Friedrich Engels, “Can Europe Disarm?” Nuremberg, 1893. An off-print from Vorwärts (Wörlein & Co.).
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In the Berne Workers’ Library, the collection begins with the pamphlet: Karl Marx before the Cologne Jury |
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Preface: the articles were published in the Berlin Vorwärts in March 1893 “during the Reichstag debate on the Army Bill” (p. 3).
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“I proceed, therefore, from this [the present, heuti- gen] situation, and for the time being propose only such measures as could be adopted today by any government without danger to the country’s security. I am seeking only to establish that, from the purely military standpoint, there is absolutely no obstacle to a gradual abolition of standing armies” and if these armies are retained it is “against the internal enemy” (p. 3). |
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“A gradual reduction of the term of service by international agreement”—that is “the central point of my thesis” (p. 4)—“a general transition from the standing army to a militia” (p. 4, idem, p. 3).
(Thus the essential point for Engels = transition to a militia. This N.B.)
The preface is dated: London, March 28, 1893.
§I. For twenty-five years now, Europe has been arming “unprecedentedly”.... “Is it not stupid then to talk of disarmament?” (p. 5).
But the mass of the people ... call ... “for disarmament” “in all countries”.... Is there no way out of the blind alley except through a devastating war?
“I maintain: disarmament, and thereby the guarantee of peace, is possible” (5) ... and Germany has the “power and vocation” to achieve it....
Further, §I describes briefly the transition to universal military service. Its “revolutionary” (p. 6) aspect is that it enlists all men for “national defence”....
There must be a transition to an “international maximum term of service” “with a militia system as the ultimate goal” (7).
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at first a two-year maximum, followed by 1½, and so on! until?? |
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§II. The possibility (military and technical) of a short term of service. A long one is unnecessary.
(Excessive parade drill (9), sentry duty (9), batmen (10) and such like idiocy.)
What of the cavalry? A rather longer term would be desirable—if the men had no previous riding training. But much can be done in this respect, too, and besides it should be possible to have “three- or four-year volunteers” (10).
In my life I have seen the collapse of so many vaunted customs, institutions, regulations, including military ones (10)———“that I would advise everyone especially to distrust military ‘expert opinion’” (p. 11, end of §II).
§III. The stupidity of conservatism in military matters, because military technology is especially revolutionary.
| Infantry fire | |||
| 40 years ago at ... | 300 | paces | |
| 1870-71 | 600-1,000 | ” | (artillery: |
| 3,000-4,000) | |||
| “new” | up to 3,000-4,000 | ” | (p. 11) |
The necessity for military training of the youth, gymnastics, etc. (13-14), route marches (in summer), field exercises (14), etc., etc.
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And the instructors?—retired non-commissioned officers. If they are dragged out “into the daylight of the school yard and the general code of civil law”,—“then I will wager that our rebellious (sic!!?) school youth will teach reason to the worst of these former oppressors of soldiers” (15). |
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§IV. Will other countries adopt it? Austria and Italy—yes
France?—the “decisive country” (15). Will France deceive?
But Germany is much stronger: her population is greater; she has more officers, and that is very important. (“In all previous wars there was a shortage of officers after a few months of military operations” (17))....
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Incidentally, the “undemocratic and politically objectionable” (16) institution of volunteers has a military value for Germany (> officers). But in France “the three-year soldiers have simply pushed out of the army the privileged one-year volunteers. This indicates that Germany’s level of public politi- cal consciousness and the political institutions it permits are far below the French level” (16) |
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§V. Russia? Whether or not Russia will adopt it is unimportant. Unimportant in general; there are no officers.
The Russian soldier is very brave and fights well in a group. Now, however, individual action is required, and here he is of no use at all, and stands no comparison with “Western soldiers” (19).
Embezzlement by government officials, etc., in Russia (20).
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“Russia has only to lose a few battles and the scene of operations will shift from the Vistula to the Dvina and Dnieper; an Allied Polish Army will be formed in the rear of the German army, under its protection; this will be just punishment for Prussia if she has then to restore a strong Poland for the sake of her own safety” (20). |
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§VI. The internal situation of Russia is “almost desperate” ... “this European China” (21) ... the ruin of the peasants after 1861.... “This path” (of economic and social revolution = capitalism—in Russia) “is for the time being predom- inantly a destructive path” (21). |
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Impoverishment of the soil, deforestation, etc. in Russia. Russia’s credit is falling. “It is not France that needs Russia, but rather Russia that needs France.... If she had a little sense, France could obtain from Russia whatever she liked. Instead, official France crawls on her belly before the tsar” (23)....
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Russia lives by exporting rye—mainly to Ger- many. “As soon as Germany begins to eat white bread instead of black, the present official tsarist and big-bourgeois Russia will at once be bankrupt” (23). |
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end of §VI
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§VII. And how do things stand with us? Endless “tyrannical treatment of soldiers” (24) ... “a para- sitic nobility”, “the arrogance of the sons of the bourgeoisie”.... Formerly they were accidentally shot during manoeuvres (25)—“I knew a youth from Cologne who was killed in this way in 1849 by a bullet intended for his captain” (25), nowadays, with the small calibre magazine rifle, “this can’t be done, so easily and unnoticeably” (25).... |
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In France such treatment of the soldiers is impossible.... The French soldiers must despise the German soldiers when they read of the treatment they are subjected to in the barracks....
§VIII. Will this proposal be adopted?
Germany puts it to Austria, Italy, France. If the lastnamed adopts it, she will not worsen her position, but she will if she rejects it.
“All armies are unusually capable of learning after great defeats” (27)....
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“We should not forget that twenty-seven years of Bismarck’s administration made Germany hated everywhere—and with good reason. Neither the annexation of the North Schleswig Danes, nor the non-observance, and subsequent swindling cancella- tion, of the Prague Peace Treaty article relating to them, nor the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, nor the shabby measures taken against the Prussian Poles, have had anything at all to do with establish- ing ‘national unity’” (27).... Bismarck made Ger- many hated.... |
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“Wherever you go you will find sympathy for France, but distrust of Germany” (28).... |
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“Let us not forget that Great Britain will decide the outcome of the next war” (28)—mastery of the seas, “will simply starve out” (France or Germany).
Germany would gain a great deal by making such a proposal (p. 29)....
End
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