The Russo-German Alliance: August 1939 – June 1941, by A. Rossi (Angelo Tasca) 1949
On 12 November 1940, probably a few hours before Molotov’s arrival in Berlin, Hitler issued Directive 18, signed by Jodl, [1] which dealt with the military situation. The idea of invading Britain was provisionally abandoned, but all the operations enumerated in the directive were intended to be the opening phase of a large-scale manoeuvre to isolate her. The most important objectives were: to capture Gibraltar, obtain a foothold in Morocco, and thus ‘chase Britain out of the western Mediterranean’. France, in the meantime, might perhaps be persuaded to support Germany in the struggle. In the eastern Mediterranean the British were to be trapped between the German drive towards Greece and the Italian push in Egypt. The Axis air forces were given the job of hunting the British fleet from its lairs.
The document also explained that the movement of the German forces eastwards was to continue while the Reich government tried to discover and clarify the present attitude of Russia. [2] This was precisely what Hitler was up to in his talks with Molotov, for the first of their interviews was during the afternoon of the same day.
Hitler had been most disappointed and annoyed at the result of the conversations. [3] On 13 November he told Goering that Russia’s demands must be rejected and that he would not tolerate her ambitions in Southern Europe. [4] Keitel later explained that these demands ‘alarmed the Führer’:
Molotov was considering making war on Finland a second time so as to occupy the whole country, and he was also thinking of expanding in the direction of the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The Führer saw in these schemes the beginning of a great encircling movement against Germany. Just then he was receiving reports on the tremendous expansion of the Soviet war industries, and this worried him a great deal. [5]
Molotov was quite willing to receive his slice in the new world share-out which was being planned in the Three-Power Pact, but without having to give up the Balkans. Hitler had no illusions about this. ‘Herr Molotov’, he wrote to Mussolini on 20 November, ‘has made it plain that he was becoming increasingly interested in the Balkans.’ [6] Any doubts there may have been on this score were dispelled by Molotov’s letter of 25 November 1940, in which he stated the conditions on which the Soviet would join the Three-Power Pact. [7] The plan on which the Nazis had worked for several weeks for refloating the pact of August 1939 and diverting the Russians from the Balkans did not survive the test of the Berlin talks. According to von Papen, who is a good judge, it was then that Germany lost the war, [8] since that was the moment when war with Russia became inevitable.
Caught in the Toils: Thenceforth the war with Russia became Hitler’s obsession. The naval chiefs, especially Admiral Raeder, insisted on its being postponed until after the victory over Britain, [9] but Hitler did not give way to their arguments. Bearing in mind, he said, ‘Russia’s inclination to interfere in Balkan affairs, it is necessary to eliminate at all costs the last enemy remaining on the continent’ [10] before possibly being able to reach an agreement with Britain. For Britain was sustained in her struggle only because of the hopes she placed in the United States and Russia. The United States had been neutralised by the Three-Power Pact, but the only thing to be done with Russia was to eliminate her:
Stalin [Hitler told his admirals] must be regarded as a cold-blooded blackmailer; he would, if expedient, repudiate any written treaty at any time. Britain’s aim for some time to come will be to set Russian strength in motion against us. If the USA and Russia should enter the war against Germany, the situation would become very complicated. Any possibility for such a threat to develop must be eliminated at the very beginning. [11]
His decision was made between the end of November and the end of December, although he tried to conceal it even from Mussolini. [12] At the beginning of December Hitler agreed that the offensive should be launched on 15 May 1941, a date suggested to him by General Halder [13] and given in Directive 21 containing the strategic data for ‘operation Barbarossa’ against the USSR. Soviet Russia was to be thrown back beyond a line running from Archangel to the Volga, and the German air force would, if necessary, undertake to destroy the distant industrial centres in the Urals. [14]
Hitler thought he could bring this immense operation to a successful conclusion in a few months ‘by means of a quick campaign before the end of the war with Britain’. Chronologically, Russia was now first on the list for execution, but the main objective was still victory over Britain.
The defeat of the Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1940 proved that to continue the offensive against Britain Germany would have to throw in everything she had, and could not afford the luxury of detaching a large force to guard the Eastern front. The rapid conclusion of a victorious campaign in the East would allow her to concentrate all her resources against her principal enemy before Britain could utilise the shipments from America which, for 1942, were said to be on a very large scale.
On the other hand, since there was no likelihood, as Ribbentrop himself realised, of the war with Britain ending before 1942, and even the risk that it might last longer, Germany needed a substantial part of Russia’s economic resources. The Nazi leaders recognised this fact when they met in Berlin on 2 May 1941: ‘The war can only be carried on if our armed forces are fed entirely by Russia during the third year of hostilities.’ [15] Alfred Rosenberg had reminded them a month earlier that the principal aim of the occupation of Russia was ‘to acquire those materials which were essential for continuing the struggle against England’. [16]
At this point the question may be asked why Germany did not agree to discuss the Soviet proposals outlined in Molotov’s letter of 25 November 1940. Why did she not try to reach a political compromise? And why was Russia not asked for even greater supplies, which she would doubtless not have refused to provide?
The reason seems clear. It was too late for the two partners to return to the state of affairs – and to the illusions, in so far as they ever had any – existing in August and September 1939. Each had revealed his plans, and his greed, during the conversations in November 1940. At Berlin they had put their cards on the table, and now the spell was broken. From that moment Molotov knew that Hitler would not stand for any further Soviet encroachments in the North or in the Balkans. Hitler was afraid that as soon as he was heavily engaged in the West in the final struggle with Britain, Stalin would seize the opportunity of carrying out his programme by annexing Finland, occupying Bulgaria and moving into the Dardanelles. Germany and the USSR had each sized up the other’s lust for power, which from now on was to be indulged in identical areas. Their interests had seemed reconcilable in 1939, but now they conflicted. Neither side could ever trust the other again. The two partners had had time to get to know each other well; the similarity of their methods and the same lack of scruple which had enabled them to work together in 1939 now made them enemies.
The Struggle in the Balkans: The Soviet leaders wished to stay out of the war at all costs. Their plan was thenceforth to wait for the war to spread, until both the United States in the West and Japan in the East were involved. If Russia succeeded in keeping out of the fray until the eleventh hour, she would then no doubt be in a much better position to obtain her share in the partitioning of the world.
The Russian leaders were well aware of the aims of German policy in the Balkans and did all they could to counteract them, but they confined themselves for the moment to political and diplomatic methods. The Communist parties were mobilised, and from the end of 1940 they started to agitate against German influence in the Danubian countries and the Balkans, forming a nucleus inside these countries for all those currents of opinion and movements capable of fighting or merely paralysing the activities of any government which happened to be pro-German, such as the Serb nationalists in Belgrade and the ‘Iron Guard’ in Bucharest. Even more important, they embarked on a battle of notes and communiqués which showed their distrust and dislike of Berlin’s new policy.
But Germany was in a hurry, and was daily reinforcing her positions in the Balkans with complete disregard for Soviet protests. Actually, these could not go very far, for whereas Hitler had decided on war, Stalin was anxious to avoid it. Barely a week after Molotov’s return to Moscow a whole series of agreements which had been brewing for some time was put through under German auspices. On 20 November 1940, Hitler met the Hungarian leaders in Vienna and secured their adherence to the Three-Power Pact. On the 22nd General Jan Antonescu went to Berlin, where Hitler asked for his support in the struggle against the ‘Slav wave’ and dazzled him with the possibility of getting his ‘revenge’ on the Russians; on the following day Rumania too joined the Three-Power Pact. On the 28th the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Markovich, went to Berchtesgaden. The position in Yugoslavia was more difficult, and Hitler had to step more warily and arrange the change-over with tact. But he took drastic measures: if Yugoslavia would go over to the Axis and assist Germany in the Balkans, even if she did not play an active part, she would receive a share of the booty at Greece’s expense by being allowed to occupy Salonica. Bulgaria’s share was to be Eastern Thrace. [17]
This worried the Russians, and they tried to parry the blow. As Molotov had explained at Berlin, they were particularly interested in Bulgaria. Consequently, on 18 November 1940, Molotov summoned Stamenoff, the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow, and speaking in a ‘vigorous yet friendly’ way, made the following statement:
Is Bulgaria too going to join the Three-Power Pact? Bulgaria’s future is of great concern to Soviet Russia who, because of her historic responsibilities, wants a strong Bulgaria. The Soviet government is of the opinion that Bulgaria should achieve her national aims against Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. It had said as much to Hitler. The Soviet government is ready to give every assistance to Bulgaria. It will also support the present Bulgarian regime and the Czar (Boris), whom it considers to be intelligent and loyal. But the Bulgarian government must inform him of its ties with Italy and Germany... If there is any question of a guarantee it will also be given by the Soviet government. [18]
Nothing was achieved by the Soviet’s pressure on Bulgaria and the many fair words that accompanied it, especially as the Bulgarian leaders knew precisely what Russia’s real intentions were, for they had been bluntly described by Molotov in the Berlin talks. Stalin’s representative in Berlin had, it is true, declared that Russia would not change the internal order of Bulgaria ‘by a hair’s-breadth’, [19] and that she intended to secure for her ‘an outlet to the Aegean Sea’, [20] but he had demanded for Russia the right to give her a special guarantee based on a pact of mutual assistance. [21] Moreover Sofia soon found out that in its written proposals of 25 November the Soviet government had asked that, in exchange for joining the Three-Power Pact, Bulgaria should be included in the Russian sphere of interest and security. [22]
On 25 November 1940, a week after the Moscow talks, the Soviet government officially sent its proposal for a pact of mutual assistance to Sofia. On the same day the Soviet representative at the Danubian Conference, Skobelev, was granted an interview by King Boris and spoke also to M Filov, the head of the government. The plan miscarried, for in his reply on 30 November the Bulgarian Foreign Minister explained that although the Bulgarian people did not renounce their claims on Western Thrace, they preferred to achieve them ‘by peaceful means’ without a clash with Turkey, who would have been alarmed by the pact proposed by Moscow. It might also risk spoiling the friendly relations between Bulgaria and Germany. These were all reasons which made them prefer to have nothing to do with it. On the other hand, the Bulgarian government had in principle agreed to join the Three-Power Pact – and surely Russia could see no harm in this ‘as she was considering doing the same thing herself’. [23]
Moscow found it difficult to accept the situation created in Rumania by the presence of German troops. The Soviet government had already tried to come to an agreement direct with Bucharest on the question of jointly administering the ‘maritime Danube’, from which Germany and Italy were to be excluded, but Antonescu had informed Hitler of this manoeuvre. [24] On 11 December Moscow came back with a new set of proposals, which were rejected. [25] Actually, this move recoiled on the heads of the Russians, for it gave rise to a German démarche in Moscow [26] and caused a deadlock in the Danubian Conference. The conference adjourned on 22 December and its work was never resumed. [27]
Germany, now sure of Hungary and Rumania and hoping at least to neutralise Yugoslavia, persevered methodically with her plans. Hitler himself confirmed to Mussolini the fact that since 13 December ‘German troops were almost continuously en route for Rumania’, whose railways had been placed at their disposal. [28] The Soviet government wanted precise details of the numbers involved and the purpose of the troop movements, but Ribbentrop ordered von Schulenburg to avoid answering these questions. [29]
Bulgaria: The Slippery Slope: To reach the Greek frontier, all that remained was to win over Bulgaria. The Soviet leaders vainly hoped to prevent Germany from seizing this country. On 17 January 1941, Molotov summoned von Schulenburg and, after expressing surprise at not having received a reply to his letter of 25 November, betrayed his anxiety at the concentration in Rumania of German troops who were apparently ready to march into Bulgaria. Were they going to occupy Greece and the Dardanelles? Molotov emphasised, as he had already done in Berlin, that Bulgaria was in Russia’s security zone and that it would be a violation of this zone if it were occupied by German troops. [30] Ribbentrop replied on 22 January that the sole purpose of the measures taken by Germany in the Balkans was to prevent the British from landing in Greece. Once this had been achieved, the German troops would be withdrawn. [31]
Instead of reassuring the Russians, these statements merely increased their fears. Berlin was in fact working steadily to secure Bulgaria’s cooperation in its plans and succeeded in doing so during the second half of February 1941. Nothing better reveals the German tactics than Ribbentrop’s instructions to von Schulenburg on 27 February. The German Ambassador was to telephone Molotov on the evening of 28 February and announce that Bulgaria would formally sign an undertaking to join the Three-Power Pact on 1 March. No written note, and not a word more. Next day, on 1 March, again in the evening, von Schulenburg was to telephone Molotov a second time and inform him that German troops were entering Bulgaria. If there was any discussion, he was to repeat the usual assurances. Molotov protested and declared that Russia would not support Germany’s action in Bulgaria. It was the least he could say, and von Schulenburg notified Berlin that Moscow would confine itself to a protest. [32] On 1 March the Bulgarian government informed the Soviet Minister in Sofia that it had agreed to the entry of the German troops. Vyshinsky told the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow that this would drag Bulgaria into the war and that his government ‘could not support the Bulgarian government in the application of its present policy’. That was all.
Sand in the Machinery: Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria: the chain was complete, and Germany could march her troops into Greece whenever she pleased.
But a few grains of sand managed to find their way into this precision-made machinery. It ought to have run smoothly enough, but they came near to throwing it out of gear.
First, there were the unfortunate experiences of the Italian armed forces in Africa, the Mediterranean and Albania. General Wavell’s offensive began on 9 December 1940. The attack took the Italians by surprise – it ‘came like a thunderbolt’ Ciano remarked sadly in his diary [33] – and in the space of a few weeks the British had reached Benghazi. The second claw of the pincer movement which was to have thrown back the British to Suez was broken. Hitler had at first refused to send troops to stiffen the shattered Italian forces in Libya, but to avoid disaster he was forced to form the Afrika Korps. In the Mediterranean the Italian fleet was so severely mauled as to be practically annihilated at Taranto, so much so that it was scarcely in a condition to guard the convoys. But most serious of all was what happened on the Greek frontier, for instead of advancing into Epirus the Italian divisions were thrown back into Albania and suffered a series of defeats. The Italian ally was becoming a millstone round Hitler’s neck, and Field Marshal List’s troops had to occupy Greece as much to tow out the Italians as to drive out the British.
Spain’s reaction to this state of affairs was unfavourable. On 7 December 1940, Admiral Canaris sent Franco a message from Hitler asking him to allow the free passage of the German troops due to enter Spain on 10 January 1941 for the attack on Gibraltar. [34] Franco had been very enterprising in July 1940, but he had now grown wiser: thenceforth ‘he was scared’, [35] and fear gave him the courage to refuse. Meanwhile, the chances of inveigling France into cooperating against Britain were reduced by the palace revolution at Vichy on 13 December.
The Coup d'État in Yugoslavia: Hitler’s plans were disorganised by yet another event. In Yugoslavia, everything seemed to be going smoothly. On 25 March the Belgrade government agreed to join the Three-Power Pact; but two days later it was overthrown by a coup d'état and the Regent, Prince Paul, was expelled. This exploit was backed by the pro-Soviet faction. Hitler, very angry, decided on war, whatever the promises made to him by the new government. He reached this decision on 27 March during a conference with the High Command at which the operational orders were drawn up. [36] The attack was launched on the morning of 6 April.
Stalin was delighted by the turn of events in Belgrade at the end of March. It could, he thought, bring the German machine to a halt. It was war in the Balkans, a mountain war in which the Wehrmacht would wear itself out, or at any rate be side-tracked for a time from the Eastern frontier. It was important that Yugoslavia should hold out as long as possible. To encourage her to resist, Stalin suddenly signed a friendship and non-aggression pact with M Gavrilovich, the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, on the morning of 6 April. It amounted to nothing more than moral support and vague promises; [37] and Stalin had 5 April inserted as the date of the pact so that Germany should not be able to accuse Russia of violating Yugoslavia’s neutrality. [38] Nobody was taken in by this little stratagem. According to Ribbentrop, Hitler considered the Soviet gesture an insult, [39] although Moscow had taken the precaution of informing him of it beforehand. [40]
The combined Yugoslav and Greek campaigns (operation Marita) were over in a few days. The Serbian army surrendered unconditionally on 17 April, and on the 27th the Germans reached Athens. As early as 15 April the British began to evacuate the troops rushed in from Egypt. The last formations had left the Peloponnese by the end of the month and all these British operations ended in a victory for Germany with the occupation of Crete (20-31 May).
The right flank of the ‘operation Barbarossa’ zone was thus strongly protected against an attack from Africa or the Near East. Any possible threat to the Rumanian oil-fields had been averted. But for Germany the most serious, and indeed the irreparable result of events in Belgrade was that she found it impossible to keep to her ‘D day’ for the attack on Russia on 15 May, the date decided in December. [41] At the beginning of April this date had to be postponed by about five weeks, that is, put forward to the second half of June. [42] On 30 April it was finally fixed for 22 June. [43] The consequences of postponing it were later summarised by Karl von Ritter, the Ambassador, as follows: ‘This delay cost the Germans the winter battle before Moscow, and it was there that the war was lost.’ [44]
At Daggers Drawn: The USSR’s refusal to effect some kind of withdrawal into Asia, as Berlin had suggested, and her fixed determination to continue expanding westwards, rekindled in Hitler and his colleagues the distrust and hatred which had been damped down by their 10 months of profitable cooperation. For Hitler, Stalin now stood revealed as a ‘cold-blooded blackmailer’ [45] who had to be got rid of; and Ribbentrop, so smitten formerly, now declared that he was ‘extremely sceptical of the good faith of the Russians’. [46] Hitler saw the only guarantee of good relations between Russia and Germany in the German divisions drawn up on the frontier. [47] The Berlin conversations which were to inaugurate a new period of cooperation ‘built to last centuries’ had even brought down the scaffolding of the August – September agreements of 1939.
In this connection, Germany had chalked up several things to her credit. The Soviet leaders had been forced to disclose the full extent of their ambitions in order to resist the pressure applied to them by the Three-Power Pact. They described them in precise and unequivocal terms in their proposals of 25 November. They thus presented Hitler with a dangerous weapon which he later used against any countries so threatened. Thenceforth they were all afraid of being left face to face with their powerful neighbour in the East, who they knew was ready to pounce on them at the first favourable opportunity.
It is lamentable that Finland and Rumania should have ended by linking their destinies to the military might of Germany and become the left and right wings respectively of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front. But their blunder can to some extent be explained; it was due primarily to the attitude of Soviet Russia. Finland would undoubtedly have kept out of the world conflict if Russia had not attacked her in December 1939, and dismembered her in March 1940. Nor would she have entered the war at the end of June 1941 had not Russia demanded, at Berlin in November 1940, a free hand to ‘settle accounts with her’. It was owing to these incontrovertible facts that Hitler was able to entice Finland into the German camp. The first contacts between the General Staffs of the two countries were made as early as December. [48] Moscow’s chief aim was to isolate Finland so as to subjugate her the more easily. In a conversation with Ribbentrop on 12 December 1940, Dekanozov, the new Ambassador in Berlin, stated that Russia had ‘deliberately adopted a hostile attitude’ to the proposed agreement which was being considered by Finland and Sweden. In December 1939, during the honeymoon period of the German – Soviet Pact, Germany had intervened to prevent the Scandinavian countries forming a united front with Finland. [49] Why should she not do the same now? In an effort to persuade him, Dekanozov produced a report from Mme Kollontai, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, alleging that behind these plans for a Finnish – Swedish rapprochement was ‘the desire to free Finland from German influence’. The Soviet government was ‘strongly opposed to them’. But Ribbentrop prevaricated, and the Soviet démarche had absolutely no effect. [50]
Rumania, already worried by the encroachments of the Soviet troops in the Danubian delta, was convinced that Russia wanted to annex the whole region of Moldavia, and ‘hoped that Germany would prevent this by armed force’. [51] Between December 1940 and March 1941, Antonescu saw Hitler three times and the terms of the German – Rumanian military alliance were settled. [52] During this period Russia became increasingly isolated. Hungary took advantage of the Belgrade crisis to attack Yugoslavia; [53] Bulgaria intervened in Thrace and Macedonia; [54] and Turkey, now warned of Russia’s designs on Eastern Anatolia and the Dardanelles, proclaimed her non-belligerency. [55] Russia made every effort to calm her fears, but in vain. The Soviet government had denied early in February various rumours that it had reached ‘a secret agreement to provide Turkey with arms so that she could oppose any possible outbreak in the Balkans’. [56] But now, disturbed by the turn of events, it published a note on 25 March stating that if Turkey was attacked she could count ‘on the complete understanding and neutrality of the USSR’. [57] From the end of February 1941, von Papen became very active in Ankara and his efforts resulted in the signing of a German – Turkish treaty of neutrality and non-aggression on 18 June. [58]
Preparations for the Eastern Offensive: On their side, Hitler and his leaders speeded up preparations for the military onslaught on Russia, [59] camouflaging it, especially from mid-April, as a diversionary manoeuvre in the impending attack on Britain. It was to be ‘the greatest piece of deception in history’. [60]
The first political and economic directives for their policy in the Eastern territories were drafted at the same time. In Keitel’s initial instructions on 13 May 1941, ‘Reichsführer SS’ Himmler was entrusted with a number of ‘special missions’. [61] Anti-Jewish measures were drawn up as early as 19 March [62] and detailed instructions were ready by 7 May. [63] A note from the Führer’s Headquarters signed by Warlimont on 12 March ordered the ‘immediate liquidation’ [64] of any Red Army political commissar taken prisoner, and next day there was a further order from Hitler signed by Keitel containing instructions for the application of martial law in the occupied territories. [65]
On about 2 April 1941, Alfred Rosenberg, the great ‘specialist’ on Eastern affairs, had written a report on the USSR and the fate that was in store for it. [66] His zeal was rewarded shortly afterwards by his appointment on 20 April as ‘Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories’. [67] In this capacity he drew up a preliminary establishment for his department, in a note written on 29 April, [68] and on 8 May sent to ‘all Reich Commissars for the Eastern Territories’ his first instructions regarding the future status of Russia. Included in this programme was the reoccupation of the Baltic states and the dismemberment of the ‘Russian Empire’. [69]
In the economic sphere, General Thomas, head of the War Economics Department of the OKW, held a meeting of his staff towards the end of February 1941 to work out a scheme for the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories. [70] The ‘Oldenburg Plan’ committee went over them in detail several times, for example, on 21 March [71] and 29 April. [72] A meeting of Reich Secretaries of State, to which reference has already been made, [73] decided on 2 May that the Soviet territories were to provide all the foodstuffs necessary for the whole of the German armed forces, although they anticipated that this ‘would doubtless result in the death of several million people from starvation’. [74] Directives for this plan were given in a memorandum from the Economics Department of the OKW dated 23 May. [75]
There was, therefore, no need for any improvisation, for everything was worked out to the last detail at least a month before the offensive began. The most atrocious measures were discussed and planned by the Nazi leaders – under Hitler – not in the heat of battle, but cold-bloodedly and resolutely in the peaceful atmosphere of their committee meetings. All the documents proving their existence provide terrifying evidence of the extent to which a combination of passion, self-interest and doctrine can corrupt the ruling caste of a country and, through it, a whole section of its people.
The Neutralisation of Japan: When M Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, left Moscow for Berlin towards the end of March 1941, he was very sceptical of the chances of signing a non-aggression pact with Russia, for the Russians were demanding conditions which Tokyo had no intention of accepting. Back in Moscow at the beginning of April, M Matsuoka again made contact with the Kremlin, but this did nothing to dispel his pessimism. He told Steinhardt, the American Ambassador, that he had very little hope of concluding a treaty with Stalin because Stalin did not want one, and because ‘the Japanese public would not stand for the concessions which the Russians were asking for a non-aggression pact’. [76]
M Matsuoka was scarcely cut out for discussions with the Moscow leaders. He had left Tokyo with a number of rather preposterous ideas about the Soviet regime. In an interview given in the train a few hours before reaching the capital of the USSR he had made a point of mentioning that ‘racially the Slavs were half Asiatic, which meant that the Russians and the Japanese had much in common, both emotionally and in their spiritual make-up’. During his first meeting with Stalin on 25 March ‘he lectured him on Japanese ideology for 58 minutes out of the 60-minute interview, maintaining that there is a close parallel between Communism and Japanese family life’. [77] This was an optical illusion resembling, on a rather more farcical plane, that from which the Axis chiefs had been suffering for some time. [78]
Just when he was expecting the complete failure of his mission, Matsuoka was suddenly summoned to the Kremlin on the morning of 13 April, the very day he had arranged to leave. Stalin suggested a pact of neutrality and friendship, to be signed at once, and withdrew his demand that Japan should give up her mining concessions in North Sakhalin. The pact even included a tentative division of their respective spheres of influence: Manchuria to Japan, Outer Mongolia to Russia.
When Matsuoka signed this treaty Japan was one of the partners in the Three-Power Pact. During their interviews with him Hitler and Ribbentrop had left him in no doubt that a break with Russia was possible, but they had not asked Japan to be in at the death. [79] This apparent contradiction can be explained from the German documents and evidence. For Hitler, the aim of the Three-Power Pact was essentially to paralyse Britain and threaten America. If Japan had attacked Russia as well, she would have had to relinquish for some time any attempt to oppose Britain in the Far East. Hitler wished to take on Russia himself, for he did not think he needed any assistance in ‘crushing’ her. This was undoubtedly one of his most serious blunders, for if Japan had intervened in Siberia Stalin would not have been able to withdraw those divisions which played such a vital part in restoring the military situation in European Russia. Hitler, confident that he could beat the Russians in a few weeks, preferred Japan to attack Singapore, and between December 1940 and April 1941 the German leaders never stopped trying to persuade Japan to do this. [80] At his meeting with Raeder on 24 April Hitler explained that ‘the Russo – Japanese Pact had been concluded with Germany’s acquiescence’ and that it diverted Japan from Vladivostok and encouraged her ‘to attack Singapore instead’. [81] Later, at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop explained the reasons for the German attitude:
At the time [he stated], I was trying to persuade Japan to attack Singapore, for it seemed impossible to make peace with England and I could not see what military measures we could take to bring this about. In any case, the Führer ordered me to do everything I could by diplomatic means to weaken England so that she would be forced to sue for peace. We thought this could be achieved by Japan’s attacking England’s key positions in Eastern Asia, and that is why I tried to induce Japan to attack Singapore. [82]
It is worth mentioning – if only to complete the file of ‘Hitler Queries’ – that Ribbentrop telegraphed to the German Ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July 1941, asking him to request the Japanese government’s immediate intervention against Russia in Siberia. [83] He was too late. The barrier erected by the Russo – Japanese pact signed at Moscow three months previously was strong enough to withstand Germany’s pressure.
There is no need to dwell on the reasons why, from Russia’s point of view, Stalin felt it necessary to ask Japan for an agreement. Belgrade fell on 13 April, and after that the war in Yugoslavia was bound to end much sooner than had been foreseen in Moscow. The hour for Germany’s show-down with Russia might be correspondingly advanced. If, in spite of Moscow’s efforts, the break with Germany occurred, it was supremely important to avoid a war on two fronts, and that was the main purpose of the pact of 13 April. From Japan’s point of view, it cleared the way for an attack on Britain and the United States in the Far East and removed the danger that the Russians would take her in the rear. Stalin had already told Matsuoka when he first passed through Moscow that ‘Soviet Russia had never got on well with Great Britain and never would’, [84] and he now reassured his partner by saying that he was ‘a convinced adherent of the Axis and an opponent of England and America’. [85] Mr Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo, thought at the time that ‘the pact will tend to stimulate and support the Japanese extremists who advocated a vigorous prosecution of the southward advance because it guarantees Soviet neutrality in case Japan gets into war with a third country (that is, the United States)’. [86] America’s fears were expressed in a United Press message of 14 April:
The general opinion is that Britain and the United States have suffered a diplomatic defeat in the Moscow pact between Japan and Soviet Russia. For it is thought in Washington that, now her own frontiers with the Soviet Union have been guaranteed, Japan will press on with a policy of expansion in the South Seas.
That is what in fact occurred eight months later. Russia’s attitude remained the same even after the German attack, and she only changed it just before Japan capitulated so as to secure a share of the spoils in the Far East.
Russia Vainly Attempts to Avoid War: By making use of the violently anti-British circles to which Matsuoka belonged, Stalin steered Japan away from the ‘Maritime Provinces’ of Asiatic Russia and encouraged her to expand in the direction of the ‘South Seas’. All that was needed now was for him to play his cards well in the West. Stalin was well aware how serious was the danger threatening European Russia, but he still hoped he could counteract it. To do so, he employed every weapon in his armoury, however unimportant.
When Matsuoka left Moscow a few hours after signing the pact of friendship, Stalin went with Molotov to see him off at the station. This was a surprising and indeed an unprecedented occurrence. He turned it to good advantage by coming up to von Schulenburg, throwing his arm round his shoulders, and saying: ‘We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end!’ To the German Military Attaché, Hans Krebs, who was quite dumbfounded at being addressed directly by the ruler of Russia, he repeated: ‘We will remain friends with you – whatever happens.’ [87] Nobody missed the significance of this demonstration. Two weeks later von Schulenburg again reminded Hitler of the scene at the station on 13 April when Stalin had wished ‘to demonstrate publicly his intention to collaborate with the Axis’. [88]
From that moment the Kremlin’s professions of ‘loyalty’ to Germany and its attempts to break through her sinister silence became more frequent. Berlin was greatly surprised when, on 25 April, the Russians suddenly accepted Germany’s plan for the delimitation of the frontier between the Igorka river and the Baltic, for up till then Molotov had fought it with his usual stubbornness. [89] On 20 April the naval chiefs drew Hitler’s attention to the fact that Russia’s attitude had changed and was now markedly pro-German. [90]
On 3 May Russia officially recognised the pro-German government of Rashid Ali el Kailani in Iraq the day after he had attacked the British aerodrome at Bassara. On 6 May 1941, Stalin became head of the government. Berlin understood very well what this meant in terms of foreign policy. Stalin wished to reassure Hitler by showing him that he intended to continue his German policy of 1939 and do everything he could to avoid a conflict. [91]
The German naval chiefs interpreted this move as meaning that Stalin wished to concentrate the executive power in his own hands and to avoid a clash with Germany. [92] The diplomats stationed in Moscow were all of the opinion that this was not a ‘cabinet de guerre’ but a cabinet of ‘pacte à quatre’, the four being the USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan. [93] The German Naval Attaché at Moscow considered Stalin to be ‘the pivot of German – Soviet collaboration’. [94]
Next day Vyshinsky summoned the Yugoslav Minister, Gavrilovich, and asked him to leave Russia, an action which was taken without any prompting from Germany. The same thing happened to the diplomatic representatives of Belgium and Norway, both countries occupied by the Wehrmacht; and Greece’s turn came at the beginning of June. [95] All this was a dead loss, since in Berlin the press was instructed not to refer to these moves. [96] The Soviet government had meanwhile accredited M Bogomolov to Marshal Pétain, this time with the rank of Ambassador. [97]
To avoid war Stalin, as von Schulenburg told Hitler on 28 April, ‘was prepared to make further concessions’. [98] A pro-Soviet American journalist living in Moscow summed up the position as follows: ‘We all knew the Soviet Union wanted peace at almost any price, would make almost any concession, even unasked, to escape war.’ [99]
Economic Collaboration Continues to the End: The Soviet leaders’ anxiety to provide Germany with proofs of their goodwill was strikingly displayed, and on a lavish scale, in their trading arrangements. Since 10 January 1941, the USSR and Germany had made a new agreement. [100] There had been some difficulties at first, but they were soon smoothed out. After the beginning of March 1941, the Russians became more conciliatory and delivered hundreds of thousands of tons of grain in advance of their contracts for September. [101] They were less pressing for the goods Germany was to send in exchange [102] and promised to supply during the following year five million tons of grain, [103] which the Wehrmacht would not, therefore, have to go and find for itself in the Ukraine. The transit traffic through Siberia of raw materials imported by Germany from Eastern Asia proceeded ‘favourably’, the Russians even placing at Germany’s disposal a special freight train for rubber [104] on the Manchurian border. In April substantial deliveries were made by the Russians: 208,000 tons of grain, 90,000 tons of petroleum, 8300 tons of cotton, 6340 tons of non-ferrous metals (copper, tin and nickel). During the same month 2000 tons of rubber crossed Siberia for Germany in regular trains and another 2000 tons in special trains. [105] General Thomas, in his historical survey of German war economy, observed that ‘the Russians delivered their supplies on schedule right up to the start of the attack, and even during the last few days cargoes of rubber from the Far East were rushed through by express train’. [106]
The situation was such that on 15 May Schnurre, the German negotiator, informed his government that they could in future ask Russia to supply Germany’s ‘food and raw material requirements beyond the extent now contracted for’ [107] and be sure of a favourable reply.
‘Alea Jacta Est’: But Hitler’s decision had already been made several months before. Nothing was to cause him to change it. Von Schulenburg was much disheartened when he returned to Moscow on 30 April, after a fortnight’s stay in Berlin. He had seen Hitler and had gained the impression that the die was cast. He himself was strongly opposed to the war and even tried to warn the Soviet government of the danger in a conversation with Dekanozov. [108]
Those who knew Russia well did everything they could to dissuade Hitler from such a dangerous enterprise, but without success; in Berlin, there were Weizsäcker, von Tippelskirch and Schnurre, and in Moscow, Gustav Hilger, who was in full agreement with his Ambassador.
Stalin and his colleagues were under no illusion about the gravity of the situation. There were too many sinister portents which gave cause for anxiety. In his speech in Berlin on 4 May Hitler did not so much as mention Russia. And what was the significance of Rudolf Hess’ mysterious adventure when he parachuted into Britain on 13 May? The increasing German troop concentrations on the frontier could not have escaped their notice. Germany’s preparations were already well advanced in every field [109] and the tempo quickened at the end of May. The timing of the various moves was then fixed. [110] On 12 June German ships in Russian ports were ordered to leave ‘for fictitious reasons’. [111] The big conference of Hitler and his military chiefs which had been summoned on 6 June took place on the 14th. [112] On the 15th they decided to allow attacks on Russian submarines immediately, within a line running to the north of Poland. [113] The final talks with the Finnish General Staff began on 25 May and were actively pursued. [114] On 23 May Hitler briefed General Ritter von Schobert on the steps to be taken to supplement ‘Operation Barbarossa’ in Rumania, [115] and on 8 June he had a final discussion on this subject with General Antonescu in Munich. In June Goering put the finishing touches to his directives dealing with the economic organisation of the war zone, [116] and Rosenberg on his side infused a final dose of doctrine into the officials appointed to handle problems in the East. [117]
The Russians were therefore compelled to take counter-measures, although they concealed them as well as they could. The Red Army manoeuvres took place in several districts at the beginning of June (Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, White Russia, Moscow and the Crimea). To keep the troop movements as secret as possible, on 17 May the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the accredited diplomatic and consular missions prohibiting all movement in certain parts of the country; members of their staffs were allowed to travel only after giving previous notice. Russia’s military measures were nevertheless strictly defensive. [118] The factories near the western frontier of the USSR were moved farther east.
Moscow received numerous warnings from London and Washington. At the beginning of January 1941, Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, passed on to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington information which had reached his government about the German preparations for attacking the USSR, and he gave him further details on 20 March. [119] In his broadcast speech on the evening of 22 June Winston Churchill later recalled the ‘clear and precise’ warnings which he had given Stalin on the same subject. This was not always an easy thing to do. Shortly before hostilities broke out Sir Stafford Cripps – from whom a curious prophecy had reached the ears of the German Naval Attaché in Moscow on 24 April [120] – requested an interview with Stalin in order to give him certain information:
It was declined. He asked for an interview with Molotov. It was declined. He finally succeeded in seeing Vyshinsky... and the general impression was that Vyshinsky went as far as to indicate he considered Sir Stafford a ‘provocateur’, for implying that Germany would turn against her Soviet friends. [121]
This was because right up to the last minute the Soviet leaders were hoping to dodge the blow. Stalin could not conceive why Hitler, after going to such lengths to avoid a second front, should wish to create one himself just when the situation was, on the whole, less in his favour than in 1939. [122]
So the Russians simultaneously threw out their last life-belts and speeded up their military preparations. In a note circulated by Tass on 13 June and drafted by Stalin personally, they indulged in a violent attack on Sir Stafford Cripps, accusing him of starting false rumours – such as the story of German troop concentrations on the frontier – which were ‘a clumsy propaganda manoeuvre of the forces hostile to the USSR and Germany and interested in spreading the war’. [123]
Hitler and Ribbentrop knew very well that Russia would not attack Germany and had declared as much several times in their talks with Matsuoka. [124] On 28 April Hitler explained to von Schulenburg, who was doing his best to reassure him on this point, that he had no fear of any danger from Russia. [125] But he did not so much as mention the Tass note of 13 June and it was on his orders that it was not even reproduced in the German press. [126]
Did the Soviet leaders make any further attempts between 13 and 22 June to pierce the stubborn silence of the Nazi chiefs? According to the ‘revelations’ of an American journalist, Molotov is supposed to have paid a secret visit to Berlin in order to inform Ribbentrop of the political, economic and territorial concessions which Russia was prepared to make to avoid war. [127] An Italian diplomat attached to the Berlin Embassy noted in his diary several rumours alleging that Stalin himself was expected in Berlin, where he was to make a last attempt at conciliation. [128] But these suppositions are not borne out by anything in the German documents so far published, or by the other sources consulted.
All that is certain is that the Soviet leaders were ready to come to an agreement with Germany until just before the outbreak of war, and that they were willing to pay the necessary price for it. They even made a last attempt on the evening of 21 June. [129] But in vain. In the early hours of 22 June German troops crossed the Russian frontier, while von Schulenburg, with death in his heart, called on Molotov and carried out his government’s instructions by reading out what amounted to a declaration of war. Molotov, very pale, listened in silence, and betrayed his emotion only when he asked the German Ambassador this question: ‘Do you think we have deserved this?’ [130]
Sir Stafford Cripps had left Moscow on 10 June quite disheartened because Russia was prepared to go to any lengths to avoid war. ‘He was apparently a beaten man. He expected never to return to Moscow’, relates HC Cassidy, adding that ‘it remained for the Germans to make his mission in Russia a success.’ [131]
It was Germany, therefore, who forced Russia into war and into an unwilling alliance with the Western democracies. If Germany had not attacked, Russia would have continued the policy of the August-September pacts of 1939 for a long time to come. This was stated by Stalin himself on 3 July 1941, in his first speech after the outbreak of hostilities: ‘It was Fascist Germany who, treacherously and without warning, violated the non-aggression pact which she had signed with the USSR in 1939... The war has been forced on us.’ [132] Anthony Eden pointed out to the House of Commons on 24 June 1941 how opposed had been the attitudes of Britain and Russia: ‘We would have welcomed an agreement with Russia, but unfortunately the opportunity of reaching one never presented itself’ because ‘the USSR scrupulously observed its pact with Germany.’ During his visit to the Soviet capital Harry Hopkins remarked that there the invasion was regarded ‘as the treachery of a partner who had suddenly revealed himself as a rabid dog’. Stalin told him that his policy towards Germany had been ‘straightforward and sincere’ and that Hitler had betrayed him. [133] At the Nuremberg trial Rudenko, chief prosecutor for the USSR, declared that ‘the original documents of the Hitlerite government now made public definitely show, to the whole world and to history, the ludicrous falsity of Hitler’s propaganda about the preventive character of the war against the USSR’. [134]
The Western democracies did not hold Stalin’s past against him. As early as the evening of 22 June Winston Churchill, in the name of the British people, promised unqualified support for Russia now she was attacked by Hitler:
No one [he said] has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have been for the last 25 years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding... I see the Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled from time immemorial... But now I have to declare the decision of His Majesty’s Government... We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us – nothing. We will never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until with God’s help we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its peoples from his yoke. Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe.
For his part, President Roosevelt intervened in Tokyo on 5 July with a request that Japan should not join Germany in the war against Russia. [135]
For Russia, this was the beginning of a dramatic interlude which brought her, very much against her will, into the anti-German camp. Stalin steered his country with a firm hand, waiting for the opportunity which the end of the war, and indeed the war itself, would give him to revive once again his Rapallo policy of collaboration with Germany. But, thanks to the blindness of his allies, he is resuming it under very different and far more favourable conditions, and it will become only the starting point of a policy of even vaster expansion and world hegemony.
1. Full text in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 403-07.
2. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 406-07.
3. See above, Chapter IX. Among the reasons which hastened the clash with Russia, Admiral Raeder gave ‘the personal impression which Hitler had received from Molotov’s visit’ (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 328).
4. DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, pp 22-23 of the off-print. See also Goering’s statements at the hearing of 15 March 1946, at Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal [Volume number omitted in text – MIA] (Nuremberg, 1947).
5. R Cartier, Les Secrets de la Guerre devoilés par Nuremberg (Paris, 1946), p 239.
6. Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), p 83.
7. See above, Chapter IX, section ‘The Soviet Conditions for Joining the Three-Power Pact’.
8. DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, p 20 of the off-print.
9. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1940) (London, 1947), pp 124, 138, conferences of 14 November and 27 December.
10. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1940) (London, 1947), p 139, conference of 27 December.
11. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1941) (London, 1947), p 13, conference of 8-9 January 1941.
12. See, for example, his letter of 31 December 1940, to Mussolini, Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), especially pp 109-10.
13. HC Deutsch, ‘Quand Hitler et Staline se partageaient le monde’, La Bataille, 30 April 1947.
14. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 260-64. These directives gave the detailed application of the plan of campaign outlined in General Halder’s report to Hitler of 5 December 1940. See Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 331-32; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), pp 374-75.
15. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 2 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 296; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 5 (Washington, 1946), p 378.
16. Memorandum on the USSR dated 2 April 1941; Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 351; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), p 675.
17. For all these meetings, see Schmidt’s notes (unpublished).
18. Dispatch from Woermann, no 2138, dated 22 November 1940 (unpublished).
19. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 244.
20. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 245-46.
21. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 244.
22. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 259.
23. Unpublished telegram of 30 November 1940, from Richthofen, German Minister in Sofia. Ankara reacted strongly to the Soviet proposal to Bulgaria. See Weizsäcker’s telegram to von Schulenburg, I 7 January, 1941, no 68, unpublished.
24. In his talk with Hitler in Berlin on 22 November 1940, ‘Antonescu mentioned the difficulties with the Russians on the question of the Danube delta... He also alluded to Russia’s efforts to exclude Germany and Italy from the Danube Maritime Commission.’ (Schmidt, unpublished notes)
25. Dispatch from Clodius, 12 December 1940, no 2286 (unpublished).
26. Von Schulenburg’s report of 3 January 1941, on his talk with Molotov on 29 December (unpublished).
27. With reference to this question, see G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), pp 65-84.
28. Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), p 107.
29. Von Schulenburg’s dispatch of 8 January 1941 and Ribbentrop’s reply of 10 January, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 266.
30. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 268-71.
31. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 271-72.
32. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 276-79.
33. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 315.
34. The Spanish Government and the Axis (US Department of State, 4 March 1946), document XI.
35. That was Hitler’s own opinion: Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), p 126.
36. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 229; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), pp 275-78; von Paulus’ evidence, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 237-38, 257; General Lohr’s evidence, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 236. Hitler had already summoned the Bulgarian and Hungarian ministers on the night of 27-28 March, when he informed Mussolini, in a letter which his Ambassador, von Mackensen, was instructed to deliver to him immediately; text of the letter in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), pp 475-77.
37. In the ‘Foreign Office Report on the Soviet Government’s Propaganda and Political Agitation’ published in Berlin on 22 June 1941, it was stated that on 10 April the Moscow government had proposed to the Yugoslav Minister that war materials should be sent to his country via the Black Sea. According to information from a Rumanian source, noted in the German naval documents, the Soviet’s offer of war material to some extent influenced events in Belgrade, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 996.
38. Interesting details on this subject in HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), pp 13-14.
39. Statement by Ribbentrop at Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 10 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 293. It should be noted, however, that while the pact was directed against Germany, the naval chiefs did not consider it ‘to be too important’ since ‘there was no common frontier’ between Russia and Yugoslavia (Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 996).
40. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 316-18.
41. See above, this chapter, section ‘Caught in the Toils’.
42. Statement by von Paulus, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 255-56. The decision seems to have been made on 3 April.
43. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 996, no 142.
44. DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, p 23 of the off-print.
45. See above, this chapter, section ‘Caught in the Toils’.
46. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 419.
47. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 433.
48. Among other evidence concerning these contacts, see that of General Erich Buschenhagen at the hearing on 12 February 1946 (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 310). The Finnish army had already been allotted its part in ‘Operation Barbarossa’ in the directives of 18 December (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 261-62).
49. See above, Chapter VI, section ‘Moscow and Ankara’.
50. Report of the interview by the interpreter, LR Meyer-Heydenhagen (unpublished).
51. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), pp 991-92.
52. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 162-64, 276, 304-07, 315-16.
53. On 10 April. On 12 April the Hungarian Minister in Moscow informed M Vyshinsky of the reasons why his government had sent its troops into Yugoslavia. Vyshinsky declared that the Soviet government could not approve of this action ‘especially as Hungary had made war on Yugoslavia after concluding a treaty of perpetual friendship with her’ (Tass communiqué, 13 April).
54. On 20 April 1941.
55. On 10 April 1941.
56. Tass agency, 4 February 1941.
57. See also G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), pp 140-41. This statement by the USSR was regarded in Berlin as being ‘directed against Germany’ (Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 995).
58. For von Papen’s activities, see the documents published (by the Soviet government) in Documents secrets: La politique allemande (1941-43): Turquie (Paris, 1946).
59. See especially Hitler’s conference with his military chiefs on 3 February 1941 (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 337-38).
60. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), pp 847-48. For this diversionary manoeuvre see also a letter from the German GHQ to Todt and the instructions of 12 May 1941, signed by Keitel (Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 634-36).
61. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 339-41; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 409-13.
62. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), p 636.
63. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), p 690.
64. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A (Washington, 1946), pp 352-53.
65. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 4 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 455-57; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 637-39.
66. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 351-53; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 674-81, and appendix of 4 April, pp 681-85.
67. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 354; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 621-23.
68. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 685-90.
69. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 351-52; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 692-93.
70. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 347-48; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946),pp 911-13.
71. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 908-11.
72. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 811-16.
73. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 2 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 296; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 5 (Washington, 1946), p 378.
74. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 5 (Washington, 1946), p 378.
75. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 4 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 5-9; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 7 (Washington, 1946), pp 295-306.
76. Joseph C Grew, Ten Years in Japan (London, 1944), p 330.
77. Joseph C Grew, Ten Years in Japan (London, 1944), p 330. But see von Schulenburg’s dispatch on this conversation (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 280-81).
78. See above, Chapter VI, section ‘Hitler’s Opinion of Stalin’.
79. Report of the conversations between Matsuoka, Hitler and Ribbentrop, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 281-316.
80. The question of a Japanese attack on Singapore was first broached at the conference between Hitler and the naval and army chiefs on 27 December (Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1940) (London, 1947), p 137); it was raised again two weeks later (Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1941) (London, 1947), p 13). See also Ribbentrop’s talk with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, on 23 February 1941 (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 371-75; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), pp 469-75); Base Order 24 from OKW, 5 March, concerning collaboration with Japan (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 375-77; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 1 (Washington, 1946), p 848); meeting between Hitler and the military chiefs on 18 March (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 378; Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1941) (London, 1947), p 37; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 966); Ribbentrop – Matsuoka talks in Berlin, 27-29 March (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 287-88, 299, 302-11; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), pp 520-22); Hitler – Matsuoka talks in Berlin, 27 March and 4 April 1941 (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 295, 313-16). The attack on Singapore was considered at an interview between the Emperor of Japan and his Prime Minister, Konoe, on 10 March 1941; see The Memoirs of Prince Tuminaro Konoe (Tokyo, 1946), p 17 (and cf p 22).
81. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1941) (London, 1947), p 48.
82. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 10 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 296-97.
83. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 384-85; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 5 (Washington, 1946), pp 564-65.
84. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 297.
85. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 324.
86. Joseph C Grew, Ten Years in Japan (London, 1944), p 330.
87. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 324. On this incident, see also HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), pp 11-12; G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), pp 157-58; and the Tass communiqué of 14 April.
88. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 332.
89. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 325-26.
90. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1941) (London, 1947), p 48.
91. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 335-39.
92. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 998.
93. HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), p 19.
94. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 998 (10 May 1941).
95. The Czechoslovak minister, M Fierlinger, had already been asked to leave in December 1940.
96. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 234.
97. He presented his letters of credence to Vichy on 24 April 1941.
98. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 332.
99. HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), p 7.
100. It was the third, and succeeded those of 19 August 1939 and 11 February 1940.
101. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 318-19.
102. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 327.
103. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 332.
104. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 318.
105. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 339-41.
106. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 363; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4 (Washington, 1946), p 1083.
107. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 341.
108. Interrogation by the American Mission. Von Schulenburg later became involved in the anti-Hitler plot of July 1944, in which some members of his family played an active part; he too lost his life in the brutal repression ordered by Himmler. His evidence is therefore above suspicion, for its strongly pro-Soviet bias is unmistakable and resulted from what he conceived to be Germany’s best interests. His correspondence is of unquestionable historic value.
109. See above, this chapter, section ‘Preparations for the Eastern Offensive’.
110. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 276; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), pp 858-67.
111. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 1000.
112. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 4 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 407; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), pp 909-11.
113. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 1001; Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 195.
114. General Buschenhagen’s evidence, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 858; Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 313.
115. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), pp 877-88.
116. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 7 (Washington, 1946), pp 539-40.
117. 20-21 June, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 693-95, 716-17; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 855. A few days after the attack, on 28 June, Rosenberg drew up a report on his activities since his appointment as Reich Commissar (Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 358-61; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), pp 695-701).
118. DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, p 24 of the off-print; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 1002, under the date of 21 June.
119. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41 (Washington, 1942), p 105; Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (London, 1944), p 251.
120. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 997. Sir Stafford Cripps forecast the German attack for 22 June...
121. HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), p 20.
122. In a statement to the American press on 31 December 1941, M Litvinov said: ‘My government did receive warnings as to the treacherous intentions of Hitler with regard to the Soviet Union, but it did not take them seriously and this not because it believed in the sacredness of Hitler’s signature, or did not believe him capable of violating the treaties he signed, and the oft-repeated solemn promises he made, but because it considered that it would have been madness on his part to undertake war in the East against such a powerful land as ours, before finishing off his war in the West.’ (L Fischer, The Great Challenge (London, 1947), p 32)
123. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 345.
124. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 285, 291, 299, 303.
125. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 332.
126. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 239; A Rosso, Obbiettivi e metodi della politica estera sovietia (Florence, 1946), p 28.
127. Miss Dorothy Thomson. See the Gazette de Lausanne, 1 August 1946.
128. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), pp 232, 234, 235.
129. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 355-56.
130. G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p 212.
131. HC Cassidy, Moscow Dateline (London, 1943), p 20.
132. JV Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (London, 1946), pp 6-7.
133. Louis Fischer, The Great Challenge (London, 1947), p 43.
134. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 169.
135. Joseph C Grew, Ten Years in Japan (London, 1944), pp 343-44.