds me of the little anecdote about the officer who saw a dove flying and said: “Look, that dove is flying”. We wish to know for certain all that is meant by “Peace on earth and good will to all men”. In this good-will idea, Kautsky and Bernstein found themselves in accord already in 1912.

And here we have a small quotation from an article which Hilferding wrote in November-December, 1916 entitled The Catastrophe Theory; Reciprocity and Dominion as Methods of Commercial Policy.

“While capitalism would remain possible even when the whole world was almost equally developed capitalistically, Imperialism presupposes the existence of many economic variations.”

And further:

“The working class can advocate only the policy of commercial reciprocity.”

Then again:

“Free trade by its opposition to imperialistic commercial policy and, consequently, to imperialism generally, is a weapon which the working class cannot afford to neglect.”

And still further:

“From this standpoint capitalist colonial policy loses its importance. It is of no consequence then to whom the colonies politically belong. The development of the British colonial Empire has been economically beneficial to all other peoples having spared them the burden of acquisition and development.”

What is behind all this? It is the idea of which we have previously spoken, the idea that it is possible to direct imperialism backwards to free trade and its theoretical consequences. The toiling masses must not struggle forward towards socialism, but backward, allying themselves with the corresponding sections of the bourgeoisie following the same course. The fullest fruition of this theory was reached in an article by Hilferding, in the beginning of 1922, in which he claims that the period of imperialistic antagonisms have come to an end, and that now the era of imperialistic harmony was beginning. This is in accord with the view point advanced by Hilferding already in 1912.

In the article just referred to:

“Capitalist economy has two methods of increasing profits: competition and co-operation. At every forward step of Capitalism, co-operation fakes the place of competition. This also applies to the International policies of capitalist States ...

“The last war has left behind two principal centres of power. It has also shown how destructive the war was. In order to be successful, therefore, a change in capitalist methods is necessary, namely, cooperation instead of competition.”

So that cooperation on the part of the capitalists is the advice which Hilferding, on the grounds of his analysis, offered in 1922.

Comrades, this theoretical analysis of imperialism has been advanced not only in Germany but also in Russia. I wish especially to draw the attention of our Russian comrades to this. It was the so-called legal Marxism of Tugan-Baranowsky, Struve and Bulgakoff which advocated the theory of the unlimited expansion of capitalism. I wish to deal briefly with the foundation of this theory. It was the concern of the newly introduced Marxism in Russia to prove in opposition to the Narodniki, that capitalist development in Russia was both possible and necessary. Now, these Marxians did prove this, but they proved it a little too much. (Interruption: Lenin too!) Yes, Lenin too. They proved that capital was limitless and eternal, and incidentally they introduced the theoretical implication that socialism was impossible. This, comrades, is analogous with the case of Germany. Tugan Baranowsky, Struve and Bulgakov all landed in the camp of the bourgeoisie. There are similar instances but, as I have said, they rest upon theoretical inconsistency.

I have dealt with this question so thoroughly because it is not a matter of incidental importance, but concerns our main theory. This criticism of the theory which was advanced in Germany, and also has been, in my opinion, disproved; and those comrades who are opposed to this theory – and this refers also to a large number of Russian comrades – have the subject cleared up in their own minds.

I now come to the point relating to the general program and the programs of the individual parties upon which I stand in sharpest opposition to Comrade Bukharin, namely, the question of the demands of the minimum program. Comrade Bukharin takes the position that one must separate the transitory or immediate demands from the program proper. He assigns them to a separate room, on the door of which he affixes the inscription “program of Action”. Here, one may commit all kinds of iniquities. (Bukharin, interrupting: But admission is free!) Free admission is all right. Then let us open the door and see what things programmatically admissible we are going to find there. (Interruption: What do you consider admissible things?) That is just the point. We had opposition in Germany to the inclusion of the transitional demand for the conquest of power in the program. In this, some have seen, as Comrade Bukharin has, a certain danger of opportunism. We must therefore very carefully examine the question as to how far it is possible to separate the tactical principles from our general principles and aims. I am of the opinion that those who see any guarantee in this division of tactics, principles and aims, are in great error, and are exposing us to just those dangers which they seek to avoid. (Hear! hear!) One need only look at the history of the Second International and its decay to realise that it was precisely this division of the tactical clauses of the program from the ultimate aim which accelerated its deterioration into opportunism. How did this process start in Germany? With the Bernstein-Kautsky debates on tactics. The Final goal remained. And to-day when we wish to emphasise the difference between communists and social reformists we say: We differ in our final aims; we want socialism and communism, while they do not want it. How do we prove this statement? By pointing to the tactics, the road which these people follow and which are quite different from ours. That is the principal point. I claim therefore that specific difference between us and the reformist socialists lies not in the fact that we keep our immediate aims in a separate compartment, apart from our program but in the fact that we bring our immediate aims and preliminary demands into the closest relationship with our principles and final aims.

This relationship does not of course, of itself, insure that have found the right path when I have the right map. I do not even know how to read the map. And it seems to me that what Comrade Lenin said in regard to Russia – Russia must concern itself mainly with the elementary task of reading and writing – is also true in another sense for the Communist Parties of the West. They must learn to read the truth. Therefore, the danger of opportunism lies directly upon the opposite side, our starting point forward to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By leaving long stretches of this path in the dark many errors might be committed. I was particularly interested in what Bukharin said about the written statements of the Italian Communist Party in which that Party expresses opposition to transition demands, because one must not make a credo of them.

There is a number of such transition demands and measures which most become a credo, and which we must insist on our various parties accepting.

Comrades, the question of these transition demands and the minimum program is not new. This question was already fought out once even on Russian ground, and I think that it will be of interest to read the documents bearing on it. It was in the autumn of 1917 that the question of the Russian Party program was discussed. The question arose then, should the Russian Party, which was on the eve of assuming power retain only the maximum program and eliminate the minimum program. I believe that it will be as well to quote comrade Lenin’s statement in this connection. Comrade Lenin said then – you will excuse me if the question is rather long: “Our entire program would be nothing but a scrap of paper if it were not to serve us in all eventualities and in all the phases of the struggle by its application, and not by its non-application. If our program is the formulation of the historic development of society from capitalism to socialism, it must naturally also formulate all the transition phases of this development, and must be able to explain to the proletariat at any time the process of the transition towards socialism. Hence, it follows that the proletariat must not be put in such a position where it would be forced even for a single moment to abandon its program or be itself abandoned by it.

This finds its practical expression in the fact that there is not a single moment in which the proletariat having by force of circumstances assumed the power should not be obliged to take some measures for the realisation of its program, which would be in the nature of transition measures of a socialist nature. Behind the assertion that the socialist program may, during some phase of the political domination of the proletariat, fail to give any directions for its realisation, colours unconsciously the other assertion; that the socialist program in general can never be realised.

From the general or fundamental part of the program, we shall now go over to the program.

Here we find at once the outwardly “very radical” and perfectly unsatisfactory proposal of Comrades Bukharin and Smirnov to do away entirely with the minimum program as being “obsolete” and unnecessary, as it was a question of the transition measures towards socialism.

Such is the proposal of both these comrades who, however, for some reason or other, could not make up their minds to bring forward a suitable program (although the tasks and the agenda of the next Party Conference which provide for the revision of the party program made it incumbent on these comrades to draw up such a proposal).

It is just possible that the authors of the seemingly “radical” proposal itself have become somewhat undecided ... Be if as it may, their point of view must be examined.

Owing to the war and the economic deterioration, all the countries are compelled to go over from monopolist capitalism to monopolist State capitalism. Such is the situation. But monopolist State capitalism in a revolutionary epoch develops directly into socialism. One cannot go forward in a revolution without marching toward socialism. Such is the objective situation created by the war and by the revolution. Our April Conference confirmed this by issuing the watchwords of the dictatorship of the proletariat) and of the nationalisation of the banks and trusts as the fundamental measures for the transition to socialism. Up to it is point all the Bolsheviks are agreed. However, Comrades V. Smirnov and N. Bukharin want to go further by rejecting the minimum program. This would be tantamount to acting contrary to the wise counsel of the wise proverb which says: “Do not boast when you go into battle, but wait till you return from battle.” (Brandler: Hear, hear, laughter)

We are going into the battle, i.e, we are struggling for the conquest of the political power by means of our Party. This power would be a dictatorship i; (he proletariat and of the poor peasantry. When we assume this power, we are not only not afraid to go beyond the limits of the bourgeois order, but we deviate, on the contrary, quite openly and precisely that we will go beyond these limits, that we will march fearlessly towards socialism and that our way towards it leads via the Soviet Republic, the nationalisation of the banks and trusts, workers’ control, obligatory labour, the nationalisation of the land, confiscation of the big estates, etc, etc. It is in this sense that we formulated a program of transition measures towards socialism

But we must not drag while going to battle. We must not eliminate the minimum program, for this would be tantamount to bragging. We do not want “to demand anything from the bourgeoisie, but we must create everything ourselves, and our work must not be a tinkering within the limits of the bourgeois order”.

Such an attitude would be nothing but empty bragging, for first all, one must conquer power, and we have not yet done that. In the first instance we must put the transition measures towards socialism into practice and we must lead our revolution to the final victory of the international socialist revolution. It is only “when the battle is won” that one can put aside the minimum program as useless.

Can we vouch for it that it is not very necessary now? Of course not, for the simple reason that we have not yet conquered power, not introduced socialism; we have not yet even reached the beginning of the socialist world revolution.

We must march towards this aim boldly and without any hesitation, but it is ridiculous to declare that we have already reached it, as everyone knows that we have not yet done so. The elimination of the minimum program is tantamount to a declaration, an announcement (or rather a boast) “that we have already conquered” No, dear comrades, we have not yet conquered.

I shall now give you yet another quotation which will be useful for our further discussion of the program. Comrade Lenin continues:

“We do not know if we will be victorious tomorrow or a little later. I, personally, am inclined to think that it wilt be tomorrow, (I am writing this in October 5, 1917), and that we might be too late in taking over the power. However, tomorrow is tomorrow, and not today. We do not know how soon after our victory the revolution will come in the West. We do not know if after our victory there will not be periods of reaction and of counter-revolutionary victories. There is nothing impossible in that. Therefore, we shall after our victory construct “a triple line of trenches” against such an eventuality.

“As yet we do not know and we cannot know anything about this. No one can know it, and therefore it is ridiculous to throw out the minimum program, which is very much needed as long as we have not destroyed this order, have not laid the foundation tor the transition to socialism, have not beaten the bourgeoisie and having beaten it, have not totally destroyed it. All this will come and will probably come much sooner than some of us expect. I am myself of the opinion that it will begin tomorrow, but tomorrow is not yet with us.

“Let us deal with the minimum program on the political field. It is intended for the bourgeois republic. We add that we do not confine ourselves to its limits, but that we begin at once to struggle for the higher type – the Soviet Republic We must do this. We must march towards the new republic with boldness and determination, and I am convinced that we will do so. However, the minimum program must not be thrown out on any account, for the Soviet Republic is not yet with us. Moreover, the possibility of ‘attempts at restoration’ are not excluded and we must go through it and remove it. It is also possible that during the transition from the old to the new, “combined types” of government will make their appearance as pointed out in the Rabochi Put a few days ago; for instance the Soviet Republic as well as the constituent Assembly. All this must be outlived and then there will be ample time to throw out the minimum program.”

And in conclusion, there is the following statement:

“The same is the case on the economic field. We are all agreed that the fear to inarch towards socialism is tantamount to ignominious betrayal of the interests of the proletariat. We are also all of us agreed that the first steps in this direction must be measures such as the nationalisation of banks and trusts. Let us first of all bring into being these and similar measures, and then we can consider further steps, for experience will have broadened our outlook. Practical experience is worth a million times more that the best programs. It it quite possible and even probable that even here we shall not be able to do without “combined types” for the transition period. For instance, we cannot at once nationalise the small industrial concerns, employing a few workers, neither can we put them under a real workers’ control. These concerns may be tied hand and foot through the nationalisation of the banks and trusts, but there is no reason for throwing out the minimum program, as long as there are even small relics of bourgeois conditions. As Marxists, who enter boldly into the greatest world revolution and yet take a sane view of facts, we have no right to throw out the minimum program.

“If [we] were to throw it out now, we should only prove that we have lost our heads even before we could achieve victory. But we must not lose our heads, neither before nor during nor after the victory, for if we lose our heads, we shall lose all.”

Comrades, thus wrote Lenin on October 6th 1917 at a time when he could say: “the proletarian dictatorship, our victory, is a thing of tomorrow, but we are not yet there, it is still today with us.” Comrades, looking at it on a world scale, we are certainly justified in saying that the victory of the world revolution is not a matter of today. Perhaps, it is not even a matter of tomorrow, at least not in the sense as this was said in 1917. If we consider things on a world scale, we are obliged to say that the interval between the present state and the realisation of the proletarian dictatorship on a world scale must be measured by years, and perhaps even by decades, at least if we include in addition to the big capitalist countries also the colonial and semi-colonial countries. For the enormous field which lies before us we must lay out exact landmarks and I am asking myself what kind of landmarks and fundamental rules we should have Comrade Bukharin’s chief objection consisted in the assertion that we cannot include concrete everyday demands in the general program, because the latter are only temporary and might change every month or every week. He also said that these concrete everyday demands vary in the various countries, and that we cannot therefore bring them under one heading. My answer to this is: we need not bring into the general program nor into any national programs the concrete everyday demands in all their details, but we must give the fundamental tactical rules, the tactical principles and the methods (if you will allow me to say so) from which all these concrete separate demands may be unmistakably drawn.

And, comrades, there are not only such problems of the transition period which are different in the different countries and which may change from week to week and from month to month, but there is also a number of questions of great significance for the transition period which must absolutely be put in the Communist program. And I wish to say that a general program of the Communist International, which would be a blank on these questions, would be of very little practical worth for the Parties of Western Europe. (German delegates: Hear, hear!) It is just at this juncture that great importance should be attached to the transition period. I would like to mention certain questions which arise in this connection, and which, in my opinion, must beyond all doubt be included in a Communist Program. There is the question of the control of production, of State capitalism and of a general outline of taxation and financial policy for the various Parties. (Hear, hear!) The Parties may be confronted with these questions almost any day. Their concrete forms change. (Bukharin: That’s it) Yes, but one must have a general outline from which to draw practical conclusions. Let us take the Erfurt Program for example. It contained the groundwork of a taxation policy which, of course, is now out of date. You will certainly not deny, Comrade Bukharin, that the financial situation in various countries including Germany, as very different at different periods; yet such a general guiding principle is most useful and important.

Comrades, a second important matter relating to the transition period is our relation to bourgeois democracy. I find in the program submitted by Comrade Bukharin an admirable critical analysis of bourgeois democracy but do you regard the Communist International as a solid whole, so that it suffices for all its Parties, let us say from India to Soviet Russia: (Bukharin: No! Not by a long way!) First we must have a guide as to the relations of the Communists to the democrats in those countries where bourgeois democracy has not yet been established that is to say where the struggle must still be against absolutist and feudal forms of the State. Secondly, we must have some direction for the policy of the communists in such a situation as that in Germany, in connection with the defence of the republic against monarchist attacks. And, thirdly, we must have some guidance for the communists in a situation similar to that which prevailed in Germany in November 1918, when there was an opportunity of breaking up the democracy and establishing a dictatorship. I repeat that all these transitional phases must be dealt with in their general fundamentals, not in detail. And that this is quite possible, is proven by the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Take, for example the last chapter which deals with the relation of communists to other parties, to bourgeois democracy, to the petty-bourgeoisie, etc. In a few pithy sentences the path is indicated. The same thing must be done in our program. A program – and here I make use of a remark of Comrade Luxemburg which seems to be most appropriate must furnish a handle which may be grasped at in any essential transitional phase. A program which leaves us in the lurch during such phases, or which we can apply in some cases and cannot be applied in others has but little political value. I also find that Comrade Bukharin has not been quite consistent. If he really wishes to follow up in all consistency his denial of the transitional demands, he should oppose with all vehemence the Bulgarian program as well as the German program. It is quite obvious that he must do this.

I now leave this question and turn to that of the transitional demands, war-communism, and the new economic policy in their relationship to the peoples of Western Europe. Here I wish to agree with all that Comrade Bukharin has said, but would like to add a few explanations.

It has been quite rightly said here that war communism, is also the new economic policy are not the products of a definite scheme, but were produced by iron necessity. These necessities were due to causes which are not of a specifically Russian but of a general nature. The question is how shall we apply these things to Western Europe.

Comrade Trotzky has well pointed out – as has also Comrade Bukharin – that the necessities of civil war are frequently in contradiction to economic necessities. War communism is mainly a product of civil war. We in Western Europe will also have to go through a period of civil war, after the conquest of power, although it may be foretold that this period will be much shorter than in Russia, and so war communism many not play such an important role with us. We cannot, of course, foresee these things in detail. But we may be sure that, during the civil war, we shall have to subordinate economic necessity to war necessity.

Now, with regard io the Nep in the West. The needs of the small peasantry exist in the West also, even if not to such a great degree. Many say that in Russia these conditions necessitated a social economic policy; while in Germany they will also produce a different economic policy. One forgets that in the period when this question will confront us Germans, we shall not have to deal with an isolated Germany, but probably with a German-Russian economic alliance. What would this mean? It would mean that these great masses of the Russian small bourgeoisie will inject their interests into the German economic field, and that there will be a strengthening of the industrial factor in Russian economic life.

So far as we can see, this policy signifies a forward step for Russia, but it is probably a step backward for the West.

Comrades, the great importance of the economic policy for the Parties of the West depends upon the definition in our program of our relationship to the middle sections of society, the small peasants, the small tradesmen and craftsmen, etc. I do not mean that we should now construct a fixed policy, as there is no immediate economic necessity. We should, however, include in the program that considerations of indulgency with regard to these classes will have to be swept aside by the necessities of civil war.

And now a few remarks with regard to the Bulgarian program.

In our program and in the Bulgarian program we have placed the demand about the formation of cooperatives of small tradesmen and petty manufacturers after the seizure of power. I would like to point out that in industry these cooperatives will play a different role from that of the agricultural. Let us imagine a country like Germany with a developed industry. Here the time will soon come when we will wish to absorb these small industrial enterprises in our large scale industry. Here the cooperative methods will have to extend for a longer time and the cooperatives themselves will be of a different character from the industrial cooperatives.

I now come finally to the construction of the program. I would like to remark here that on the whole, one can agree with Comrade Bukharin’s proposals. We have ceased analysing the capitalist system in our program. We have begin to analyse its imperialist stage. We have come to the conclusion that this analysis is necessary and must be undertaken.

I believe that it will be necessary to consider the proposition of Comrade Varga, and preface our program by an analysis of the pre-capitalistic methods of exploitation. If we really want an international communist program, we shall have to do this.

And now finally the form of the program. Comrade Bukharin complained of the length of the program, Comrades, we also are not pleased with this length, but we are in the same position as the French Bishop who wrote to his friend: “I am writing you a long letter because I have no time to write a short one.” We have had no time to discuss a short program. It is absolutely necessary that the program should be short, perhaps even shorter than that of Comrade Bukharin. I recall in this connection what Engels said on the program question: He said that a program must be as short as possible, and must leave much to verbal elaboration. It should also, of course, be as simple as possible. And we also admit that the German program needs improvement.

Comrades, in conclusion I wish to emphasise that we must make our Communist program invulnerable. But we cannot hope for this if we leave a long stretch of our revolutionary path unilluminated, or to use another term, if we omit a substantial portion of our road from our chart.

Comrade Bukharin and several other comrades, fear that, if they dwell upon this part of the road, we shall be unable to leap over it. Now comrades, I would draw your attention to the example of our Russian comrades who, on October 6, 1917, formulated their minimum program but were able to take this leap very quickly, I am convinced that it does not depend upon the omission of these demands whether we should have a program which would lead us to victory.


Last updated on 5 January 2021