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Poland, the Fourth International, and the Socialist Workers Party

by Steve Bloom

[The following item is reprinted from the International Internal Information Bulletin, No. 2 in 1982. It is an edited text of a report given to the National Committee plenum of the Socialist Workers Party, February 27 to March 4, 1982.]

This is a report from the Fourth Internationalist Caucus in the National Committee in support of the resolution entitled, “Political Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland.” This resolution was adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International at its last meeting, January 8, by a vote of 24 to 2 with one abstention. (The only two opposing votes were cast by the fraternal delegates from the SWP.) The resolution is printed in the issue of Intercontinental Press dated February 15,1982.

I want to talk about four broad areas in this report. First is Poland itself, and what the political revolution in that country should mean for us. Second is the international solidarity campaign which sprang up massively in the wake of General Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law. Third is the specific approach we should have to the solidarity with Solidarity movement in this country, since it is only in the context of understanding the first two points that we can successfully orient ourselves in the United States. And fourth is what is at the root of the errors being made by the SWP leadership on these key questions.

The Meaning of the Polish Events

The political revolution which began in Poland with the Gdansk shipyard strike in August of 1980 is the strongest confirmation so far of the validity of the Trotskyist program for the Stalinized workers’ states. More than East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, or the whole series of past developments in Poland itself, the 1980-81 Polish upsurge clearly posed the question of whether the workers themselves, or the Stalinist bureaucracy, would actually rule the workers’ states.

This question — of the need for the Polish workers to organize themselves and prepare for the taking of power — is a central theme of the United Secretariat resolution. This is not a matter of offering tactical advice to the leadership of Solidarity. The tactics of the struggle for power, like any other struggle, can only be decided by those closest to the scene of action. What is involved here is a simple reconfirmation of our basic strategic perspective: the need for political revolution. The task of the working class is to actively overthrow the bureaucracy. As the resolution states:

During the second three months of 1981 all the factors involved in the mass mobilizations tended with increasing sharpness to pose the question of the workers taking over the management of the whole of society. The very needs of the people as well as the paralysis of the bureaucratic regime of management showed that a project of “partial” self-management — a shareout of tasks with the existing regime—was unrealistic and impractical.

And further on:

The declaration of martial law, the mass arrests of those who are politically active and think freely, and the imposition of an undisguised dictatorship demonstrate yet again that there can be no “reform” or “gradual democratization” of a bureaucratic regime.

The point here is clear, and I hope indisputable: the very scope and depth of the upsurge in Poland places the question of who shall rule on the agenda. The more the demands of the Solidarity movement come into conflict with the traditional prerogatives of the ruling Stalinist caste — which are the basis of its privileged position — the more inevitable a final showdown becomes.

The bureaucracy will not give up its parasitic hold on the workers’ state without a fight. It cannot be reformed away, or made passive by the upsurge of the masses. It will resist with all of its strength, and with every weapon at its disposal. The working class must also prepare itself for this confrontation.

The distinction between a tactical postponement of the decisive battle and an attempt at strategic compromise in order to reform away the bureaucracy is an important one for us to keep in mind when discussing the Polish events. There are many times in revolutionary struggles when it is to the advantage of the workers’ movement to put off a confrontation in order to be in a better position at a later time. The July days in 1917 in Russia is a classic example. But in other cases the idea of postponing a decisive battle becomes an excuse by those who in reality believe they can avoid a battle altogether. This is the classic mask of reformism in the workers’ movement. And when reformism is in the leadership of revolutionary struggles it inevitably leaves the masses disarmed and unprepared.

It is, of course, not always possible to tell, from afar, whether tactical postponement or strategic reformism is behind any particular proposal for compromise in a revolutionary situation. But this makes it all the more essential for us to state clearly the approach of revolutionary Marxism on the general questions involved. In Poland, a debate on this problem was clearly taking place within the Solidarity movement, even before the military crack down. That debate has sharpened and intensified as a result of Jaruzelski’s takeover. The question arises automatically: How could the completely discredited and despised regime win such a victory over a movement with the massive support of Solidarity? Our answer to this is contained in the United Secretariat resolution:

Centralized power and the bureaucracy’s will to act permitted even a very shaken parasitic caste to impose its initiative over a movement of millions of workers, intellectuals, and youth, but which was not prepared to oppose its own centralized counterpower at all levels.

The readiness of the workers, as well as the dynamic of their struggle, made another outcome objectively possible. The origin of this absence of centralized counterpower did not reside in an intrinsic weakness of the masses or in their lack of willingness to fight. It concerns the lack of a conscious and organized political party, or at least a revolutionary tendency having national influence and capable of grasping both the objective logic of the showdown arising from the workers’ struggle and the real nature of the bureaucratic enemy.

This answer—the need for a revolutionary party—is one which increasing numbers of Poles will be moving toward as the discussions within the vanguard of the Polish proletariat continue. These discussions are of crucial importance. One of the reasons we must be clear on this question is not simply its extreme objective significance, but exactly because it is also a real and burning debate within the Solidarity movement itself.

Another question on which we should be clear is the scope and significance of the defeat that the Polish masses have suffered at the hands of the bureaucracy. That this was a defeat, of course, there can be no question. The legal form of the mass organization through which the masses have been able to challenge the bureaucracy has been effectively smashed, and with it the period of relatively free and open exercise of democratic rights has come to an end. The bureaucracy has, at least for the moment, regained the initiative.

But although the military crackdown was a serious blow to the masses, it is by no means a decisive or crushing defeat. The bureaucracy has gained some time to attempt to rebuild its shattered social base and return society to what it considers “normal.” But it has not been successful in completely demoralizing the workers, or atomizing them, and it is still desperately seeking some credible reformist solution involving Walesa or other Solidarity leaders. This is a sign of weakness on the part of Jaruzelsi.

All political and economic realities would seem to militate against the ruling caste’s ability to decisively reestablish its authority. The experiences of the masses in the year and a half after the first development of Solidarity cannot be erased by the internment of even a large number of leaders. The movement was much too deep and broad for that, and it is quite likely that even in the medium term it will reemerge, building on all of the past lessons and experiences. The fact that extensive resistance continues even now, as we document quite well in the Militant, is a positive sign for future possibilities.

The International Solidarity Campaign

Now let’s turn to the question of what response the international working class movement should make to Jaruzelsi’s crackdown. This is a question which ought to be obvious and straightforward, as the United Secretariat resolution declares: “The international workers’ movement must commit itself, in a massive and united way, to a campaign of aid to the Polish workers’ resistance. The slogan ’Workers of the world unite’ must become the motto of the movement of solidarity with Solidarity.”

This solidarity campaign is the rightful domain of the international working class. The posturing and crocodile tears of the bourgeoisie have no legitimate place within it. The instinctive reaction of working people all over the world to the repression directed against their Polish sisters and brothers was to protest, demonstrate, send material aid, or do anything else they could to lend their support. This response is testimony to the healthy, revolutionary potential of this class on which the entire future of humanity resides. It is a response which the parties of the Fourth International should hail, encourage, spread, and attempt to lead in a clear anti-Stalinist and anti-imperialist direction.

Unfortunately, the leadership of the SWP has charted a different course, one which concedes in advance the leadership of this movement to the imperialist ruling class and their agents in the labor movement; and which places us in the position of sideline critics. The SWP leadership projects this line for our entire international movement. It is impossible to discuss the correctness or incorrectness of the current line for our own country without an understanding of the international context in which it is applied here. Such an examination demonstrates that our differences are much more fundamental than a simple tactical disagreement about what to do in the United States. It indicates a deep and serious questioning of our traditional approach, not only to the political revolution but also to the role of our historical tendency— the Fourth International — as the rightful leadership of the international working class movement.

Let’s examine what happened in Europe in the wake of the imposition of martial law in Poland. France is the most advanced example of what took place on a lesser scale throughout the continent. On December 14, a massive march occurred which attracted a crowd estimated at as many as 100,000. This march was initiated by the CFDT — the Socialist Party-led trade union federation — and not, as Intercontinental Press implied, by the Socialist Party itself or by the Mitterrand government. It was an action called reluctantly, and this is a key fact, as a result of the overwhelming pressure of the rank-and-file workers; and it was the left-wing, prosocialist workers who put their stamp on the demonstration. The slogan “Socialism means power to the workers” was one of the most popular on the march, along with the demands “Liberty for the imprisoned” and “Trade union rights in Poland.” It was a sea of red flags, and “The Internationale” was its theme song, being sung over and over throughout the crowd. The workers on the march even actively excluded a contingent of 1,000 Gaullists who tried to participate.

What relationship has all of this to the following description of this action in Intercontinental Press of December 28, 1981 — “In France, the imperialist propaganda campaign carried out under the guise of ’solidarity’ with Poland reached unrivaled heights.”

The CP-led trade union federation in France, the CGT, has not been immune from this upsurge. Despite the opposition of the CGT leadership, massive numbers of workers from these unions participated in the December 14 protest. Our comrades were instrumental in the calling and building of the largest CGT-sponsored meeting in Paris in years, called against the will of the national CGT leadership by a number of local unions. It attracted 2,000 workers, and heard two speakers from Polish Solidarity as well as oppositionists within the CGT.

Can we possibly accept a political line like the one presented by the SWP leadership, which would tell us that Trotskyists in France should not have been a part of this massive upsurge (an upsurge of rank-and-file workers, not under the control of the Social Democracy or anybody else)? That we should not march with our own slogans and banners, trying to lead it in the right direction and recruit from it (which we have done)? That we should not have helped the left-wing breakaway of CP-led workers from their leaderships? Can comrades possibly be serious in suggesting, as Steve Clark, George Novack, and Larry Seigle do in their seven-page polemic in Intercontinental Press (March 1, 1982) that because these rank-and-file workers were able to force the active expression of their opposition to Jaruzelski’s crackdown through the vehicle of their own unions, which happen to be led by Social Democrats, the entire class content of this upsurge is transformed into a part of the imperialist propaganda campaign? Does the same hold true for the workers in Stalinist-led unions? The answers should be obvious and indisputable for any serious proletarian revolutionist. The line which the SWP leadership has projected for our international movement might make sense for a sect which is primarily interested in maintaining its purity. But it makes no sense for a revolutionary party which is interested in winning the leadership of the masses, and actively supporting the political revolution in the workers’ states.

The example of the French workers was followed, on a lesser scale, throughout continental Europe. In Norway and Belgium the entire trade union movement called for a general strike. In Italy, Fiat workers voted to send a fact-finding delegation to a Fiat plant in Poland to inquire into the fate of political prisoners. Their Stalinist-led trade union was forced to print a book with the program of Solidarity (an idea our trade union fractions could propose in this country).

England was a bit of an exception, but even here our comrades have been able to take some initiatives in smaller propaganda actions, and to lead left-wing breakaways from rightist and bourgeois-dominated rallies.

What all of this marks is the reappearance of a true antibureaucratic dimension in the consciousness of the international working class movement. We have also seen for the first time significant demonstrations, numbering in the thousands, in the semicolonial countries. This is a new development even since Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In nine out often cases, the people who come out in these actions are the same people who have come out against the militarization drive and in solidarity with the Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan revolutions. They are the same forces that will mobilize tomorrow in defense of Cuba.

It is our movement which should legitimately lead this working class solidarity effort. Other forces in the workers’ movement may be able to pick up on one or another aspect of our program, and raise some of the same slogans and demands. When they do, the united front tactic should be applied as in any other situation. But the totality of our approach distinguishes us from every other current. In broad outline, our program for the solidarity with Solidarity campaign is:

1) Explaining the real goals and objectives of the Solidarity movement — exposing the lie that the Polish workers want to reestablish capitalism. We must spread the understanding of the French workers who demonstrated on December 14 — “Socialism means power to the workers.”

2) The call for the immediate lifting of martial law, and the raising of demands in defense of democratic rights—release political prisoners; legalize Solidarity; for the right of meeting and organization.

3) The sending of material aid—money, food, and medicine—directly to the Polish people and the Solidarity movement, not to the Stalinist government.

4) The sending of “trade union commissions of inquiry” to investigate the repression against Solidarity leaders and the general conditions faced by the workers and farmers.

5) Opposition to any sanctions or boycott by imperialist governments, banks, or misled sectors of the workers’ movement. Where errors have been made on this by some sections, they will have to be corrected, but the United Secretariat resolution is quite clear on this point. Such sanctions will only worsen the conditions of the masses and weaken them both organizationally and politically. It will have no effect on the standard of living of the bureaucracy.

6) The cancellation of Poland’s debt to the international bankers.

7) The linking of all of this to our opposition to world imperialism. As the United Secretariat resolution states:

The Fourth International closely links its solidarity campaign with Solidarity with its efforts to stimulate mobilizations against the remilitarization drive, against NATO’s policy of aggression, and against the criminal initiatives of U.S. imperialism, the real warmonger, in Central America and the Caribbean.

Within this perspective, the unity of interest of the working class on a world scale is crystal clear. Any reticence in giving support to the Polish workers can only hold back and divide the mobilization against nuclear rearmament in Europe, for a “Nuclear-Free Europe from Portugal to Poland” and against imperialist aggression in Central America. In the same way, any abstention or opposition — as we see among the Social Democratic parties—with regard to the mobilizations against NATO or in support of the revolutionary struggle of the people of Nicaragua, Guatemala, or El Salvador can only weaken the unity and breadth of support for the resistance struggle of the Polish masses.

No one can be called a defender of democratic rights in Poland who refuses to defend them in El Salvador, or Guatemala, or Turkey. And the converse is also true. The Fourth International’s defense of human rights and revolutionary movements in Central America will not have the necessary authority if we do not participate fully and actively in the solidarity campaign around Poland.

Our Solidarity Work in the United States

It is within this international context, and only within this context, that we can discuss the movement for solidarity with Solidarity here in the U.S. There are big tactical problems which we certainly have to resolve, resulting from the lack of a mass left wing of the working class movement here. But these should not stand in the way of our trying to intervene into this development; of testing and probing for openings at every opportunity, even if in practice what we can do will be limited.

The same features which have shaped the European movement in solidarity with Solidarity also exist in this country, though to a lesser degree and in a much less developed form. In the ranks of the labor movement we find the same class identification with the Polish workers’ struggle, though the meaning of that struggle is less clearly understood. This class identification with the workers of another country is one of the basic raw materials of revolutionary Marxism. It is a responsibility of the revolutionary party to take that raw material and use the opportunity to advance it toward the finished product — a fully class conscious and politically organized labor movement.

There are opportunities for us to attempt to do this around Poland. But we cannot do it as sideline commentators, who refuse to get our hands sullied in the real battle for the leadership of the class. If we refuse to offer our program for solidarity with Solidarity as an action perspective around which to group the more advanced sectors, then we can only expect that those who want to express their active support to the Polish workers will turn to alternative leaderships who will project activity. This is nothing less than the abdication of our leadership responsibilities.

There are forces we can work with in this country in a united front effort on this question. We obviously do not want to be associated with any right-wing or counterrevolutionary activities. But there are forces who will work with us to build a principled solidarity movement around one or more of the key aspects of our basic approach which I elaborated before. All of the money, food, and other aid which goes to Solidarity and to the Polish masses is an objective aid to a real anti-Stalinist struggle. Every pressure put on Jaruzelski to lift martial law, release the prisoners, restore democratic rights, is an objective aid to the Polish masses, and a blow against Stalinism. How the help of workers in the imperialist countries to the Solidarity movement — a workers’ struggle to overthrow Stalinism—can possibly be an aid to the plans of the imperialists is something which has not been explained.

Where committees to defend the Polish workers exist which are of a left-wing or working class character, we should participate in them and urge them to adopt these perspectives. Where no such committees exist, we should try to initiate them. We should also participate when possible in solidarity demonstrations that have a trade union base and try to develop contingents around our basic program. We can attempt to duplicate the successes of our English comrades in leading breakaway rallies as alternatives to the right-wing programs set up by the union officialdom. Of course, this will be possible only on a considerably lesser scale in this country.

One positive example of forces we can try to work with is the group that organized the rally in New York on February 6. This was an attempt, rather successful on the whole, to organize a radical, prosocialist, anti-imperialist solidarity movement with the Polish workers — though this was not reflected in our initial Militant coverage of the rally. Speaker after speaker got up and attacked Reaganism, opposed what the U.S. is doing in Central America, and explained that what the Polish workers are fighting for is real socialism, democratic socialism, and workers’ control of the economy. Susan Sontag’s reactionary comments did not stamp the character of the meeting. Though they were obviously an important occurrence which we should have noted and answered, it was inappropriate for the Militant to focus in on this speech. Far more important for us, for example, were the remarks made by Paul Robeson, Jr., and Pete Seeger, which reflect serious ferment and disagreement in the Stalinist milieu in this country.

Another good example of real activity we could involve ourselves in is the good initiative taken by our Iron Range comrades with their letter to the editor of the Mesabi Daily News. We should reject the line of the letter by Larry Seigle about this, attached to the PC minutes of January 29, 1982, which begins to call into question our whole concept of the workers’ united front.

This letter to the editor raised all of the most central political issues and clearly differentiated itself from the pseudo-supporters of Solidarity, like Reagan and the AFL-CIO bureaucracy. But this was not enough for Larry Seigle. He insisted that the letter was inadequate because it didn’t contain a number of programmatic points. He enumerated these as follows: 1) the fact that Poland is a workers’ state, is an advance over capitalism, and should be defended against imperialism; 2) “that U.S. imperialism is the most powerful and dangerous enemy of the people of the entire globe, including the workers and farmers of Poland”; 3) that we don’t place an equal sign between the Soviet bureaucracy and U.S. imperialism; and 4) that we are for socialism over capitalism. In short, Larry Seigle informs us, we cannot take joint action in defense of the Polish workers in collaboration with anyone else unless they agree completely with our entire analysis of Stalinism and the need for a socialist revolution. But this will exclude virtually everybody.

Seigle makes this point quite explicit: “It may be argued that these suggestions are aimed at something we never intended the letter to accomplish, and that it could not have accomplished even if we had wanted it to, because other signers would not agree with this approach. But that begins to get to the heart of the question.”

And further on: “A letter clearly presenting our views either signed by us and others, or simply by us alone (if others wouldn’t agree), would have been better.” But obviously others wouldn’t agree to a presentation of “our views.” If they would, they would be part of us and not “others.” An insistence that the only basis for common action around Poland is our own program — in its entirety — represents a clear negation of the united front tactic, which is based on joint work in areas where we have agreement with others, putting aside for the purposes of action our differences with them. Such a rejection of the united front for solidarity with the Solidarity movement is absolutely unwarranted, and a dangerous precedent for our party to set.

In defense of this rejection, Larry Seigle quotes from a pamphlet by James P. Cannon entitled, “American Stalinism and Anti-Stalinism” (printed in The Struggle for Socialism in the “American Century”). This pamphlet has also been quoted extensively by others recently. But it is being taken completely out of context and misapplied.

Cannon was addressing himself to a completely different problem than the one that faces us. What Cannon was arguing against is the idea of a broad, programmatic, anti-Stalinist front. He was rejecting the possibility of united action between the left wing, socialist opponents of Stalinism, and the rising tide of reactionary red-baiters at the end of the 1940s. He was quite correct to reject this possibility then and it is equally impossible today. But Cannon was by no means expressing the opinion that no united front against Stalinism was possible at any time or under any circumstances. This is clear from even a cursory reading of the pamphlet: “An understanding of the perfidious character of Stalinism is the beginning of wisdom for every serious, class conscious worker, and all anti-Stalinists who are also anticapitalist should try to work together. But anti-Stalinism, by itself, is no program for common struggle” (p. 346, emphasis added).

“We have no place in the present ’all-inclusive’ united front against American Stalinism. The reason for this is that we are anticapitalist” (p. 353, emphasis added).

There are innumerable other passages that could be cited as well. Cannon’s emphasis was on the impossibility of relying on, or collaborating with, the bourgeoisie to fight Stalinism, and explaining that this must be a fight undertaken by the workers’ movement itself. It is exactly this kind of working class opposition to Stalinism that the Polish masses are engaged in, and the creation of a broad proletarian united front of support for them is an elementary responsibility of revolutionists throughout the world.

The real movement in solidarity with Solidarity has nothing in common with the kind of reactionary anti-Stalinist front that Cannon was polemicizing against, although the ruling class and its apologists will of course try to use this issue for their own reactionary purposes. It is a specific struggle in support of an actual mass movement of revolutionary workers and farmers against a specific Stalinist bureaucracy. There are a large number of prosocialist and working class forces which are, or could be, involved in support of Solidarity—exactly the forces Cannon was referring to when he said, “All anti-Stalinists who are also anticapitalist should try to work together.” Can’t specific united fronts be established with such forces to collect material aid for the Polish masses and the Solidarity union? Wouldn’t this be an objective aid to the Polish workers? Shouldn’t these groups and individuals join together to demand an end to martial law and a respect for civil liberties in Poland, and expose the hypocrisy of Reagan and the capitalist politicians? Won’t this, too, put pressure on the Stalinists and objectively aid the struggle of the Polish workers? Isn’t this what we did when we initiated the letter to the editor of the Mesabi Daily News?

We must reject a line which would use our general political program to create artificial obstacles to cooperation and collaboration with others for a real, proletarian defense of the Solidarity movement. We must reject a line which denies the validity of the workers’ united front in this field, where it is just as valid as in any other defense of the basic interests of the working class. We must reject the general line of the letter by Larry Seigle to Kathy Wheeler and the Iron Range branch which expresses in the clearest way the errors which have been made by the current SWP leadership in its approach to Polish solidarity work.

I would also like to say a few words about the San Francisco demonstration which our party branch there participated in and which was also joined by some reactionary forces. The PC has given this action a lot of attention, and blown it out of all proportion to its actual significance, even running a criticism in the Militant of the original branch decision to participate after that decision had been reversed. It would be wrong to sidetrack the general discussion we need on Polish solidarity work into a big dispute over what amounts to a relatively minor tactical question. We must put this event into the correct context that I have tried to lay out in this report. It would be foolish for the National Committee to try to sort out all of the tactical ins and outs of the situation, but it is in order for us to discuss the political basis on which such a tactical decision should have been made by the San Francisco branch and the Bay Area district. Many of the arguments against the original branch decision to participate in this case are dangerously incorrect and one-sided. I would like to contribute several observations in this regard:

1) The initial reaction of the branch to get involved and participate was a good and healthy reaction.

2) As I have already discussed, the insistence that any activity by any group on any political axis around Polish solidarity is inherently a contribution to the imperialist propaganda drive is seriously in error.

3) The fear that our participation in the Polish solidarity movement will be confused with that of the right wing or will be distorted by the bourgeois media has become greatly exaggerated and been given far too much weight. Trotsky’s opposition to Stalinism was always being used and distorted by the bourgeois media in an attempt to make an amalgam between his views and those of the counterrevolutionaries. But Trotsky continuously asserted that the approach of revolutionists could not be dictated by how their positions would be portrayed in the bourgeois media.

There is a much bigger danger in the current situation than that our views will be confused with those of the right wing — which is actually quite unlikely. The bigger danger is that people in this country will think that only rightists, pro-imperialists, and trade union bureaucrats defend the Solidarity movement in Poland, and this would, indeed, contribute immeasurably to the bourgeois propaganda drive.

Continuity of Line?

In the March 1, 1982, issue of Intercontinental Press comrades Steve Clark, George Novack, and Larry Seigle state, and set out to prove, that the SWP leadership’s basic approach to the political revolution in Poland today is the same as our attitude toward Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956, and East Germany in 1953; that our main stress in the past was not on the crimes of the Stalinists but on the defense of the workers’ states and the role of imperialism. But they are wrong. There has been a change. And their evidence doesn’t stand up to even the slightest investigation. They cite many passages from our past coverage of these struggles which explain the need to defend the workers’ states and oppose imperialism. Such passages are not hard to find, since this was always an aspect of our coverage. But such quotations do not prove that this was its axis. Their assertion that it was is completely disproven if we look at the entirety of the articles from which their quotations were selected, as well as at the overall approach of our press to previous struggles in Eastern Europe. Let’s cite just two examples:

Clark, Novack, and Seigle write: “Fred Halstead emphasized the connection between opposition to the Soviet invasion and defense of the “Vietnamese revolution.” Then they go on to quote a paragraph from a statement by then-presidential candidate Halstead dated August 21,1968, and reprinted in the August 30, 1968, Militant. But it is not true that the quoted paragraph accurately conveys the emphasis of this statement. This is the sixth paragraph. The fifth one deals with the question of defense of the workers’ state. One paragraph for each of these questions. The first four paragraphs, the lead of the statement, and the last five, its conclusion, were all about the counterrevolutionary actions of the Kremlin Stalinists. That’s nine to two for an anti-Stalinist emphasis.

The citation of Alan Harris’s article in the September 9, 1968, issue of Intercontinental Press is even more amazing. Clark et al. quote a long section of this article to prove that our British comrades followed a line similar to the SWP’s today. But here is the paragraph immediately following the quoted section: “As the Labour party rally ended in turmoil, the left tendencies, heading some 10,000 persons, moved off in their own demonstration. Marching from Hyde Park toward the Soviet embassy, they were joined by more along the way” (emphasis added). Among the speakers at the Soviet embassy, along with comrades from the IMG, was Richard Kirkwood of International Social ism, the major state capitalist organization in England.

Search high and low through the pages of the Militant and Intercontinental Press in 1968, comrades, but you won’t find a single word written to expose this dastardly, twofold betrayal by our British comrades — forcing their fire on the Soviet embassy, and speaking at the same anti-Stalinist rally with a “third-camper.” The reason you won’t find any such attack isn’t because the leadership of our party was any less vigilant in defense of our program in 1968, but because our program in 1968 was to encourage the genuine defense of the political revolution by the working class movement through the united front, and to focus our main attention clearly on the crimes of the Stalinists. In fact, this action by the IMG was singled out for praise at the time as a model, and the SWP participated in demonstrations with third-campers and others in support of the Czech workers in 1968. The big difference between then and now is that we have more opportunities for such efforts today.

The exposure of the misleading use of quotations brings the case built up by comrades Clark, Novack, and Seigle toppling down like a house of cards. They also spend pages quoting from Cannon’s pamphlet “American Stalinism and Anti-Stalinism,” which I have already discussed. The fact is that there has been a big change from the SWP’s attitude toward the proletarian-revolutionary, anti-Stalinist movement in the bureaucratized workers’ states from 1968 to today. But that change is being proposed by the PC, and not by our tendency or by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

The Roots of the Problem

We must ask the questions, Why have comrades altered this approach now? Why the sudden emphasis on defending the workers’ state and on imperialism when discussing the political revolution? Why the squeamishness about get ting involved in a real support campaign for the anti-Stalinist struggle?

The answer has to do with another change since 1968 — the change in the SWP majority’s attitude toward Cuba and Castroism. On the one hand, the positions we now emphasize — defense of the workers’ state, and the imperialist war drive—are compatible with the Castroists’ international outlook. On the other hand, our position in support of the political revolution against Stalinism — which we emphasized in 1968 and before — is probably our biggest single programmatic difference with Castroism.

The leadership of the SWP has not, of course, adopted Castro’s completely incorrect position on Poland. But it has begun to adapt to it in an unacceptable way. Some of our articles, including particularly our factual coverage of what is happening in Poland itself, have been good. But the overall balance and tone of the articles we print clearly reveal this adaptation. It should also be noted that our press, which is so concerned with the betrayals of the Social Democrats, is totally mum on the betrayals of the American CP, again in stark contrast with our approach in 1968.

To demonstrate this question of balance and tone, I would like to take the time to compare two articles, one from 1968 and one from today, which were written on a similar theme — the attitude of Fidel Castro to the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The one from today is David Frankel’s article in the February 22, 1982, issue of Intercontinental Press. The one from 1968 appeared in the Militant of September 6 and was by Harry Ring. Our caucus asked that this article be reprinted, and it is in your packet of materials for the plenum.

To the superficial reader, it may appear that both of these articles make the same general points. In reality, though, they are quite different. Frankel sets his basic framework in the second paragraph: “Does the crackdown by the Polish regime strengthen the defense of the workers’ state against imperialism, or does it weaken it still further?”

And further on: “Within this framework, the question that has to be addressed is whether the actions of the Polish government have advanced or hindered the defense of the Polish workers’ state.”

Ring’s article, on the other hand, focuses on the right of self-determination and the struggle of the masses against the Stalinist regime, “seeking to get the Moscow and Prague bureaucrats off their backs....” The defense of the workers’ state against imperialism is not even mentioned, except perhaps where Ring explains that there is no substance whatsoever to Castro’s charges of an imperialist threat.

The Ring article clearly brands the Stalinist caste for what it is: “counterrevolutionary,” a word that appears twice. He explains that “It has persistently sought accommodation with imperialism at the expense of the revolutionary forces in the world.” The sharpest characterization of Stalinism that Frankel can muster (he never uses the term “Stalinism” by the way) is a “parasitic petty-bourgeois layer [which] plays no role in production... [and whose] privileged position is incompatible with workers’ democracy....”

These differences in tone and emphasis between 1968 and today reflect something quite profound. In 1968 Harry Ring wrote his article as a Trotskyist and analyzed Castro’s incorrect line from that perspective. Today, Frankel is instead attempting to explain our point of view in a way which is consistent with a Castroist framework. His entire effort has the character of an attempt to clear up some monstrous factual misunderstanding which must account for Castro’s incorrect position. Indeed, the Cuban line on Poland is quite incomprehensible if everything Frankel has to say in the last section of his article about their understanding of the bureaucracy is true.

But this is obviously a false perspective. Castro’s wrong view of Stalinism and his counterrevolutionary position on the political revolution are not due to simple factual misunderstandings or tactical errors. They are of a basic, programmatic character, and stem from the inaccurate and incomplete theoretical base of Castroism. Our differences with the Castroists on this are of long standing, and have, if anything, become deeper since Czechoslovakia. If ever there was any question on which we must stand firmly and resolutely on the historical program of our movement, and counterpose it — even if in a comradely way — to the Castroist program, it is exactly on this question of Stalinism and the political revolution.

A significant contrast on this score can also be seen if comrades compare Frankel’s article with Joseph Hansen’s analysis in 1968 of Castro’s position after Czechoslovakia. Frankel doesn’t even consider it necessary to mention the concept of the political revolution. Hansen’s approach, while maintaining the most comradely tone throughout, succeeds in pointing to where Castro’s theoretical framework is faulty. He counterposes a Trotskyist analysis to it.

The changes in tone and emphasis contained in this article by Frankel, along with the rest of our coverage of events in Poland, our attitude toward the solidarity with Solidarity movement, the general tendency to soften our characterizations of Stalinism, and the artificial elevation of defense of the workers’ state and opposition to imperialism as the touchstones of our work in defense of the political revolution, all clearly illustrate how far our party leadership has begun to move away from a clear, consistent Trotskyist position on this question. This should be a warning sign for us. The drift toward a Castroist approach must be reversed. Comrades who want to reaffirm the traditional program of the Fourth International on this key question should join with us in voting for the general line of the United Secretariat resolution, “Political Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland.”

Summary

I was particularly struck by one aspect of this discussion. Although in his report this morning Larry Seigle told us that the question at issue here is the continuity of our line for forty-five years in defense of the workers’ states and in defense of the political revolution, not a single comrade in this discussion tried to defend the current position of the Socialist Workers Party as representing that continuity of line. I demonstrated in my report that the line being presented by the PC today is a change from our past position. And I suggest that however we vote on these motions and the USec resolution, everyone should go back and look at the Militant from 1968, and from 1956 and 1953, and see how we covered similar developments in the past. If there is going to be a change in line we should consider it, we can discuss it, but it shouldn’t be smuggled in as a defense of continuity.

Jack [Barnes] and Betsey [Stone] and other comrades raised the question of whether we are in favor of participating in demonstrations with labor lieutenants of capital in France. This is a fantastic approach; particularly after we have heard the reports of the European comrades on this action here at the plenum and read various accounts of it. This was not a demonstration of the French labor lieutenants of capital. It was a demonstration of the French working class. That’s the perspective from which we have to look at it. Does the presence of trade union bureaucrats on such a demonstration really mean that we should exclude ourselves from it and voluntarily cut ourselves off from the hundreds of thousands of French workers who were propelled into action in solidarity with Solidarity? This would be the height of sectarianism.

Voting on our motion* or our report will not decide any specific tactical questions for the United States. This is the wrong way to think about this report. It wasn’t intended as a specific report on tactics. What we need first of all is a correct strategic understanding in which to take up the tactical questions. That is what we have tried to present. Once we’re agreed on that, we can take up the tactical problems.

We should take advantage of any openings that exist in this country. Though it would certainly be wrong to exaggerate what is possible on this, I simply tried to point out a few possibilities in order to explain that it’s also wrong to say that there is nothing we can do. There are some openings, and we should take advantage of them. What we are proposing is simply that we test and probe, undertake some initiatives, try to influence the initiatives of others, and see what activities we can carry out or participate in.

The big test of the SWP leadership’s line, in our opinion, is not simply its tactical application in the United States. The big test is as a line for our entire world movement, particularly in Europe. Here it clearly fails. We are not interested in the social democratic leadership, in Mitterrand, or any other misleaders of our class. Just as we are interested in the rank and file of the union movement in this country, we are likewise interested in the rank and file of the social democracy and the Stalinist-led workers’ organizations in Europe. These are mass organizations. We have to address ourselves to those workers. That’s what our comrades did in France, and that’s what we’ve done in Europe as a whole through the movement of solidarity with Solidarity. In my opinion there are some openings to do that in this country through the same movement. We have to try to find them.

What does it mean to say that we subordinate the overthrow of the bureaucracy to defense of the workers’ state and we subordinate defense of the workers’ state to the world revolution? We can certainly all agree with that statement. It’s a very important one. But I feel compelled to ask: what is its relevance to this discussion? We subordinate one thing to another when there’s a contradiction between the two of them. When Trotsky was writing In Defense of Marxism, there was a real and impending danger of the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the imperialist powers. We subordinate the overthrow of the bureaucracy in that case to the defense of the workers’ state. We are not in favor of the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the right wing, by the imperialists. But can anyone seriously assert that this is what is at stake in Poland today? No, we are 100 percent in favor of the overthrow of the bureaucracy by Solidarity, by the Polish workers, by the Russian workers. There is no contradiction today in Poland between the defense of the workers’ state and the defense of the Solidarity movement. They are one and the same thing. To talk about subordinating one to the other in this case only obscures the issue.

There’s been a lot of confusion in this discussion about the question of an anti-Stalinist united front, which is not what we are proposing. As Frank Lovell explained in his comments, what we are talking about is a pro-Solidarity united front, a united front to support a specific action against Stalinism, a specific mass movement against Stalinism, and not a broad programmatic front which would have to be compatible with the anticommunist program of the Social Democracy, third-campers, and others. So this is a false discussion.

Andy Rose and a number of other comrades raised the idea that the decisive aid to the Polish political revolution is extending the world revolution and fighting against U.S. imperialism. That’s certainly true. This is a general historical conception that we’ve always had. But it seems to me an elementary point that there is no contradiction between fighting for the American socialist revolution and giving support to the Solidarity movement in Poland. I do not understand why comrade after comrade got up and counterposed these things. Nor can we counterpose supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland to the liberation struggles in Central America. There is no contradiction here either. They are part and parcel of the same thing. We have to do both. By explaining and actively undertaking our support to the Polish workers, we are fighting for the American working class to take power in this country; we are deepening the consciousness and understanding of the American working class, just as we are doing when we fight in solidarity with the struggles in Central America.

Now, comrades who defend the current line have made a big thing about Susan Sontag’s speech. And it was obviously a very important speech. But it is wrong for us to pick that out as the central focus of that particular meeting. I think that’s borne out by a balanced look at it. And I doubt very much, by the way, whether either Brodsky or Sontag will be invited back by that group when they have another meeting. Sontag was explicitly answered (and not supported, as the Militant asserted) by Ralph Schoenman, who was chairing the meeting. Speaker after speaker at Town Hall that night gave anti-imperialist, prosocialist remarks, both before and after Sontag spoke. Paul Robeson, Jr., presented a virtual Trotskyist analysis calling for political revolution in Poland and received a prolonged ovation, the biggest one of the night. This was the real overall character of that event and it shows that Sontag’s speech, although it represents a certain layer of intellectuals, is not typical of intellectuals as a whole, that there are other factors which are pushing to the left. In my opinion that was the most important thing for us at that meeting. A not insignificant milieu of intellectuals was moving to the left under the influence of Solidarity and its struggle in Poland.

To sum up, since my time is almost gone: voting for our proposals will focus us on what our basic tasks are in this country and the world in defense of Polish Solidarity and the political revolution against Stalinism.

*Motion: The plenum rejects the line of the letter of Larry Seigle to Kathy Wheeler of the Iron Range branch, attached to the minutes by the PC on Jan. 29,1982.


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