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The New International, November 1945


James Barret

New Tactics in Fighting Totalitarianism

A Critique of the Liberal and Radical Positions


From New International, Vol. XI No. 8, November 1945, pp. 237–241.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.


(With the publication of the following article, we open our pages to a discussion of the controversial questions which its author raises. The editors of The New International find themselves in substantial disagreement with the point of view here presented, particularly those views expressed in the concluding half of the article to appear in our December issue. The latter issue will contain a reply presenting our own point of view. – Editors)


“Totalitarianism” is used here to describe a system existing in Russia or in any fascist country. It also describes the activities of those native, multi-shirted internationalists who not only attempt to aid such totalitarian powers abroad but also to effect a similar type of regime in this country. Included in the term is any individual, group or movement subscribing to the persecution of race, color or nationality. The term, thus, also covers the activities of tomorrow’s nameless who will take the place of those whom we have learned to identify as Bundists, fascists, Stalinists and their associates. “Liberalism” will be explained in the context of the views herein presented. “Radical” is to be construed as synonymous with “Socialist” and is chosen for its inclusiveness lest any specific group lay unction to its soul and feel that my criticisms have validity as far as every other organization is concerned, but not its own.

The question might be raised as to the wisdom of drawing attention to these manifestations of totalitarianism indicated above, while a greater danger seems to be emerging from the statisms inherent in contemporary capitalism. The answer is that most liberals have by now been sufficiently schooled through recent events to detect encroachments by the state. [1] The radical’s theory of the state keeps him constantly on the alert for such aggressions. One does not have to be particularly astute to detect and react “instinctively” against such frontal attacks as no-strike pledges, black-listings by the War Manpower Commission, threats by Selective Service, labor drafts, etc. I am dealing with the other dangers because not sufficient attention has been paid to them and even when it has, the methods employed to combat them have been woefully inadequate. As far as the fascists are concerned, the war in the eyes of most people seemed to have “taken care” of them; as for the “democratic” Communists, they too appear to be no problem as far as the innocent can see. However, the Communists will be with us at least as long as Stalinism, or its counterpart, continues to exist in Russia. The ideological and organizational associates of the other groups are not only here, but are increasing with great rapidity. If the liberals and radicals continue to evaluate the danger of these totalitarians purely in terms of numerical strength or spectacular offensives, and if they persist in their supercilious attitude of looking upon the fascists as “crackpots” and the Stalinists as “harmless fanatics,” they will commit the same disastrous mistakes as their European predecessors.

Liberal’s Ineptitude

The liberal, for instance, who thinks that a few FBI arrests of fascists or the transformation of the Stalinist Party into euphemistic “committees” and “associations” can render these groups innocuous, either understands nothing of the deeper issues involved, or he is attempting to absolve a guilty conscience of the responsibility for having done little to control these destructive organizations. He may, as Dwight Macdonald suggests, counter this accusation by pointing to the liberals’ condemnation of the twenty-nine seditionists, but this is beside the point. They pursued no militant policy in stopping the seditionists in the first place; it was not their libertarian theories which brought the twenty-nine to trial, but the’ action of Edgar Hoover, who apprehended them not for bigotry but for sedition. To show how superficial even his wartime “realism” was, one need only refer to the liberal’s customary ineptitude in dealing with totalitarians who continued to operate all during the war under the protection of his “free speech.” And the radical who feels that he has dispensed with his revolutionary duty simply by ascribing the growing bigotry to the “capitalist system” is only satisfying his sectarian ego. Field studies – not political generalizations – will no doubt reveal very close correlations between “inoffensive crackpot” activity and the racism we are now witnessing.

For instance, the notorious transportation strike in Philadelphia last summer (necessitating the use of large, armed force) disclosed the tragic results of the radical’s academic attitude toward fascist propaganda which had flooded the city for the past six years or so. Coupled with this attitude was such solicitous regard for the white worker’s feelings (not to be antagonized lest the radicals lose “control” in the unions) that when the anti-Negro strike occurred there was no sharp castigation of workers’ intolerance, no mass protests, demonstrations, etc., by all the other unions in an attempt to effect an alliance with the democratic group inside the strike; to bring the rest of the workers to their senses; and to express sympathy with all the Negroes in the city. The radical correspondents in covering the strike never even discussed the factor of fascist propaganda in the city!

When some years ago (after the Spanish Civil War) I first suggested to liberals and radicals the arguments presented here, I immediately became suspect. Anyone who dared, for instance, advocate the illegalization of bigots was a “reactionary,” violating the most sacred principles of “liberty”; and according to the radicals, I was guilty of an unforgivable heresy. I was, as that “hard-boiled” revolutionary, Dwight Macdonald, once warned me, “calling the cops.” Although many of these “libertarians” through bitter personal experiences or recent world history, or even the reading of such popular works as Red Decade, Out of the Night, Under Cover, Blackmail, etc., and latest exposés by Segal, Riesel, Kellman and others, have had some change of heart, they have not permitted such change to affect their minds. They will admit privately, of course, that if by some act of will they eould destroy all totalitarians they would gladly do so, but when asked to initiate or support juridical measures (as part of a larger program) directed toward that destruction they are unable to act. This self-inflicted impotence stems from their “libertarian” theories which we shall now examine. The reader should not regard the appended footnotes as mere gratuitous supplementation, but as an integral part of the main discussion.


Havelock Ellis in The Dance of Life remarks that “no one has ever counted the books that have been written about morals.” One could by this time make the same observation concerning the literature which has already been written about the problems of civil liberties. The reason for this is obvious when one realizes that such problems have always constituted the quintessence of the moral – and therefore political – life, dealing as they do with the relationship between the majority and the minority, group disciplines and individual freedom, societal organization and liberty, etc. One should not be surprised, therefore, to find that during socioeconomic and political crises such as ours there would occur an intensified productivity of literature reflecting those very problems which are already being decided upon in the more practicable terms of group and class conflict. [2]

In both theory and practice the liberal’s position on civil liberties is so seriously inconsistent as actually to contribute to the development of totalitarianism. His concept of an ideological “market place” (Holmes, Beard, et al.) where views of competing individuals and .groups are presented for majority approval and where minority “rights” are provided as defenses against mass tyranny is fraught with distortions relating respectively to the fields of history, social psychology, politics, and logic.

(1) The distortion of history: Since he refuses to recognize the class nature of the State, the liberal always treats civil liberties as “rights” existing “precedent to the State” (MacLeish), and therefore something so sacred as never to be abrogated. This idealistic approach prevents him from rooting those “rights” within class relationships. His constant references to the “immutable” principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are malaprops. Civil liberties during the Colonial Revolution meant opportunities for the abolition of despotism, and American “tradition” granted asylum here to 19th Century democrats, not tyrants. Liberties never meant freedom for slavocracy such as the liberal advocates when he insists upon granting freedom today to totalitarians. He fails, moreover, to differentiate between a legitimate minority which attempts to further the democratic processes and a purely destructive one intent upon establishing bigotry. The liberal erroneously considers a Debs and a Smith or a Bilbo representatives of “left” and “right” oppositions equally essential to the “democratic market place.” [3]

Speech and Behavior

(2) The distortion of social psychology: Voltaire’s “I disagree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it” is a psychological abstraction, since “speech” is treated here as a uniquely-privileged modality of the mind completely divorced from the whole pattern of a person’s behavior. The absurdity of the quotation is quickly revealed as soon as it is rephrased, “I do not agree with what you do, but I will fight to the death your right to do it.” None of the other modalities such as sight or kinaesthesia, for instance, is ever treated with such fetishistic consideration by the liberal. He recognizes the necessity of differentiating between an astronomer and a “peeping Tom.” Or he will approve of a gym bout but condemn mayhem. But when it comes to “speech,” the liberal proceeds to write voluminous nonsense about its “sanctity.” Not merely the speech perhaps of a Bertrand Russell or a John Dewey but everybody’s. In that vague realm which he calls “expression” there apparently exists no hierarchy of values; speech per se is precious whether uttered by the foolish or the wise, the depraved or the noble.

Your more sophisticated or “pragmatic” liberal, on the other hand, who admits that “thinking is a form of doing” and that ideas, too, are “weapons,” maintains, however, that (a) “opinion” must be differentiated from “incitement” and from “advocacy.” The first is punishable if it expresses personal (but not group) libel; the second is always subject to prosecution, and the third, only if there is, as Holmes phrased it, a “clear and present danger.” (b) “Opinions” should never be curtailed as long as anti-social “acts” which may result from them are punishable. First, the attempted neat demarcation among the three terms cannot be an intelligible guide to constructive action. According to the liberal’s theory, if there are no dramatic manifestations of “violence,” “incitement,” etc., during a lecture, then the speaker is merely voicing an “opinion” and should not be interfered with. A totalitarian leader, thus, could in a very temperate manner (utilizing the more subtle techniques of allusion, indirection, etc.) disseminate his bigotry and even be clever enough to urge only “peaceful” means to effect his program. A socialist orator, on the other hand, in expressing his opinion could organize such large numbers of militant followers as to be punished ostensibly for “imperilling public safety” or “promoting disorder.” “Opinion” can therefore be conveniently transformed into “incitement” or “advocacy” (with its “clear and present danger” clause). This last legalistic formula actually represents the nadir of the “free opinion” theory, for it is precisely here that the State reveals most sharply its coercive powers in behalf of the ruling class. People, like Fraenkel and others, who accept the validity of Holmes’ directive or who subscribe to the theories of the ACLU and at the same time refer to themselves as “Socialists” are only deluding themselves, as well as others. [4] Second, neither can “anti-social” acts by themselves provide the only reason for punishment, since from a purely juridical standpoint the causal relationships between “opinion” and destructive results may at time; be difficult to establish. It is an indefensible position to assume that one must wait until statements have eventuated into destructive deeds, because words alone can inflict pain and alienation, effect racial hostility, etc., and from the standpoint of some totalitaridan group, these words may be much more effective at certain times (such as the present) than overt acts.

Liberal View on Slander

When it comes to considering group libel or slander, the liberal argues that prosecuting anyone for attacking a race or nationality is either impossible or impracticable. [5] We are told that “public opinion” must first be enlightened, for if it condemns bigotry then laws are not needed. If it favors bigotry, the laws won’t work. Other reasons offered by the liberal include prejudiced juries and the possible martyrdom of the accused. (a) He poses the problem as though it were merely illegalization or public enlightenment. He not only neglects the educational value of public discussion concerning necessary legislation, but he assumes further that illegalization is proposed as the only method in dealing with totalitarianism. Actually it is suggested as a supplementary weapon within a larger framework of struggle – economic, political, social, etc. [6] (b) We are asked to put our faith in a public which presumably is capable of enlightenment but which at the same time is so perverted in its values as to confuse bigotry with “martyrdom.” Such logic questions the validity of the liberal’s whole jury system: can a disinterested panel ever be chosen in the first place, can it function in cases involving intolerance, must it be replaced by a body of “specialists,” etc? Furthermore, if laws will not work wherever the public favors bigotry, then the decent qtinority seems doomed to perpetual impotence. The latter apparently can participate in “public discussions” but never initiate libertarian legislation before the majority has been fully persuaded. To be consistent, the liberal would have to disapprove of a permanent FEPC or its equivalent directed against discrimination, since these as yet may not be supported by majority opinion.

A more realistic and fundamental approach by the liberal to the whole problem of “speech” would consist. first, in demanding that all opinions libelling any race, color or nationality be severely prosecuted; second, in requiring that every writer or speaker state whether his views are fact or opinion. This would act as a general warning to the consumer and minimize to a great extent the potency which the totalitarian’s propaganda might ordinarily possess, depending as it does oftimes upon so-called factual “evidence” in order to substantiate its wild allegations. Being subject to prosecution for misstatement or distortion, the totalitarian would necessarily be forced to present his views as mere “opinion,” thus robbing his material of much-desired “prestige” value. Third, even facts should not be entirely free from social control if they are utilized in order to bring malicious persecution upon someone. A Pegler, for instance, should not be allowed to insert repeatedly and irrelevantly the birthplace of an American (Hillman, “born in Lithuania” or Frankfurter, “born in Austria”). Any intelligent reader knows, of course, what Pegler is actually saying. According to the liberal’s logic of “free speech” there is nothing to prevent this journalist from taking the next logical step by substituting “Jew” for the countries’ mentioned. Lest the liberal imagine that my suggestions in connection with the control of factual material might perhaps prevent necessary publicizing of social, economic or political evils, he should remember in the first place that wherever such evils do exist, everyone should have the full right to expose them and no guilty person should ever have recourse to a defense against “persecution:’ In the second place, social control of facts does not mean that a man’s past record should not be referred to, especially when he is attempting to participate in public affairs, such as running for some important office (e.g., Chief Justice Black’s early association with the Ku Klux Klan). What it does mean is that no one has the right constantly and maliciously to publicize a fact in someone’s past (a prison sentence, for instance, by means of which he has already paid his “debt” to society) so as to alienate him from the community. And especially should no one have the right to use as a weapon of bigotry the facts of a man’s race or nationality. Finally, instead of drawing an untenable distinction between words and their “anti-social” results, the liberal should use as a guide the basic tenet of modern criminology, the danger of the criminal himself, and not only his deeds. One who merely attempts a crime or who in any way reveals destructive tendencies should be watched, neutralized or arrested. The point of attack upon the totalitarian is not only his acts but his poisonous words, his dangerous potentialities, organization tieups, past record, sources of support, etc.

For Suppression of Totalitarians

(3) The distortion of politics: Even within his framework of capitalist democracy, the liberal could play a more constructive role, once he realized that civil liberties for bigots are merely techniques for dealing with forces inimical to his “democratic” ideal. [7] As soon as these people make their position clear, it becomes pure expediency whether they should be permitted to exist. Methods of control, such as heavy fines and imprisonment for anyone (including congressmen, public officials, religious and business leaders, union leaders, etc.) guilty of group libel, or the requirement that the totalitarians’ meetings be open and policed and that their press provide space for rejoinder, etc., are secondary matters to the main objective – eventual suppression. Anything short of this not only spells political suicide but it flatly contradicts all the other progressive activities in which the liberal has engaged, e.g., his pre-war support of the European underground, his granting of asylum to victims of fascism, and his traditional championing of generally progressive legislation. One cannot subscribe to all these and at the same time insist upon the activity of native totalitarian groups in order to demonstrate “democracy’s strength.” [8] The reductio ad absurdum of liberal politics is The Progressive’s (June 26, 1944) reaction to the Supreme Court’s freeing of the Nazis, Hartzel and Baumgarten. In spite of the Nazis’ “gross libels,” “sinister racial theories,” anti-Semitism, etc., the decision, we are informed, represents a “brilliant new chapter” in our juridical history!

When confronted with the above criticism, the liberal has a last refuge, “dangerous precedents.” The suppression of one group, he warns, means the suppression of others, and such action spells the end of the democratic process. We have already referred to his failure in drawing a distinction between a reactionary and a democratic minority. If this distinction were made, how would penalizing the guilty ever endanger the innocent? If a law originally framed against bigots were ever to be subverted to suppress democratic groups, the liberal would naturally fight that issue. But he should not commit himself in advance to a policy of evasion because a given situation (like all those involving human problems) possesses potentialities for evil as well as good. A recent statement by William Henry Chamberlain in connection with the Hartzel case illustrates the type of confusion under discussion. Says the author: “Personally, I should rather see a hundred Hartzels go free than run the risk that one Debs might be convicted.” Note also his assumption that the same court which freed the Nazi would necessarily have done the same for Debs.

(4) The distortion of logic: The liberal fails to draw obvious conclusions not only from his social or political philosophy but from practical situations as well. Consider a few examples:

(a) The liberals’ ineptitude in connection with their own “democratic” war: their criticism of the movie, Mission to Moscow, contained the words “lies,” “propagandistic misrepresentation,” “totalitarianism,” “apology for bloody dictatorship,” etc. They also deplored the mass “cynicism and disillusion” likely to follow this film and indignantly referred to it as an “insult to American intelligence.” The Writers War Board, in condemning the film, stated that “the deepest principle of human liberty is involved, the necessity of telling the truth.” One would gather from all this that the picture was a destructive force the liberal could very well dispense with, especially during a war ostensibly directed against totalitarianism. Yet no one dared to suggest that the picture be withdrawn. Neither was the “public” advised what exactly it was supposed to do in connection with the future showing of the Hollywood ‘epic.’[9] Or take the case of journalists, for instance, like Kahn-Sayers [10], who pile up evidence of alleged sedition existing in this country before and since Pearl Harbor. Powerful native groups are accused of “defeatism,” “obstructionism” and conduct which, as MacLeish complains, “scoffs at the law but takes scrupulous care to stay within it.” Or Norman Cousins, who, among others, attacks the McCormick-Patterson press for “splitting the United Nations,” “weakening American morale” and “jeopardizing the success of military operations.” Yet the only program Sabotage can suggest is to vote for “patriotic congressmen,” and all that Cousins can offer is to say that “the very freedom (the disrupters) are using as a shield has been dented.” [11]

(b) Liberal trade-union policy: Prof. Childs and Counts (ideologically supported by The New Leader) who rather belatedly expelled the Stalinists from the American Federation of Teachers, consider these totalitarians no better than Nazis and fascists. The authors in their America, Russia and the Communist Party in the Post-War World [12] warn us, however, that the Stalinists must not be proscribed since the “ultimate source of the party’s strength derives from the ... injustices ... of American society.” Now it is one thing to argue that social maladjustments give rise to political parties, but it is another to maintain that corruption and criminality should not be punished or that a totalitarian party is ever inevitable or essential. Counts, Childs and other union leaders also fail to draw important lessons from their expulsion of Stalinists. To be consistent in their “democratic” ideals and practices, they should by constant publicity and inter-group arrangements have helped drive them out of every other organization whose activity seriously affects the democratic life of the country. These liberals cannot in any logical or moral sense protect only themselves and be indifferent to their afflicted neighbors. The fact that the expelled Stalinists later entered the CIO should make these leaders reconsider the tenets of their ineffective creed.

(c) Liberal philosophers who are supposed to have made logic their profession: During the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Mortimer Adler accused Hook and his associates of being “atheistic saboteurs ... more dangerous to democracy than Hitler.” Hook and other “rationalists” countered later by charging their opponents with nothing less than “authoritarianism,” “reaction,” “corporate thinking,” “irresponsibility.” How Hook and others who have polemized for years against totalitarianism ever expected to effect a “united front” with them in behalf of “democracy” is never explained. Actually the rift at this meeting was between the same forces which – according to the liberals’ war aims – were engaged in global conflict. Since the “rationalists” never made this clear, other liberal participants, also in characteristic, befuddled fashion, tried to reconcile the two factions, deploring what they considered manifestations of mere “bad taste,” “acrimony” and “ill temper.” Horace Kallen summed up both his own and his colleagues’ disorientation with, “the softness of the liberal’s heart (in dealing with bigotry) has gone to his head.” But after warning further that such tolerance may mean “suicide,” he concluded lamely that “the democratic way is the way toward equal liberty for different doctrines” [13]

I should like to comment briefly upon Professor Overstreet’s remarks at the conference, since they have especial significance with regard to religious freedom. He stated that “a man can believe in a perfectly cockeyed theology and still be a royally fine person.” He also described his friend Father Ryan as “that grand old fighter for the human decencies.” Does Overstreet mean that a man’s ideas concerning human conduct have no effect upon his behavior? Suppose a person takes his “cockeyed” theology seriously by attempting to put it into practice. Will not his ideas eventuate into “cockeyed” actions? Father Ryan, who apparently takes his religion seriously, informs us that if ever Catholics constituted a majority of our population, they would deny those religious liberties which they themselves enjoy to all others because only Catholic theology is infallible. [14] How does Overstreet reconcile “human decencies” with a dictatorial theology? I stated earlier that an attack upon any group because of race, color or nationality should be liable to prosecution. A group naturally is not responsible for these, but it is for its religion. On the basis of my argument concerning opinions as distinct from their social consequences, I maintain that a person’s religious views, like his others, should be subject to control if they are “cockeyed” enough to libel, slander or disseminate totalitarian propaganda. All the more is such social control necessary wherever anyone attempts to express his religious views organizationally by means of proselytizing party or church. Failing to draw this important distinction between a purely private religion which has no evil social effects and one which does, has kept liberalism constantly on the defensive. This is clearly indicated both in hooks on civil liberties where religious freedom is treated in terms of “sacredness,” “inviolability,” etc., and in “practical politics” where everyone, including the liberals, generally sacrifices the truth, rather than “antagonize” this or that religious group (e.g., The Saturday Review of Literature will not accept an advertisement from The Converted Catholic Magazine). Organized churches, of course, have lost no opportunity in exploiting their advantageous position by construing any criticism of their secular policies as desecrations upon man’s “private” religion.


1. In fairness to the liberal, it should be stressed that his suspicious attitude toward statism follows not only from recent events but also from theories rooted in traditional ‘individualism” expressed as laissez-faire, utilitarianism, rationalism, empiricism, protestantism, parliamentarianism, natural rights, etc., in the respective fields of economics, ethics, philosophy, religion, politics and law. The historical framework of these concepts will be indicated later, especially in footnote 7.

2. See the articles and bibliographical data in The Annals, September 1942 (especially the contributions by Klineberg, Lee and Miller) and the material gathered by the various inter-racial and religious organizations, as well as the works by Powdermaker, Logan, Benedict, McWilliams, Vickery and Cole, Davis-Dubois and, of course, Myrdal.

3. Q.v. the Z. Chafee. Jr., school of thought; e.g., Free Speech in the U.S.

4. Interesting in this connection is the rationale behind the defense of CP “rights” by such men as Hays, Baldwin and Ernst. Since, they argue, the CP has never been able to poll a sufficient number of votes to have any political significance, it represents no danger. They urge all liberals to concentrate their attacks upon the fascists. Thus their defense is not based upon any principle of libertarian justice to which they offer so much lip service, but is motivated instead by sheer expediency. Moreover, their argument is self-contradictory: they assume that the extent and type of influence exerted by a political group can be determined merely by its electoral power, and at the same time they urge people to combat totalitarian groups which have not even become influential enough to present formidable candidates!

5. A convenient summary of these reasons against illegalization of bigotry may be found in Can Anti-Semitism Be Outlawed? by S.A. Fineberg, The Contemporary Jewish Record, December 1943. The author attempts to show the juridical difficulty involved, by referring mostly to precedents in Germany. The latter are discussed by A. Doskow and S. Jacob in Anti-Semitism and Law in Pre-War Germany, The Contemporary Jewish Record, September-October 1940. Fineberg’s major weakness, besides those which I shall now deal with, consists in assuming that the general conditions prevailing in Germany were comparable to those in the U.S. today. The German liberals, by the way, never attempted to formulate group libel laws.

6. One might gather from the liberal’s objections that he is in a position to know the inadequacy of such method, having utilized others with greater success. He has not even availed himself fully of the usual liberal methods of combat, e.g., lobbying, mass protests, boycottmg, etc., let alone employed the more radical techniques of marches, picketing, etc.

7. He never even stops to trace the class genesis of this goal, its economic, ideological and technological antecedents. In the struggle between capitalism and feudalism the “open arena” meant the freedom of the bourgeoisie to compete, conquer, exploit and defend property. In terms of a new class morality, it stressed the uniqueness of man, the superiority of reason over faith and of man’s natural goodness over the corrupting institutions – church, monarchy, nobility. Later the democratic ideal was buttressed by certain pragmatic-experimental aspects when scientific technics became an inherent part of American capitalism.

8. Another typical example of contradiction is afforded by the recent wave of the liberals’ adulation lavished upon Swiss “democracy” (yesterday it was Scandinavia’s “middle way”). What the liberals do not explain is how the democratic processes in Switzerland have not been impaired by the illegalization of the Nazis, fascists and Communists. To be completely consistent, the liberal should do more than insist upon liberties for totalitarians (Max Lerner in one of his expansive moods demanded them for all, regardless of time, place and circumstance). He ought to go out of his way to facilitate the public meetings of bigots. Milton Mayer seems to be the only one “courageous” enough to accept the suicidal implications of his libertarian creed. That is why he can enjoy the luxury of baiting PM, The Nation and The New Republic for not bestirring themselves in behalf of the Voltairean tradition. Where were they, he asks, when “Coughlin was being suppressed and Lizzie Dilling railroaded?” (Just a Little Fascism, The Progressive, April 2, 1945. See also his The Hollywood Squeeze, July 23. 1945). For a nauseating variation of this theme of “loving” the fascists to death, vide Overcoming Antisemitism by S. Fineberg or the letters to Bilbo by the Negro Labor Committee and the Knitgood Workers Union (The New Leader, July 28, 1945; The Call, September 10, 1945).

9. The attack upon the picture, on the other hand, as conducted by those associated with the Trotskyist movement both here and abroad was intelligent in that it was motivated by political consistency. They exposed historical distortions, totalitarian aspects of American propaganda, etc., and they also supplemented this journalistic activity with picketing wherever possible. That was all they were supposed to do. Unlike the liberals and those radicals who supported the war only militarily (Norman Thomas and many of his followers, the Social Democratic Federation, the intellectual companions of The New Leader and Partisan Review, especially the latter’s former editors, Greenberg and Macdonald et al.), the Trotskyists were not interested in advising the state how to conduct its ideological warfare.

10. Sabotage.

11. The Poison-Gas Boys, Saturday Review of Literature, January 22, 1944. Note Goering’s recent comment that “we got all the information we needed from some of your magazines and newspapers.”

12. Q.v., The American Teacher, May 1941.

13. Hook. S., Theological Tom-Tom and Metaphysical Bagpipe, The Humanist, Autumn 1942, and Pro and Con the Conference, etc., The Humanist, Spring 1943.

14. Catholic Principles of Politics. This is the man whose recent death called forth such fulsome praise from the liberal press, including that pious sheet, The Daily Worker. For Catholic religious and political objectives consult the files of The Converted Catholic magazine.

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