The Russo-German Alliance: August 1939 – June 1941, by A. Rossi (Angelo Tasca) 1949
With the signing of the pacts of 23 August, the two contracting parties had fixed the line of demarcation between their spheres of interest in Poland, but there had been no final decision on the future status of the country. In the secret protocol they reserved the right to resolve ‘by means of a friendly agreement’ the question of ‘maintaining an independent Polish state’ and of settling its future boundary.
The Germans were inclined to favour the creation of a small Polish state which would be a kind of new version of the ‘Poland of the Congress’. Von Moltke, who before the war had been German Ambassador in Warsaw, [1] was still of this opinion on 25 September, as was Mussolini at the beginning of January 1940. In a letter he wrote to Hitler on 4 January, Mussolini expressed his conviction that ‘the creation of a small, disarmed and exclusively Polish Poland... could not constitute a threat to the Greater Reich’. He added that if this were done ‘on Germany’s initiative, it would be a way out of the war and would establish a sufficiently strong basis for peace’. [2]
When he made this suggestion to Hitler, Mussolini did not know that Hitler was no longer in a position to carry it out. Poland’s fate had been decided along quite different lines six weeks before in Moscow.
Ribbentrop Has His Eye on Polish Oil: As Have the Russians: The secret protocol of 23 August had stood up to the test of the Polish campaign very well. While the West, blinded by animosity or by hope, waited to see what would happen when the German and Soviet troops met face to face in Eastern Poland, the Red Army finished taking over from the Wehrmacht without incident.
The question of deciding the political future of the conquered territory then arose. During the fighting Ribbentrop had tried to have the demarcation line in the region of the upper San, the farthest south of the ‘four rivers’, moved in Germany’s favour, and on 20 September had given General Köstring instructions to this effect by telephone. [3] Germany would have liked to keep just that oil-bearing district of Borysław-Drohobycz which the German troops had occupied on 17 September, the day on which Soviet troops entered Poland. But Germany’s request was rejected by Molotov during his interview with von Schulenburg on 20 September. Schulenburg then suggested that this district in which Ribbentrop took such an interest should be left provisionally under German control within the military demarcation line and that the decision on the final political frontier should be postponed. This temporary solution was turned down by Molotov, who said that the military frontier should coincide in future with the political frontier, which in the upper San should be kept strictly to the line agreed in the secret protocol of 23 August. To gild the pill a little, Molotov stated that the Soviet government was prepared to give Germany the Suwałki triangle between East Prussia and Lithuania, except for Augustów. [4] The question of the upper San was to be raised again by Ribbentrop during his second Moscow visit. At first there was a certain amount of haggling over Suwałki, but the matter was provisionally settled through an exchange of secret letters on 8 October 1939. [5]
Stalin Against an Independent Poland: All these were trifling matters compared with the question which the Soviet leaders had raised the previous day.
On 19 September 1939, Molotov summoned von Schulenburg and informed him of the Soviet government’s intention to negotiate a final settlement of the status of Poland with the German government. ‘The original inclination’, he declared, ‘entertained by the Soviet government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the Pisa – Narew – Vistula – San line’, [6] the four-river line agreed on 23 August.
This was the first move in a manoeuvre which Stalin was to bring to a masterly conclusion on 27 and 28 September. Its success depended on the abandonment of any idea of setting up a new ‘Congress Poland’.
If such a solution had been accepted, both Russia and Germany would have had to part with some of the territory they had occupied west and east of the line of demarcation in order to form a new Polish state, however reduced. This idea was certainly distasteful to Stalin, who was temperamentally incapable of making a concession without getting something for it in return. And, more important, it would have spoilt the plan he intended to spring on Ribbentrop. The USSR had nothing to gain by surrendering territory to the new Polish state because, as things were at the time, she did not want a new Polish state at all. Stalin might have agreed to give up some of his Polish territory, but only if he could have used it as a bargaining counter to be bought back by Germany at the highest price he could get.
Stalin Exchanges a Strip of Poland for Lithuania: On 22 September Ribbentrop agreed to go to Moscow to discuss the Polish question, after trying in vain to persuade Molotov to come to Berlin. [7] The visit was arranged for 27 September.
But the bombshell on which Stalin was counting to blow a ‘Little Poland’ sky high and give him Lithuania as well went off two days before Ribbentrop’s departure. At 8.00pm on 25 September Stalin summoned von Schulenburg and, according to the report sent by the German Ambassador to Berlin the same evening, made the following remarks, in the presence of Molotov:
Stalin stated the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent Polish rump state. He proposed the following: From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the province of Lublin and that portion of the province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to Germany’s share. In return, Germany would waive her claim to Lithuania. Stalin offered this suggestion as a subject for the forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and added that, if Germany consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the Protocol of 23 August, and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German government. Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but did not mention Finland. [8]
Stalin was in fact proposing to exchange a strip of Poland, whose status was as yet undefined and which did not belong to him, for Lithuania. If Germany agreed, Lithuania would soon become Soviet territory. The USSR would thereby gain control of the three Baltic states and Stalin would rid himself of some exclusively Polish provinces while at the same time making Germany pay a very high price for them – provinces which would have been difficult to assimilate and might have given rise to nationalist claims against Russia. It was better to hand over these provinces to Germany and acquire from this ‘transfer’ the enormous advantage of a radical settlement of the Baltic problem on lines desired by Russian policy ever since the time of Peter the Great.
How could a few million Poles handed over to the German executioners tip Stalin’s scales against such a resounding success as this?
Ribbentrop’s Visit to Moscow and the Talks: Ribbentrop had not even two days in which to prepare himself for a discussion of the Soviet proposals of the 25th. A note written by Weizsäcker, the Secretary of State, on the coming Moscow negotiations claimed for Germany, ‘in the event of the Russians being opposed to an independent Poland, the right to dispose of Polish territory as she pleased, including territory on both sides of the line of demarcation’. [9] Until then Hitler had merely declared, in his Danzig speech of 19 September, that ‘the Poland created by the Treaty of Versailles would never be restored’. It was no doubt with his consent that the Reich Foreign Minister left for Moscow armed with full powers and with the task of reaching a decision on the spot from information supplied in his talks with the Soviet leaders.
On his arrival in Moscow with a large number of advisers at about 5.30pm on 27 September (when the plane put in at Königsberg they also picked up Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig), Ribbentrop was this time given a much more spectacular reception. A cohort of high officials, representatives of the Red Army, and a guard of honour were waiting for him in the station, which was all decorated with flags bearing the emblems of the two regimes – the hammer and sickle and the swastika.
Ribbentrop and his suite stayed at what was formerly the Austrian Embassy, where the members of the British military mission had been their neighbours during their previous visit to Moscow on 23 August.
The first meeting began after 9.00pm and lasted until about 1.00am. Stalin again explained his proposals of 25 September: they could, of course, keep to the demarcation line laid down in the secret protocol of 23 August, but he thought that this would involve them in a number of serious difficulties. The creation of even a small independent Polish state meant that it would be the centre of a tug-of-war between East and West, and might cause permanent friction between the two governments. By handing over Lithuania to Russia, Germany would get the exclusively Polish provinces east of the Vistula and the Suwałki district in Lithuania as well. [10]
Ribbentrop Weighs Up the Pros and Cons: Stalin had everything to gain from this offer, made on 25 September and renewed on the 27th.
For his part, Ribbentrop spent several hours in weighing up the pros and cons in so far as they affected German interests. He informed Hitler of his deliberations in a coded telegram sent during the night. [11] The fact that Germany would retain Lithuania was an argument in favour of keeping to the line agreed on 23 August; and the four-river boundary formed the shortest military frontier between the two countries. But there were other reasons for accepting Stalin’s proposals. Under the conditions laid down on 23 August, the partition of Poland could, in fact, cause friction between Germany and the USSR. If Russia were to annex the other Baltic states, Germany would have to take Lithuania under her protection, perhaps at an inconvenient time. The area west of the Vistula which Stalin was offering was richer than that in the east. What eventually attracted Ribbentrop was the idea that Germany could settle the Polish question in the way she preferred, but he was imprudent enough not to have this point of view formally incorporated in the new Moscow agreements and was disagreeably surprised when later Molotov again raised the whole question of Poland’s status [12] – solely, of course, with regard to the territories still under German jurisdiction.
The only drawback was that while Russia was simultaneously ridding herself of the Polish problem and cutting off a large slice for herself in the east, this same problem was now being inherited by Germany. But the Reich thought it was strong enough to find a solution, especially as Stalin was apparently giving it a free hand.
Towards the ‘Government General’ of Poland: Ribbentrop had until midday on 28 September to answer this vital question. When the discussion was resumed at three in the afternoon, Stalin’s proposal had been accepted, after an exchange of views between Ribbentrop and Hitler.
This was the last that was heard of a ‘Congress Poland’. The independence of the new state would doubtless have been very precarious, hemmed in as it was between its two powerful neighbours. An open breach between them would have been as fatal for it as their agreement.
The historical fact is, however, that the ‘Government General of Poland’, as instituted by decree of Hitler on the following 8 October (10 days after the conclusion of the Moscow agreements), was the direct result of Stalin’s policy and proposals. The situation of Poland would have been less terrible if, caeteris paribus, [13] Stalin had not forced Hitler’s hand by offering him part of Poland – and just that part inhabited by millions of Jews, nearly all of whom were to be exterminated.
The Agreements of 28 September: Besides the specific reasons why Hitler and Ribbentrop should accept Stalin’s proposal, their decision was influenced by others of a more general nature.
Before going into them, a few details of the Moscow talks should be mentioned. Ribbentrop again did his best to have the upper San boundary moved, as he had unsuccessfully tried to do once before on 20 September. [14] He was again unable to overcome Stalin’s resistance, although he did extract one concession. Russia was willing to supply Germany with the same amount of oil as was produced yearly by the Borysław-Drohobycz district which Ribbentrop would have liked to annex, that is, the quite considerable total of 300,000 tons. [15] Molotov’s suggestion that Germany should get the south-western corner of Lithuania (Suwałki) was at the same time confirmed.
The territorial questions affecting the Polish frontier were settled by a ‘boundary treaty’ concluded on 28 September and signed by Molotov and von Schulenburg on 4 October. [16] The amendments to the secret protocol of 23 August affecting Lithuania and the Suwałki district were incorporated in a new secret protocol signed on the morning of the 29th but bearing the date of the previous day. Its text, like that of the protocol of 23 August, is now known, and runs as follows:
The Secret Supplementary protocol signed on 23 August 1939 shall be amended in item I to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fill to the sphere of influence of Germany. As soon as the government of the USSR shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German – Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the south-west of the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany. Further, it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above. [17]
To this were added:
i: A joint declaration, for publication, advocating the immediate re-establishment of peace on the basis, of course, of the acceptance of the Soviet-German partition of Poland as an accomplished fact. [18]
ii: An undertaking by the two countries to carry out a far-reaching joint economic programme ‘under which the Soviet Union will supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany in turn will make compensation through delivery of manufactured goods over an extended period’. [19]
iii: A confidential agreement by which Russia undertook to facilitate the exchange of goods between Germany, Rumania, Iran, Afghanistan and the Far East, allowing the use of her own railways. [20]
iv: A confidential protocol on the exchange of German and Soviet nationals in the territories which had been occupied. [21]
v: A secret protocol in which the two governments agreed to take joint action against any unrest in Poland:
Both parties [it said] will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose. [22]
The conversations of the 27th and especially those of the 28th and 29th ended in a cheerful atmosphere. Ribbentrop spoke to Hitler and consulted him by telephone, using the one in Molotov’s office. Molotov gave a dinner to Ribbentrop at which Stalin and several of his chief colleagues were present, including Mikoyan, Lazar Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Beria, etc... Stalin was all smiles. Ribbentrop later told one of his friends that he felt at the Kremlin as if he were among old Partei Genossen. [23] He repeated this to Ciano during their meeting at Rome on 10 March.
At the gala dinner [he said], on the German side there were present some old party members like Gauleiter Forster who, at the end of the ceremony, said that everything had gone off as if they had been talking with old comrades. [24]
The honeymoon was in full swing. It was to last some months.
1. Memorandum by von Moltke, Berlin, 25 September; not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
2. Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), pp 52-53.
3. Telephone message from Ribbentrop to Köstring, not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
4. Telegram from von Schulenburg to Berlin, no 402, 20 September, not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
5. A copy of these letters appears in the Tagebuch of the German Ambassador at Moscow, dated 27 June 1940. Not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
6. Telegram from von Schulenburg to Berlin on the morning of 20 September, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 101.
7. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 102.
8. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 102-03.
9. Not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
10. The details of these conversations are taken from the notes written by Hencke, Under-Secretary of State, in September 1939. Not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
11. It was put into cipher by Hencke himself. Not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
12. See below, Chapter IX, section ‘The Last Talk Between Ribbentrop and Molotov’.
13. Caeteris paribus – ‘with other things the same’, that is, with all other things being equal – MIA.
14. See above, Chapter V, section ‘Ribbentrop Has His Eye on Polish Oil’.
15. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 109.
16. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 105-06.
17. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 107.
18. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 108.
19. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 108-09.
20. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 109.
21. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 106.
22. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 107.
23. Interrogation of the American Mission. [Partei Genossen – party comrades – MIA.]
24. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 342.