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From The New International, Vol. XIII No. 8, October 1947, pp. 234–241.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
To the Bitter End
by Hans Bernd Givesius
Houghton-Mifflin. Inc. 1947
Translated by Richard and Clara Winston
It is rare indeed to find a work of contemporary history which succeeds in bringing to life the great drama of the tragedies of our time. The book, To the Bitter End, by the German oppositionist, H.B. Gisevius, is such a work; it is both a brilliant picture of the dynamics of the Nazi regime, its leadership and opposition, and a completely convincing analysis of the work and problems of the anti-Nazi elements within Germany.
I believe that this book will be the primary source record of the Hitler opposition for the historians. Certainly no one else was in the position of Gisevius and alive to tell the story. The author was an integral part of the leadership of the military and civilian junta who were actively opposed to Hitler; an intimate of Beck and Goefdeler, the two leading figures of the opposition; and at the same time a man of letters who has carefully recorded the history of that movement.
To the Bitter End is a long book, as is befitting the history of a revolutionary movement. Fortunately, unlike the histories of most defeated revolutions, Gisevius has provided us with the materials for the most detailed study of that revolution and the opportunity to check all the theories and speculations of the Marxists and liberals in the days before the Hitler defeat.
The most striking aspect of this history of the opposition is that it deals almost exclusively with the role of the German generals. No doubt some liberals and vulgar Marxists will raise the cry that the history is therefore inadequate; that since the working class is not discussed at any great length and its role in the opposition to Hitler dismissed very lightly, Gisevius thereby ignores the role of the only viable class in modern industrial society.
This document proves that Hitler’s fascism succeeded in accomplishing the complete atomization of the German working class. Trotsky’s warning, in answer to the smug complacency of the school typified by Manuilsky’s “After fascism, we come,” has been proved true. Fascism did mean the destruction of all the working class organizations. The old unions had no existence, legal or illegal. The working class parties had been destroyed. The underground committee of the Social Democrats “was little more than a loose, tenuous and undisciplined circle. The underground committee of the Communist Party, riddled at its very top with agents of the Gestapo, played no active role and at its strongest, represented nothing more than the potential power of a bargaining agent for the Russians.
Fascism meant that the German workers were unable to accomplish their own revolution. The unquestioned leadership of the German military men demonstrated that the German workers found it impossible to play ANY organized role, let alone that of the leader in the struggle against Hitler.
For most of the Hitler decade, the army was the only force in Germany that was never completely taken over by the Nazi party bureaucracy. The army’s tradition, organization and prestige proved sufficient to resist integration at the top by the Nazi’s, and in large measure, in the lower ranks as well. The dramatic story of Goering’s failure in his attempt to take command of the army through the now well known frame-up of the general, Fritsche, and the Blomberg scandal, are examples of the army’s resistance to Nazi integration. Germany was an example of the Bonapartist role that can be played by the army when the working class, for whatever the reason, fails to play the role history has cast for her. The fact that the army did not play this role does not disprove the point; Gisevius furnishes us ample evidence to demonstrate that on different occasions, the generals could have succeeded in making themselves masters of the state.
At each crisis in Hitler’s rule, the distinct possibility arose of the army’s deposing the Nazis. We learn of the frequency of these crises, of the remarkable indecision and weakness at the top of the state. Why then did the conspirators, among whom were the most important figures in the German military machine, fail to accomplish this end? They failed at each crisis and at the very end, the tragic attempted putsch of July 20, 1944, when they headed a conspiracy supported by all the authoritative anti-Nazi civilian figures, their failure cost them their lives at the hands of the Nazis.
The military men opposed Hitler primarily because they were convinced all during the Thirties that he was leading the nation to a war that could only end for Germany in complete and disastrous defeat. This was reason enough for many of them consistently to oppose Hitler’s policy before and after Munich; for General Beck to resign his position as head of the army; further, at a later stage, for many of the most important men in the machine to act treasonably in attempted collaboration with emissaries of the Allies. This was part of their policy to bring the war to a quick end at almost any terms before the material superiority of the Allies would bring the country to her knees. Gisevius’ revelations here are of the highest importance.
If we can accept the word of the man praised by the chief of the US Office of Strategic Services as thoroughly reliable and one who was probably the most important witness for the prosecution at the Nuremberg trial, we now have confirmation that the Allies were aware for the last five years and more of Hitler’s rule that the bulk of the army leadership was opposed to him. We know now that the Allies turned a deaf ear to the pleas of the German oppositionists and refused to collaborate with them. The reasoning that justified their use of the atom bomb over Nagasaki and-Hiroshima, but denied themselves the “moral” right to deal with the German oppositionists is quite revealing. We are justified in drawing the conclusion, if Gisevius does not, that Roosevelt and Chamberlain and later Churchill, feared the possible consequences of local disturbances in Germany so much that they preferred to continue the war rather than risk that eventuality. Another consideration of the Allies was their constant hope and even conviction that Hitler would turn and concentrate Germany’s military power upon Russia. A revolution in Germany would have removed that possibility.
Why did the conspiracy of the generals fail? Given their powerful motives and the strong material forces at their disposal, the answer of the Hitler “mystique” is thoroughly unsatisfactory. The Hitler popularity was not a mystical quality. It was grounded in the successes and failures of the regime. After the victory at Munich, the easy triumph over Poland and after the occupation of Paris, Hitler’s prestige was high. The generals would not and could not oppose the seemingly invincible figure of the Fuehrer. But after defeats and the worsening of the military and the material situation, the mystique was mysteriously missing. All of the elements for decisive action were present.
Gisevius’ limitation is that at each crisis and consequent failure of the opposition, he sees their collapse as the result of the failure of nerve and of character. The fact of the failure of nerve and character is true. With the exception of Beck, the leading military men were spineless and cowardly figures who drew back each time when the moment for decisive action came. One general after another within the conspiracy revealed the same traits at each emergency.
But to leave the answer at this does not tell the whole tale. The pattern of the generals’ behavior is a constant refrain of this book. We can draw the only conclusion; that this was not a wholly accidental variation of history.
Beck was the exception, the only one who was able to break from the lifetime habits and training of the military school. And we should point out that by the outbreak of the war, Beck no longer held any official position in the army. It was part of the pattern of the lives of the officer caste that they should find it impossible to take decisive revolutionary action. To commit themselves irrevocably to steps which might lead to social disturbances and disorder was almost organically impossible for men who spent their lives in the training of the professional German army. It was not inevitable that the military men could not actually overthrow totalitarianism; we can say that it was highly unlikely that in such a situation more than one Beck could appear from the ranks of the Junker officers.
We can state as a fact that in Germany, the training, old habits and convictions of the generals proved too strong for them to overcome. Their “character” was molded by their life’s work; this was the Achilles heel of the generals’ revolution.
The role of the dictator within the totalitarian system is here outlined very clearly. From the moment that Hitler took power, his principal task was that of maintaining a balance between the different forces within the totalitarian regime. Oppositions took new forms. Such fundamental forces within the country as the different and often conflicting sections of the bourgeoisie, the clergy, the lower middle class, peasantry and the working class, were no longer represented by the old legal parties, unions, trade associations and church organizations, but found their representation within the figures and tendencies of the Nazi party and state. From the forces of the left represented by such figures as Roehm to the forces of the right as typified by Schacht, every one was involved in the rivalries within the regime itself. Hitler was an adept opportunist, ever shifting the weight of the forces he led.
The complete inability of totalitarianism to solve the military, economic and social problems of the country was the reason Hitler was never able to achieve real stability and was the essential reason why at the end decisive forces within the regime took military action against the Fuehrer. Hitler’s role as the eternal opportunist, never certain of stability and unable to permit any of the members of his Cabinet to achieve too much power, is a forcible reminder of the weakness of the totalitarian regime, even when it appears to be all-conquering. The nature of totalitarianism in Germany was extremely deceptive; its strength was apparent, but the deep-going weaknesses and cleavages were hidden from most of the world.
This section of the book causes automatic speculation about Soviet Russia. The note in the August 29, 1947, issue of the New York Times reporting the self-exile into France of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian occupation forces in Germany is one of the few pieces of evidence which have seen the light of day concerning the friction and struggle which may well be raging within the party and military bureaucracy of the Russian totalitarian state. As we now know was the case with Germany, we may be sure that the diplomatic representatives of the US and England have far more concrete information on these struggles than have been permitted to be made public.
This book is a brilliant memoir and a valuable social document. It is rich in the factual material of the last days of Hitler’s Reich and its evidence can serve to stimulate discussion on the all-important question of the dynamics of revolution under totalitarianism.
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