J. V. Stalin
Letter from Mr. Ralph Parker, The Times correspondent in Moscow, to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin:
THE foreign Press has printed a report that several Poles who, according to the recent Tass statement, had been arrested on the charge of the organization and carrying out of diversionist actions in the rear of the Red Army, in reality were members of a delegation invited to conduct negotiations with the Soviet authorities. It has also been reported that this group of Poles includes democratic leaders whose opinion on the formation of the future Polish Government would have made a valuable contribution to the formation of such a Government. It has also been reported that by the arrest of these Poles the Soviet Government undermines confidence in the measures adopted in the Crimea, and hinders the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government.
Would you care to make a statement on this question in order to clarify public opinion, which is interested in this question?
May 11, 1945
J. V. Stalin addressed the following reply to Mr. Parker:
I HAVE somewhat delayed my answer, but this is understandable if one keeps in mind how busy I am.
1. The arrest of the sixteen Poles in Poland headed by the well-known diversionist General Okulicki has no connection with the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government. These “gentlemen” were arrested in accordance with the law protecting the Red Army rear from diversionists—a law similar to the British Defence of the Realm Act. The arrests were carried out by Soviet military authorities in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Polish Provisional Government and the Soviet Military Command.
2. It is untrue that the arrested Poles were invited for negotiations with the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities do not and will not conduct negotiations with those who break the law on the protection of the Red Army rear.
3. As far as the question of the reorganization of the Polish Provisional Government itself is concerned, it can only be solved on the basis of the Crimea decisions, because no deviation from these decisions can be permitted.
4. I think the Polish question can be solved by agreement between the Allies only if the following elementary conditions are observed:
a.—if in the reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government the latter is recognized as the basic core of the future Polish Government of National Unity, similar to the case of Yugoslavia, where the National Liberation Committee was recognized as the basic core of the United Yugoslav Government;
b.—if as a result of the reconstruction a Government is created in Poland which will pursue a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, and not the policy of the “cordon sanitaire” against the Soviet Union;
c.—if the question of the reconstruction of the Polish Govel’hment is resolved together with the Poles who now have ties with the Polish people, and not without them.
May 18, 1945