The Russo-German Alliance: August 1939 – June 1941, by A. Rossi (Angelo Tasca) 1949
At the beginning of August 1939, the main issue between Berlin and Moscow was no longer the preservation of peace between the two countries but the joint settlement of the status of Eastern Europe.
Molotov had already been informed on 3 August of Ribbentrop’s proposals to Astakhov, and he received confirmation the same day from von Schulenburg, the Ambassador, that Germany was prepared to recognise Russia’s interests in the Baltic and in Poland. Molotov was anxious to know if the Baltic included Lithuania as well. [1]
Hitler was unwilling to give way on Lithuania, and so this country was not included in the Russian sphere of interest in the agreements of 23 August. But on the whole the talks proceeded smoothly, both in Berlin and Moscow, where Astakhov and von Schulenburg were being briefed by Molotov and Ribbentrop respectively. Certain assurances were exchanged, the Germans declaring that their interests in Poland ‘were quite limited’, and the Russians that ‘negotiations with England had begun at a time when there had still been no sign of a disposition on the part of Germany to come to an understanding’. [2]
After this both parties were basically in agreement. According to President Beneš, a trustworthy and well-informed witness, the Soviet demands were finally accepted by the Nazi leaders on the night of 3-4 August.
On 19 July 1939 [he wrote in his memoirs], General Ingr and Colonel Moravec informed me that, according to reports they had received from Berlin, very far-reaching negotiations were going on between Germany and the USSR. On 10 August we received some important details through the same channels. The crucial moment had come and gone. It occurred during the night of 3-4 August. There was an important meeting at which Ribbentrop, Goering, Goebbels, Keitel, Jodl and a few others were present. Was the agreement to be signed or not? Hitler was in Berchtesgaden and had a direct line to the room where they met... The discussion went on until daybreak on 4 August, with Hitler constantly on the line. The Führer at last agreed and the special messenger flew to Moscow carrying with him their general decision. [3]
A non-aggression pact could have been settled at once. But there was the much more delicate question, already considered in broad outline, of dividing up the spheres of interest:
The partition of Poland had in principle been decided on about 10 August and Germany had given Russia an assurance that she would not interfere with the negotiations which Moscow might see fit to open with the Baltic states and Finland. [4]
But the undertakings which they had exchanged still had to be worked out in detail and the discussions could not proceed through the normal diplomatic channels, especially as Hitler’s war-machine was ready to go into action against Poland and he was in a hurry to get things settled.
A Decisive Day: 12 August 1939: Worried by rumours that an attack on Poland was imminent, Ciano arrived at Salzburg on 11 August. At their first meeting Ribbentrop gave him to understand that Germany would turn down any compromise, and that she wanted war. ‘The decision to fight is implacable’, he wrote in his diary the same day. [5] The Italian Foreign Minister was completely panic-stricken at the German decision. When they had signed the ‘Pact of Steel’ a few months previously both Italy and Germany had agreed not to embark on any new adventures for at least three years. Italy was not in a fit state to join in a war which risked becoming world-wide. Ciano raised a number of objections and suggested issuing a joint communiqué which would leave the door open for negotiations. To this Ribbentrop turned a deaf ear, although he did his best to reassure his colleague. There was really nothing to fear, for Britain and France would not become involved. The conflict would not spread, but even if it did victory was certain since they could count on Russia’s neutrality: ‘Russia will not come in as the Moscow talks have completely broken down.’ [6] Also ‘talks of a very definite character are proceeding between Moscow and Berlin’. [7]
Next day Ciano went up with Ribbentrop to Obersalzburg, where Hitler was expecting him. The Italian Foreign Minister insisted that Italy, in her present state, was unprepared militarily and dangerously exposed. He suggested an international conference which Mussolini would again be willing to summon. But now Hitler was going off on quite a different course. Another Munich was out of the question as this time Germany risked not getting everything she wanted. Right up to the eve of the attack on Poland Hitler had only one fear: ‘... that some swine [Schweinhund] would offer to mediate.’ [8] They also explained to Ciano that Poland and Russia would have to be invited to the conference:
The Führer declared that Russia could no longer be kept out of meetings between the powers in future. During the talks between Russia and Germany the Russians brought up Munich and various other occasions when they had been left out in the cold and made it clear that they would not put up with this in future. [9]
Besides, Italy had nothing to fear, for the conflict would be localised: ‘Hitler was firmly convinced that the Western democracies would in the end flinch when faced with the outbreak of a general war.’ [10]
Hitler was not, as a matter of fact, quite so sure as all that. If he assumed an air of ‘complete confidence’ it was with the idea of bolstering up Ciano’s morale, which was considerably shaken when he found himself faced with a decision he did not expect. Allowance should be made for the fact that Hitler made use of bluff, even with his Axis partners, whether they were ‘senior’ or ‘junior’. This was a usual feature of his tactics in the ‘war of nerves’, which he inflicted on his allies just as much as on his enemies. For some months, and by 23 May 1939 at the latest, he had borne in mind the possibility that this time Britain and France would not back out, but he had decided on war nevertheless. [11] His military plans were in fact dictated by this possibility. Poland had to be crushed quickly before the Western powers had time to intervene, and the Rhine fortifications and the Blitzkrieg in the East made this possible.
For the Blitzkrieg to have the success he reckoned on, it was important that Poland should be isolated from the West as well as from the East. In the West the new fortifications went right up to the Dutch frontier, thus barring the classical invasion routes. A direct attack could be made only through Holland, whose neutrality the Western powers would not violate. [12] All that remained therefore was to isolate Poland from Russia, and that had already been done. Hitler even went to the trouble of explaining to Ciano that ‘Russia would never come in on the side of Poland, for she cordially hated her'; that ‘the only reason for sending an Anglo – French military mission to Moscow was to cover up the complete breakdown of the political negotiations'; and that Russia’s aim was ‘to widen her outlet to the Baltic, and she was not in the mood to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Western powers’.
At the precise moment when Hitler was beginning to paint such a reassuring picture, two telegrams were brought in, one from Moscow, the other from Tokyo.
The conversation was interrupted for a moment [noted Paul Schmidt], and the contents of the Moscow telegram were immediately given to Count Ciano. The Russians said they agreed that a German political negotiator should be sent to Moscow. [13]
After Hitler had commented on this, Ribbentrop added that ‘the Russians had been kept fully informed of Germany’s intentions with regard to Poland. He himself had informed the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, on the Führer’s orders.’
The same day, on 12 August, the first meeting took place in Moscow between the British and French military delegations and the Soviet army chiefs. The die had therefore been cast when these talks began. The question of a political understanding between Russia and Germany was in fact already settled. It was now a matter of thrashing out the much more urgent problem of how the territory was to be divided up, [14] and that was the object of the German envoy’s journey which had just been arranged.
If Lord Halifax Had Gone To Moscow: This envoy was to be Ribbentrop in person. There has been a great deal of discussion of this event, and London and Paris have been blamed for not sending their leading political figures to Moscow. As early as 15 May, however, Chamberlain in his speech to the House of Commons had anticipated a meeting between his Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, and the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Potemkin, which was due to take place at the assembly of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva. The opening of the Geneva session had even been postponed for a few days so that M Potemkin, then on a tour of the Balkans, could be present. Potemkin had returned to Moscow on 11 May, but the Soviet government took good care not to send him to Geneva, his place being filled by Maisky, the Ambassador in London. Another opportunity arose when the British government invited Voroshilov, People’s Commissar for War, to attend the British army manoeuvres on 3 June 1939, but the Soviet marshal declined the invitation.
Even if Lord Halifax had gone to Moscow instead of Mr William Strang, the situation could only have been changed if the British Foreign Minister had been able to offer Stalin a free hand in the Baltic states and Bessarabia, and a slice of Poland – all without the risk of war. As such a proposal could not possibly have come from London and Paris, whoever was sent to negotiate, the agreement between Germany and Russia was certain to go through from the very fact that the policies of Hitler and Stalin had the same ends in view. These ends would have had to be changed, and no one had the power to change them but Hitler and Stalin themselves.
The Agreements of ‘The Eve’: On 14 August Molotov sent fresh instructions to Astakhov which showed that in Moscow the choice had been made. [15] During the three-power military talks on the same day, Marshal Voroshilov raised the question of the passage of Soviet troops across Poland and Rumania and of the occupation of ports and bases in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic.
Next day, on 15 August, Molotov received through von Schulenburg Ribbentrop’s suggestion that he should himself go to Moscow to complete the work which had started so well. [16] Molotov replied that ‘the Soviet government warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet Union’, and that ‘he now believed in the sincerity of these intentions’. [17] But as the Soviet chiefs knew exactly where Germany stood there was no longer any need for them to hurry. Molotov agreed to Ribbentrop’s visit, but the preparatory work for it would have to be ‘very detailed’. The Soviet government was henceforth ‘convinced that the German government was really in earnest in its intentions to bring about a change in its relations with the Soviet Union’, but he wanted to know if the proposals sent on from Ciano in June were still valid. He put the following very pertinent question: ‘Was the German government still ready to conclude a non-aggression pact or something similar with the Soviet Union?’ If so, they must begin ‘concrete discussions of these questions’. [18]
On the 16th Ribbentrop hastened to accept all Molotov’s requests:
... the points brought up by M Molotov are in accordance with German desires; Germany is ready to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the Soviet government so desires, one which would be irrevocable for a term of 25 years.
He confirmed the June proposals. But the situation was such that war with Poland might break out any day and the most urgent questions between the two countries had therefore to be settled quickly. Ribbentrop was ready to go to Moscow on 18 August, armed with full powers of negotiation from the Führer. [19]
When von Schulenburg called at the Kremlin on 17 August to read Ribbentrop’s reply to Molotov, Molotov was able to hand him a note from his government summarising its position. The Soviet government had considered joining in the organisation of a defensive front against Germany only because it believed it was threatened by her. If Germany’s policy was undergoing a change ‘the Soviet government could look upon such a change only with pleasure’, and for its part was quite prepared to alter its own policy. The preliminary conditions for the establishment of these new relations now existed. They could begin with the trade agreement, then go on to the second stage, which:
... could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact... with the simultaneous conclusion of a special protocol which would define the interests of the signatory parties in this or that question of foreign policy and which would form an integral part of the Pact. [20]
The Soviet government had, therefore, decided that the moment had come to show its hand. It began by considering a simple rapprochement, then demanded a non-aggression pact, and finally produced the ‘special protocol’, in which the real ground for discussion with Germany was specified: a definition of the political and territorial interests of the two countries in Eastern Europe.
On the same day, 17 August, Voroshilov asked for, or rather insisted on, the postponement of the work of the military committee until 21 August. The Soviet chiefs were to use these few days to bring to final completion the operation they had been planning since the previous March.
Hitler Cries: ‘I Have the World in My Pocket!’ Von Ribbentrop was feverishly busy – they had to hurry as ‘hostilities might break out any day’. Von Schulenburg was told to insist to Molotov on a quick settlement of the agreement, which Hitler said would be impossible if they kept to the usual diplomatic methods. The break with Poland was ‘probable’, even ‘inevitable’, and Russia’s interests would therefore have to be taken into consideration beforehand. Ribbentrop was ready to leave for Moscow at once so as to discuss these points orally. The Reich Embassy was instructed to point out to the Kremlin that German foreign policy had reached an historic turning-point: the journey of its Minister must therefore ‘take place immediately’. [21]
During the night of 19-20 August the trade treaty was signed in Berlin. This meant that, in its essentials, the political agreement had been secured. On 19 August Molotov had handed Schulenburg a draft of the non-aggression pact, but when the Russians suggested signing it in a week’s time Hitler, with 26 August fixed as the date of the attack on Poland, [22] grew impatient and on 20 August sent a personal message to Stalin asking him to see Ribbentrop on the 22nd or at the latest on the 23rd. He accepted the text of the pact put forward by Molotov, but as the various points to be incorporated in the secret protocol had still to be defined, the only quick way of settling them was for a ‘responsible statesman’ to go and negotiate on the spot, since ‘the tension between Germany and Poland had become intolerable’. [23]
Hitler’s message reached Stalin on the 21st, and Stalin at once sent his agreement. [24] The Soviet leaders could hardly conceal their satisfaction from von Schulenburg. For his part Hitler, according to Goering’s evidence, [25] was very worried because the answer to his message was slow in coming, but when the good news of the Russians’ acceptance reached Berlin he gave way to an hysterical outburst of joy. One of his intimates who was present at the scene relates that Hitler began to hammer on the wall with his fists, uttering inarticulate cries, and finally shouting exultantly: ‘I have the world in my pocket!’ [26]
An Historic Day: 23 August: On the evening of 21 August in Berlin, and on the morning of the 22nd in Moscow, a communiqué whose wording had been suggested by Molotov announced the departure of Ribbentrop from Moscow with a view to signing a pact of non-aggression. The last meeting of the three-power military committee took place in Moscow on the 21st in an atmosphere of farewells. On the 22nd Hitler informed his General Staff of the impending offensive against Poland. On the same day Voroshilov had finally consented to see General Doumenc, head of the French military mission, at about seven o'clock in the evening. He listened to Doumenc’s announcement that the French government agreed to Soviet troops crossing Poland, then replied that this was not sufficient and that he wanted the formal consent of the Polish and Rumanian governments. If their consent came, they would conclude the pact ‘if the political circumstances were still the same’. [27]
When he gave this dilatory answer to General Doumenc, Marshal Voroshilov was well aware that the ‘political circumstances’ were no longer ‘the same’, for the conclusion of the German – Soviet agreement which had been in preparation since March 1939 was now certain.
Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow at about midday on 23 August with another message from Hitler stating that henceforth ‘all the problems of Eastern Europe were to be handled exclusively by Germany and Russia’. [28]
The talks between Stalin, Molotov, Ribbentrop, von Schulenburg and Gustav Hilger began at 3.00pm. Almost at once Stalin broached what for him was the all-important question: Russia must have the Latvian ports of Windau and Libau on the Baltic. Ribbentrop telephoned for Hitler’s agreement and for authority to sign the secret protocol defining their respective spheres of influence. Hitler had an atlas quickly brought to him, glanced at the map of the Baltic, and answered ‘Yes. Agreed.’ at about 8.00pm. [29]
The meeting was resumed shortly afterwards and went on until after midnight. The non-aggression pact and the secret protocol were signed and dated the 23rd. Everybody was jubilant. The camera caught them with their faces split from ear to ear with satisfied smiles. They drank champagne. Stalin proposed a toast in honour of Hitler: ‘I know how much the German nation loves its Führer; I should therefore like to drink to his health.’ [30]
The Two Treaties: The non-aggression pact, made public immediately, contained two important clauses. In its fourth article the two contracting parties undertook not to join ‘any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party’. By that Stalin severed any possible connection between Russia and the Anglo – French efforts on behalf of ‘collective security’. Moreover the pact was to ‘enter into force as soon as it was signed’, without the need to wait for its ratification; and since the secret protocol was considered to be an ‘integral part’ of the pact, it too came into effect at once. The way was thus cleared immediately for Hitler to attack Poland, since the diplomatic spadework for this operation, planned as early as the beginning of April, was then finished. The pact was to last 10 years, a compromise between the 25 years which the Germans had at first asked for and the five years suggested by the Russians. [31]
A good deal about the secret protocol came out at Nuremberg. The defence for the accused wished to mention it since the fact that Hitler and his associates had attacked, partitioned and occupied Poland was rightly held to be a crime. Legally, the secret protocol proved that this crime had been committed by two powers, Germany and Russia – and Russia’s representatives were sitting among the judges. Each time a reference to the protocol was made by the defence or by the witnesses, Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, rose to protest. In spite of his interruptions, the evidence of Gaus, the Counsellor, Weizsäcker, the Secretary of State, and von Ribbentrop himself was incontrovertible.
Actually, there is no point in discussing this, since the documents discovered, including the text of the protocol, provide all the necessary information. This historical problem has been solved.
The secret protocol was in fact signed during the night of 23-24 August; Ribbentrop made the journey in order to sign it, and the Russians welcomed him to Moscow for the same reason.
Dividing Up the Spheres of Interest: The text of this document was already known before it was published by the Americans. It runs as follows:
Moscow, 23 August 1939
On the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions.
I: In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognised by each party.
II: In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
III: With regard to South-Eastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interests in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.
IV: This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
For the government of the German Reich: V Ribbentrop
Plenipotentiary of the government of the USSR: V Molotov
This document fixed, in particular, the northern boundary of Lithuania as the frontier between Germany and Russia in the Baltic countries, Lithuania being left in the German sphere for the time being; the frontier was continued in Poland along a line following the rivers Narew, Vistula and San; and the question of preserving an independent Polish state was left in the air. Finally, it recognised Russia’s interests in Bessarabia.
By this treaty Russia was, until she occupied them, henceforth assured of the control of three Baltic states – Finland, Estonia and Latvia; of Eastern Poland along a line appreciably to the west of the old ‘Curzon line'; and lastly, of Bessarabia. The booty was considerable.
Russia gained slightly through a readjustment in the protocol which she had requested on 25 August: in the north the boundary line was to follow the river Pisa, so that it became ‘the four-river line’. This adjustment was recorded as an additional note and was signed on 28 August. [32]
The protocol was to be kept as a jealously guarded secret. In the last clause of the signed text it was stated that ‘this protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret’. There exists a curious document about this in the shape of an envelope containing the statements of 14 officials of the German Embassy at Moscow, dated 27 August 1939. Each gave his word to preserve the strictest silence, not only about the contents of the protocol, which not more than three or four of them knew, but about the very existence of a ‘certain secret protocol.’ [33]
Ribbentrop reached Berlin on the 24th and in the afternoon reported to Hitler, who had come up from Berchtesgaden to see him. The Führer was beaming and heaped fulsome praise on his Minister, whom he hailed as ‘a second Bismarck’. [34] After that, only the complete surrender of the Western powers could have prevented the outbreak of war.
The non-aggression pact was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the evening of 31 August, after a speech by Molotov acclaiming Stalin’s success, which was the triumphant conclusion of the great operation begun on 10 May 1939. A few hours later the Wehrmacht launched its attack on Poland.
1. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 39-41.
2. Conversation between Schnurre and Astakhov, 10 August, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 44-46.
3. Extract published in the Gazette de Lausanne, 14 March 1948.
4. Article previously quoted from the Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1940; see Chapter I, note 1.
5. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 124. In the introduction which he wrote a few days before the Verona trial Ciano recalled that on 11 August Ribbentrop informed him of ‘the German decision to put a match to the powder barrel’. When he asked him if Germany wanted Danzig or the Corridor, Ribbentrop replied: ‘Not that any more. We want war!’ (Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), pp 557-58) Cf also Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 299.
6. The reference here is, of course, to the conversations between Russia and the Western democracies. The British and French military missions reached Moscow on the morning of the same day, 11 August.
7. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 298.
8. In his report to the military chiefs on 22 August 1939. See the judgement in the Nuremberg trial: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 1 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 201; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 3 (Washington, 1946), p 585.
9. Except when otherwise stated, the passages quoted from this conversation are taken from the memorandum of Paul Schmidt, the interpreter, dated 12 August (unpublished).
10. According to Ciano, Hitler ended the interview by reaffirming ‘his determination to act quickly against Poland and his complete certainty that the conflict would be localised, so that Italy would not find herself involved for any reason’ (Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 303).
11. See Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 1 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 38-39; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 7 (Washington, 1946), pp 849ff. According to Goering’s evidence, Hitler had decided as early as April 1939 to adopt military measures if other methods failed. See DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, pp 7-8 of the off-print of the article.
12. These views of Hitler’s on Allied tactics correspond closely to the military concepts favoured by the French High Command, as is shown in Gamelin’s memoirs (Servir, three volumes, Paris).
13. The fact that this telegram has not been discovered among the correspondence between von Schulenburg and the Wilhelmstrasse does not invalidate Schmidt’s account, if one bears in mind the large number of contacts retained between Berlin and Moscow up to the last minute. But the possibility that it might simply have been a manoeuvre to bolster up Ciano’s morale cannot be ruled out. In Ciano’s notes on this meeting Hitler is reported to have said: ‘The Russians will not make any move. The Moscow negotiations have been a complete failure. The Anglo – French military missions were sent to Moscow only to cover up the great political failure. On the other hand, Russo-German contacts are proceeding very favourably, and in the last few days there has been a Russian request for the dispatch of a German plenipotentiary to Moscow to negotiate the friendship pact.’ (Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 302) Note that in Schmidt’s account the initiative for sending an envoy is ascribed to the Germans and not to the Russians.
14. This partition was already roughly defined at the beginning of August, that is to say, before the arrival of the Western military missions in Moscow.
15. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 48-49.
16. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 51-52.
17. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 52.
18. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 53-56.
19. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 58.
20. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 59-60.
21. Telegram of 18 August to von Schulenburg, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 61-63.
22. On 25 August Hitler decided to postpone D-day until 1 September. He needed these few days for a last attempt he intended to make to persuade the British government to allow him a free hand in Poland. See his letter on the morning of the 25th to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, in the British White Paper, Misc no 8 (1939), Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government, August 1939 (London 1939), p 5.
23. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 66-67.
24. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 69.
25. See DC Poole, ‘Light on Nazi Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1946, p 15 of the off-print.
26. Interrogation by the American Mission.
27. Account by General Doumenc in Carrefour, 21 May 1947.
28. Telegram of 23 August, not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
29. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 71-72, and American Mission’s interrogation.
30. For these meetings, see Hencke’s memorandum, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 72-76.
31. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 76-77.
32. Telegram from von Schulenburg to Berlin, no 229, 28 August, not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
33. Sealed envelope in the archives of the German Embassy, Moscow.
34. HB Gisevius, To the Bitter End (London, 1948), p 364.