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Ferdinand Lassalle

To the Supreme Court

(1863)


Written: As a speech in German, delivered 1863.
Published in English: 1927.
Translated by: Jakob Altmeier (presumed).
Source: Voices of Revolt: Speeches of Ferdinand Lassalle. International Publishers, first edition, 1927, New York, USA. 94 pages.
Transcription and Markup: Bill Wright for marxists.org, February, 2023


In the first part of my speech, in my consideration of the Middle Ages, I had mentioned that the abolition of the guilds had been demanded as early as 1672 in the German Diet, and as early as 1614 in the French Etats Généraux.[a] I had mentioned that in the year 1776 the Reform Minister Turgot[b] abolished guilds in France, but that the King was forced by the outcries of the privileged classes to recall his own edict a few months later, and that then, finally, by the storming of the Bastille,[c] a single day’s work achieved results that had been worked for in vain in Germany and France for almost two centuries.

To this statement I had added the following objective historical observation: “You will see, therefore, gentlemen, that no matter how great are the advantages inherent in reforms by the legal method, this method nevertheless suffers — in all important matters — from the disadvantage of sometimes remaining powerless for centuries, and, on the other hand, that the path of revolution, however undeniable its defects may be, has the advantage of leading swiftly and energetically to a practical outcome.”

And in this strictly objective and historical observation, which expounds impartially both the advantages and disadvantages of revolutions, and which was taken from a historical presentation of the Middle Ages, the First Judge finds a reason for passing a sentence of condemnation, since he assumes that I necessarily prefer the revolutionary course to the legal course, and that I, in consequence, would necessarily be of the same opinion with regard to the present epoch of history and the goals to be achieved in it, and would, therefore, be inspired in the bottom of my heart with the idea that the working classes should act similarly now! — I could hardly believe my eyes when I encountered in the sentence this basis of the condemnation!

Aside from the fact that, even if one should admit this logical process, it would lead only to an indictment for inciting to revolution against the State power, and not to an indictment for inciting to hatred and contempt for citizens of the State — does not the First Judge understand that this condemnation on the basis of inferences is a most flagrant transgression of all the principles of justice? . . .

These inferences are entirely erroneous and deceiving. They are paralogisms[d] whose incorrectness I have proven to you with as much brevity as clearness in the document serving as a justification for my appeal.

But even if these conclusions should be as correct as they really are incorrect — does not the First Judge understand that he has no right to indulge in such inferences? Does he not know that it is his duty to adhere to my stated words only, and not to venture any intrusion into the sacred domain of my internal freedom of thought? That he has not the slightest right to drag before the Tribunal of Penal Justice views that have not been expressed, even though it might be possible to infer from what has been expressed that such thoughts might be present at the bottom of my soul?

I was boundlessly astonished at this, for the judgment here involves a violation of all the most sacred principles of justice, a violation that is so flagrant that it remains without precedent, on this scale, even in periods of an utter contempt for justice.

Do you know, gentlemen, which case has been chosen by conservative writers of history as the worst atrocity against justice of which the Tribunals of the Terror were guilty under the French Revolution? It is the case of a condemnation which was pronounced on an accused person who had been found guilty of singing the song: “O Richard, mon roi!” (“O, Richard, my King!”).

Well, then! I am being sentenced because the judge believes he has heard, not from my lips; no, but in the deepest recesses of my soul, the melody: “O Révolution, ma reine!” (“O, Revolution, my Queen!”). . . .

I shall not conceal from you, gentlemen, that our views may be widely different. Certainly I wish for many things which you do not wish, and I am opposed to many things that you wish.

But what has this to do with the sphere of justice?

We are even more widely divergent in the matter of what we believe than in the matter of what we wish.

You do not believe in the possibility of a revolution, gentlemen. And yet, my studies have brought me to the point in which I believe in the possibility of a revolution.

In my speech of defense before the court of the first instance, I already made statements as to the scientific meaning of the word “revolution,” the meaning in which I understand this word.

The definition I assigned to this word is simply that of substituting a new principle for an old condition, either with or without the use of force.

In this sense I can say that I am at any rate convinced of the future occurrence of a revolution.

It will either come with full legality and with all the blessings of peace, if men are wise enough to make up their minds in time to enable them to introduce it from above, or it will come — within some appreciable period — as a whirlwind with all the convulsions of violence, as a fury with wild, waving hair, with bronze sandals on her feet.

In either one of these two ways, revolution will come; of that there is no doubt, and when I cut myself off from the tumult of the day and bury myself in the study of history, I can hear her treading her iron gait.

—From Die indirekte Steuer und die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse (“Indirect Taxation and the Situation of the Working Class”), a speech delivered by Lassalle in his own defense before the Royal Chamber Court in answer to the accusation of having “publicly incited the propertyless classes to hatred and contempt for the prosperous.”

THE END

 


Explanatory Notes

[a] States General: A general as opposed to provincial legislature, composed of different classes or estates of citizens; the name of the legislative body of the Netherlands, and that of France during the Revolution; it was convoked in France only in periods of national crisis.

[b] Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques (1727-1781): General supervisor of finances in France before the Revolution.

[c] Bastille: The prison fortress built at the Porte St. Antoine, Paris, in 1369, destroyed by a popular uprising, July 14, 1789. It was regarded as a symbol of monarchical despotism, and July 14, the day of its demolition, remains a national holiday in France.

[d] Paralogism: A fallacy in reason of which the reasoner is unconscious; also, loosely, any act of false reasoning.


Last updated on 15 February 2023