The Russo-German Alliance: August 1939 – June 1941, by A. Rossi (Angelo Tasca) 1949
France’s defeat and the failure of the frontal attack on Britain were two factors which were now beginning to influence both Hitler’s plans and German – Soviet relations generally. To them was added a third which was to be decisive. In the summer of 1940, a few days after his victory in the West, Hitler decided that in future he would resist any fresh demands from Soviet Russia. He was quite willing, for the moment, to give her the territory assigned to her by the secret protocols of 23 August and 28 September 1939, but not to make further concessions in Europe.
Berlin and Moscow Begin to Quarrel: There had been a certain amount of friction between Berlin and Moscow during the discussions over the repatriation of German nationals in the Baltic states occupied by the Russians; and it had been very hard work drafting the Latvian agreement, which was signed on 8 November 1939.
The secret protocol of 23 August had assigned Bessarabia to the Soviet zone of influence. Molotov had once more gone out of his way to draw attention to the Soviet’s claims on this country in a speech on 29 March 1940. Hitler knew what Molotov was up to – so well, in fact, that Fabricius, his Ambassador in Bucharest, had twice (on 4 December 1939 and 22 May 1940) given the Rumanian government to understand that it would be better to submit to the Soviet’s demands, and that in any case Germany could not give any support because ‘the Führer was not the man to forget Stalin’s great services to him’. [1] The truth was that it was not a question of being grateful for services rendered but a definite obligation to which Hitler was bound by the Moscow agreements.
On 23 June 1940, Molotov informed von Schulenburg that Russia considered the time was ripe to force a solution of the Bessarabian problem without delay, and that he counted on Germany’s support; the Soviet claims likewise extended to Bukovina, which had not been mentioned in the secret protocol of 23 August. [2] Molotov also stated that his government would wait for the German reply until 25 June. [3]
Germany could hardly raise any objections as far as Bessarabia was concerned since this province had been given to Russia on 23 August 1939; but she did protest about Bukovina. This caused the first serious wranglings between the two partners. The Russians accused the Germans of failing in their duty to maintain solidarity, but everything was settled through a compromise by which Moscow agreed to limit its demands to Northern Bukovina, and the Soviet ultimatum to Rumania was drafted on this basis. Germany then advised the Rumanian government to yield, [4] and the same advice was given by Italy. [5]
When he signed the pacts of August and September 1939, Hitler was so obsessed with the idea of fighting the war on a single front and isolating Britain that in the heat of the moment he had not realised the full importance of the IOUs he was handing over to Russia. Although he knew they were negotiable, he did not think the Russians would cash them immediately. The occupation and especially the ‘sovietisation’ of the Baltic countries made an unpleasant impression on him. When Moscow showed that it intended to begin the same game in Bessarabia Hitler asked Ribbentrop if the secret protocol he had signed in Moscow did in fact confer this region on the Soviets. Ribbentrop’s reply showed that he felt he had to put up some sort of defence, and he excused himself by reminding Hitler that all he had done was to carry out his instructions, in fact, he had not gone as far as he could have done. After making Hitler read through the text of the secret protocol, the German Foreign Minister went on to explain that:
... at the time of the delimitation of the mutual spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, the Soviets stressed their interest in Bessarabia. On this occasion I stated orally our disinterestedness in the Bessarabian question. However, in order not to put down explicitly in written form [6] the recognition of the Russian claims to Bessarabia because of the possibility of indiscretions, with which we had to count in view of the then still very vague German – Russian relationship, I chose a formulation of a general nature [7] for the Protocol. This was done in such a way that when the South-Eastern European problems were discussed I declared very generally that Germany was politically disinterested in ‘these areas’, [8] that is, in the South-East of Europe. The economic interest of Germany in these South-Eastern European territories was duly stressed by me. This was in accordance with the general instructions given by the Führer for South-Eastern Europe and also, as I recall it, with a special directive of the Führer which I received before my departure for Moscow, in which the Führer authorised me to declare German disinterestedness in the territories of South-Eastern Europe, even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the Dardanelles. However, the latter were not discussed. [9]
Hitler could not, therefore, shift the blame on to his Foreign Minister. If the concessions to Russia had gone too far, it was on his own instructions. This distressing discovery annoyed him and set him against Moscow even more. His game had been rather wild because he had expected to have an easy-going partner; but his partner had taken him at his word and had almost immediately rushed off to cash in on all the ‘general’ advantages which he had been allowed. Hitler’s reaction was not determined by the Bessarabian question alone, but by Soviet Russia’s whole attitude and by her relentless determination. Hitler had never had any dealings with creditors like this. The ink was scarcely dry on the pact when the Moscow leaders launched their grand manoeuvre in the Baltic. Three months later they attacked Finland, and 10 months later it was Bessarabia’s turn.
If for the moment Hitler gave way because he did not want any complications in the Balkans, he felt deeply resentful nevertheless, and this feeling was shared by almost all the Nazi chiefs. That very clear-sighted observer who conceals his identity under the pseudonym of Leonardo Simoni, and who was a high official in the Italian Embassy in Berlin, noted in his journal under the date of 24 June:
This means that Berlin will again swallow the pill, but further Soviet demands will result in a stiffening of Berlin’s attitude. All this can have serious and unforeseen consequences. [10]
The German leaders grew more concerned about Soviet Russia, and their antagonism against her increased. [11] They had anticipated Soviet action in the Baltic countries and Rumania and had allowed for it in their calculations, but what made them think twice was ‘the moment Russia had chosen to put it into effect, and the way she rushed it through’. Their Russian creditor ‘had already pocketed everything’ and this gave Berlin the uneasy feeling that the East was no longer quite so secure as it had been. [12] Molotov’s assurances in his speech of 31 July [13] were not sufficient to restore the situation. ‘The fact is, there is a Russo-German crisis which, although it is cleverly concealed, can be the starting point for what may eventually lead to important developments.’ [14] At Nuremberg Ribbentrop told how, when the Soviets were occupying Bessarabia and North Bukovina, Hitler had said to him: ‘I will not let myself be overrun by the Russians.’ [15]
The state of mind of Hitler and his colleagues during this period is shown by another incident, which went almost unnoticed. When Memel was annexed in March 1939, Germany concluded a treaty with Lithuania guaranteeing her a free port area in the town. But when the Soviet troops took over the whole of Lithuania the German government decided – on 9 August 1940 – not to extend the 1939 concessions to the new Lithuania. On 24 August this decision was sent to the Soviet government, which vainly protested five days later. [16] At about the same time, Hitler was concerned at Moscow’s possible designs on Scandinavia, and during a meeting with his naval chiefs on 13 August asked that the northern fjords of Norway should be ‘more heavily fortified’ so that if there was a Russian attack it ‘would have no chance of success’, and so that the Germans could, on the other hand, set up bases there and occupy Petsamo in the event of another Russo – Finnish conflict. [17]
A Misunderstanding Is Cleared Up: The German leaders had on many occasions declared that German-Soviet friendship was all the more solid for being based on the separation of their respective zones of interest.
Hitler himself did his utmost to persuade Ciano of the truth of this during their meeting in Berlin on 1 October 1939. He then:
... considered the Moscow agreement to be absolutely unshakeable and such as to prevent the possibility of friction between the Slav and German worlds for a long time to come. Clarity was the basis of every decision – the Russian and German zones of influence were marked out beyond any possibility of misunderstanding. [18]
A few weeks later Ribbentrop declared at Danzig that the understanding between the two countries was permanent, since ‘the Lebensräume of the two powers adjoin but do not overlap. Therefore any territorial disagreements between the two countries need not arise in the future.’ [19] Again, on 19 July 1940, Hitler praised before the Reichstag the permanent nature of the Russian agreement, which was based on ‘the clear delimitation of the spheres of interest of each power’. [20]
In fact, his confidence rested on something which was essentially vague, for the delimitation of the ‘spheres of interest’ – the ‘living space’ – between Germany and Russia was far from being clear, even on the assumption that it would be unaffected by fluctuations in the balance of power between the two countries. Or rather, what was ‘clear’ for Hitler was not at all clear for Stalin.
This made itself apparent in an obvious and almost dramatic way during the Vienna Award (30 August 1940), when the two Axis powers, after compelling Rumania to cede a large slice of Transylvania to Hungary forthwith and to undertake the speedy return of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, [21] decided to guarantee the new Rumanian frontiers. As the Hungarian and Bulgarian claims had now been met, this guarantee could only be directed against Russia. Russia did not let this pass, for she was not satisfied with Bessarabia alone, [22] and protested at being confronted with a fait accompli. [23] In his first reply, written on 3 September 1940, but delivered to Molotov only on the 9th because in the interval the text had been altered slightly at the request of von Schulenburg, Ribbentrop once more stated the German viewpoint: so far as Berlin was concerned, the zones of interest between the two countries had been fixed once and for all in the secret protocol of 23 August, and Russian interests in the Balkans had been finally settled by the cession of Bessarabia. [24]
Moscow at once replied verbally that the Soviet government did not share this opinion. [25] In a memorandum dated 21 September, Molotov declared that, on the contrary, Russia still had considerable interests in the Balkans and he once more protested that at Vienna Germany had reached decisions on countries (Hungary and Rumania) adjoining Russia’s frontiers without consulting her, and had therefore violated article III of the non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939. [26]
The discussion became embittered and nothing was settled. If Germany persisted in her decision to keep Russia out of the Balkans, relations between the countries would be jeopardised and sooner or later there would be war. For at Vienna Berlin consciously dealt the August agreements of 1939 a blow from which they were never to recover. Ciano was not mistaken when he noted in his diary shortly afterwards: ‘The dream of an understanding with Russia has vanished for ever in the rooms of the Belvedere at Vienna.’ [27]
Germany and Russia at Loggerheads in the Balkans: Russia had never at any time given up the idea of playing an important role in the Balkans. She was quite willing to recognise Germany’s prior economic claims on Rumanian oil, and this Molotov did in a formal note on 17 July 1940, [28] a few weeks after Bessarabia had been occupied. But, politically, Russia wanted to cut off a slice for herself, and thus reoccupy the positions traditionally held by Czarist Russia.
She set out vigorously to achieve this. Lavrentiev, the Soviet Minister, was very active in Sofia. Early in October 1939, Molotov took soundings with the idea of concluding a pact of mutual assistance, but this was rejected by the Bulgarian government. [29] On 5 January 1940, a Russo – Bulgarian trade and navigation treaty was signed, followed on 15 March by the opening of a direct air line between Sofia and Moscow. After concluding a trade and navigation treaty with Yugoslavia on 11 May 1940, Russia renewed diplomatic relations with her on 24 June.
During these negotiations, which took place in Moscow, the Soviet leaders asked that Russia should be given a place on the International Danubian Commission, which had just decided on certain measures for the protection of shipping on the river. [30] This question was to come up again as a result of a move by Germany which had alarmed Moscow. What Germany had done was to summon the riparian states and Italy to Vienna on 5 September 1940. When the conference ended on the 13th it had decided to dissolve the International Commission and had agreed on various provisional arrangements until new regulations had been drawn up. After a protest from the Soviet government, which was surprised not to have been invited to the conference, [31] Molotov told von Schulenburg on 14 September that he approved of the dissolution of the International Commission but demanded the dissolution of the European Commission as well; both should be replaced by a single Danubian Commission in which the USSR would be represented. The agreement was made in October. Germany accepted the Russian proposals. Britain and France were excluded from the new Commission, and Italy retained her seat. [32] On 28 October the German, Italian, Rumanian and Soviet delegates met at Bucharest to discuss the new regulations for the Lower Danube.
Britain reacted strongly to the Soviet attitude. On 29 October the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, handed Molotov a note of protest from his government which stated that the Soviet attitude to the Danubian Commission constituted ‘a breach of neutrality’. The Soviet government rejected this protest on 2 November, repeating the German argument that the Commission was none of Britain’s business as she was ‘thousands of kilometres away from the Danube’. [33] It was true that the Danube did not flow through Italy either, but Germany had formally demanded her presence. And Russia was all the more inclined to fall in with this stretching of the ‘principle’ applied against Britain as she counted on Italy to defend her own interests in the Balkans.
The idea of reaching an agreement with Italy over this probably first occurred to the Soviet government as a result of a conversation in Rome between von Mackensen and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on 25 May 1940. During the conversation the Reich Ambassador mentioned Italy’s imminent entry into the war and suggested that ‘all problems in the Balkans could be solved without war by mutual cooperation between Germany, Italy and Russia’. [34]
Was this a purely personal move on Mackensen’s part, made without the knowledge of the Wilhelmstrasse? That was to be Ribbentrop’s argument later, but it is not borne out by the evidence. Ribbentrop had made the German – Soviet pact the pivot of his policy and until half-way through June 1940, he was advising Italy to seek an understanding with Russia. During his talk with Mussolini on 11 March he ‘pointed out that it would be to the advantage of the Axis if relations between Italy and Russia could again become good’. [35] When, after being estranged for several months, Rome and Moscow decided that their Ambassadors should return to their posts, Ciano noted in his diary on 8 June: ‘Ribbentrop will be happy over this, since it was one of the great objectives of his policy.’ [36]
What had happened to make the Wilhelmstrasse pull up short and practically repudiate von Mackensen? The reason was that in the meantime the victory in France had confronted Hitler with the problem of the future status of Europe; he thought that thenceforth he could solve it without having recourse to Russia’s help, and he wished to forestall any subsequent thrust by Russia towards the Balkans. The speed with which the Russians were carrying out their occupation of the Baltic states showed him how forceful and dynamic his partner was. Hitler was determined not to go beyond the outside limits laid down on 23 August and 28 September 1939.
That was why Molotov tried in vain to prevent von Mackensen’s ‘proposals’ from slipping through his fingers. From 3 June 1940, he repeatedly asked for details and further elucidation of the German Ambassador’s very interesting remarks. He returned to the charge on 7 June, but to no purpose. Finally, on 16 June, Ribbentrop in his reply stated that what von Mackensen had said was of no importance, and that the question of their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans had been settled in the secret protocol of 23 August 1939, when Germany had agreed to Russia’s annexation of Bessarabia. [37]
Mussolini Acts on Impulse: Notwithstanding Ribbentrop’s blunt reply, Molotov did not retire from the game, for he thought he had found an ally in Mussolini.
Mussolini was ‘deeply hurt’ at the back-stage part to which Hitler had relegated him. Ever since his first meeting with Hitler in June 1934, he had acted as his mentor, and now he was condemned to listen to him almost without being able to get in a word edgeways. He felt that both Italy and he himself were a ‘negligible quantity’ in the eyes of his powerful partner. This had been made quite clear to him when the French armistice conditions were being settled, for Hitler had set more store on winning the cooperation of France, a vanquished enemy, than on meeting the claims of Italy, his ally.
On the other hand, Mussolini saw with some disquiet that Germany was casting an eye on the Balkans, and he was anxious to slow up her expansionist tendencies before they reduced the Italian share in this region to a mere fraction. For a brief moment, therefore, he supported the Russians in the game they were playing. It was one of those muddle-headed, impulsive gestures, thought up on the spur of the moment, which were typical of his foreign policy, especially after 1934. This was the reason for his attempt to reach an understanding with Russia.
The Italian representative in Moscow was M Augusto Rosso, described by M Gafencu, who was in a position to know, as ‘a diplomat of great experience and wisdom’. [38] He was in von Schulenburg’s confidence and enjoyed the esteem of his Anglo – Saxon colleagues. After being recalled at the end of December 1939, as a result of the tension created by the Italian government’s pro-Finnish attitude, [39] he was sent back to Moscow at the beginning of June with instructions to restore relations between the two countries to normal and to prepare the ground for a trade agreement. Molotov, who had never lost sight of the suggestion thrown out by von Mackensen [40] and who thought that the defeat of the Western democracies was imminent, tried to discover Italy’s ‘plan of campaign’ at their first meeting on 13 June, three days after Italy had become a ‘belligerent’. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs clearly betrayed his disappointment at the Italian Ambassador’s replies, which were too vague for his taste. M Rosso knew that before the Kremlin would sign a trade agreement with Germany it would insist on the acceptance of certain very definite ‘political premises’ [41] and warned his government that it would have to talk politics if it wished to obtain results. Mussolini jumped at the suggestion and told M Rosso that here they could ‘go very far’. That is why M Rosso could return to Molotov on 20 August and turn his new instructions to good advantage. Molotov was delighted, but, in accordance with the methods which both suited his own temperament and were the accepted convention in Stalinist diplomacy, asked a great number of pointed questions and proposed ‘consultations between Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union with a view to a common policy in all matters relating to the Danube basin, the Balkans and the Black Sea’. [42]
M Rosso was not, for the moment, in a position to pursue the conversation as far as Molotov wished to take it. The Soviet Ambassador in Rome, M Gorelkin, who had seen Ciano on 22 June and had asked him ‘some questions about the Balkans’, was fobbed off with assurances as vague as they were cordial. [43] A few days later, on 25 June (two days after von Schulenburg was informed of the Soviet decision to settle the Bessarabian question and two days before the ultimatum to the Rumanian government), Molotov, now grown impatient, summoned the Italian Ambassador and first read, then handed him a note ‘dealing with the question of the Danube, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and the Soviet frontiers in Asia Minor’. [44] He was as outspoken and at the same time as insinuating as it was possible to be. In his opinion [45] the war might possibly be over ‘before the winter’, or just after. They should therefore hasten ‘without delay’ the settlement of any political problems which were still outstanding and reach agreement immediately on how to share out the loot. Italo – Soviet relations should be placed ‘quickly and for good’ on ‘the same satisfactory basis as those of the USSR and Germany’. The Soviet government’s attitude on a number of points was quite definite: it supported Bulgaria’s demands for the Dobrudja and for access to the Aegean; it wanted at all costs to see a settlement of the Bessarabian question; it regarded Turkey with suspicion, for Turkey persisted in retaining exclusive control over the Dardanelles and constituted a threat to the Soviet South and South-East against which Russia was determined to protect herself, although here German and Italian interests would be taken into account. In this connection, the respective positions of Russia and Italy were to be defined as follows: ‘In the Mediterranean, the Soviet government would recognise Italy’s hegemony, provided that Italy would recognise the Soviet government’s hegemony in the Black Sea.’ [46]
Mussolini was very proud of these overtures and hoped conversations would take place between the three powers at which his role would no longer be confined to absorbing Hitler’s oracular utterances in silence. In a speech on 31 July Molotov expressed satisfaction at the ‘improvement’ of relations with Italy. ‘An exchange of views’, he declared, ‘had shown that in the field of foreign policy it is highly probable that our two countries will reach a mutual understanding.’
In other words, Moscow and Rome were apparently agreed on preventing the Germans from seizing the whole of the Balkans, and on taking a slice for themselves whatever happened.
The understanding with Moscow became an idée fixe with Mussolini for several days. He spoke of it to Ciano on 4 August, [47] and again on the 6th:
He wants me to arrive quickly at an agreement with Russia which should have a ‘spectacular’ character [Ciano wrote in his diary]. He also raised the question of my going to Moscow. Litvinov’s visit was never returned. [48]
What a triumph it would be for the ‘Duce’ if, by sending Ciano to Moscow, he could get even with Hitler and repeat the sensation of 23 August 1939, all on his own!
But Molotov was mistaken in thinking that Mussolini would put up any real show of resistance to Hitler. He still believed that Mussolini was a ‘tough'; but Hitler, notwithstanding his sincere friendship for his comrade, had discovered that Mussolini was a weakling and had reproached him for remaining shackled to the monarchy and for keeping a ‘traitor’ like Ciano in his entourage.
Thus when he heard that Rome and Moscow were discussing a rapprochement which would harmonise with German – Soviet relations, Ribbentrop warned Italy, in a note to von Mackensen on 16 August 1940, not to encourage the USSR into attempting to settle the Balkan question. The language of the note was plain and amounted to a thinly disguised veto:
Now that the Axis [it ran] is endeavouring in the Balkans to urge Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania to negotiate, it does not seem to me to be in our interests to bring the Russians into this question in any manner whatsoever.
Ribbentrop added that it was better ‘to leave the question of the Dardanelles in abeyance’. [49]
That killed the Molotov – Mussolini ‘plan’ stone dead, even before its birth. Ribbentrop’s warning to the Italian government was enough to cause its collapse. A new attempt at the end of December 1940 suffered the same fate. [50] Mussolini did his best to maintain good relations with the USSR, but there was little point in doing so.
Finland: Another Stake in the Game: Another shadow which fell between Germany and Russia was the increasing divergence of their views on Finland, which had, as a matter of fact, been assigned to Russia, in the secret protocol of 23 August. At the end of October 1939, Molotov had shown concern at the presence of German warships in the Gulf of Finland, and to dispel the Soviet leaders’ misgivings Berlin had agreed to shift their operational area slightly to the west. [51] During the Russo – Finnish war relations between Berlin and Moscow had been excellent. [52] But as soon as the campaign in France was over, and especially after the annexation of Bessarabia, Hitler feared that Russia would attack Finland and in August he therefore decided to take certain precautions in northern Norway. [53]
Germany suddenly concluded an agreement with Finland for the transport of troops and equipment to Kirkenes across Finnish territory, the first ships to be unloaded on 22 September. Under the terms of the German – Soviet non-aggression pact Germany had agreed to give Russia advance information of such arrangements. But, making use of the technique which she was in future to employ with her partner, [54] Germany did not do this until the last minute, so that, while it was too late for effective action, she kept more or less to the letter of the agreement. Ribbentrop’s instructions asking von Schulenburg to inform Molotov of the Finnish agreement were dated 16 September, but he told him not to deliver the information until ‘the evening of 21 September’, that is, just when the German ships were nearing the Finnish coast and were within a few hours of landing there. [55]
There were explanations from Berlin, but the Soviet chiefs remained very suspicious. The fact that Germany had also reached agreement with Sweden for the transport of troops over her territory [56] did anything but quiet their fears. They therefore insisted on being supplied with further information concerning the duration of the German – Finnish agreement, the number of German troops involved, and whether the troops were going only to Kirkenes. [57]
All these questions were left practically unanswered. A real race developed between the two governments for an option on the Petsamo nickel mines. [58] This resulted in a ‘deterioration’ in German – Russian relations which was ‘slight’ [59] according to von Schulenburg, but which proved to be serious when judged in the light of future events.
Spain and Morocco: While Molotov continued his probings and Mussolini flirted with vague schemes, risking having to give them up at a frown from Hitler, Hitler and Ribbentrop had made a start on the political and economic organisation of Central Europe and the Balkans under German protection.
In the autumn of 1940 Hitler did not contemplate any further military operations before the following spring. The all-important problem was still the isolation of Britain. He had by then given up the Spanish venture because he considered Franco’s conditions for allowing him into Spain and giving him his active support to be too severe. Among other things, Spain wanted the whole of Morocco and the Oran region, which might have precipitated a revolt in French North Africa. Also, Hitler did not wish Morocco to become the exclusive property of Spain because he had designs on it himself. On 28 September 1940, he therefore decided a second time against Spain’s participation in the war, [60] and as Serrano Suñer seemed to be disappointed, Ciano remarked: ‘Why hasn’t he yet seen that the Germans have had an eye on Morocco for a long time?’ [61] During the Brenner conference with Mussolini on 4 October 1940, Hitler spoke of:
... the treaty proposed by the Spaniards, by which Germany would undertake to provide Spain with ample food supplies in return for a promise of Spanish intervention as soon as her military preparations were completed. But over and above the supplies, they have asked that Spain should be given Gibraltar and French Morocco from Oran to Cap Blanc.
Apropos of this, he:
... remarked first of all that Germany claimed a stretch of the Moroccan coastline as a base for her own commerce. Either Casablanca or Agadir would do... Hitler was also afraid that by agreeing to make territorial concessions of this kind to Spain he might produce two reactions: first, the occupation by England of the Spanish bases in the Canaries; and secondly, the adherence of the French North African Empire to the de Gaullist movement. [62]
The results of the talks between Franco and Hitler at Hendaye on 23 October – just before Montoire – were not, therefore, of any great importance.
The Balkans and the War in Greece: Elsewhere, Hitler’s chief worry was to keep the Balkans more or less quiet until the spring so that he could thoroughly exploit the Rumanian oil-fields. He might have thought that this was a way of throwing off, or at least whittling down, the allegiance to Russia forced on him by his need for her motor oil.
Germany therefore resolutely and methodically set about obtaining control of the whole Danubian and Balkan region. On one side, she was asking Italy not to undertake any action against Yugoslavia and Greece; [63] on the other, she was busy on her own behalf trying to obtain what she wanted. In April 1940, the German General Staff sounded Budapest on the possibility of being allowed to transfer troops for the occupation of the Rumanian oil-fields. [64] The handing back of Transylvania was already being discussed there, and this took place through the Vienna ‘Award’ on 30 August. A German military mission went to Rumania in September, [65] a move directed as much against the Russians as against the British.
In fact, included among the duties of the mission, as laid down in the High Command’s operational order of 20 September, was that of preparing the way for the deployment of German and Rumanian troops ‘in the event of our being forced into war with Soviet Russia’. [66]
The German troops were expected in Rumania at the beginning of October, and they arrived on the 11th. As usual, Berlin informed Moscow at the last minute: on 9 October Ribbentrop instructed von Schulenburg to notify Moscow the following day, that is, when the troops were already on the move.
Russia protested [67] and Mussolini, who a few days earlier had been vainly hoping that Italy would be given some share in the operation, gave way to an outburst of fury and indignation. It was then that, partly through Ciano’s influence, [68] he decided to attack Greece:
Hitler [he said] always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the newspapers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be re-established. [69]
What actually happened was that he informed Hitler of his intentions in a letter written on 19 October, but arranged for it to arrive too late. For months he had been telling Hitler that the war should not be allowed to spread to the Danube and the Balkans, but now a spiteful impulse made him put a match to the powder.
Hitler was kept in France by the talks at Hendaye and Montoire, and it was in vain that he left for Italy as soon as he could to persuade the Duce to give up his dangerous enterprise. [70] On 28 October, the day he met him in Florence, the Italian offensive was launched on the Greek – Albanian frontier. [71] ‘We attack in Albania and talk in Florence’, Ciano remarked on the same day with malicious pleasure. [72] Hitler was ‘extremely displeased’, [73] ‘very annoyed’, because he feared that this would complicate matters with Yugoslavia at a moment when he was making every effort to win her over to his policy. [74] He complained to Ciano at Salzburg, [75] and later, on 20 November, to Mussolini, [76] in a letter written in so harsh a tone that the Duce shamefacedly admitted that Hitler had ‘rapped him over the knuckles’ [77] like a schoolmaster with an unruly pupil. When they rushed into the Greek adventure neither Ciano nor Mussolini had the slightest notion of what its consequences would be, or that it would bring Italy to the end of her tether and put her still more at Germany’s mercy. But the chief risk was that it would spoil Hitler’s plans. From this point of view it was, according to the German army chiefs, ‘a serious strategic blunder’. [78]
1. G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p 258.
2. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 156.
3. Schulenburg’s telegram of 23 August, no 1208, not published in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948).
4. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 163.
5. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 271.
6. Emphasis in the original.
7. Emphasis in the original.
8. The secret protocol of 23 August stated that: ‘With regard to South-Eastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interests in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.’ (See above, Chapter III, section ‘Dividing Up the Spheres of Interest’.
9. Note from Ribbentrop to Hitler, 24 July 1940; Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 157-58.
10. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 136. [Leonardo Simoni was the pseudonym of Michele Lanza (1906-1973); he joined the diplomatic service in 1930 and served in London, Moscow and Tunis during the 1930s, and was Secretary in Berlin during 1939-43; he joined the partisans in 1943, and held diplomatic posts during the postwar period – MIA.]
11. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 151.
12. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 155.
13. See above Chapter VII, section ‘After the Battle of France’.
14. L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), p 156.
15. R Cartier, Les Secrets de la Guerre devoilés par Nuremberg (Paris, 1946), p 232.
16. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 175-78; telegram from Berlin of 24 August, no 1513, unpublished.
17. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1940) (London, 1947), p 83; cf Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 986.
18. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 311.
19. Speech made on 23 October 1939. Ribbentrop used more or less the same terms in his letter to Stalin of 13 October 1940 (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 207).
20. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 3 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 140-41.
21. Craïova agreements between Rumania and Bulgaria (7 September 1940).
22. In his conversation with Hitler on 13 November, Molotov claimed Southern Bukovina and requested that the German – Italian guarantee of the Rumanian frontier should be dropped (Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 237-44).
23. Meeting between Schulenburg and Molotov, 1 September, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 180-81.
24. Text of this reply in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 181-83.
25. Meeting between Schulenburg and Molotov, 9 September 1940. See the Ambassador’s two dispatches on this subject in Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 187-88, and especially Hilger’s unpublished memorandum.
26. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 190-94.
27. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 291; cf also the Ribbentrop – Ciano meeting on 19 September 1940, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), pp 390-92.
28. Telegram from von Schulenburg, no 1405, unpublished.
29. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 124.
30. The Commission sat from 5 to 17 April in Belgrade.
31. Message from Vyshinsky to von Schulenburg, 11 September 1940; cf G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p 65.
32. The European Commission was in control of the Danube from Braila to the sea. For these discussions see G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), pp 67-70.
33. These facts and the contents of the Soviet note were published in a Tass communiqué on 4 November 1940. The Nazi leaders were overjoyed at the ‘anti-British attitude’ shown by Moscow. See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 989.
34. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 144.
35. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 350.
36. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 262.
37. Telegram from von Schulenburg, 6 June, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 144; telegram from von Schulenburg, 7 June, no 1094, unpublished; telegram from Ribbentrop, 26 June, Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 148.
38. G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p 51.
39. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 190.
40. See above, this chapter, section ‘Germany and Russia at Loggerheads in the Balkans’.
41. See above, Chapter II, section ‘Molotov Seeks a Political Agreement With Hitler’.
42. A Rosso, Obbiettivi e metodi della politica estera sovietia (Florence, 1946), p 20. The author rightly remarks that ‘from June 1940, Moscow had the intention of intervening in every problem which concerned South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea’ on equal terms with her two partners, Germany and Italy, and that this was ‘the origin of those insurmountable differences with Germany which a year later led to an armed conflict’.
43. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 269.
44. G Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p 52.
45. This account of the Molotov – Rosso meeting on the 25th is taken from von Schulenburg’s report of it to Berlin, see Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 160 – 61.
46. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 160-61.
47. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 280.
48. Litvinov went to Rome on 3 December 1933, three months after the signature of the Italo – Soviet pact of friendship; he had a ‘long and cordial interview with Mussolini’.
49. Telegram from Ribbentrop to von Mackensen, no 1113, unpublished. This note was also communicated verbally to Alfieri, Italian Ambassador in Berlin. See L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), pp 161-62; Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 284.
50. See especially L Simoni, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-43) (Rome, 1946), pp 197, 200, 203-06; cf Dino Alfieri, Due dittatori di fronte (Milan, 1948), pp 206-07.
51. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 979.
52. See above, Chapter VI, section ‘Moscow and Ankara’.
53. See above, this chapter, section ‘Berlin and Moscow Begin to Quarrel’.
54. See above, this chapter, section ‘A Misunderstanding Is Cleared Up’.
55. The text of the agreement was not made known to Moscow until 4 October 1940; Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 202-04.
56. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 202.
57. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 204.
58. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), p 205.
59. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 988.
60. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 295. See also The Spanish Government and the Axis (US Department of State, 4 March 1946), document VI.
61. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 296.
62. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p 396.
63. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 284.
64. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 233.
65. Ribbentrop referred to it during his meeting with Mussolini in Rome on 19 September 1940 (unpublished notes of Schmidt, the interpreter).
66. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 6 (Washington, 1946), p 877. See confirmatory evidence by von Paulus at Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p 256.
67. Nazi – Soviet Relations 1939-41 (Washington, 1948), pp 206-07.
68. Ciano began his intrigues to provoke the war with Greece as early as August. See General Quirino Armellini, Diario di guerra (Milan, 1948), pp 54-60.
69. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 297.
70. See the statements of Keitel, who accompanied Hitler, in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 10 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 522-23.
71. On 13 October, D-day had been fixed for the 26; on the 18th it was postponed until the 28th. See General Quirino Armellini, Diario di guerra (Milan, 1948), pp 111, 119.
72. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 301.
73. See the statements of Keitel, who accompanied Hitler, in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 10 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 522-23.
74. Statement by Ribbentrop at Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 10 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp 287-88.
75. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 307.
76. Lettres secrètes Hitler-Mussolini (Paris, 1946), pp 82-88.
77. Ciano’s Diary, 1939-43 (London, 1947), p 309.
78. Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (1940) (London, 1947), p 126. See below, Chapter X, sections ‘Sand in the Machinery’ and ‘The Coup d'État in Yugoslavia’.